From the Publisher:
This is the first comprehensive treatment of feed-forward neural networks from the perspective of statistical pattern recognition. After introducing the basic concepts, the book examines techniques for modelling probability density functions and the properties and merits of the multi-layer perceptron and radial basis function network models. Also covered are various forms of error functions, principal algorithms for error function minimalization, learning and generalization in neural networks, and Bayesian techniques and their applications. Designed as a text, with over 100 exercises, this fully up-to-date work will benefit anyone involved in the fields of neural computation and pattern recognition.

/pdf/neural-networks-for-pattern-recognition-34puigiau1.pdf

Neural networks for pattern recognition

https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/DeepLearningInNeuralNetworksOverview.JSchmidhuber2015.pdf

Deep learning in neural networks

A framework is developed to explore the connection between effective optimization algorithms and the problems they are solving. A number of "no free lunch" (NFL) theorems are presented which establish that for any algorithm, any elevated performance over one class of problems is offset by performance over another class. These theorems result in a geometric interpretation of what it means for an algorithm to be well suited to an optimization problem. Applications of the NFL theorems to information-theoretic aspects of optimization and benchmark measures of performance are also presented. Other issues addressed include time-varying optimization problems and a priori "head-to-head" minimax distinctions between optimization algorithms, distinctions that result despite the NFL theorems' enforcing of a type of uniformity over all algorithms.

/pdf/no-free-lunch-theorems-for-optimization-aoo4zkggf4.pdf

No free lunch theorems for optimization

From the Publisher:
Artificial "neural networks" are now widely used as flexible models for regression classification applications, but questions remain regarding what these models mean, and how they can safely be used when training data is limited. Bayesian Learning for Neural Networks shows that Bayesian methods allow complex neural network models to be used without fear of the "overfitting" that can occur with traditional neural network learning methods. Insight into the nature of these complex Bayesian models is provided by a theoretical investigation of the priors over functions that underlie them. Use of these models in practice is made possible using Markov chain Monte Carlo techniques. Both the theoretical and computational aspects of this work are of wider statistical interest, as they contribute to a better understanding of how Bayesian methods can be applied to complex problems. Presupposing only the basic knowledge of probability and statistics, this book should be of interest to many researchers in statistics, engineering, and artificial intelligence. Software for Unix systems that implements the methods described is freely available over the Internet.

Bayesian learning for neural networks

Preface 1. Decision-Theoretic Foundations 1.1 Game Theory, Rationality, and Intelligence 1.2 Basic Concepts of Decision Theory 1.3 Axioms 1.4 The Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem 1.5 Equivalent Representations 1.6 Bayesian Conditional-Probability Systems 1.7 Limitations of the Bayesian Model 1.8 Domination 1.9 Proofs of the Domination Theorems Exercises 2. Basic Models 2.1 Games in Extensive Form 2.2 Strategic Form and the Normal Representation 2.3 Equivalence of Strategic-Form Games 2.4 Reduced Normal Representations 2.5 Elimination of Dominated Strategies 2.6 Multiagent Representations 2.7 Common Knowledge 2.8 Bayesian Games 2.9 Modeling Games with Incomplete Information Exercises 3. Equilibria of Strategic-Form Games 3.1 Domination and Ratonalizability 3.2 Nash Equilibrium 3.3 Computing Nash Equilibria 3.4 Significance of Nash Equilibria 3.5 The Focal-Point Effect 3.6 The Decision-Analytic Approach to Games 3.7 Evolution. Resistance. and Risk Dominance 3.8 Two-Person Zero-Sum Games 3.9 Bayesian Equilibria 3.10 Purification of Randomized Strategies in Equilibria 3.11 Auctions 3.12 Proof of Existence of Equilibrium 3.13 Infinite Strategy Sets Exercises 4. Sequential Equilibria of Extensive-Form Games 4.1 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies 4.2 Equilibria in Behavioral Strategies 4.3 Sequential Rationality at Information States with Positive Probability 4.4 Consistent Beliefs and Sequential Rationality at All Information States 4.5 Computing Sequential Equilibria 4.6 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria 4.7 Games with Perfect Information 4.8 Adding Chance Events with Small Probability 4.9 Forward Induction 4.10 Voting and Binary Agendas 4.11 Technical Proofs Exercises 5. Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Perfect Equilibria 5.3 Existence of Perfect and Sequential Equilibria 5.4 Proper Equilibria 5.5 Persistent Equilibria 5.6 Stable Sets 01 Equilibria 5.7 Generic Properties 5.8 Conclusions Exercises 6. Games with Communication 6.1 Contracts and Correlated Strategies 6.2 Correlated Equilibria 6.3 Bayesian Games with Communication 6.4 Bayesian Collective-Choice Problems and Bayesian Bargaining Problems 6.5 Trading Problems with Linear Utility 6.6 General Participation Constraints for Bayesian Games with Contracts 6.7 Sender-Receiver Games 6.8 Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria 6.9 Communication in Extensive-Form and Multistage Games Exercises Bibliographic Note 7. Repeated Games 7.1 The Repeated Prisoners Dilemma 7.2 A General Model of Repeated Garnet 7.3 Stationary Equilibria of Repeated Games with Complete State Information and Discounting 7.4 Repeated Games with Standard Information: Examples 7.5 General Feasibility Theorems for Standard Repeated Games 7.6 Finitely Repeated Games and the Role of Initial Doubt 7.7 Imperfect Observability of Moves 7.8 Repeated Wines in Large Decentralized Groups 7.9 Repeated Games with Incomplete Information 7.10 Continuous Time 7.11 Evolutionary Simulation of Repeated Games Exercises 8. Bargaining and Cooperation in Two-Person Games 8.1 Noncooperative Foundations of Cooperative Game Theory 8.2 Two-Person Bargaining Problems and the Nash Bargaining Solution 8.3 Interpersonal Comparisons of Weighted Utility 8.4 Transferable Utility 8.5 Rational Threats 8.6 Other Bargaining Solutions 8.7 An Alternating-Offer Bargaining Game 8.8 An Alternating-Offer Game with Incomplete Information 8.9 A Discrete Alternating-Offer Game 8.10 Renegotiation Exercises 9. Coalitions in Cooperative Games 9.1 Introduction to Coalitional Analysis 9.2 Characteristic Functions with Transferable Utility 9.3 The Core 9.4 The Shapkey Value 9.5 Values with Cooperation Structures 9.6 Other Solution Concepts 9.7 Colational Games with Nontransferable Utility 9.8 Cores without Transferable Utility 9.9 Values without Transferable Utility Exercises Bibliographic Note 10. Cooperation under Uncertainty 10.1 Introduction 10.2 Concepts of Efficiency 10.3 An Example 10.4 Ex Post Inefficiency and Subsequent Oilers 10.5 Computing Incentive-Efficient Mechanisms 10.6 Inscrutability and Durability 10.7 Mechanism Selection by an Informed Principal 10.8 Neutral Bargaining Solutions 10.9 Dynamic Matching Processes with Incomplete Information Exercises Bibliography Index

博弈论 : 矛盾冲突分析 = Game theory : analysis of conflict

This article presents several additive corrections to the conventional quadratic loss bias-plus-variance formula. One of these corrections is appropriate when both the target is not fixed (as in Bayesian analysis) and training sets are averaged over (as in the conventional bias plus variance formula). Another additive correction casts conventional fixed-trainingset Bayesian analysis directly in terms of bias plus variance. Another correction is appropriate for measuring full generalization error over a test set rather than (as with conventional bias plus variance) error at a single point. Yet another correction can help explain the recent counterintuitive bias-variance decomposition of Friedman for zero-one loss. After presenting these corrections, this article discusses some other loss function-specific aspects of supervised learning. In particular, there is a discussion of the fact that if the loss function is a metric (e.g., zero-one loss), then there is bound on the change in generalization error acco...

On bias plus variance

Recent years have seen increased interest in the design and deployment of smart grid devices and control algorithms. Each of these smart communicating devices represents a potential access point for an intruder spurring research into intruder prevention and detection. However, no security measures are complete, and intruding attackers will compromise smart grid devices leading to the attacker and the system operator interacting via the grid and its control systems. The outcome of these machine-mediated human-human interactions will depend on the design of the physical and control systems mediating the interactions. If these outcomes can be predicted via simulation, they can be used as a tool for designing attack-resilient grids and control systems. However, accurate predictions require good models of not just the physical and control systems, but also of the human decision making. In this manuscript, we present an approach to develop such tools, i.e. models of the decisions of the cyber-physical intruder who is attacking the systems and the system operator who is defending it, and demonstrate its usefulness for design.

Cyber-Physical Security: A Game Theory Model of Humans Interacting over Control Systems

Recent years have seen increased interest in the design and deployment of smart grid devices and control algorithms. Each of these smart communicating devices represents a potential access point for an intruder spurring research into intruder prevention and detection. However, no security measures are complete, and intruding attackers will compromise smart grid devices leading to the attacker and the system operator interacting via the grid and its control systems. The outcome of these machine-mediated human-human interactions will depend on the design of the physical and control systems mediating the interactions. If these outcomes can be predicted via simulation, they can be used as a tool for designing attack-resilient grids and control systems. However, accurate predictions require good models of not just the physical and control systems, but also of the human decision making. In this manuscript, we present an approach to develop such tools, i.e., models of the decisions of the cyber-physical intruder who is attacking the systems and the system operator who is defending it, and demonstrate its usefulness for design.

Cyber-Physical Security: A Game Theory Model of Humans Interacting Over Control Systems

We adapt the method used by Jaynes to derive the equilibria of statistical physics to instead derive equilibria of bounded rational game theory. We analyze the dependence of these equilibria on the parameters of the underlying game, focusing on hysteresis effects. In particular, we show that by gradually imposing individual-specific tax rates on the players of the game, and then gradually removing those taxes, the players move from a poor equilibrium to one that is better for all of them.

https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1698855_code526048.pdf?abstractid=1698855&mirid=1&type=2

Hysteresis Effects of Changing Parameters of Noncooperative Games

We show how to combine Bayes nets and game theory to predict the behavior of hybrid systems involving both humans and automated components. We call this novel framework “Semi Network-Form Games”, and illustrate it by predicting aircraft pilot behavior in potential near mid-air collisions. At present, at the beginning of such potential collisions, a collision avoidance system in the aircraft cockpit advises the pilots what to do to avoid the collision. However studies of mid-air encounters have found wide variability in pilot responses to avoidance system advisories. In particular, pilots rarely perfectly execute the recommended maneuvers, despite the fact that the collision avoidance system’s effectiveness relies on their doing so. Rather pilots decide their actions based on all information available to them (advisory, instrument readings, visual observations). We show how to build this aspect into a semi network-form game model of the encounter and then present computational simulations of the resultant model.

David H. Wolpert

Papers

On bias plus variance

Cyber-Physical Security: A Game Theory Model of Humans Interacting over Control Systems

Cyber-Physical Security: A Game Theory Model of Humans Interacting Over Control Systems

Hysteresis Effects of Changing Parameters of Noncooperative Games

Game Theoretic Modeling of Pilot Behavior during Mid-Air Encounters