Showing papers on "Military intelligence published in 1998"

CoRAVEN: modeling and design of a multimedia intelligent infrastructure for collaborative intelligence analysis

Abstract: Intelligence analysis is one of the major functions performed by an Army staff in battlefield management. In particular, intelligence analysts develop intelligence requirements based on the commander's information requirements, develop a collection plan, and then monitor messages from the battlefield with respect to the commander's information requirements. The goal of the CoRAVEN project is to develop an intelligent collaborative multimedia system to support intelligence analysts. Key ingredients of our design approach include: (1) significant knowledge engineering activities with domain experts, (2) representation of an explicit model of reasoning and activity to drive design, (3) the use of Bayesian belief networks as a way to structure inferences that relate observable data to the commander's information requirements, (4) collaborative graphical user interfaces to provide flexible support for the multiple tasks in which analysts are engaged, (5) sonification of data streams and alarms to support enhanced situation awareness, (6) detailed psychological studies of reasoning and judgment under uncertainty, and (7) iterative prototyping of candidate designs with domain experts for both formative and summative evaluation. The paper discusses our current progress on all these fronts.

The Tao Of Spycraft: Intelligence Theory And Practice In Traditional China

Abstract: Early History * Early Records and the First Spies * The Spring and Autumn Period * The Warring States Period Spycraft * Fundamental Thrust * Nature and Theory of Agents * Operations and Control * Secrecy and Countermeasures Covert Activities * Systematic Programs and Psychological Warfare * Assassination and Other Techniques Theories Of Evaluating And Intelligence * Basic Theory and Issues * Knowing Men * Character, Archetypes, and Typology * Intelligence Applications * Political Intelligence Military Intelligence * Field Intelligence * Classifications of Terrain Prognostication, Divination, And Nonhuman Factors * Historical Practices and Their Rejection

Intelligent Fusion and Asset Management Processor

Abstract: Owing to continual advances in sensor capabilities, avionics, and inter-service C/sup 4/I, the volume of battlefield intelligence data to which the modern-day military intelligence analyst has access is increasing at an exponential rate. This has created the need for more intelligent systems capable of scanning and extracting the tactically most useful information for presentation to the human analyst. The presence of a more extensive and flexible sensor asset infrastructure also mandates more intelligent and accountable asset deployment and management. Accordingly, we describe an effort to develop for the Air Force Research Laboratory's Information Directorate an Intelligent Fusion and Asset Management Processor (IFAMP) for enhancing tactical situation awareness and for providing needs-based sensor asset planning and scheduling information to assist the C/sup 2/ staff. The IFAMP architecture incorporates three distinct modules: a fuzzy logic-based level one fusion module responsible for low-level event detection, unit/echelon type discrimination, observation-to-track gating and assignment, and track database management; a belief network-based level two situation assessment module responsible for generating probabilistic hypotheses for high-level situational state descriptors; and a fuzzy logic-based level four collection management expert system responsible for mapping informational requirements and current state information into asset resource requests.

The "Small Change" of Soldiering? Peace Operations as Preparation for Future Wars

Abstract: : This paper examines the effects of peace operations on the warfighting capability of U.S. Army combat forces. It focuses upon operations in the Sinai, Somalia, Haiti, Macedonia, and Bosnia, and relies upon survey data, unit status reports, interviews, historical accounts, after action reports, and other sources. If properly exploited, peace operations can provide valuable preparation for future wars. Such operations exercise a broad set of capabilities--particularly in the areas of command and control, planning, logistics, deployment, intelligence, and small unit tasks--that are essential to effectiveness across the range of military operations. Their strongest potential contribution to readiness lies in the cultivation of human factors, such as self-discipline, initiative, decision-making ability, leadership skills, unit cohesion, and endurance. Moreover, their contribution to endurance appears to be duplicated by no other form of peacetime training. A view nevertheless persists that peace operations detract from the Army's primary mission. This view is rooted in a paradigm of readiness that assumed its present form during General William E. DePuy's tenure at U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The paper assesses the strengths and weaknesses of this paradigm and suggests an alternative that better accounts for human and other factors integral to readiness.

Police intelligence processes: A study of criminal intelligence units in Canada

Abstract: A model of an intelligence ‘system’ is used to develop an exploratory map of specialist criminal intelligence units at municipal, provincial and federal levels in Canada. This involves part‐competing and part‐complementary structures, especially as represented by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police on the one hand and the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada on the other. Processes of targeting and priority‐setting are considered, including especially the role of ethnicity in identifying criminal organisations. Particular attention is given to the sharing of information between units and the fact that informal contacts between them frequently transcend formal agreements. There is discussion of the competing demands of ‘strategic’ and ‘tactical’ intelligence and the relationship of intelligence to police action. The interaction of processes of power and information within the partially fragmented structure of policing in Canada all mean that police intelligence processes will remain pre‐eminently examples of...

Satellite Reconnaissance of the Future

Abstract: : The intelligence community is responding to a Presidential tasking that calls for more direct support of military operations. It is also adjusting to concepts presented in Joint Vision 2010 that are based on the assumption that commanders will enjoy information superiority--an ability to see and hear virtually everything of importance--to control the course and outcome of any military operation. However, developing such a capability could take a decade or longer. There may not be a consensus on the import of JV 2010 for intelligence requirements that deal with targeting, damage assessment, and simultaneous operations until 2005. This would pose a serious dilemma. In 2005 it will be too late to change reconnaissance satellites in orbit to meet these requirements, and it will take several more years to develop and launch new satellite systems. Moreover, other nations will have increasing access to satellite derived intelligence to support their operations while America's ability to use space to freely collect intelligence may be challenged. Space is rapidly becoming commercialized. U.S. success during Desert Storm can largely be ascribed to superior information from its spaceborne intelligence system. Changes in the highly competitive field of space reflect this progress. Three American firms plan to launch commercial imagery systems before 2000, and at least ten nations will have imagery systems with resolution to one meter or less by 2010. That information will likely be available in the marketplace.

Decision support for reconnaissance using intelligent software agents

Abstract: : Research in reconnaissance traditionally focuses on data detection and discrimination methods. Less emphasis is placed on transforming the collected data into useful information and presenting it to key command and control nodes. Information not presented in a timely manner is excluded from the decision process. This thesis proposes a conceptual model of intelligent software agents to support the human decision process and reconnaissance- related tasks. The Mobile Agent Reconnaissance Kit (MARK) suggests a hierarchy of software agents to facilitate data integration and coordination in a network-centric multisensor environment. The model uses static and mobile agents to collect data from dispersed, heterogeneous data sources, process and fuse the data, and present the resultant information to the user in an HTML file. The authors explore applications of MARK in terms of the military Intelligence Cycle, the Joint Director of Laboratories (JDL) Technical Panel for C3I Data Fusion Model, and the Joint Operations Planning and Evaluation System (JOPES) Crisis Action Planning.

Uneasy alliances: French military intelligence and the American army during the first world war

Abstract: (1998). Uneasy alliances: French military intelligence and the American army during the first world war. Intelligence and National Security: Vol. 13, Knowing Your Friends Intelligence Inside Alliances and Coalitions From 1914 to the Cold War, pp. 18-36.

Futures Intelligence: Assessing Intelligence Support to Three Army Long-Range Planning Communities

Abstract: : This report highlights the principal lines of investigation and findings of a project entitled "Intelligence Support to Long-Range Planning," undertaken for the U.S. Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence. The project examined intelligence support to the three main groups of Army long-range planners. The research was conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND's Arroyo Center, a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army. It should interest those with responsibilities either in futures intelligence, acquisition, force development, or other forms of long-range planning. The report should also prove useful for those involved in the Army's future force initiatives, Force XXI and the Army After Next.

Where hath our intelligence been? The revolution in military affairs

Abstract: The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) has implications for the gathering, processing and exploiting of intelligence. However, its implications for military intelligence is unclear. In this article Michael Her‐man examines the possible ramifications of the RMA on military‐intelligence an asks whether RMA will simply increase its efficiency or whether it envisages some new institution to replace it; and what the nature of the ‘Red’ knowledge assumed in the RMA concept actually is. He argues that, although the orchestrating and fusing of technology's powerful collection sources needs some redrawing, we need to be clear about the kind of knowledge that results. Having information and understanding it are two separate things—information about the adversary's deployments is one thing but understanding their motivations is quite another. Textual intelligence gathering is just as important as observing and measuring objects and should, therefore, have a place in the RMA. It follows from this that there is a ne...

Burma's intelligence apparatus

Abstract: Since it regained its independence in 1948, Burma has developed a complex structure of intelligence and specialized security agencies. After General Ne Win's coup d'etat in 1962, and led by the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), this apparatus was completely dominated by the armed forces, which used it not only to gather combat‐related intelligence but also to stamp out any challenges to continuing military rule. So powerful did the MIS become that, at times, it was seen as a threat to the Ne Win regime, and purged of key personnel. After the creation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council in 1988, the resources devoted to Burma's intelligence agencies greatly increased. Under the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence, more attention was given to purely military intelligence, but there was also closer surveillance of both the armed forces and the civilian population. Since late 1997, this policy has continued under the State Peace and Development Council. Several intelligence failures in ...

Tracking the Axis Enemy: The Triumph of Anglo-American Naval Intelligence

Abstract: The 1942-43 naval campaign against German U-boats known as the Battle of the Atlantic was a major victory not only for Allied warships but also for naval intelligence. Thanks to the co-ordinated efforts of submarine tracking rooms in London, Washington and Ottawa, the antisubmarine forces' search-and-destroy missions helped preserve the safety of the seaways. Naval intelligence has been an aspect of World War II that has received scant attention. Now former naval intelligence officer Alan Harris Bath traces the co-ordination of Anglo-American efforts before and during the war, identifying the political, military, technological and human factors that aided and sometimes hindered co-operation. He compares the two nations' different and often conflicting styles of intelligence gathering and reveals ways in which interagency and interservice rivalries complicated an already complex process. Drawing on archives in the US, UK and British Commonwealth, Bath describes how co-operation took place at all levels of decision-making, in all theatres of war and at all points in the intelligence cycle, from gathering through analysis to dissemination. He tells how the US learned from Britain's longer experience in the war and how intelligence co-operation was always subordinated to Anglo-American political relations - and how in the final months of fighting intelligence co-operation was impeded by the governments' postwar agendas. Although victory in the Atlantic was the capstone of this co-operative endeavour, Bath also describes how intelligence relationships fared in the South Pacific, not only between the forces of Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur but also with those of Australia and New Zealand. Throughout the book, he emphasizes the contributions of Australian, New Zealand and Canadian naval intelligence to this co-operative effort. As an in-depth study of the nature, evolution and impact of information sharing by Allied navies, "Tracking the Axis Enemy" aims to be informative reading for historians and buffs alike. By showing how the Anglo-American political and cultural bonds shaped intelligence operations and how those operations shaped campaigns, it contributes a new perspective on the Allied victory.

Global Threats and Challenges: The Decades Ahead: A Statement for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 28 January 1998,

Abstract: : The testimony I provided before the Committee last February reflected the extensive analysis done by the Defense Intelligence Community in support of the Joint Strategy Review and the Quadrennial Defense Review. The conclusions drawn from that effort were based on our understanding of the most important trends and factors shaping the international security environment over the long term. Much of what I testified to last year remains valid. The "headline" events of the past year - confrontation with Iraq, developments in Bosnia, NATO expansion, unrest in Central Africa, the troubled Middle East peace process, rogue state efforts to acquire advanced weapons, and the economic crisis in Asia - reinforce the central themes from that testimony.

Strategic Intelligence for Tactical Operations: Intelligence Requirements for Force Projection Operations.

Abstract: : In the post-Cold War world, U.S. Armed Forces will conduct force projection operations more frequently to respond to crises. The military will place demanding requirements on the National Intelligence Community to provide intelligence to support contingency operations. Where do we need to focus for threats in the future? What are the Armed Forces' intelligence requirements to support force projection operations? This study argues that the National Intelligence Community must understand the information requirements of the Armed Forces and narrow their products to meet tactical commanders' needs when supporting crisis operations. It briefly discusses areas for future conflicts, highlights crisis and deployment operations, and provides a general statement of information requirements for these operations. It uses recent historical examples (such as Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and Operation DESERT SHIELD in Saudi Arabia) to support its conclusions.

British naval intelligence and bonaparte's egyptian expedition of 1798

Abstract: (1998). BRITISH NAVAL INTELLIGENCE AND BONAPARTE'S EGYPTIAN EXPEDITION OF 1798. The Mariner's Mirror: Vol. 84, No. 3, pp. 278-290.

Pull, Push or Shove: Global Broadcast Service and Intelligence Support to Maritime Forces

Abstract: : The Department of Defense developed the Global Broadcast Service (GBS) to increase the amount of national and theater level information provided to deployed forces, resolving some shortcomings in information dissemination identified during the Gulf War. Using direct broadcast satellite technology, GBS is expected to deliver information at rates exponentially faster than what is available now. The broadcast service makes possible the near-simultaneous transfer of critical information to multiple users. While GBS may speed the flow of information, it does nothing to improve the quality of intelligence. Given the large capacity of GBS, intelligence managers may be under unreasonable pressures to release information to fill available bandwidth. The result could be more raw information for commanders, and less finished intelligence. GBS has constraints and limitations inherent in its design. Not all users in a theater will have access to high-capacity bandwidth at the same time. Where the GBS broadcast beams are positioned will determine who gets what level of GBS bandwidth. Naval forces deploying into an area of operations could experience as many as five variations on broadcast support from the service. Theater CINCs will have to share GBS resources, and the system probably will not be able to support multiple crises in the same theater at the same time. The small antenna size of GBS receive suites allow the lowest-level tactical forces to receive intelligence support previously only available at the flag-level. Tactical forces will also have access to vastly greater amounts of data. Passive recipients of large broadcast products may experience information overload and other unintended negative consequences. To make the best use of the technology, under the proposed dissemination architecture intelligence planners must take the time actively manage the flow of information they receive. GBS offers new and unique dissemination capabilities.

Symptoms and Systems: Intelligence and Information for Future Urban OOTW

Abstract: : This paper posits that military operations other than war (OOTW) in an urban environment require information and intelligence from two complex but ultimately knowable systems. First is the city itself, which is made up of three interconnected subsystems, the physical environment, the people, and the infrastructure. The second system is the outside actors sent to accomplish a specific, possibly changing mission. The parts of that system include the groups of people; military and nonmilitary, the OOTW mission assigned, the information and intelligence to support, the mission, and the resources available to accomplish the mission. All of the parts of the outside actor system are there to change the city, in some way shaping it to their own ends. While this description may sound overly complicated, urban planners, historians, economists, sociologists, and military doctrine writers have already done a great deal of work on analyzing certain aspects of both systems. One of the paper's main points is the necessity to look beyond traditional military templates and the narrow focus of intelligence as traditionally defined in order to first understand the dynamics of the systems and then to exploit the information available to effect the mission.

UAVs: Holy Grail for Intel, Panacea for RSTA, or Much Ado about Nothing? UAVs for the Operational Commander

Abstract: : The Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) is a force multiplier for the operational commander. Characterized as either lethal or non-lethal and employed singularly or as a system of systems, they significantly enhance a combatant or joint force commander's ability to satisfy strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. UAVs have supported military operations including the Vietnam War, the 1983 Israeli War, the Gulf War and most recently the United Nations Peace Keeping Operation in Bosnia, to name a few. Although U.S. UAV acquisition programs have followed a very rocky road to date, slowing their evolution, their future is promising. Non-lethal UAVs are intended to operate as a system of systems to provide blanket coverage for the commander in conjunction with other manned and satellite systems. Non-lethal UAV missions include RSTA, intelligence, and BDA. Lethal UAVs are essentially smart bombs that can locate, identity and attack a target. If a suitable target is not identified, they can return to fight another day. Advantages to using UAVs over manned platforms are that they provide a low risk, highly efficient and effective, and low cost solution to fighting wars and MOOTW. This is especially important in today's world of decreasing resources and increasing responsibilities. Today, UAVs uniquely support the operational functions of Operational Art and are equally suited to supporting the operational concepts of Joint Vision 2010. Whether providing eyes on target, steel on target, or acting as a virtual communications satellite, UAVs provide the force commander with a low-risk high-payoff approach to warfighting. UAVs are a force multiplier for the operational commander.

The Role of the Plans, Operations and Medical Intelligence (POMI) Officer on the Component and Unified-level Staff

Abstract: : Unprecedented threats in global disease endemicity, frightening advancements in weapons technology, and the horrific specter of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) can and will have an enormous impact on the health and welfare of the American Military without proper intelligence and planning considerations. The plans, Operations and Medical Intelligence (POMI) Officer provides the theater-level commander with vital information on the health service support (HSS) requirements, based on theater medical intelligence estimates and an assessment of the potential public health impact on the conduct of operations, in that commander's area of responsibility (AOR). This paper will focus on the roles and functions of the Plans, Operations and Medical Intelligence Officer, and will assess the importance of this function on major theater staffs.

Seeking Every Advantage: The Impact of Military Media Relations on the Operational Commander

Abstract: : Technological advances have greatly improved reporting from the scene of battle and conflict, and therefore have radically increased the media's potential to influence and impact the outcome of future military operations The overriding issues of contention between the military and the media revolve around three critical factors: access, censorship, and timely reporting from the field Operational commanders' foremost concerns center on operational security, mission accomplishment and troop safety Their two disparate yet complementary objectives must be reconciled Military commanders control sanctioned access to the military area of operations; the situation is thus rife with potential for conflict between the two Various methods of information control have been employed through history Censorship, ground rules, denial of access and media pools (the most widely used) each has its pros and cons The unique attributes of military operations other than war have further complicated the issue for operational commanders Information provided by the mass media can be a force multiplier for the astute commander; he must adopt a proactive approach toward media relations in order to realize the media's potential for improving his chances for mission accomplishment His approach must include personal involvement, organizational reform and force-wide education and training as he seeks to balance the legitimate and worthy objectives of both the military operation and the media covering the story

A Theory For Human Intelligence Operations

Abstract: : The effectiveness of national military strategy or military campaigns are often evaluated in terms of intelligence success or failure. Examples of intelligence "failures" include the fall of the Shah of Iran in 1979, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, and terrorist attacks - most recently in Kenya and Tanzania in September 1998. A critical, analytic theory and principles of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations may permit a comparison between what constitutes success or failure of HUMINT operations; however, such a theory and principles are not openly available today in adequate detail. The goal of this project is to better understand how to plan and execute intelligence operations. This study proposes a theory of HUMINT operations that helps explain why and how intelligence operations are successful. This project will show that through the use of certain principles of intelligence operations, HUMINT operators can reduce what Carl Von Clausewitz called the fog of war.

More Than Combating Terrorism: The Force Security Concept And The Role Of Intelligence

Abstract: : Significant enhancements to DOD force protection programs have occurred since the Khobar Towers terrorist bombing, but serious shortfalls remain. Differing definitions of force protection and the scope of the threat have caused confusion and have hampered the development of intelligence support efforts. DOD force protection programs are too narrowly defined, and intelligence support is fragmented and uneven. Current efforts focus on the terrorist threat, and most programs have overlooked other significant risks. DOD personnel and facilities face an increasingly complex threat environment. While terrorism represents the most serious threat, it is not the only risk. Civil wars, insurgencies, and riots pose additional hazards. Hostile intelligence activities, crime, disease, environmental hazards, and war debris also threaten DOD personnel and facilities. These risks are part of a total "force security" threat that includes hazards, other than force-on-force actions.

Strategic Restructuring of the U.S. Intelligence Community: A Civilian Intelligence Reserve

Abstract: : The end of the Cold War led to significant reductions in national security spending and corresponding reductions in the Intelligence Community's (IC) workforce. The IC faces an increasing range of issues of interest to policy makers and remains responsible for covering both traditionally hostile states and new, transnational issues. The new challenges require skills not needed during the Cold War, and the current IC workforce lacks the specialized knowledge to fully cover the emerging transnational and global issues. Continuing budget restrictions prevent the IC from recruiting necessary specialists as full-time staff officers. This study argues that by developing a multi tiered Civilian Intelligence Reserve, the IC can gain access to collection and analytical expertise not found in the IC now.

Joint Vision 2010: Information Superiority and Its Effect on the Command and Control Process

Abstract: : With the impiementation of Joint Vision 2010, information superiority will impact every aspect of operational art, but none will be so great as the impact on operational command and control. Through information superiority, the operational commander theoretically gains a clearer picture of the battlespace, thus mitigating the fog of war. This study examines some of the potential command and control issues facing the operational commander as he attempts to conduct Major Operations and Campaigns. Given the diverse threat, it is doubtful that U.S. forces can gain and maintain information superiority over our enemies. The need for information superiority will hamper our ability to operate in a combined environment. Information superiority may lead to operational command and control that is too rigid and too centralized to maintain friendly freedom of action. Operational commanders may become transfixed by increasing levels of information focusing on data instead of the application of forces in space and time. In the end, information superiority will provide a clearer picture of the battlespace but it will not mitigate the fog of war.

The Information Operations Coordination Cell-Necessary for Division Offensive Actions

Abstract: : This monograph analyzes the need for a division Information Operations (IO) Coordination Cell during offensive military actions. The integrated concept team draft of FM 100-6, Information Operations: Tactics Techniques and Procedures, includes a division Information Operations Coordination Cell. The cell is responsible for integrating the components of Information Superiority (IS) to defeat the enemy's command, control, computers, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) while protecting friendly C4ISR. Their focus is the Information Operations segment of IS that includes operational security (OPSEC), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, electronic warfare (EW), physical destruction, computer network attack (CNA), public affairs (PA), and civil affairs (CA). The monograph restricts the topic to Offensive IO, or IO that attacks the enemy commander's ability to achieve his objectives. Also, the monograph limits the type of military action to offensive. The current draft of FM 100-5, Operations, dated June 1998 divides operations into four types of military actions: offense, defense, stability and support. The monograph focuses on offensive actions, the primary action within offensive operations, because that is what the Army is designed for; fighting and winning wars. The monograph analyzes the IO tasks using three supporting research processes. First, it determines that only five of the tasks are necessary for Offensive IO: PSYOP, military deception, EW, physical destruction, and CA. The monograph then analyzes current doctrine and the heavy division Army of Excellence Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) to determine the division's capabilities to execute the Offensive 10 tasks. Finally, the monograph uses these capabilities and doctrine to determine if the current division staff has the necessary staff mechanisms to conduct the Offensive IO tasks.

Advanced Intelligence Information System Hyper Toolkit

Abstract: : In this rapidly changing world, intelligence analysts analyze the latest information on foreign systems and trends and produce assessments of the present and anticipated future capabilities of particular countries. For these assessments to be of maximum utility to operational planners and national decision makers, it is necessary to: (1) reduce the time it takes to produce and disseminate intelligence products and information, and; (2) provide better and more effective ways of packaging and presenting the information to facilitate its access and understanding. To help address these problems, this effort focused on the development of the Hyper ToolKit to provide efficient means for creating and maintaining electronic linked multimedia documents and information spaces, particularly in World Wide Web (WWW) formats (e.g., HTML), to provide fast dissemination and online viewing by the intelligence community via electronic means such as Intelink and other networks, dial-up facilities, CDROM, etc. The Hyper ToolKit includes popular off the shelf word processing and media editing tools to enable users to work with familiar tools; support for information organization; and automation of lower level publishing operations via rule based processes for automated hyperlink insertion, linked wallet sized image generation and insertion, format conversion, special character handling, table of contents generation, header and footer generation, etc. The Hyper ToolKit has been developed under contract to Rome Laboratory for intelligence analysts at the National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC), at WPAFB OH.

Organizing National Level Imagery and Mapping

Abstract: : One category of battlespace information particularly relevant to operational commanders is the physical environment. Imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information (mapping, charting, and geodesy) portray that environment and are thus important bands along the battlespace information spectrum. They enable commanders to place myriad battlespace data into a framework based on time and location. Fusing all data sources in this manner allows for the development of an awareness of the battlespace so that decisions can be made faster than an enemy can act -- the core concept of knowledge-based warfare. Accordingly, intelligence and information are the basis of dominant battlespace awareness. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) was established by Congress in 1996 to furnish imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information in support of national security objectives. It is the combat support/intelligence community agency charged with merging imagery and mapping from separate intelligence and defense organizations. NIMA has broad authority over the U.S. imagery and geospatial information system (USIGS) and the production/dissemination of imagery, intelligence, and geospatial information that permit commanders on all levels to acquire access to common references and information. One challenge facing NIMA is to construct imagery and geospatial data bases with a global framework on which to build a common view of the battlespace. Within the information domain, NIMA is one step toward achieving the information superiority envisioned in Joint Vision 2010. This article examines the impact of NIMA on military operations with emphasis on the synergy of merging imagery and geospatial databases. (4 figures, 4 photographs)

Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence in the Mayaguez Incident: Who's on First?

Abstract: : On 15 May 1975, U.S. military forces successfully recaptured the U.S. container ship Mayaguez and her crew from Cambodian Khmer Route forces. Considered a strategic success, the effort was hampered by numerous flaws at the operational level. Because of the strategic implications of hostage rescue missions, it is imperative that the application of operational art be done in the most thorough manner possible. This paper will examine some of the failures of the Mayaguez incident at the operational level with specific focus on the operational functions of command control, communications and intelligence. Lessons learned will be determined and checked for applicability today in the hope of preventing the shortfalls identified in Mayaguez from occurring in the future.