Showing papers by "Gary W. Yohe published in 2010"

Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties

Abstract: These guidance notes are intended to assist Lead Authors of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) in the consistent treatment of uncertainties across all three Working Groups. These notes define a common approach and calibrated language that can be used broadly for developing expert judgments and for evaluating and communicating the degree of certainty in findings of the assessment process. These notes refine background material provided to support the Third and Fourth Assessment Reports [1] and [2]; they represent the results of discussions at a Cross-Working Group Meeting on Consistent Treatment of Uncertainties convened in July of 2010 [3]. They also address key elements of the recommendations made by the 2010 independent review of the IPCC by the InterAcademy Council [4]. Review Editors play an important role in ensuring consistent use of this calibrated language within each Working Group report. Each Working Group will supplement these notes with more specific guidance on particular issues consistent with the common approach given here.

Characterizing changes in drought risk for the United States from climate change

Abstract: The effect of climate change on the frequency and intensity of droughts across the contiguous United States over the next century is assessed by applying Standardized Precipitation Indices and the Palmer Drought Severity Index to the full suite of 22 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change General Circulation Models for three IPCC-SRES emissions scenarios (B1, A1B, and A2 from the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) listed in order of their emissions through 2100 from high to low). The frequency of meteorological drought based on precipitation alone is projected to increase in some parts of the US, for example the southwestern states, and decrease in others. Hydrological drought frequencies based on precipitation and temperature are projected to increase across most of the country, however, with very substantial and almost universally experienced increases in drought risk by 2050. For both measures, the southwestern US and the Rocky Mountain states are projected to experience the largest increases in drought frequency, but these areas may be able to exploit existing excess storage capacity. Drought frequencies and uncertainties in their projection tend to increase considerably over time and show a strong worsening trend along higher greenhouse gas emissions scenarios, suggesting substantial benefits for greenhouse gas emissions reductions.

Chapter 2: Adopting a risk-based approach

Abstract: A significant message accompanying the call forgreenhouse gas mitigation actions from the Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)2007 Fourth Assessment Report is the increasingneed to identify a decision framework for climatechangethatencompassesbothmitigationandadap-tation Through the IPCC, governments have be-gun to acknowledge risk management as a unify-ing theme for both climate change mitigation andadaptation Their unanimous approval of this mes-sageunderscorestheimportanceofprovidingmoreinformationaboutclimaterisks(inadditiontopro-viding information about impacts and associatedvulnerabilities) and suggests that consideration ofriskplaysacriticalroleinallfacetsofclimatechangedecision making:“Responding to climate change involves an

Time to take action on climate communication.

Abstract: According to broad international agreement, a global warming increase beyond 2°C is unacceptable ([ 1 ][1]). Because of the physics of the climate system, we must ensure that global emissions of greenhouse gases peak and start to decline rapidly within a decade in order to have a reasonable chance of meeting the 2°C goal ([ 2 ][2]). Humankind has waffled and delayed for decades; further delay risks serious consequences for people and the ecosystems on which we rely. Because the potential consequences of climate change are so high, the science community has an obligation to help people, organizations, and governments make informed decisions. Yet existing institutions are not well suited to this task. Therefore, we call for the science community to develop, implement, and sustain an independent initiative with a singular mandate: to actively and effectively share information about climate change risks and potential solutions with the public, particularly decision-makers in the public, private, and nonprofit sectors. Moreover, we call on philanthropic funding institutions to endorse and provide sustained support for the initiative. ![Figure][3] CREDIT: ANDREW PARFENOV/ISTOCKPHOTO.COM The initiative must make concerted efforts to provide people, organizations, and governments with critical information, to address misperceptions, and to counter misinformation and deception. In doing so, it will have to overcome psychological and cultural barriers to learning and engagement ([ 3 ][4]–[ 5 ][5]). The initiative should be judged against two critical outcomes: (i) improved understanding of risks and potential solutions by people, organizations, and governments, and (ii) more informed decision-making—and less avoidance of decision-making—about how to manage those risks. The initiative should be an embodiment of what Fischhoff calls “non-persuasive communication.” It should not advocate specific policy decisions; good decision-making involves weighing the best available information with the values of the decision-makers and those affected by the decisions. The initiative should recruit a full range of climate scientists, decision scientists, and communication professionals into the effort ([ 6 ][6], [ 7 ][7]) to ensure both sound scientific information and effective communication. In addition, it should build bridges to other communities of experts—such as clergy, financial managers, business managers, and insurers—who help people, organizations, and governments assess and express their values. Scientists and nonscientists alike inevitably interpret climate science information in the context of other information and values; the initiative should mobilize experts who can facilitate appropriate and useful interpretations. Despite the politically contentious nature of climate change policy, the initiative must be strictly nonpartisan. In the face of efforts to undermine public confidence in science, it must become a trusted broker of un biased information for people on all sides of the issue. At this potentially critical moment for human civilization, it is imperative that people, organizations, and governments be given the resources they need to participate in constructive civic, commercial, and personal decision-making about climate change risks and solutions. 1. [↵][8] Group of 8, “Responsible leadership for a sustainable future” (G8 Summit, L'Aquila, Italy, 2009). 2. [↵][9] 1. M. Meinshausen 2. et al ., Nature 458, 1158 (2009). [OpenUrl][10][CrossRef][11][PubMed][12][Web of Science][13] 3. [↵][14] National Research Council, Evaluating Progress of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program: Methods and Preliminary Results (National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2007). 4. National Research Council, Informing Decisions in a Changing Climate (National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2009). 5. [↵][15] National Research Council, Informing an Effective Response to Climate Change (National Academies Press, Washington, DC, 2010). 6. [↵][16] 1. B. Fischhoff , Environ. Sci. Technol. Online 41, 7207 (2007). [OpenUrl][17] 7. [↵][18] 1. T. E. Bowman, 2. E. Maibach, 3. M. E. Mann, 4. S. C. Moser, 5. R. C. J. Somerville , Science 324, 36-b (2009). [OpenUrl][19] [1]: #ref-1 [2]: #ref-2 [3]: pending:yes [4]: #ref-3 [5]: #ref-5 [6]: #ref-6 [7]: #ref-7 [8]: #xref-ref-1-1 "View reference 1 in text" [9]: #xref-ref-2-1 "View reference 2 in text" [10]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DNature%253B%2BPhysical%2BScience%2B%2528London%2529%26rft.stitle%253DNature%253B%2BPhysical%2BScience%2B%2528London%2529%26rft.aulast%253DMeinshausen%26rft.auinit1%253DM.%26rft.volume%253D458%26rft.issue%253D7242%26rft.spage%253D1158%26rft.epage%253D1162%26rft.atitle%253DGreenhouse-gas%2Bemission%2Btargets%2Bfor%2Blimiting%2Bglobal%2Bwarming%2Bto%2B2%2Bdegrees%2BC.%26rft_id%253Dinfo%253Adoi%252F10.1038%252Fnature08017%26rft_id%253Dinfo%253Apmid%252F19407799%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [11]: /lookup/external-ref?access_num=10.1038/nature08017&link_type=DOI [12]: /lookup/external-ref?access_num=19407799&link_type=MED&atom=%2Fsci%2F330%2F6007%2F1044.atom [13]: /lookup/external-ref?access_num=000265754600045&link_type=ISI [14]: #xref-ref-3-1 "View reference 3 in text" [15]: #xref-ref-5-1 "View reference 5 in text" [16]: #xref-ref-6-1 "View reference 6 in text" [17]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DEnviron.%2BSci.%2BTechnol.%2BOnline%26rft.volume%253D41%26rft.spage%253D7207%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx [18]: #xref-ref-7-1 "View reference 7 in text" [19]: {openurl}?query=rft.jtitle%253DScience%26rft.volume%253D324%26rft.spage%253D36%26rft.genre%253Darticle%26rft_val_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Ajournal%26ctx_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ver%253DZ39.88-2004%26url_ctx_fmt%253Dinfo%253Aofi%252Ffmt%253Akev%253Amtx%253Actx

“Reasons for concern” (about climate change) in the United States

Abstract: Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change commits its parties to stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that “would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Authors of the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001a, b) offered some insight into what negotiators might consider dangerous by highlighting five “reasons for concern” (RFC’s) and tracking concern against changes in global mean temperature; they illustrated their assessments in the now iconic “burning embers” diagram. The Fourth Assessment Report reaffirmed the value of plotting RFC’s against temperature change (IPCC 2007a, b), and Smith et al. (2009) produced an unpated embers visualization for the globe. This paper applies the same assessment and communication strategies to calibrate the comparable RFC’s for the United States. It adds “National Security Concern” as a sixth RFC because many now see changes in the intensity and/or frequency of extreme events around the world as “risk enhancers” that deserve attention at the highest levels of the US policy and research communities. The US embers portrayed here suggest that: (1) US policy-makers will not discover anything really “dangerous” over the near to medium term if they consider only economic impacts that are aggregated across the entire country but that (2) they could easily uncover “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” by focusing their attention on changes in the intensities, frequencies, and regional distributions of extreme weather events driven by climate change.

Climate change and Asian agriculture.

Abstract: Asian and global agriculture will be under significant pressure to meet the demands of rising populations, using finite and often degraded soil and water resources that are predicted to be further stressed by the impacts of climate change. In addition, agriculture and land use change are prominent sources of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Fertilizer application, livestock rearing, and land management affect levels of GHG in the atmosphere and the amount of carbon storage and sequestration potential. Therefore, while some impending climatic changes will have negative effects on agricultural production in parts of Asia, and especially on resource-poor farmers, the sector also presents opportunities for emission reductions. Warming across the Asian continent will be unevenly distributed, but will certainly lead to crop yield losses in much of the region and subsequent impacts on prices, trade, and food security—disproportionately affecting poor people. Most projections indicate that agriculture in South, Central, and West Asia will be hardest hit.

The inappropriate treatment of climate change in copenhagen consensus 2008

Abstract: The Copenhagen Consensus, conducted at four-year intervals, is an explicit attempt to prioritise solutions to many of the world’s most pressing problems. In its 2008 exercise (CC08) (Lomborg, 2009), a panel of eminent scholars, on the basis of the input of a larger number of field experts, ranked proposed solutions to ten leading problems (see Table 1). Although we are pleased that one of the proposed solutions to climate change was raised from the bottom of the list in the 2004 exercise (Lomborg, 2004)) to the middle of the current list, we have several problems with the study design and the manner in which its results are being interpreted. As authors of the paper on climate change evaluated by the CC08 panel (Yohe et al., 2009), we are concerned that the

The economics of climate change: an editorial essay

Abstract: The Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change (Stern et al. 2006a, b; Stern 2007) has been the catalyst of an enormous amount of discussion since its release in the fall of 2006. Policy makers see it as an authoritative report that makes an economic case for rapid reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Most economists have a different opinion of the quality of the analysis, even though there is a virtual consensus among economists that climate change is a serious externality which calls for the immediate implementation of a carbon tax or some other type of policy intervention. Economists who have glanced at the Stern Review typically argue, for example, that its choice of ethical parameters (rate of pure time preference, rate of risk aversion) is peculiar, biased, and potentially misleading to be point of being counterproductive (Arrow 2007; Dasgupta 2007; Varian 2006; Yohe and Tol 2007a, b). Analysts who took a closer look at the Stern Review tend to notice a range of other assumptions that are questionable, and many have lamented what they perceive to be inadequate documentation (Jensen and Webster 2007; Mendelsohn 2006; Nordhaus 2007a; Pielke, 2007; Tol 2006; Tol and Yohe 2006; Yohe 2006; Yohe and Tol 2007b). Some papers claim that the Stern Review underestimated the impacts of climate change (Neumayer 2007; Spash 2007; Sterner and Persson 2007), while other papers argue that human-induced climate change is not real (Byatt et al. 2006; Carter et al. 2006). Neither position has any empirical support. The Stern Review team has published a number of rebuttals to our Climatic Change (2008) 89:231–240 DOI 10.1007/s10584-008-9431-z

Thoughts on 100 volumes of Climatic Change

Abstract: When I was first approached to write something for volume 100 about what we had learned since number 1 of volume 1 appeared in March of 1977, I thought that I might write something about progress in developing a common language—i.e., something about how members of the various research communities that have something to say about climate change had emerged from the “Canadian haze” of attempting to do interdisciplinary research by learning each others’ languages and respecting each others’ perspectives.1 I intended to quote the prescript from Malone and Yohe (1992) published in a rival (and much younger) journal. That paper reported on the topic of an international conference that we had hosted in Interlaken, Switzerland, the week after the Second World Climate Conference had completed its work in Geneva. We devoted the text of the paper to a discussion of a regional approach to assessment that could incorporate “diverse inputs from a wide range of disciplines and professions” (p. 101); but we began with a little preliminary story that highlights the prerequisite of communication in building such an assessment: