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Ana B. Ania
Researcher at University of Vienna
Publications - 21
Citations - 550
Ana B. Ania is an academic researcher from University of Vienna. The author has contributed to research in topics: Nash equilibrium & Equilibrium selection. The author has an hindex of 10, co-authored 21 publications receiving 539 citations. Previous affiliations of Ana B. Ania include Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.
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Journal ArticleDOI
The Evolutionary Stability of Perfectly Competitive Behavior
Carlos Alós-Ferrer,Ana B. Ania +1 more
TL;DR: The results obtained are useful to characterize evolutionarily stable strategies in a finite population and to provide evolutionary and dynamic foundations for such behavior when the game satisfies supermodularity conditions.
Posted ContentDOI
The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an Evolutionary Learning Process
TL;DR: In this paper, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) is interpreted as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory, and the best-practise feature and the iterative design of the OMC correspond to the behavioral rule ''imitate the best''.
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An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly
TL;DR: A new approach to model boundedly rational behavior, based on the idea of behavioral principles, is introduced, which is a robust and clear-cut prediction wich, under quadratic costs and arbitrary demand, essentially coincides with the Walrasian equilibrium.
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An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection
TL;DR: It is shown that the Rothschild-Stiglitz outcome arises in the long run if it cinstitutes an equilibrium in the static framework, but also if it is not an equilibrium, provides that firms only experiment with contracts in the vicinity of their current portfolio.
Journal ArticleDOI
Evolutionary stability and Nash equilibrium in finite populations, with an application to price competition
TL;DR: In particular, the authors explores the relation of evolutionary stability to Nash equilibrium in particular classes of games, including constant-sum games, games with weak payoff externalities, and games where imitative decision rules are individually improving.