F
Francis Bloch
Researcher at Paris School of Economics
Publications - 117
Citations - 5036
Francis Bloch is an academic researcher from Paris School of Economics. The author has contributed to research in topics: Oligopoly & Public good. The author has an hindex of 31, co-authored 116 publications receiving 4660 citations. Previous affiliations of Francis Bloch include Centre national de la recherche scientifique & École Polytechnique.
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Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed a sequential game of coalition formation when the division of the coalitional surplus is fixed and the payoffs are defined relative to the whole coalition structure and showed that any core stable coalition structure can be attained as a stationary perfect equilibrium of the game.
Posted Content
Terror as a Bargaining Instrument: A Case Study of Dowry Violence in Rural India
TL;DR: In this paper, Bloch and Rao examined how domestic violence may be used as a bargaining instrument, to extract larger dowries from a spouse's family after the marriage, and found that women whose families pay smaller dowries suffer increased risk of marital violence.
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The Formation of Networks with Transfers Among Players
TL;DR: This work examines the formation of networks among a set of players whose payoffs depend on the structure of the network, when players may bargain by promising or demanding transfer payments when forming links.
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Endogenous Structures of Association in Oligopolies
TL;DR: In this article, the formulation of associations of firms in an oligopoly with linear demand is analyzed as a two-stage non-cooperative game, in which firms form associations in order to decrease their costs, and in the second stage they compete on the market.
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Informal Insurance in Social Networks
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the structure of stable insurance networks, in which self-enforcement constraints are satisfied, and find that both thickly connected networks and thin connected networks (such as trees) are likely to be stable, whereas intermediate degrees of connectedness jeopardize stability.