Showing papers on "Value (ethics) published in 1984"

Collaborative Learning and the "Conversation of Mankind.".

Abstract: eighth or ninth on a list of ten items. Last year it appeared again, first on the list. Teachers of literature have also begun to talk about collaborative learning, although not always by that name. It is viewed as a way of engaging students more deeply with the text and also as an aspect of professors' engagement with the professional community. At its 1978 convention the Modern Language Association scheduled a multi-session forum entitled "Presence, Knowledge, and Authority in the Teaching of Literature." One of the associated sessions, called "Negotiations of Literary Knowledge," included a discussion of the authority and structure (including the collaborative classroom structure) of "interpretive communities." At the 1983 MLA convention collaborative practices in reestablishing authority and value in literary studies were examined under such rubrics as "Talking to the Academic Community: Conferences as Institutions" and "How Books 11 and 12 of Paradise Lost Got to be Valuable" (changes in interpretive attitudes in the community of Miltonists). In both these contexts collaborative learning is discussed sometimes as a process that constitutes fields or disciplines of study and sometimes as a pedagogical tool that "works" in teaching composition and literature. The former discussion, often highly theoretical, usually manages to keep at bay the more

The language of ideology

Abstract: Even in a relatively quiet and sober decade, such as the seventies, one can hardly subscribe to Daniel Belt's evidently premature judgment about "the end of ideology". Ideologies may no longer sound so biased, militant and aggressive as in the days of the Cold War, but they still dominate the whole world of politics and culture. Humankind is still divided into ideologically exclusive camps. Many economic, political and ecological problems cannot be solved in optimal ways for ideological reasons. Rather than withering away, ideologies tend to multiply and grow in complexity. In addition to traditional class struggles, new conflicts break out and new social movements have been generated: those of rebellious youth, oppressed races, women, national and religious communities. Each of them tends to create a new ideology: the New Left, feminism, black racism as opposed to white racism, various forms of nationalism, and of (Zionist and Islamic) religious ideology. Philosophy was never able to preserve its purity from various ideological intrusions. On the contrary, it was philosophers who pro vided theoretical foundations for all three of the most important political ideologies of our times: liberalism, Marxism and fascism. And it could be shown that even the most strictly anti-metaphysical, anti-speculative, consequently anti-ideological contemporary trend that of analytical philosophy tacitly assumes some of the basic premises of liberalism. Now when analytical philosophy is opened up for historical study and value judgments, it will even less be able to keep its distance from ideological considerations. And yet philosophy, because of its commitment to unbiased thinking and universal values, is better equipped than any other form of inquiry to provide a critique of ideology and ideological reasoning. The first question we have to discuss is then the following: What is ideology? How can it be distinguished from philosophy, science, and rhetorics? What are the basic logical characteristics of the language of ideology?

The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self

Abstract: O gLITICAL PHILOSOPHY seems often to reside at a distance from the world. Principles are one thing, politics another, and even our best efforts to "live up" to our ideals typically founder on the gap between theory and practice.' But if political philosophy is unrealizable in one sense, it is unavoidable in another. This is the sense in which philosophy inhabits the world from the start; our practices and institutions are embodiments of theory. To engage in a political practice is already to stand in relation to theory.2 For all our uncertainties about ultimate questions of political philosophy-of justice and value and the nature of the good life-the one thing we know is that we live some answer all the time. In this essay I will try to explore the answer we live now, in contemporary America. What is the political philosophy implicit in our practices and institutions? How does it stand, as philosophy? And how do tensions in the philosophy find expression in our present political condition? It may be objected that it is a mistake to look for a single philosophy, that we live no "answer," only answers. But a plurality of answers is itself a kind of answer. And the political theory that affirms this plurality is the theory I propose to explore.

Tradition, genuine or spurious.

Abstract: LIKE MANY SCHOLARLY CONCEPTS, "tradition" is at once a commonsense and a scientific category. In its commonsense meaning, tradition refers to an inherited body of customs and beliefs. In the social sciences, an ongoing discourse has attempted to refine this understanding of tradition as it has proven empirically and theoretically inadequate. Recent efforts to clarify the concept of tradition, most notably those of Edward Shils (1971, 1981), do much to add nuance to our conventional understanding but leave unresolved a major ambiguity: does tradition refer to a core of inherited culture traits whose continuity and boundedness are analogous to that of a natural object, or must tradition be understood as a wholly symbolic construction? We will argue that the latter is the only viable understanding-a conclusion we have arrived at by comparing our independent investigations in two quite disparate ethnographic situations. In our attempts to analyze national and ethnic identification in Quebec and Hawaii we have concluded that tradition cannot be defined in terms of boundedness, givenness, or essence. Rather, tradition refers to an interpretive process that embodies both continuity and discontinuity. As a scientific concept, tradition fails when those who use it are unable to detach it from the implications of Western common sense, which presumes that an unchanging core of ideas and customs is always handed down to us from the past. As many writers have noted (e.g., Eisenstadt 1973; Rudolph and Rudolph 1967; Singer 1972; Tipps 1973), one inadequacy of the conventional understanding of tradition is that it posits a false dichotomy between tradition and modernity as fixed and mutually exclusive states. M. E. Smith (1982) has pointed out that "traditional" and "new" are interpretive rather than descriptive terms: since all cultures change ceaselessly, there can only be what is new, although what is new can take on symbolic value as "traditional." Following Smith's lead, we can see that designating any part of culture as old or new, traditional or modern, has two problematic implications. First, this approach encourages us to see culture and tradition naturalistically, as bounded entities made up of constituent parts that are themselves bounded objects. Second, in this atomistic paradigm we treat culture and its constituents as entities having an essence apart from our interpretation of them; we attempt to specify, for example, which trait is old, which new, and to show how traits fit

Toward a Conception of Culture for Cross-Cultural Psychology

Abstract: The concept "culture" in cross-cultural psychology remains largely unexamined theoretically, and is often undifferentiated from other core behavioral science concepts such as "social system" and "society." As a result, the theoretical usefulness and research value of these constructs have been diminished seriously. In order to provide the beginnings of a theory of "culture" for heuristic use in cross-cultural psychology, an attempt is made in this article first, to differentiate conceptually, and second, to interrelate the packaged variables of "culture," "social system," and "society." The intent of this article is to promote the framework for shared understanding about culture and its relation to the other core concepts discussed here, and hence to initiate a dialogue within cross-cultural psychology about the utility of the conceptualization.

Environmental Ethics and Weak Anthropocentrism

Abstract: This chapter suggests that the distinction between anthropocentrism and nonanthropocentrism has been given more importance in discussions of the foundations of environmental ethics than it warrants because a crucial ambiguity in the term anthropocentrism has gone unnoticed. There are two forms of anthropocentrism, weak and strong, and weak anthropocentrism is adequate to support an environmental ethic. Environmental ethics is, however, distinctive vis-a-vis standard British and American ethical systems because, in order to be adequate, it must be nonindividualistic. Weak anthropocentrism provides a basis for criticizing individual, consumptive needs and can provide the basis for adjudicating between these levels, thereby providing an adequate basis for environmental ethics without the questionable ontological commitments made by nonanthropocentrists in attributing intrinsic value to nature. Anthropocentrists are therefore taken to believe that every instance of value originates in a contribution to human values and that all elements of nature can, at most, have value instrumental to the satisfaction of human interests.

What Works in Teaching Composition: A Meta-Analysis of Experimental Treatment Studies.

Abstract: As one part of a comprehensive review of research related to the teaching of composition, I have conducted an integrative review or meta-analysis of experimental treatment studies completed from 1963 through 1982. Among many researchers in the field of composition, such studies are currently in disrepute. Cooper and Odell (1978, p. xiii) claim that the authors included in their Research on Composing share "one audacious aim-that of redirecting and revitalizing research in written composition." Their aim was to redirect research away from the kind of experimental studies summarized by Braddock, LloydJones, and Schoer in 1963. They argue that the Braddock et al. review was based on the assumption that "We already had a thorough understanding of written products and processes" (p. xiv), an assumption that Cooper, Odell, and their co-authors see as unwarranted. They believe that "ultimately, comparison-group research may enable us to improve instruction in writing" (p. xiv), but not before such research is "informed by carefully tested theory and by descriptions of written discourse and the processes by which that discourse comes into being" (p. xiv). Emig (1982) sees much less promise for "comparison group" studies. Her attack is launched against the whole "positivist" research "paradigm," by which she apparently means testing hypotheses in experimental designs in or out of laboratories. The most vituperative attack against experimental studies was launched by Graves (1980). He claims that such research in writing is "an exercise for students to apply courses in statistics to their dissertations" (p. 914). Referring to experimental studies conducted between 1955 and 1972, Graves claims that most of this research "wasn't readable and was of limited value. It couldn't help teachers in the classroom"

A Comparison of Multiple Constituency Models of Organizational Effectiveness

Abstract: Four sets of multiple constituency models of organizational effectiveness, which employ relativistic, power, social justice, and evolutionary perspectives, are reviewed. Comparison of these perspectives shows that the construct of organizational effectiveness is both value-based and time-specific. The implications of these findings are examined in the form of potential directions for research on organizational effectiveness.

From Knowledge to Wisdom: A Revolution in the Aims and Methods of Science

Abstract: This book argues for the need to put into practice a profound and comprehensive intellectual revolution, affecting to a greater or lesser extent all branches of scientific and technological research, scholarship and education. This intellectual revolution differs, however, from the now familiar kind of scientific revolution described by Kuhn. It does not primarily involve a radical change in what we take to be knowledge about some aspect of the world, a change of paradigm. Rather it involves a radical change in the fundamental, overall intellectual aims and methods of inquiry. At present inquiry is devoted to the enhancement of knowledge. This needs to be transformed into a kind of rational inquiry having as its basic aim to enhance personal and social wisdom. This new kind of inquiry gives intellectual priority to the personal and social problems we encounter in our lives as we strive to realize what is desirable and of value – problems of knowledge and technology being intellectually subordinate and secondary. For this new kind of inquiry, it is what we do and what we are that ultimately matters: our knowledge is but an aspect of our life and being.

Social Judgment Theory

Abstract: This chapter discusses the social judgment theory. Social judgment theory is a variation of information processing theory. The theory began with the studies of message perception reported by Sherif and Hovland (1961), who found that receivers do not react neutrally to messages, rather they judge messages as being acceptable or not. This judgment is highly predictable from the discrepancy between message value and the attitude of the receiver. If the discrepancy between message and attitude is small, then the receiver judges the message to be acceptable. However, if the discrepancy is large, then the receiver will judge the message to be biased or distorted and not acceptable. This phenomenon is described in terms of latitudes of acceptance and latitudes of rejection. The latitude of acceptance is centered about the attitude value of the perceiver and represents a region of small message-attitude discrepancy. On either side of the latitude of acceptance, there is a latitude of rejection that contains messages that are highly discrepant in one direction or the other.

The Man-Of-Words In The West Indies: Performance And The Emergence Of Creole Culture

Abstract: This is a significant volume of essays-significant because they show one man's development and refinement of a folkloristic theory, significant because the theory is representative of the performance-centered school of folkloristics, and significant because through his analysis, Abrahams touches the very core of the British West Indian cultural system and places West Indian creativity within a cultural and historical framework. Abrahams brings not only the field of folkloristic theory to bear on his fieldwork, but those of sociolinguistics, ethnography of communication, symbolic interactionism, and symbolic anthropology as well. The author's major focus is the "man-of-words" and his role of the verbal performer in the English-speaking Caribbean. As Abrahams tells us in his introduction, through these essays he "attempts to establish the presence and importance of a performance complex, a set of traits that articulate expressive relationships" (p. xv). His fieldwork was conducted in the 1960s and early 1970s on the islands of Nevis, St. Kitts, Tobago, and St. Vincent. Abrahams is careful to establish West Indian speech traditions as adaptations of African style to New World language. He points to "the continuity of African attitudes toward eloquence and the adaptation of selected European forms into this value and performance system" (p. 33). Abrahams also takes pains to develop the Afro-American term "play" as opposed to "work." While work is defined as a cooperative activity, play is referred to as a performance or means of publicly asserting one's individuality. Play is given a negative connotation as being the means of acting out "behaviors regarded as bad," but also provides "a means of channeling the energies of all those in the performance environment" (p. 53). Abrahams distinguishes two different men-of-words: "good talkers" and "good arguers." This distinction lies at the heart of the book, for the men-of-words function at different kinds of traditional performances. These different kinds of performances represent a basic point of conflict within the West Indian social structure: differences that are "spatial, temporal and social," and that "operate in virtually every facet of village life-and perhaps elsewhere in Afro-America" (p. xvii). On the one hand, there is the family and yard where people are supposed to "live nice" together. This is the realm of order, decorum, and respectability. The second is the world of the rum shop, the crossroads, and the town: the realm of license and gregarious camaraderie. It is the world that takes the men out of the home and yard. Here a man makes his reputation, a "reputation established by dramatic performance" (p. 146) by exhibiting his male prowess and masculinity. Here the friendship network rather than family ties hold sway; playing rather than working cooperatively is the major focus. The good talker or sweet talker is representative of the world of order, of family, yard, decorum, and respectability. He speaks eloquently, employing elevated diction, elaborate stylistic features, and an approximation of standard English speech patterns. This is the speech of community celebration. On the other hand, the good arguer employs invective, creole that emphasizes dialogue and punning, and generally wit through wordplay leading to talking nonsense and a language of license (p. 39). This is the primary means of both entertainment and communication in the world of the town and crossroads. Even festival performances underscore this dichotomy between the respectability of family, continuity, home, order, and tradition, and the reputation values of friendships, male meeting 472

Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics

Abstract: OVER the last decade, environmental ethics has emerged as a new subdiscipline of moral philosophy. As with anything new in philosophy or the sciences, there has been some controversy, not only about its legitimacy, but about its very identity or definition. The question of legitimacy has been settled more or less by default: profes? sional philosophical interest in environmental philosophy seems to be growing as, certainly, work in the field proliferates. The question of identity? just what is environmental ethics??has not been so ingenuous. Environmental ethics may be understood to be but one among several new sorts of applied philosophies, the others of which also arose during the seventies. That is, it may be understood to be an application of well-established conventional philosophical categories to emergent practical environmental problems. On the other hand, it may be understood to be an exploration of alternative moral and even metaphysical principles, forced upon philosophy by the magnitude and recalcitr? ance of these problems.1 If defined in the former way, then the work of environmental ethics is that of a philosophical yeoman or underlaborer (to employ Locke's self appraisal); if defined in the latter way, it is that of a theoretician or philosophical architect (as in Descartes' self image). If interpreted as an essentially theoretical, not applied discipline, the most important philosophical task for environmental ethics is the development of a non-anthropocentric value theory.2 Indeed, as the discussion which follows will make clear, without a non-anthropocentric axiology the revolutionary aspirations of theoretical environmental ethics would be betrayed and the whole enterprise would collapse into its more work? aday, applied counterpart. The subject of this paper, accordingly, is a synoptic and critical review of various proferred candidates for a non-anthropocentric value theory for environmental ethics. Ethical hedonism and

Autonomy: a moral good, not a moral obsession.

Abstract: KIE: While acknowledging the value of respect for autonomy as a means of establishing moral independence for the individual, Callahan sees a danger in making autonomy the moral goal of a society or of a system of medical care. He discusses its shortcomings as a form of subjectivism that may end up being used as a justification for selfishness. Accordingly, autonomy should be considered a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a moral life; what is needed as well is a broader ethic that incorporates obligations to others and builds bonds of community.

Effects of personal values, perceived surveillance, and task labels on task preference: The ideology of turning play into work

Abstract: Case Western Reserve UniversityIn Experiment 1, subjects who endorsed the work ethic spent more free-choicetime performing the target activity that had been labeled as "work" than didsubjects who opposed the work ethic The effect was eliminated or reversed if theactivity had been labeled as a leisure pastime. Experiment 2 demonstrated thatthe relation between personal values and task preference was mediated in somesubjects by a belief that the experimenter would know what they did, whereas othersubjects seemed unaffected by that belief. Implications for intrinsic motivation andfor attitude-behavior consistency are discussed In particular, "turning play intowork" by means of explicit labels may increase intrinsic motivation among personswho truly value work.

Meaning and Scientific Change

Abstract: In the past decade, a revolution — or at least a rebellion — has occurred in the philosophy of science. Views have been advanced which claim to be radically new not only in their doctrines about science and its evolution and structure, but also in their conceptions of the methods appropriate to solving the problems of the philosophy of science, and even as to what those problems themselves are. It will be the primary purpose of this paper to examine some of the tenets of this revolution, in order to determine what there is in them of permanent value for all people who wish to understand the nature of science.

“I'm the thinkist, you're the typist”: The Interaction of Technology and the Social Life of Classrooms

Abstract: The experimental research approach has some limitations when used to understand the effects of the recent introduction of computers on the social context of classrooms. Rather than looking for effects per se, an alternate framework is used to study the places and processes of change that accompany the use of new technologies. The authors outline two critical elements of the process by which computers are incorporated into the social context of the classroom. First, teachers' interpretations of the meaning of the software–its purpose and value, and whether it has a legitimate relationship to traditional curricular areas and modes of learning – will play a central role in how and whether computers become an integral part of the classroom. Second, teachers' and students' views regarding the new kinds of learning interactions often arising when working with computers, namely, the legitimacy of collaborative work and child experts, will also have a powerful influence in shaping the role of computers. The paper concludes with a discussion of how computers may enable teachers and students to learn new things about and through the technology, as well as provide opportunities for rethinking the learning agendas and the organization of learning interactions currently employed by schools.

Socialization in traditional society: a challenge to psychology

Abstract: This paper discusses problems of Third-World psychology and its potential relevance for development. Child socialization in the traditional society is discussed as an example of a problem area where psychology could have an impact in the Third World. Specifically, the concept of autonomy is analyzed within the context of socialization as an illustration of the difficulty faced in the unquestioned application of Western psychology in non-Western society. Some of the findings of the cross-cultural Value of Children Study are examined as a case in point. On the basis of the above discussions, a challenge to psychology is put forward both for its own sake as a science of human behavior and also for the sake of humanity.

Liberty A Better Husband: Single Women in America: The Generations of 1780-1840

Abstract: This sensitive account focuses on the women who chose to remain single in antebellum America. Based on a study of the lives and writings of over one hundred Northeastern women, it describes the reasons why they rejected marriage and the joys and frustrations they encountered in adhering to the tenets of the cult of "Single Blessedness." By demonstrating how these women asserted themselves as individuals, Chambers-Schiller presents them as among the first to articulate the value of female autonomy and as pioneers in expanding the boundaries of women's progress toward equality.

Explanation: A First Pass.

Abstract: : The author discusses some of the issues surrounding the problem of explanation. He asks: Why do we need to send and receive these explanations? What is their value? After we explain a thing to ourselves or accept the explantation of another, what becomes of it? What is the point of these explanations? What is their role in the learning process? What do they tell us about what it means to be intelligent? For some people, explanations do not play a big role. Many people are willing to observe events that would disturb others, and attribute these events to inexplicable circumstances. What is the difference between people who search for explanations for everything and those who do not require them? What are they doing differently? Is curiosity the major factor with little more significance than the entertainment value of the explanation? Is there some emotional satisfaction derived from knowing why things have happened the way they did, or, is something more significant afoot? Keywords: Understanding, Reminding, and Memory.

A Liberal Theory of Exploitation

Abstract: A common suggestion is that liberalism intrinsically lacks an adequate theory of exploitation. Eschewing any conception of objective value or human needs, agnostic as between different tastes and preferences, dismissive of irreducibly holist or functionalist explanations of social interaction, it commits itself only to the primacy of personal rights and liberties and to individual choice as the basic explanatory datum of social phenomena. Such an impoverished commitment, it is claimed, renders liberalism conceptually incapable of either identifying or abolishing many significant forms of exploitation. The argument which follows aims to refute this claim. I

The Pediatric Perspective

Abstract: Pediatricians vary in their perceptions of child psychiatrists and of the value of diagnosis and treatment by child psychiatrists. They also differ as to problems which they will refer for consultations. This chapter discusses the reasons for these differences and presents a brief review of the literature, as well as opinions of the author and a selected group of practitioners and acedemicians as to what problems should have psychiatric consultation. Poor school performance and adjustment is mentioned. The choice of consultation and practice setting, as well as the use of other mental health professionals, is discussed. Lastly, the chapter outlines obligations of both the referring physician and the consultant, regarding use of child psychiatrists, and causes of patients’ failure to get maximum benefit from a consultation.

Continuing problems with self-efficacy theory: A reply to Bandura

Abstract: The major points of Bandura's response to our critique are discussed in this paper. There remain problems both at the theoretical and the methodological levels with self-efficacy theory. We highlight the difficulty of defining self-efficacy theory without reference to outcome considerations. We reiterate our disquiet concerning the methodology usedby Bandura in the assessment of self-efficacy. We conclude that the value of self-efficacy theory both at a theoretical and at a practical level remains to be demonstrated.

Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft: Testing the Spatial and Communal Hypotheses

Abstract: Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft often have been and still are equated with the rural-urban continuum and are employed to describe the "way of life" or the "moral basis" for rural/urban living. By employing common American values that seem to represent Gemeinschaftliche or Gesellschaftliche attributes, this article (1) explicates the value basis for the two concepts and (2) tests for the spatial (rural-urban) hypothesis and the communal (collectivistic-individualistic) hypothesis. In 1887 Toennies introduced the terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, which have "proved to be one of the discipline's most enduring and fruitful concepts for studying social change" (Bender, 17). Gemeinschaft describes binding, primary interactional relationships based on sentiment; while Gesellschaft describes an interactional system characterized by selfinterest, competition, and negotiated accommodation. Much of rural and urban sociological theory has looked to these concepts as "ideal types." Fischer (a) observes that, even in advanced industrial societies like the United States, different ways of life are ascribed to people in urban and rural areas. While Toennies' concepts continue to be used to describe different ways of living, little empirical research has been generated to document this relationship. Kasarda and Janowitz point out that Toennies' concepts encompass general philosophical ideas and value conditions that describe more of a "reasoned moral position" than a plan "for empirical research" (329). When the concepts are used for empirical research, indicators selected often equate the concepts with an ecological (rural-urban or city *This research was partially supported by the Kentucky Agricultural Experiment Station Project #825, journal article #82-14-50, and is published with approval of the Director. I appreciate the helpful comments of Louis Swanson, Jim Copp, Harry Cohen, Don Dillman, Andy Deseran, Will Goudy, Al Luloff, Keith Warner, and Ken Wilkinson. Address correspondence to the author, Department of Sociology, S-205 Agricultural Sciences Center, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY 40506. ? 1984 The University of North Carolina Press

William Perry and Liberal Education

Abstract: The work of psychologist William G. Perry, Jr. has attracted much attention recently from college writing teachers who seek a developmental model to inform composition courses and writing-across-the-curriculum programs. To assess Perry's usefulness to writing instruction, I would like first to summarize his work, giving his own interpretation of its significance, and then to say how I think we should, and should not, use it. After taking a BA in psychology at Harvard College, Perry began his academic career teaching English literature at Williams College. In 1947 he returned to Harvard to head the Bureau of Study Counsel, and there he performed the research that led to the publication of his influential book, Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years: A Scheme (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968). Perry describes how college students pass from childhood to adulthood by moving through nine developmental positions. The shape of this process and the nature of the positions were defined through a series of interviews with Harvard undergraduate men in each of their four years in college. Perry's nine-position scheme chronicles movement through three world views, "Dualism," "Relativism," and "Commitment in Relativism." The young person typically passes through them in this order, sometimes pausing or backtracking. Each world view shapes value judgments on religion, politics, family relations, and so on. Drawing on the student interviews, Perry depicts each world view primarily in terms of the young person's attitude toward schoolwork. The first world view, "Dualism," is characterized by the belief that everything in the world can be ordered in one of two categories-right or wrong. These categories are defined by axiomatic statements or "Absolutes," which are possessed by "Authority," adults who have perfect knowledge of the Absolutes. The proper task of Authority is to convey the Absolutes to the ignorant. For the dualist, knowing the world means memorizing the Absolutes and applying them to individual instances. For the student Dualist, education is a process of finding right answers (correct applications of Absolutes), with the help of the teacher (Authority). The student Dualist resists exploring academic problems that have

Respecting the autonomy of competent patients.

Abstract: The weight of recent opinion, as well as a new body of law, supports the rights of competent adults to have information about their medical condition and to participate in decisions concerning their health.1 2 3 4 5 This is not to say that patients are invited to make technical decisions that they may not be qualified to make; rather, they have the right to make the value judgments that are a part of most important medical decisions and that they are uniquely qualified to make. The article by Bedell and Delbanco in this issue of the Journal tells us something about how the . . .

Multiculturalism and an Overarching Framework of Values: some educational responses for ethnically plural societies

Abstract: In a society composed of more than one ethnic group, there can exist a variety of relationships between the dominant (frequently the majority) group and the minorities (Smolicz, 1979). If such a society is governed by a degree of consensus, rather than coercion, there must have evolved a set of shared values that oznerarch the various ethnic groups. Within such a cultural 'umbrella', ethnic groups may retain certain core values, such as a distinct language, family tradition or religion (Smolicz, 1981a) . We thus have a dynamic equilibrium established between the overarching or shared values of the country, on the one hand, and ethnic core values on the other. The dominant group exhibits its own set of majority values, many of which have percolated into the overarching framework. Such shared values should not be regarded, however, as the majority's own 'private domain', but as the common possession of all the citizens. To take an example, the overarching framework that has evolved in Australian society relates to the upholding of the western democratic political tradition; the concept of man as worthy of freedom and respect; economic pluralism whereby individuals can advance themselves according to merit; and the English language as the basic value for all Australians. Although these shared values may largely originate in the heritage of the Anglo-Saxon group, they ultimately become the property of all groups. There is, for example, an accumulation of research evidence that ethnic groups recognise the importance of English as an overarching value, in the sense that it is indispensable for communication among all Australians and the principal vehicle for the political, economic, and legal activities of society (Marioribanks, 1979, 1980; Smolicz & Secombe, 1977, 1983). However, the acceptance of English by all the ethnic groups is based upon the understanding that, for those who wish to preserve their native tongue, English represents an additional language, rather than the sole and unique means of communication.

Matthew and Paul: A Comparison of Ethical Perspectives

Abstract: The purpose of this study is to investigate and compare the basic structures of Matthew's and Paul's ethics, rather than to deal in detail with their teaching on specific moral issues. Dr Mohrlang discusses their perspectives under the five headings of 'law', 'reward and punishment', 'relationship to Christ and the role of grace', 'love', and 'inner forces', and gives special attention to the question of ethical motivation. There is no absolute contrast, however, since elements both of law and of grace are found in both writers, and for both it is their understanding of Christ that is decisive. The comparison is highly illuminating, and serves to throw into clear relief the more striking characteristics of each writer's ethical system. It should prove of considerable value to students both of New Testament ethics and of Matthean and Pauline theology and to those interested in the larger question of unity and diversity in the New Testament as a whole.

In defense of the dignity of being human.

Abstract: C ertain concepts-like certain books with cachet-are prominently "displayed" and discussed in intellectual abodes, while remaining essentially unexamined and unexplored. Human dignity is one such concept. "Respect for human dignity," "the right to dignity," "treatment with dignity," and even "death with dignity," all are catch phrases circulating in the current world of ideas. Yet the literature of dignity is a sparse one indeed. The word "dignity" traditionally alluded to the inherent nobility and worth that had been generally ascribed to our species. But in recent times, our decency and our value as a species have been under attack. We are the polluters of the environment, the brutalizers of animals, the war makers and the destroyers of the planet. The groves of academe have been invaded by Tigers and Foxes (and Lorenzes and Singers), all devouring our reputation as a species. What is so special, we are asked, about being human? Well, human beings are special-a glorious discontinuity in the animal kingdom. Sui generis, we are as different from the apes in many ways as the apes are from the amoebas. It is time to enunciate what is so special about being human.

Max Weber and the Dispute over Reason and Value: A Study in Philosophy, Ethics, and Politics

Abstract: Introduction 1. Problems of context and interpretation 2. Reason and decision: Weber's core doctrine and value choices i. The nature of value choice ii. Weber's 'scholarly' value choice iii. Weber's 'political' value choice 3. Weber's political design 4. The Weimar era dispute 5. Words into action: Jaspers and Heidegger 6. Nazism, Fascism and the later dispute 7. The ermergence of the dispute in England i. The English crisis of culture ii. The American context 8. The issue reframed: positivism and value-free social science i. Logical positivism and the dispute 9. the later form of the critique