Showing papers on "Value (ethics) published in 1974"

The Duality of Persons and Groups

Abstract: A metaphor of classical social theory concerning the "intersection" of persons within groups and of groups within the individual is translated into a set of techniques to aid in empirical analysis of the interpenetration of networks of interpersonal ties and networks of intergroup ties. These techniques are useful in'the study of director interlocks, clique structures, organizations within community and national power structures, and other collectivities which share members. The "membership network analysis" suggested in this paper is compared to and contrasted with sociometric approaches and is applied to the study by Davis et al. (1941) of the social participation of eighteen women. Consider a metaphor which has often appeared in sociological literature but has remained largely unexploited in empirical work. Individuals come together (or, metaphorically, "intersect" one another) within groups, which are collectivities based on the shared interests, personal affinities, or ascribed status of members who participate regularly in collective activities. At the same time, the particular patterning of an individual's affiliations (or the "intersection" of groups within the person) defines his points of reference and (at least partially) determines his individuality.1 The following discussion consists of a translation of this metaphor into a set of techniques which aid in the empirical analysis of the interpenetration of networks of persons and networks of the groups that they comprise. My usage of the term "group" is restrictive in that I consider only those groups for which membership lists are available-through published sources, reconstruction from field observation or interviews, or by any other means. Such groups include corporation boards of directors (J. Levine, 1972), organizations within a community or national power structure (Lieberson, 1971; Perrucci and Pilisuk, 1970), cliques or organizations in a high school (Bonacich, 1972; Coleman, 1961), and political factions. Donald Levine (1959:19-22) writes that "the concept of dualism" is a key principle "underlying Simmel's social thought." Levine explicates Simmel's dualism as "the assumption . . . that the subsistence of any aspect of human life depends on the coexistence of diametrically opposed elements." My own usage of the comparable term "duality" is specified with respect to Equations 3 and 4 below.2 THE BASIC CONCEPTION Consider a set of individuals and a set of groups such that the value of a tie between any two individuals is defined as the number of groups of which they both are members. The value of a tie between any two groups is de* For their criticism and encouragement, I am indebted to Harrison White, Gregory Heil, Francois Lorrain, and Scott Boorman. For seminars which first introduced me to Simmel's thought, I am indebted to Kurt H. Wolff. Thanks are due Professor White for support through NSF Grant GS-2689. 1 Simmel (1955) entitled one of his essays "The Intersection of Social Circles," but Reinhard Bendix changed the title in translation because "a literal translation of this phrase . . . is almost meaningless . . . Simmel often plays with geometric analogies; it has seemed advisable to me to minimize this play with words ." (Simmel, 1955:125). For an assertion that Simmel's original title is not at all inappropriate, see Walter's essay (1959). For a more complete explication of the "dualism" inherent in Simmel's thought, see the essays by D. Levine, Lipman, and Tenbruck in Wolff (1959). A similar metaphor was put forward in America by Charles H. Cooley (1902:148), who wrote that "A man may be regarded as the point of intersection of an indefinite number of circles representing social groups, having as many arcs passing through him as there are groups." Much later, Sorokin (1947:345) observed that "the individual has as many social egos as there are different social groups and strata with which he is connected." On the "much neglected" development of the concept of "social circle" since Simmel's writings, see Kadushin (1966). 2The "directional duality principle" enunciated by Harary et al. (1965) is to be distinguished from my conception. The former principle consists in reversing the directionality of lines in a graph; in the method of this paper, the lines in one graph are transformed into the points of its dual graph, and vice versa.

Social differentiation and social originality

Abstract: In this article we have presented a theoretical outline and a body of empirical work relating to the processes of social differentiation and social originality. If, in a competition, someone else seems to possess a decisive advantage or if mere comparison with this other person constitutes a threat to social identity, there are signs, in given conditions, of a tendency to differentiate oneself from the other, to be different or to do something else, to invent new criteria of being or doing with others or to combine accepted criteria in an original way. In other words, one tends to give proof of originality or, to use a Darwinian metaphor, to occupy ‘vacant places’. Doubtless the strategies described here only apply to certain social systems in which the visibility of the agent is an important social value and in which comparison may pose a threat to that identity. The restoring of identity by way of the search for otherness merits the attention of social psychology. But originality is not necessarily accepted or not necessarily immediately. Innovation may take time, may necessitate the creation of schismatic groups and the waging of battles for recognition, etc. We give a brief account of observations made with regard to groups of children in summer camps, laboratory experiments and the results of surveys in the scientific and artistic communities which fit into our theoretical framework. It will not be difficult for the reader to see that this article is a first step in a direction which, in our eyes, holds out a great deal of promise.

Fairness and Envy

Abstract: Standard neoclassical economic analysis is typically concerned with individual utility maximization In this paper we shall consider a problem of constrained social welfare maximization Our criterion of social welfare is "fairness," and we shall discuss how this may be maximized by a move from an initial allocation to a final fairer allocation, subject to the constraint that no one be made worse off by the move We think the goal of fairness maximization characterizes, albeit in a simplistic way, the goals pursued by "enlightened" governments in their redistributional policies We shall also discuss a concept of complete fairness and illustrate some of its weaknesses The fairness problem is ancient and dates back at least to classical Greece It has been treated recently by mathematicians who typically are concerned with the existence of a "fair division" of a nonuniform object among n persons; that is, a division with the property that each party thinks he is getting at least t/nth of the value of the object (See, for example, Lester Dubins and Edwin Spanier, Harold Kuhn, and Hugo Steinhaus) This is not the approach we will take, since we will assume a world of homogeneous infinitely divisible goods in which the mathematical fair division problem becomes trivial The concept of fairness has also been treated extensively by philosophers The most recent philosophical approach is that of John Rawls, who argues at length for a social contract theory of justice: a society which maximizes the welfare of its worst off members is most just and that is the sort of society people will, from an initial position of ignorance about their endowments and interests, contract to enter Rawls' approach has been extended to a theory of taxation by Edmund Phelps Again, Rawlsian fairness, or "justice," is not the fairness we are interested in; we do not assume a precontractual state of ignorance, we do assume that knowledge of wealth and tastes is given In fact, knowledge about one's own and others' bundles of goods is crucial in our discussion What then is our notion of fairness? It is fairness in the sense of non-envy A completely fair social state is one in which no citizen would prefer what another has to what he himself has; a relatively fair social state is one in which few citizens would prefer what others have to what they themselves have; a totally unfair state is one in which every citizen finds his position to be inferior to that of everyone else This concept of fairness is appealing because it only depends, like other economic concepts, on individual tastes and endowments Fairness in the non-envy sense has been discussed in several recent papers by economists Serge Christophe Kolm considers allocative fairness, and shows that there exist allocations which are both completely fair and efficient' David Schmeidler and Karl Vind define fair trades as

The Concept of Legitimacy

Abstract: Stillman offers his own definition of legitimacy; in the course of explication he usefully illuminates the meanings and problems of the concept. He seeks to use the strengths of traditional definitions (which include reference to possession or pursuit of right values) and modern social science (notably Carl Friedrich's) conceptions of legitimacy. He offers the definition: the compatibility of the results of governmental output with the value patterns of the relevant systems, that is, those affected by these results (especially the value pattern of the society, but also of individuals, groups, and other societies). The definition relates legitimacy to the values of the society, but does not hinge it on popular opinion about the government. Taking legitimacy to be a matter of degree rather than of either/or, the definition is held to be empirically useful, that is, to permit "operationalization," building, for example, on some of Lasswell's work. In sum, we are helped in inquiring into what justifies a part...

William Johannsen and the genotype concept.

Abstract: Recent secondary literature on the rise of modern genetics has begun to drag out of the shadows of historical neglect one of the major accomplishments in the history of biology. I refer to the conceptual distinction drawn between "phenotypes" and "genotypes," the use, if not the full meaning of which was fashioned in 1909 by Wilhelm Johannsen. Vorzimmer in his study of Darwin's later years has indicated how unaware Darwin and his contemporaries were of this distinction.' Both Allen and I have referred to the fundamental yet often misunderstood nature of this dichtomy,2 and just recently in an essay review Mayr has described the failure to make this distinction as the basic confusion which was "by far the most damaging" to the progress of modern genetics.3 Following these leads, I intend to explore the phenotypegenotype distinction in an effort to discover what it meant to geneticists at the time of its inception. First, however, it is of value to remind ourselves how we define this distinction for contemporary students, who must fully grasp it in order to understand modern genetics, ecology, psychology, the study of behavior, and above all modern evolution theory. The definition given in J. D. Watson's Molecular Biology of the Gene is typical and has the advantage of conciseness. Watson writes: "We refer to the appearance (physical structure) of an individual as its phenotype, and to its genetic composition as its genotype."4 Monroe Strickberger in a standard textbook, Genetics, is somewhat more elaborate. "In their broad definitions," he writes:

Developmental Psychology as a Guide to Value Education: A Review of “Kohlbergian” Programs

Abstract: The enthusiasm that Kohlberg and his associates have recently generated in value education programs lies not so much in new curriculum materials and new teaching techniques, nor in the demonstration of spectacular results in their pilot programs, but rather in the way they discuss their general directions and purposes in terms of philosophical and psychological theory and research. Kohlberg has characterized his efforts as "warmed-over Dewey," and refers to John Dewey as "the only modem thinker about education worth taking seriously" (Kohlberg, 1971a). Dewey laid out an educational program in broad philosophical terms. It was not, however, until Piaget's work that a psychology was begun which "developed the general premises of Dewey ... into a science of great richness and logical and empirical rigor." Following Piaget, Kohlberg has worked "to make Dewey's ideas concrete," and Kohlberg's associates, in turn, have worked on "an application of Kohlberg to a high school curriculum (Sprinthall, 1971b)." Educational programs with such a venerable lineage (DeweyPiaget-Kohlberg, and so forth), have created interest because of the intellectual heft behind them and the promise of initiating something more than a superficial, piecemeal, short-lived fad. A review of these current educational programs entails a consideration of the way in which the foundational ideas have been extended in educational practice and a consideration of their distinctive features. I shall not review the psychological research on which the programs are based but rather the way in which the conclusions from research are used to guide program construction. The gist of this review is that "Kohlbergian" value education programs are based on ideas that separately have widespread acceptance and that have been around for some time; the programs integrate and "concretize" these basic ideas in new ways, although many further developments are necessary before one can claim to have successfully developed a distinctively new kind of educational program. Some next steps in program development will be suggested.

Some Principles of Autobiography

Abstract: CRITICS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY still preside over an unfederated domain, so each feels compelled to begin with a new definition of the genre. We have an ample number of precedents, ranging from hostility to encomia, most of them centering on the relative value of history and art, fiction and fact. Others, tracing the growth of autobiography since the Middle Ages, call it a history of the human mind, reflecting man's rise from dogma to greater individuality. But these views all pack the same evolutionary bias: that recent lives are necessarily more complex, and their stories more challenging; that the content of a life shapes the form of its story, and not the other way around. Of paramount importance to most critics is the autobiographer's ideology or profession, which supposedly influenced the events and values of his book. So the critics customarily divide authors into separate categories and-working like so many vocational counselorsgrade them according to religious denomination or social class. As a result, we learn that a "simple" faith produces a simple narrative, that a soldier writes as a soldier, a poet always as a poet.1 While this definition of autobiography may be useful for social historians, it is hardly a suitable basis for critical evaluation. Some readers have resisted the occupational mode of defining autobiography, preferring a broader and more inclusive scheme of classification. A partial disclaimer appears in Roy Pascal's influential book Design and Truth in Autobiography, which argues convincingly that autobiography is a unique literary form, offering its close readers a complex set of interpretive problems. But Pascal's sensitive analysis of the genre is marred by rather insistent value judgments. The "true" autobiography, in his opinion, tells us not merely of remembered deeds and thoughts, but

Volition and Basic Action

Abstract: THE purpose of this paper is to defend the view that the bodily actions of men typically involve a mental action of volition or willing, and that such mental acts are, in at least one important sense, the basic actions we perform when we do things like raise an arm, move a finger, or flex a muscle. The defense will be theoretically oriented, concentrating on the advantages of a proper account of volition for solving certain general problems about action, rather than on providing independent evidence that volition occurs. To be sure, the latter emphasis deserves full development also. But space does not permit performing both tasks, and it is easier to search for something after one knows what one is looking for and what its value is. Knowing these things requires a theoretical development; hence the present task deserves priority. Since I shall maintain that volition itself counts as action, I cannot argue that it is the key to understanding the nature of action generally. It does, however, provide a solution to what I shall call the action-result problem. This is the problem that gives rise to Wittgenstein's question, "What is left over if I substract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm?"'1 A strong theoretical case for volition will have been made if it can be shown to lay this problem to rest. Along the way, we shall see that a theory of volition sheds considerable light on other important matters as well.

The correlation between education and earnings: the external-test-not-content hypothesis (etnc)

Abstract: The Human Capital theory, as ordinarily defined, is a "content" theory of the economic value of a higher education to its recipient or his employer. But non-vocational higher education offers by definition no such content. So why does it yield a higher income? Various theories are examined: 1) The degree is an external test, vastly expensive to society but very cheap to individual employers; 2) The degree course forms character, and that is a kind of human capital; 3) The degree course exercises the mind, and develops it like a muscle; 4) The degree confers social status; 5) Insistence on a degree, including now vocational degrees, is a restrictive practice by many trade unions. People also seek non-vocational higher education because it is publicly financed. There is a "Robbinsian" supply curve of higher education facilities. This is profoundly irrational, but all parties react rationally to it. No evidence connecting degree certificates with income could distinguish between Human Capital and most of these other theories. Possible statistical tests are discussed.

Compensatory effects in moral judgment: two rights don't make up for a wrong.

Abstract: Ratings of the morality of persons described as having committed moral and immoral behaviors indicate that good deeds do not make up for bad ones. The overall goodness of a person is determined mostly by his worst bad deed, with good deeds having lesser influence. Addition of moral deeds does improve ratings of sets containing low-valued items, but, consistent with previous research, this compensation appears to be. limited. Data suggest that performance of very immoral deeds limits the highest level of morality a person can achieve. The value of that limit appears to depend upon both the immorality of the bad deeds and the virtue of the good ones.

Enthnography and Administration: a Study of Anglo-Tiv ‘Working Misunderstanding’

Abstract: F 0 R the historian of Africa, ethnographic sources are invaluable in the quest for an understanding of indigenous cultures and institutions. Only in the light of such information can one begin to assess the potential modes of change within and the impact of external forces upon a society. However, if the true value of such material is to be appreciated, it must be viewed within its historical context. Recent articles by Gough, Goddard, Banaji, and others have stimulated considerable interest in the relationship between anthropology and colonialism,2 though the resulting discussion has tended to focus on the impact of the colonial situation on the discipline of anthropology. Colonialism in Nigeria, the extension of British economic and political control over the indigenous population and polities, embodied as a concomitant aspect ideological justifications based on racial and cultural differences. With the establishment of colonial rule, this ideology became the dominant system of values, acceptance of which by the governed led to the development of a symbiotic relationship between the cultures of paternalism and subservience. Moreover, such symbiosis involved numerous 'working misunderstandings', arising from conceptual models which had proven meaningful in one situation being applied under quite different circumstances.3 This article examines the conceptual models which influenced European perception of Tiv society, the consequent 'working misunderstanding' which underlay the symbiotic relationship between government and a society subject to its jurisdiction but which had its own particular traditions, and the changes which appear to have occurred in Tiv values, institutions, and traditions in response to new situations.4 It is hoped that the article will be of general interest to social and political historians, as well as to those

Success Values: Are They Universal or Class-Differentiated?.

Abstract: This study utilizes Hyman Rodman's concept "value stretch" in an attempt to help resolve the long-standing controversy over the existence of universal versus class-differentiated success values in American society. Some of the basic assumptions of the "value stretch" concept are drawn out, and a set of six hypotheses is derived. Data on educational, occupational, and income aspirations were obtained from white high school boys in four Massachusetts communities. Results failed to support the value stretch on most points, but instead supported the notion of moderately class-differentiated success values.

The Concept of Social Problems: Vox Populi and Sociological Analysis

Abstract: To many sociologists, social problems are conditions considered to be undesirable by many people. While the concept relies upon public judgments, exponents of the definition claim to be value-free. This questionable position is maintained in Merton's distinction between manifest and latent problems. The categories indicate the existence of unrecognized social problems while retaining the public's value perspective. Unlike functional analysis, which distinguishes between objective conditions and subjective interpretations, the manifest-latent social problems categories are limited to the latter. Current usage ignores the possibility that some perceived social problems may be trivial or spurious. Applying the scientific values and norms of sociology offers a possible alternative. The values of modern science may provide useful criteria for redefining the concept of social problems.

College student marijuana use and societal alienation.

Abstract: This study examines the relationship between four levels of marijuana use and two forms of alienation (personal and societal). Marijuana use was significantly related to societal alienation but not to personal alienation. It was also found that heavy marijuana users perceived themselves to be more open to legal and societal harassment. Finally it was found that value hierarchies differed as a function of marijuana use.

Marxist and American Sociological Conceptions of Alienation: Implications for Social Problems Theory

Abstract: Analytic and normative properties of Marxist and American concepts of alienation are examined. The Marxist concept of alienation is dialectically related to economic structure and productive, self developing activities. A condition of alienation involves control over man and his development, as defined by a theory of human nature, by institutions and social processes of his own making. Marx's analysis of the dynamics of capitalism may be understood as an explanation of the social bases of alienation in capitalist societies. Control is viewed as objective by the observer employing a theory of human nature and is not necessarily identical to the consciousness of the actors. Explicit and implicit normative properties of the two conceptions are examined in terms of their analytic implications. Implications for social problems theory include the desirability of further analysis of the consciousness of actors and researchers as elements of social processes involved in social phenomena, the necessity of certain value judgments, the treatment of power and control, and attention to work as a social problem.

Value Confluence and Behavioral Conflict in Intergenerational Relations

Abstract: This paper describes findings of an investigation of values and interpersonal perceptions of high school seniors and parents of high school seniors. The findings support the notion that there is relatively little value conflict, that conflict arises over means not ends, and that the "'generation gap" within middleand lower-middle-class families is in large part a myth. A general tolerance of other was found in both generations in their attempt to understand value and behavior differences through an historical perspective.

Philosophical speculations on systems design

Abstract: Belief in the value of the scientific method as a means of implementing improvement in social systems (here called “systems design”—SD) raises important philosophical questions concerning, inter alia, the meaning of “scientific method”, of “improvement”, and of social reality. One underlying problem is that of the “self reflecting paradox”; e.g. the content and validity of the scientific method can only be discovered by the application of the scientific method. Similarly, SD has its own “social reality” through which it perceives that of its client. “Improvement” is bound up with ethics but ethics does not admit the limitation of obligation to one sub-system, therefore improvement requires the recognition of sub-system linkages. Paradoxically, again, the “improver” is himself part of the total system and bears its impress. Implementation (of improvement) meets the paradox that SD on SD is needed to judge the worth of the SD proposal. The pragmatic escape from the paradox identifies SD with a heuristic role in social progress but presupposes the possibility of progress. “Implementation” secures the possibility of such progress. The second major problem is that SD requires a social reality in which individuals have visible goals; but the “inner world” of individual goals is unknown and cannot be tracked from observable responses. In any case, Kant's moral precept requires that individuals be valued as ends rather than means. Much of SD uses them as means. Though SD is and must be practised, such philosophical speculation raises SD's self knowledge and points the neat paradox of its technical precision won at the price of its fundamental woolliness.

Frank Knight and the Tradition of Liberalism

Abstract: Frank Knight was a very complex and subtle thinker, especially so in the area of political philosophy, and any appreciation of his views in short compass (or perhaps even at length) is bound to produce simplifications of the kind that would have made him groan. In the 60 years of his study and meditation upon man as a political animal (i.e., a rational one, not a behavioristically social one like the termites or ants), he generated far more questions than answers, more problems than solutions, and he was more distressed by ingenuousness in political philosophy than by error or evil. He had the uncommon gift (and the curse!) of the compound eye; human society appeared to his perception through many angles of view which compelled a projection that was a mosaic of great richness, complexity, and, ultimately, mystery. We may label him a "liberal" (in the midnineteenth-century meaning of that term) because he did so describe himself, but his own discussion of liberalism was more concerned with its weaknesses than its strengths. No one, indeed, has searched out its subterranean defects with more tenacity. The essence of the liberal philosophy, in Knight's view, was freedom, not as an instrument (for utilitarian efficiency) or even as a human preference, but as an ethical value in itself. This raises many philosophical problems, which are compounded by the fact that Knight was unwilling to accept any specific theory of ethics or even any of the extant general approaches to ethical theory. He rejected alike all reductionist theories (including the reduction of all values to freedom) and all deontological statements of absolute values. The closest he would come to advancing an ethical position of his own was to evince a belief (or a hope) that man is capable of attaining higher levels of social existence-to become more "civilized" in some sense. Yet he rejected altogether the idea that one may describe some ideal civilization and set it up as a goal, the ceaseless

The Motivation to be Just

Abstract: No other work of recent analytical philosophical history has had the immediate -and widespread impact of John Rawls's A Theory ofJustice, not only among philosophers and members of other academic disciplines, but also among a general public, which, for a substantial period of time, has been disconnected from the contemporary philosophical tradition in those countries dominated by analytical philosophy.1 Part of the explanation is that the book was eagerly awaited because Rawls had published parts of the theory in a highly influential series of articles since 1958.2 Now that we have the book, we find that it contains even more than we could have expected simply on the basis of the articles. Rawls has actually developed in detail a theory of justice-one only realizes how staggering this is if he considers in detail some of the major works in analytical moral philosophy since World War II.3 It is characteristic of these works that they are chiefly concerned with what has come to be called by the barbarous neologism "metaethics," namely, a subject concerned with "higher-order" questions of the meaning, justification, and truth value of moral propositions as opposed to "first-order" questions of value, or normative ethics. As Stuart Hampshire notes, Rawls's work marks a decisive break with this recent practice (a practice which rested, at least partly, on a skepticism, engendered by positivism, about the possibility of saying anything philosophically worthwhile on questions of value) and a

Threatened retaliation as an inhibitor of human aggression: Mediating effects of the instrumental value of aggression

Abstract: Sixty male undergraduates participated in an experiment designed to investigate the hypothesis that threatened retaliation from the victim would be highly effective in inhibiting subsequent aggression under conditions where the instrumental value of such behavior was low, but would be relatively ineffective in this regard under conditions where the instrumental value of such actions was high. Support was obtained for both of these predictions. Findings were discussed in terms of their implications with respect to the usefulness of threatened punishment as a means of preventing or controlling human violence.

International Law in a Multicultural World

Abstract: The effectiveness, even the possibility, of universal international law continues to be denied on the grounds of the international society's cultural heterogeneity. The argument dates back to the time when international law was developed in the Western world and applied only among "Christian" and "civilized" states. The Statute of the International Court of Justice still refers to general principles of law "recognized by civilized nations." The argument received a slight shift and a big boost from the ideological warfare in the 1930s, the Cold War in the 1940s and 1950s, and finally from the birth of new states in Asia and Africa. Effective law, the argument runs, requires consensus on values. Yet the main consensus prevailing in the contemporary international society is that all states shall enjoy sovereign independence. They try to do so, with deleterious consequences for international law. Their ways of life, moral tenets, and legal systems differ. The shared value is divisive nationalism, leading to isolated national existence with international structures, institutions, and organizations geared to maintaining or at least not disturbing the separation of states. Even that value is said to be shared in some Asian and African countries only by elites. It is not representative of a generally internalized and accepted normative system. The seemingly unifying spread of modern technology and an international diplomatic language is written off as a surface phenomenon, unable to overcome the world's

Passives, Pronouns, and Themes and Rhemes.

Abstract: Tne 'direct discourse analysis' introduced by Susumu Kuno is examined Lind found to be inadequate. To account for the data Kuno discusses, as well for related data, a new approach to transformations is suggested. By determining the function, rather than the form, of a transformation, certain predictions are possible. Primary is the prediction that two or more grammatical devices may not apply to achieve antagonistic purposes in terms of theme-rheme distinctions. That is, no grammatical device may be used to indicate that an element of a sentence is the theme (or rheme) if another device .has already been used to indicate the opposite. 4( PASSIVES, PRONOUNS, AN THEMES AND RHEMES John Hinds January, 1 974 O. In this paper I intend to demonstrate that the "direct discourse analysis" introduced in Susumu Kuno's paper entitled "Pronominalization, reflexivizatiori, and direct discourse" III:161-961 is invalid. In many respects this is a difficult chore, since I find myself in almost complete disagreement with Kuno's grammaticality judgVments concerning his crucial examples. 1 This makes a refutation of his analysis diyicult, because a simile reanalysis of the data UsinE my grammaticality judgfements would devolve in to the (sometimes) relatively sophiSticated name-calling game referred to as "In my dialect, . . ." The problem is that linguistic facts, or raw data, are not objectively, but rather subjectively, determined. That is, in the simplest terms, the use of intuitions to determine grammatical-ungraruniatica.1 sequences constitutes a value judgment. In this regard, Kaplan (1964:370ff) points out that value judgments are in fact necessary for scientific investigation, but also that "there are real difficulties in the empirical validation of value judgments." (397) Unfortunately, he provides us with no answer to the question of how to valllate -value judgments, nor do I have a reasonable suggestion for this

Ethical issues of military leadership

Abstract: : I would like to emphasize four pressing ethical issues for leaders in the military establishment to consider. The first is the danger posed by the acceptance of various forms of "ethical relativism," or the blurring of right from wrong. It appears obvious that the erosion of a sense of right and wrong in favor of a "no-fault" society poses a threat to sound ethical judgments. A second ethical issue every military leader should face is what I call the "loyalty syndrome." This is the practice wherein questions of right or wrong are subordinated to the overriding value of loyalty to the boss. Loyalty, an admirable and necessary quality within limits, can become all-consuming. It also becomes dangerous when a genuine, wholesome loyalty to the boss degenerates into covering up for him, hiding things from him, or not differing with him when he is wrong. Concern about what might turn out to be an "embarrassing situation" leads into a third ethical trap on which we've been particularly hung-up for years in the Army, namely, the anxious worry over image. We frequently run scared; instead of acting upon what is right, we often hear: "You know, if we do this, it'll be embarrassing to the Army's image." Whereas with the loyalty syndrome people are reluctant to tell the truth, with the image syndrome they aren't even interested in it. What becomes important is how things are perceived, rather than how things really are. Thus, a dream world of image is created which is often different from the world of reality. A fourth ethical trouble spot in our military experience involves the drive for success. This is the masochistic whip by which, sometimes, we punish ourselves and by which we sometimes are beaten sadistically by others. In the Army, we must insure that the ambition of the professional soldier can move him along the path of career advancement only as he makes frequent azimuth checks with his ethical compass.

The New Religious Consciousness and the Secular University.

Abstract: One way of getting at the ethos of the secular university today is to characterize its central value as "cognitive rationality," the concept developed by Talcott Parsons in his recent work. Parsons is probably right in saying, that this is the central value around which the university is organized. But I am not quite so happy about that fact as Parsons tends to be. It is not, as I think will be evident, that I don't respect cognitive rationality, but that I think there are other things in the world with which the university might be concerned as well. At its best, "cognitive rationality" means "disciplined knowing," not simply the acquisition of knowledge, the sheer intake of the finished product. Disciplined knowing is not just learning what has already been discovered, but learning to learn, the process of inquiry itself. This statement of the normative commitment, the basic value system of the secular university, obviously has a link to traditional, philosophical, and religious commitments and to traditions of education that stretch back far before the emergence of the secular university. The pursuit of truth for its own sake can become, and has become, a kind of supreme rationality, like that which Spinoza expresses in the notion of the intellec tual love of God. In its more traditional, philosophical, and religious forms, there is a point at which rationality transcends itself, merges with nonrational ways of know ing, and becomes one way of attaining the vision of divine truth, of ultimate reality. Even when that particular chain of connections is not made in traditional ways of thinking about the pursuit of knowledge, the quest of reason has been seen as in volved in a complex of human activities that includes feeling, moral evaluation, and action in the world. For most of what the secular university does, however, cognitive rationality or disciplined knowing does not go beyond a simple desire to understand things?how they operate, why they came to be, and what they may do next. But even in that relatively mundane form, cognitive rationality exists precariously in the university. It exists on sufferance, so to speak, in relation to a pervasive notion in our culture that, after all, knowing is not an end in itself. It is simply a means. Knowledge is a tool for the manipulation of the world. The pervasive emphasis on the manipulative, instrumental use of knowledge has tended to make of the university a kind of uni versal filling station where students tank up on knowledge they will "need" later. The idea of the university which Clark Kerr presented not many years ago, the so called "multiversity" catering to the numerous knowledge needs of a diverse clientele, is perilously close to that image. In this image, all university education becomes professional education, and there is great pressure in that direction, par ticularly perhaps in state universities. The ethos behind this conception of education is very general in the culture. It is rooted in the deep American value of pragmatism and is intense at the moment partly because of a resurgence of old ways of thinking in the society, and partly because of a curious convergence in this matter ?10

Experiential learning groups.

Abstract: This article provides descriptive guidelines to experiential groups for prospective participants. The statement may also be useful to leaders and of interest to other readers seeking a concrete view of working principles. The guidelines reflect value choices among possible goals in human living. One overarching value principle is that individuals should have the opportunity to be a principal architect of their own being and becoming. (1) Once a group begins, all persons belong because they are there. (2) A first purpose is to gain a sense of one another as inwardly active, feeling, thinking persons. (3) Each group member endeavors to be personal, direct and specific in communications. (4) Each of us listens to the other, not always with patience or sensitivity but generally with a concern to know what the other is experiencing. (5) We let our inner feelings of relatedness show as these feelings arise in us. (6) The group is a place for honesty and realism. (7) Group members are not seeking to sit in judgment on each other. (8) People in the group are responsible for themselves and to others. (9) We often provide each other with personal feedback. (10) What we express can be expected to call forth varied responses in different others. (11) Decisions involving some new or altered plan for the whole group are shared in by all members. (12) The group leader is a member of the group, with purposes and needs and "uniqueness," like everyone else.

What Should Undergraduate Education Do

Abstract: At the abstract level of desirable goals, there is wide agreement on what an ideal undergraduate education should do. The liberally educated man or woman who is the ideal college graduate should have a well-developed capacity and taste for critical thought, especially in relation to problems of value?what constitutes the good or virtuous or beautiful life, the model society. He should also command what might be called the techniques and habits of learning so that he is able to continue the educational process in a self-motivated and self-directed way. And, finally, he should master some defined body of knowledge: "the common culture of society." In some formulations, the second and third of these desiderata are subservient to the first, and the whole might be characterized in the phrase "the formation of in formed, inquiring, and critical minds." So much for agreed ends. There is less agreement among the relevant publics of academics and academic administrators on the extent to which this goal is presently being achieved or can be achieved. If we move further from the general description of desirable ends to a concrete consideration of the means for reaching them, con sensus vanishes entirely. In its stead, we find a wide variety of practices interpreted in an even wider variety of rationalizations. In practice, college education viewed over the whole spectrum of institutions that offer the four-year B.A. or B.S. degree today is a supermarket in which each student is expected to do his own thing by choosing from the enormously wide dis play. Within particular institutions, of course, the range is much narrower, although in the great universities it encompasses a large part of the whole. The supermarket is rarely justified as such in educational theory. Indeed, the most vocal comment on it from the academic world is hostile, cast in terms of the continuing centrality of liberal education. The ruling concept of liberal education today is usually defined as serious in volvement with the various kinds of intellectual experience represented by the humanities, the natural sciences, the social sciences, and, more recently, the (non verbal) arts?combined with some degree of deeper entry into one of them. Degree requirements in the liberal arts colleges and the undergraduate colleges of the great universities still reflect this formula, though with increasingly frequent exceptions. And, to a degree, we all share a belief in it. Who does not wish to believe that every educated man should have a nontrivial grasp of the various modes of knowing and the diverse products which they yield? If traditional humanists are stubbornly?and properly?unwilling to yield to science a monopoly on claims to valid knowledge, and in particular to the social sciences' claim to valid knowledge of mankind, they usually refrain from asserting publicly that they alone represent what every educated man should know. Natural and social scientists?for the most part, more

The concept of mathemagenic behaviour: an analysis of its heuristic value

Abstract: Summary.-The work of Rothkopf and Frase is reviewed to introduce and refine the concept of mathemagenic behaviour as it developed in the instructional literature. A theoretical underpinning is provided for this concept from studies involving models of memory, and its integration into a broader stream of research is illustrated. The heuristic value of such an integration is shown by consideration of the problem of the poor reader; a detailed analysis of some recent experiments provides leads for future empirical investigations and some developmental applications. Rothkopf's conceptualization of mathemagenic behaviour (as those activities engaged in by S which facilitated learning) directed attention to the importance of the mediating processes used by Ss when engaged in a learning task. The early research concentrated on the effect of questions or test-like events on the learning of prose material, and the most concise summary of findings is presented by Rothkopf ( 1966) : Test-like questions which are presented after reading the relevant text passage have apparently both specific and general facilitative effects on post-reading performance. The general facilitative effects were found to be of the same magnitude as those of specially prepared hortatory directions. Test-like questions which were presented before the relevant text passage was read produced only question-specific facilitative effects. These question-specific effects were greater when the correct answer was given to the student after he made his response. . . . (p. 248). Most research in the area has been concerned wich this effect of question usage, concentrating on optimum spacing of questions (Frase, 1967), the interaction of this wich question placement (before versus after) (Frase, 1968) and the apparent shaping of the effect over time (Morasky & Willcox, 1970; Rothkopf & Bisbicos, 1967). This has clarified the instructional principles involved in the use of questions but has done little to expose the underlying mechanism. In contrast, Frase has carried out a series of experiments on "incidental learning" (which is independent of S's voluntary learning efforts, and which, for the purposes of this paper, will be contrasted with intentional learning); these have focused on the mechanisms involved in some areas of S's mathemagenic behaviours and have done much to formalize present conceptualizations of these activities. The particular studies of interest look at the incidental learning which results from searching prose text for information. It is important to emphasize that Ss are not instructed to learn the material; the task is usually presented as a test of problem-solving ability, and an unexpected content test is given after S has completed the problem.