Showing papers on "Sovereignty published in 1982"

The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry

Abstract: To the benefit of all of us, Paul Starr has published an updated version of Social Transformation of American Medicine. Nearly everyone in health policy, health politics, or health law who has taken undergraduate or graduate study in the subject—to say nothing of the study of professions, the history of science, the sociology and history of medicine, and the political economy of health—will be familiar with this magisterial 1982 volume. Reading the updated edition gives students and scholars alike a chance to reengage with Starr’s centuries-spanning narrative of the rise of the American medical profession to combined social, economic, and political dominance over the sphere of American health care. To the classic material, Starr appends a new epilogue surveying the last 35 years in light of what came before it. Revisiting the text in the twenty-first century provides an opportunity to examine Starr’s history in light of subsequent academic developments, as well as the intervening years. Starr’s second chapter, “Medicine in a Democratic Culture, 1760–1850,” reads as ever more perceptive in light of four decades of historical, sociological, and political science inquiry that connect the American Revolution more tightly to democratizing patterns in antebellum America. These years saw the undermining of ecclesiastical authority (Hatch 1989), of patriarchal household dominance (Cott 1977; Salmon 1986), of slaveholding magisterium (Sinha 2016), and of landed rentier economies (Huston 2000; McCurdy 2006). It saw the democratization of American political life (Wilentz 2005) and even the democratization of capital through free banking (Lamoreaux 1997; Moss and Brennan 2001). Starr’s description of democratic culture during the “long Revolution” provides a necessary basis for the later liberation of professional expertise. The rise in meritocratic professional authority required first, in some sense, the rupture of earlier barriers that hindered scientific advance. The power accumulated by the medical profession in the late nineteenth century replaced another form of dominance, weakened by cultural democratization. Rereading Starr’s chapters on “The Consolidation of Authority, 1850– 1930” and “The Escape from the Corporation, 1900–1930” reminds us of other work written since that sketches the role of professional and state

Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism

Abstract: Canadians have relatively few binding national myths, but one of the most pervasive and enduring is the conviction that the country is doomed. In 1965 George Grant passionately defended Canadian identity by asking fundamental questions about the meaning and future of Canada's political existence. In Lament for a Nation he argued that Canada - immense and under-populated, defined by a shared border, history, and culture with the United States, and torn by conflicting loyalties to Britain, Quebec, and America - had ceased to exist as a sovereign state. Nonetheless, Lament for a Nation became the seminal work in Canadian political thought and Grant became known as the father of Canadian nationalism. The fortieth anniversary edition introduces Lament for a Nation to a new generation. A major introduction by Andrew Potter explores Grant's arguments in the context of changes in ethnic diversity, free trade, globalization and post-modernism. Potter discusses the shifting uses of the terms "liberal" and "conservative" and closes with a look at the current state of Canadian nationalism. George Grant's Lament for a Nation remains essential reading for anyone interested in questions of Canadian identity, sovereignty, and national unity.

History of the Public/Private Distinction

Abstract: The distinction between public and private realms arose out of a double movement in modern political and legal thought. On the one hand, with the emergence of the nation-state and theories of sovereignty in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, ideas of a distinctly public realm began to crystallize.' On the other hand, in reaction to the claims of monarchs and, later, parliaments to the unrestrained power to make law, there developed a countervailing effort to stake out distinctively private spheres free from the enicroaching power of the state.2 Natural rights theories were elaborated in the seventeenth century for the purpose of setting limits on state power, both over property and religious conscience. Rights theories were therefore not only efforts to incorporate into law what one writer has called a philosophy of "possessive individualism," 3 but also to provide an important basis for arguing for religious toleration. One can trace the emergence of a distinctively public realm in various legal doctrines. By the late medieval period, for example, English law had already begun to draw a distinction between two different roles of the monarch as landowner. First were the lands the King held as feudal lord. These he could alienate as private property. But, increasingly, English law defined a second category of crown lands-in essence, public lands-which he could not alienate. Here we see an example of the gradual emergence of a distinctively public realm, which in the field of crown ownership of land finally crystallized in seventeenth century struggles over the King's power to alienate land between high and low watermark.' Taxation provides a fascinating example of the emergence of the public/private distinction. As late as the sixteenth century, English judges still analyzed taxation, not as an exaction by the

International Economic Integration

Abstract: International economic integration is one aspect of ‘international economics’ that has been growing in importance in the past four decades or so. It is concerned with the discriminatory removal of all trade impediments between the participating nations and with the establishment of certain elements of cooperation and coordination between them. The latter depends entirely on the actual form that integration takes. Different forms of international integration can be envisaged, and some have actually been implemented: 1. Free trade areas, where the member nations remove all trade impediments among themselves but retain their freedom with regard to the determination of their policies vis-a-vis the outside world (the non-participants): e.g., EFTA and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA). 2. Customs unions, which are very similar to free trade areas except that member nations must conduct and pursue common external commercial relations; for instance, they must adopt common external tariffs (CETs) on imports from the non-participants, as is the case in the EU; the EU in this particular sense is a customs union, but it is much more than that. 3. Common markets, which are customs unions that also allow for free factor mobility across national member frontiers; i.e. capital, labour and enterprise should move unhindered between the participating countries, as in the example of the East African Community (EAG) and the EU (but again it is far more complex). 4. Complete economic unions, which are common markets that ask for complete unification of monetary and fiscal policies; i.e., a central authority is introduced to exercise control over these matters so that existing member nations effectively become regions of one nation. 5. Complete political integration, where the participants become literally one nation: i.e., the central authority needed in point 4 not only controls monetary and fiscal policies but is also responsible to a central Parliament with the sovereignty of a nation’s government. An example of this is the recent unification of the two Germanies.

Patterns of Social Conflict: State, Class, and Ethnicity

Abstract: In the somber mood evoked by reflections on the prospects for mankind worldwide in this decade, it is difficult to recapture the sense of exhilaration that attended African liberation at its high-water mark in 1960, when no fewer than sixteen states achieved independence. The crumbling of colonialism seemed but prologue to other triumphs. A young and vigorous leadership would capture the resources once diverted by the colonizers, and direct them into the swift construction of prosperous national economies. The sense of common purpose that nationalism had frequently crystallized would be translatable into the sphere of economic development. In this springtime of hope, the harvest of plenty was within reach. Probably no other geographic region experienced such a conjuncture of optimism and newly won sovereignty. Confusion and disorder had attended the birth of new states in Latin America. Independence in Asia was punctuated with such upheavals as the partition of India and the bitter colonial wars in Indonesia and Indochina. Progress appeared at the time a veritable birthright of humanity, as a prolonged era of economic expansion in most parts of the world fostered the conviction among many that the policy instruments and political wisdom for its indefinite continuation were at hand.1

The Dream of Nation: A Social and Intellectual History of Quebec

Abstract: Essential reading for an understanding of contemporary Quebec, The Dream of Nation traces the changing nature of various "dreams of nation," from the imperial dream of New France to the separatist dream of the 1980 referendum. Susan Mann demonstrates that these dreams, fashioned by elites in response to the recurring question of how to be French in North America, proposed an ever-elusive unanimity. She discusses how social, economic, and political pressures, as well as changing populations, invariably thwarted one dream and provided the makings of another. A work of pioneering scholarship and remarkable synthesis, The Dream of Nation weaves together two of the dominant ideologies of the twentieth century: nationalism and feminism. A new preface contextualizes the 1982 edition and outlines the different contours of Quebec's latest thoughts on sovereignty.

Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights Practices

Abstract: In the United States, with its government of separated powers and functions, it is the executive branch, and in particular the Department of State, that bears responsibility for implementing legislation on foreign relations. The success of implementation will depend on political decisions, involving competing national interests, as well as on institutional and personal considerations of the officials concerned. Inevitably, there is a gap between legislation and execution, especially when the Executive is not wholly sympathetic to the law. The gap may even devour legislated policies as the Executive refuses "to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"2 and bureaucratic and personal considerations distort judgments, exploit the generality and uncertainty of language, and lead to abuse of discretion. A notable instance of this problem has been executive implementation of legislation on international human rights. The international law of human rights imposes obligations on governments in the exercise of their domestic sovereignty. Under the Universal Declaration, the United Nations Covenants, the European and Inter-American Conventions, and the Helsinki accords, states have defined and agreed to respect certain basic freedoms of persons within their jurisdiction.3 These obligations suggest a corresponding duty of one government not to support another engaged in serious violations of internationally recognized human rights. In the world of states,

Dual Authority Polities

Abstract: In other words, unlike cohesive nation-states,2 polities deeply divided along ethnonational religious or linguistic lines are characterized by noncongruent societal and political boundaries that reflect a conflict between two principles of "national" affiliation-'"national" in the sense of "nationality" and "national" in the sense of "nationalism."' The territorial boundaries of state borders and the criteria for citizenship distinguish clearly between those who belong to a polity and those who do not. In contrast, communal affiliation is at least in part voluntary and permits different degrees of relationship to the system, any degree of which may be adopted as a criterion for membership in the community. The duality of national identity and authority structure and the noncongruent boundaries of state and community relate to the basic conceptual problems of political science and political sociology.' In the context of dual authority and inconsistent collective identity, notions such as "the political system," "sovereignty," and "political legitimation" in their conventional meaning lose much of the explanatory power,5 while issues such as the degree of autonomy of politics acquire a new significance.6 Hence an attempt at a new conceptualization may serve as a promising departure point both for an analysis oriented toward theory building and for formulation of empirically testable hypotheses. In this paper a conceptual framework is proposed that, while applicable to a broad spectrum of phenomena, appears to be particularly useful for the study of politics in the context of dual authority structures in

The pasts of a Pālaiyakārar : the ethnohistory of a south Indian little king

Abstract: This paper examines a text which is the family history of a line of south Indian "little kings," or pālaiyakārars. Beginning with a discussion of different modes of history, I analyze this text as both a statement of a particular history and a cultural representation of a more general modality of history. As a particular history, this text enables me to talk about conceptions of royal appropriateness and sovereignty, of political relations, and of kingly privileges; as a cultural form the text provides clues about the relations of these cultural conceptions to a structural form of narrative emplotment with all its underlying assumptions about time, causation, and process. Finally, I consider how a hermeneutical exercise of this sort is very important for Western analysts who wish to reconstruct the "history" of south Indian politics.

United States Jurisdiction over Extraterritorial Crime

Abstract: ion of sovereignty or the institutions or functions of government would be an appro1982] 1137 1138 CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY [Vol. 73 tors of actual and inchoate offenses which damage or threaten to damage state security, sovereignty, treasury, or governmental function. It is the only accepted theory which allows jurisdiction over conduct which threatens potential danger to the above-mentioned abstractions or functions. Because of the significant dangers the protective principle poses to relations among nations, application of the theory is limited to those recognized and stated abstractions or functions. 73 With very few exceptions, national penal codes throughout the world recognize this principle and its limitations. 74 priate trigger for the protective principle. Of course, it is very difficult to determine whether or not such damage has actually occurred. Thus, potential damage or danger is sufficient. See, RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, §§ 402-03, which refines § 33 of the old Restatement but retains the traditional bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction. This refinement will be discussed in detail infra in text accompanying notes 147-77. With regard to the protective principle, Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 440, describes the traditional theory: 7. A state has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its territory by an alien against the security, territorial integrity or political independence of that state, provided that the act or omission which constitutes the crime was not committed in exercise of a liberty guaranteed the alien by the law of the place where it was committed. 8. A state has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed outside its territory by an alien which consists of falsification or counterfeiting, or an uttering of falsified copies or counterfeits, of the seals, currency, instrument or credit, stamps, passports, or public documents, issued by the state or under its authority. The RESTATEMENT DRAFT, supra note 1, § 402(3), provides that jurisdiction to prescribe obtains with regard to \"Certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals which is directed against the security of the state or certain state interests.\" 73 United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d at 10; United States v. Egan, 501 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.C.P.R. 1978); Note, supra note 72, at 1193. 74 See, e.g., C. Pr. Pn. art. 694; Harvard Research, supra note 5, at 543, 547-51; Shavia & Bishop, The Authori of the State: Its Range with Respect to Persons and Places, in MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 311, 363-64 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968). Probably the most famous international case actually involving the principle of objective territoriality also involved, and well illustrates, the protective principle. S.S Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10 (judgment of Sept. 7). The Lotus case stands for the principle of objective territoriality (perhaps including the floating territorial principle). In the Lotus case, Turkey prosecuted and convicted the French officer of the French flag merchant vessel, the Lotus, for manslaughter. The Lotus had collided with the Turkish flag vessel, the Boz-Kourt, causing much property damage and the loss of eight Turkish lives. France objected to the Turkish prosecution, claiming that Turkey had no basis for jurisdiction under any principle of international law. France and Turkey submitted the dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice for resolution of this dispute over jurisdiction. France argued that an officer of a ship on the high seas can only be held to obey the laws and regulations of the flag state and that international law prohibited Turkey from taking jurisdiction simply by reason of the nationality of the victims; France argued that the passive personality principle was not sufficient for Turkey to take jurisdiction. The Permanent Court of International Justice declined to decide the passive personality issue, but held that Turkey's assumption ofjurisdiction could be predicated on the fact that the effects had occurred on the Boz-Kourt, which, being a Turkish flag vessel, was a place assimilated to Turkish territory for the purposes of the case. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 16, at 86. This type of jurisdiction may more aptly be called the \"floating objective territorial principle.\" See Empson, The Application of Criminal Law to Acts Committed Outside the Jurisdiction, 6 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 1982] EXTRA TERRITORIAL CRIME 1139 In sum, foreign and domestic commentators have considered the United States traditionally to be essentially adherents of the territorial theory. However, adherence to a strict interpretation of territorial jurisdiction has been tempered by fictional extension of the concept of territoriality, via the objective and subjective territorial theories, and by exception to it in theories such as the protective principle. IV. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION International law provides that there are certain offenses for which any nation may assert jurisdiction once the nation obtains personal jurisdiction over the accused; such offenses are those so heinous that any of the community of nations may prosecute. The most ancient offense of universal interest is probably piracy. With regard to universal jurisdiction over piracy, Hackworth writes: \"It has long been recognized and well-settled that persons and vessels engaged in piratical operations on the high seas are entitled to the protection of no nation and may be punished by any nation that may apprehend or capture them.\"' 75 The Geneva Convention on the High Seas, in 1958, article 19, states: 32 (1967); George, £xtraterriton'al Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH. L. REv. 609, 613 (1966). The French and the dissent in the case argued that the law of the flag-vessel should govern the pilot. This position was later adopted by two major international conventions relating to navigation on the high seas and probably reflects customary international law today. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 617 F.2d 1063, 1090 (5th Cir. 1980); D. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAv 93 (2d ed. 1979). The French opposition to the assertion of jurisdiction in cases occurring on vessels on the high seas eventually won out, at least with regard to the signatories at the 1952 Brussels International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal Jurisdiction in Matters of Collisions or other Incidents of Navigation. The parties to this convention were: Szgnatories: Germany, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Spain, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Italy, Monaco, Nicaragua, Yugoslavia; Ratifcations: United Kingdom, France, Spain, Yugoslavia, Vatican, Egypt, Portugal, Belgium, Argentina; Accessions: Switzerland, Costa Rica, Cambodia, French Overseas Territories, the Republic of Togo and the Cameroons, Haiti, Vietnam. Quoted in 4 BRITISH SHIPPING LAWS COLLISIONS AT SEA No. 1285, 902-03 (McGuffie ed. 1961); 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, art. 11, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. at 82 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention], states: 1. In the event of a collision or of any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on the high seas, involving the penal or disciplinary responsibility of the master or any other person in the service of the ship, no penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted against such persons except before the judicial or administrative authorities either of the flag state or of the state of which such a person is a national. 2. In disciplinary matters, the state which has issued a masters certificate or a certificate of competence or license shall alone be competent. After due legal process, to pronounce the withdrawal of such certificates, even if the holder is not a national of the state which issued them. 3. No arrest or detention of the ship, even as a measure of investigation shall be ordered by any authorities other than those of the flag state. Quoted in 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 240 (1968). 75 2 G. HACKWORTH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 681 (1940). See R. MERLE & A. VITU, TRAITE DE DROIT CRIMINEL 319 (1967). 1140 CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY [Vol. 73 On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship taken by piracy and under pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which carried out the seize may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith. 76 In addition to piracy, several other crimes are of universal or nearly universal interest. These crimes, many of which have been made subjects of international conventions aimed at their elimination, include slave trading,77 war crimes,78 highjacking and sabotage of civil aircraft, 79 genocide,80 and terrorism.8 t There is a growing trend to include 76 Geneva Convention, supra note 74, at art. 19. See, Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piray Obsolete? 38 HARV. L. REV. 334 (1925); The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (Wheat) 1, 40 (1826): \"Pirates may, without doubt, be lawfully captured on the ocean by the public or private ships of every nation; for they, are in truth, the common enemies of all mankind, and, as such, are liable to the extreme rights of war.\" 77 Geneva Convention, supra note 74, at arts. 13, 22. 78 See generalo T. TAYLOR, NUREMBERG AND VIETNAM (1970); U.S. ARMY, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL, FM 27-10 (rev. ed. 1976); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); United States v. Calley, 22 C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (1973); I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES (1963); Bond, Application of/he Law of War to International Conflicts, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 345 (1973); Taubenfeld, The

The doctrine of exclusivity and the position of mixed agreements in the external relations of the european community

Abstract: The exclusive nature of the European Community's powers in the treaty-making field, and the boundary between these powers and those of the Member States, has produced some of the Court of Justice's most interesting and controversial case law. The judgments of the Court have to date concentrated on the existence and justification of the doctrine of exclusivity. It is now time to re-assess the effects of the doctrine, and its place in Community law. Its political consequences for the Member States are enormous, confirming, as it does, the extent to which they have transferred certain of their sovereign powers to the European Community-in relation not merely to domestic legislation, but to external, treaty-making powers, that most widely-accepted characteristic of the sovereign State.

British Policy Towards the Indian States 1905-1939

Abstract: Prior to 1947 approximately one-third of the Indian sub-continent was broken up into 635 Indian States which were ruled by princes of varying rank. In the process of consolidating their empire in India the British had, during the first half of the nineteenth century, deprived the princes of the power to conduct external relations with each other or with foreign powers. Internally the princes were theoretically independent but their sovereignty in this respect was in practice restricted by the paramountcy of the Imperial power. Many of the princes resented the manner in which the British used this paramountcy to justify intervening in their domestic affairs. During the nineteenth century the British had maintained the princes basically as an administrative convenience and as a source of revenue. By the opening of the twentieth century, however, the British had come to regard the princes as potential political allies against the growth of nationalism in India. In order that the princes would willingly serve as allies the British adopted a policy of non-interference in their domestic affairs. In practice such intervention was reduced to an absolute minimum and would only be contemplated in cases of gross misgovernment. This thesis is concerned with how well the princes performed as Imperial allies. Two major themes are investigated. First, the position of the princes within an All-India constitutional framework. Here the scheme for an All-India Federation is examined in relation to its origins and ultimate demise in 1939 (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). The second theme concerns the policy of non-interference. While it operated, administrative standards in the states deteriorated rapidly. By the late 1930's many of them had become obvious targets for nationalist attack. The British belatedly realised that the non-interference policy had failed to make worth-while allies of the princes. On the contrary, they had become a serious liability because of it. In vain the British attempted to reverse the trends of the previous thirty years but their efforts were interrupted by the second world war and could not be resumed once it was over (Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 6).

The Development of the State

Abstract: The previous chapter was concerned almost exclusively with theoretical issues relating to the nature of the modern state. There was little explicit treatment of either the historical or the geographical realities of the concept. Implicit throughout, following the discussion of sovereignty in Chapter 1, was the essential territorial component of the state’s existence, and of the local states into which most states are divided. Thus the existence of states implies a geography. But the concern here is not only with theoretical abstractions but also with real instances whose understanding is advanced by the theoretical work. Thus the remainder of this book is interested not in a geography but in the geography, that which either has existed or still does exist. How has that particular geography emerged? Why has that pattern come about rather than any other?

Abortion and the rhetoric of individual rights.

Abstract: The abortion debate is intellectually and morally empty. A prominent example of the intellectual emptiness of the debate in addressing moral issues is the use of rights language. Both opponents and proponents of abortion use the notion of rights (e.g. right to life right to privacy and right to control ones own body) to further their positions. For opponents of abortion the right of the fetus to life is absolute while for the proponents of abortion the right to privacy or self-determination is the cardinal right. Both sides use the concept of rights as tools of moral debate or castigation wielded by individuals as claims against others. Both see these rights as immunities from Interference by others and defenses of individual freedoms and entitlements. In contrast to this conventional use of rights the authors argue that: l) rights are public and social not private or primarily individual; 2) rights designate the relationship between and among persons they do not belong to persons as possessions; 3) rights delineate mutual respect and moral equality they do not guarantee the rightness of particular actions in advance or in general; 4) rights are only a fraction of any ethical system they do not exhaust moral judgments or hold sovereignty over other elements in ethical debates; and 5) rights are not free-standing items but are organically related to the larger body of duties and obligations which they incur. As there is no single correct answer or approach to the abortion issue because of its multiple dimensions divergent answers relating to abortion must be respected and the pluralistic values that such divergence reflects tolerated.

The Sovereignty Goddess as Goddess of Death

Abstract: The discussion of the intimate relationship between a king and his realm as personified by a woman, inflaithius or Sovereignty, has formed the basis of many articles. 0 Maille sought to explain the nuptial chaos apparent in some early Irish tales by identifying their heroines with the Sovereignty Goddess of the particular territory. 0' Rahilly identified the goddess firiu with Terra Mater. He dealt specifically with the allegorical representation of the Sovereignty Goddess, who poured out draughts of red liquor in a golden cup to each successive king of Ireland. This symbolic act was often reflected in her name: Medb, for example, 'she who has intoxicated'. Prof. B.A.Breathnach showed that the Irish theme contained the following motifs: 'a hero, a hunt in which the hero is victorious over a wild animal, a search for water in a royal cup, an encounter with the puella senilis, coition or osculation and the metamorphosis or promise of Sovereignty'. Prof. Mac Gana showed the complexities of forms in this theme

The Communist Party: Trends and Problems

Abstract: It makes sense to picture Soviet leaders as convinced and thoroughgoing Hobbesians, so persuaded of the precariousness of social cohesion and so appalled at the prospect of social breakdown, as to rate the absolute position of the sovereign as a supreme value in politics.1 They are Hobbesians, moreover, not Machiavellians, because they seek the bulwark against social breakdown in an institutional arrangement, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and not in the personal qualities of the sovereign.2 If we imagine Soviet leaders proceeding from a serious conviction of the actual superiority of one-party (absolute) government over other forms, we find a great many of the familiar but characteristic features of Soviet politics, ideological, stylistic and institutional, taking their place in a coherent pattern.

Territorial Claims as a Limitation to the Right of Self-Determination in the Context of the Falkland Islands Dispute

Abstract: This Note will trace the development and present status of the right to self-determination under international law and its applicability to the decolonization of the Falkland Islands. No attempt will be made to determine whether Argentina’s claim to sovereignty over the Islands is valid. The focus will be, rather, on whether the right of self-determination as set out by the United Nations can be limited and superseded by competing territorial claims. TERRITORIAL CLAIMS AS A LIMITATION TO THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS DISPUTE

Building a New American State: The early American state

Abstract: No greater disservice has ever been rendered political science than the statement that the liberal state was a “weak” state. It was precisely as strong as it needed to be in the circumstances. Franz Neumann, Democratic and Authoritarian States , 1957 An analysis of American state building around the turn of the century requires a closer look at the early American state. This state was not a directive force in social affairs, nor was it an ideal reified in American culture. To Tocqueville, Hegel, and Marx, it appeared as pure instrumentality, an innocuous reflection of the society it served. Yet, this organization of coercive power was no less indispensable for its unobtrusive character. The early American state maintained an integrated legal order on a continental scale; it fought wars, expropriated Indians, secured new territories, carried on relations with other states, and aided economic development. Despite the absence of a sense of the state, the state was essential to social order and social development in nineteenth-century America. The early American state can be described much as one would describe any other state. Readily comparable determinants of a state's mode of operations will be used here to assess this great anomaly as a working complex of institutions and personnel. These determinants are: the organizational orientations of government, the procedural routines that tie institutions together within a given organizational scheme, and the intellectual talents employed in government. Identifying the early American state along these operational dimensions will capture the distinctive way it performed the basic tasks of government. The reconstruction of state power between 1877 and 1920 will be observed in qualitative changes along each of these dimensions.

The Federal Role in American Indian Education.

Abstract: The federal role in American Indian education has its basis in the treaty and commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution. In the early years of the republic it was recognized that, in the interest of protecting the borders of the Western frontier, the cost of war with the Indians was much higher than the cost of education. Until 1871, in accordance with international law, the United States treated with Indian tribes as separate nations. Commissioners appointed by the President frequently negotiated treaties with specific provisions for education, whose Christianizing and civilizing functions were perceived to be instrumental in obtaining amicable relations. Through the quid pro quo of the treaty process, the United States and Indian tribes established their peculiar relationship. This required that tribes surrender their external powers of sovereignty to the United States. Generally, this meant that they would not engage in treaties with competitive foreign powers such as Great Britain, France, or Spain. T...

The United States and Moroccan International Status, 1943-1956: A Contributory Factor in Morocco's Reassertion of Independence From France

Abstract: "The Franco-Moroccan conflict may be considered as having begun on 22 January 1943 with the meeting at Anfa between Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef and President Franklin Delano Roosevelt."l With these words Stephane Bernard opens his discerning study, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict,1943-1956. Although there is some dispute as to exactly what was said at this dinner meeting and even why it was held, the incontrovertible fact is that the event represents United States' public acknowledgement that Morocco was not a mere colony of France but that it enjoyed a distinct international status, namely sovereignty under its own monarch, the sultan, albeit as a protectorate of France. Bernard is not quite accurate in asserting that the Franco-Moroccan conflict began with this meeting, since Moroccan resistance to French domination goes back to the very date that the protectorate was imposed with the Treaty of Fez in 1912. Moreover, as Bernard indicates, the reaction to the Berber Dahir of 1930, the establishment of the National Party in the 1930s, the work of the Comitg d'Action Marocaine all bear witness to the mounting Moroccan opposition to French rule even before 1943. Yet Bernard's focus on the Anfa meeting is quite reasonable because this face-to-face contact between the sultan and the chief of state of the leading Allied power, which was not sanctioned by the French Protectorate authorities, ushered in a new period in the Franco-Moroccan conflict. Not only did it, in the words of Roger Le Tourneau, transform the sultan into "a totally new man who on leaving the President of the United States declared 'A new future for my country,'"2 but it also markedly altered the nature of the Franco-Moroccan controversy from a purely bilateral dispute to one with an international dimension, focusing on Morocco's international status.

The preservation of Turkey's neutrality during the second world war: 1940

Abstract: On 19 October 1939, the Turkish Republic signed a treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and France. But leaders like President In6nu and the close circle of foreign policy advisers around him knew that Turkey was in no condition to take part in any modem war. ' She was only just beginning to heal the wounds left by the continuous wars from 1909 to 1923, when the Republic had been founded. Therefore, Turkey had to be kept out of the war, and yet her sovereignty and territorial integrity safeguarded. This brought forth from the Turkish leaders at the time, a most remarkable feat of diplomacy. Despite her vital strategic location Turkey managed to avoid involvement in the worldwide upheaval. The most critical stage of the war for Turkey was 1940, as this year presented the Turkish foreign policy planners with great difficulty in the application of their policies. It was a year of severe crises and unforeseen events. 'When the Turks, the French and the British signed an alliance it was impossible to foresee either the German successes in Western Europe and the developments which brought the Axis to the very doors of Turkey, or the threat of complete hostile encirclement ...'I In the previous year during the treaty negotiations the British had spoken in terms of the 'Maginot line' and the French having 'the best existing land defences in the world', this making 'a direct attack on France most unlikely'. They had also spoken of a 'Polish Offensive in the East'.3 In view of what actually happened it was hardly surprising that the Turks kept their reserve. It is no more surprising that Turkey, 'was not even ready to allow the indispensable naval and air bases to be prepared in her territory'.4 The British and Turks approached the Alliance with completely contradictory viewpoints. To the Turks it was an insurance policy to be put into practice only in case of dire need, while for the British it was a means of effective action in the Balkans and Middle East. Barutqu quotes Inonu as saying at the time:

Military forces abroad

Abstract: This chapter discusses the issues faced by military in setting up bases on foreign land. Where military forces are in belligerent occupation of territory, their powers are regulated by the laws of war. Where such forces are engaged in belligerent activity, but are fighting on friendly allied territory, they will customarily enjoy complete exemption from the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereignty. However, in situations where such forces are in the territory of another state with its consent and not actively engaged in hostilities, problems arise from reconciling the jurisdictions of the “sending” state and the “territorial” state where the acts of the forces of the sending state are delictual under the territorial state. Agreements during World War I in general conceded virtually full jurisdiction to the sending state but during World War II the pattern changed, in large part due to the fact that Allied Forces were stationed for long periods in the United Kingdom.

Afghanistan between the great powers

Abstract: history of Afghanistan, particularly its relations with the great powers. In this connection the period of World War II has often been treated superficially, and until today there has been only one book (L. W. Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid- Twentieth Century: Relations with the USSR, Germany, and Britain (Tucson, 1974)) which contains adequate coverage of the war years. These years ought to be considered as a watershed for the entire region since they clearly foreshadowed the events to come, which we are observing today with great amazement and alarm. Afghanistan has traditionally been referred to as the buffer state par ex- cellence. This term has become a well-worn phrase and it would be desirable if, for the purposes of this paper, its specific meaning within the given historical context could be clarified. The classical notion of Afghanistan as a buffer state consisted principally in the maintenance of a shaking balance, which usually engaged the entire statecraft of the Afghan government, between the two great powers in the region: Britain and Russia. This fragile pattern had already emerged during the nineteenth century and survived World War I-albeit with some important modifications. From 1919, when Afghanistan acquired formal sovereignty in her external relations, the maintenance of this balance became more complicated. Although the geopolitical setup for Britain and Russia vis-a- vis Afghanistan remained in principle the same, each of the two great powers acquired an additional dimension: 1. In addition to being a world power with direct bearing on the region by virtue of its Indian possession, Britain was gradually changing into a caretaker power trying first to delay, then to accommodate the forces of Indian nationalism and communalism. The Afghans rightly feared that the constitutional progress in India might lead to the establishment of a Hindu-dominated self-government ruling over a large Muslim population which would be mislabeled a "minority." But on the whole it could be said that the Afghan government of the 1930s dominated by the Yahya Khel family, though deeply suspicious as ever, found the British to be tolerable neighbors, in spite of the unfortunate incidents of the nineteenth century. Since the British already possessed so much of the earth's surface, it was unlikely that the barren hills of Afghanistan would attract them history of Afghanistan, particularly its relations with the great powers. In this connection the period of World War II has often been treated superficially, and until today there has been only one book (L. W. Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid- Twentieth Century: Relations with the USSR, Germany, and Britain (Tucson, 1974)) which contains adequate coverage of the war years. These years ought to be considered as a watershed for the entire region since they clearly foreshadowed the events to come, which we are observing today with great amazement and alarm. Afghanistan has traditionally been referred to as the buffer state par ex- cellence. This term has become a well-worn phrase and it would be desirable if, for the purposes of this paper, its specific meaning within the given historical context could be clarified. The classical notion of Afghanistan as a buffer state consisted principally in the maintenance of a shaking balance, which usually engaged the entire statecraft of the Afghan government, between the two great powers in the region: Britain and Russia. This fragile pattern had already emerged during the nineteenth century and survived World War I-albeit with some important modifications. From 1919, when Afghanistan acquired formal sovereignty in her external relations, the maintenance of this balance became more complicated. Although the geopolitical setup for Britain and Russia vis-a- vis Afghanistan remained in principle the same, each of the two great powers acquired an additional dimension: 1. In addition to being a world power with direct bearing on the region by virtue of its Indian possession, Britain was gradually changing into a caretaker power trying first to delay, then to accommodate the forces of Indian nationalism and communalism. The Afghans rightly feared that the constitutional progress in India might lead to the establishment of a Hindu-dominated self-government ruling over a large Muslim population which would be mislabeled a "minority." But on the whole it could be said that the Afghan government of the 1930s dominated by the Yahya Khel family, though deeply suspicious as ever, found the British to be tolerable neighbors, in spite of the unfortunate incidents of the nineteenth century. Since the British already possessed so much of the earth's surface, it was unlikely that the barren hills of Afghanistan would attract them history of Afghanistan, particularly its relations with the great powers. In this connection the period of World War II has often been treated superficially, and until today there has been only one book (L. W. Adamec, Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid- Twentieth Century: Relations with the USSR, Germany, and Britain (Tucson, 1974)) which contains adequate coverage of the war years. These years ought to be considered as a watershed for the entire region since they clearly foreshadowed the events to come, which we are observing today with great amazement and alarm. Afghanistan has traditionally been referred to as the buffer state par ex- cellence. This term has become a well-worn phrase and it would be desirable if, for the purposes of this paper, its specific meaning within the given historical context could be clarified. The classical notion of Afghanistan as a buffer state consisted principally in the maintenance of a shaking balance, which usually engaged the entire statecraft of the Afghan government, between the two great powers in the region: Britain and Russia. This fragile pattern had already emerged during the nineteenth century and survived World War I-albeit with some important modifications. From 1919, when Afghanistan acquired formal sovereignty in her external relations, the maintenance of this balance became more complicated. Although the geopolitical setup for Britain and Russia vis-a- vis Afghanistan remained in principle the same, each of the two great powers acquired an additional dimension: 1. In addition to being a world power with direct bearing on the region by virtue of its Indian possession, Britain was gradually changing into a caretaker power trying first to delay, then to accommodate the forces of Indian nationalism and communalism. The Afghans rightly feared that the constitutional progress in India might lead to the establishment of a Hindu-dominated self-government ruling over a large Muslim population which would be mislabeled a "minority." But on the whole it could be said that the Afghan government of the 1930s dominated by the Yahya Khel family, though deeply suspicious as ever, found the British to be tolerable neighbors, in spite of the unfortunate incidents of the nineteenth century. Since the British already possessed so much of the earth's surface, it was unlikely that the barren hills of Afghanistan would attract them

Bangladesh in United States Foreign Policy

Abstract: B angladesh emerged as an independent nation in December 1971, after struggling for nine months against Pakistani military forces. India and the Soviet Union had championed its fight for freedom, while the United States implicity opposed its emergence by tilting toward Pakistan. That was the situation in 1971. But time passes, and new circumstances arise. After the fall of the Mujib regime in August 1975, there was a reversal of roles. Now, after only ten years of independence, Bangladesh is faced with external threats not from those who originally opposed it, but from those who supported it directly and significantly during the liberation struggle. India's present attitude toward Bangladesh is a direct threat to its independence and sovereignty. If Bangladesh is to survive and prosper, it must embark upon a pragmatic policy of neutralizing this threat within the shortest possible span of time. It is here that the friendship of the United States is so important. This essay provides a rationale for a viable Bangladesh-United States relationship, projected in the light of mutual interests.

Norway's law of the sea policy in the 1970s

Abstract: The Norwegian government has stated that creating a new international law of the sea is a foreign policy matter of the highest political priority in the period 1978–1981. A reasonable explanation might be the close correlation that normally exists between the political significance and the economic importance of issues and the area on which they impinge. As to Norway, it should suffice to point to the fact that the country ranks fifth among the merchant marine nations of the world, takes the fifth largest fish catch, and has sovereignty over the biggest continental shelf in Europe. Against this background, the author discusses the hypothesis that economic factors are the guiding hand in Norwegian ocean policy. However, the conclusion reached is that economic factors play a rather modest role in explaining this policy and that the reasons behind it are to be found at the intersection between economic interests, security policies, jurisdiction, the protection of resources and the environment as the...