THE DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF EXPERIMENTS. By Oscar Kempthorne. New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1952. 631 pp. $8.50. This book by a teacher of statistics (as well as a consultant for \"experimenters\") is a comprehensive study of the philosophical background for the statistical design of experiment. It is necessary to have some facility with algebraic notation and manipulation to be able to use the volume intelligently. The problems are presented from the theoretical point of view, without such practical examples as would be helpful for those not acquainted with mathematics. The mathematical justification for the techniques is given. As a somewhat advanced treatment of the design and analysis of experiments, this volume will be interesting and helpful for many who approach statistics theoretically as well as practically. With emphasis on the \"why,\" and with description given broadly, the author relates the subject matter to the general theory of statistics and to the general problem of experimental inference. MARGARET J. ROBERTSON

The Design and Analysis of Experiments

Data Mining - Concepts and Techniques.

Part I. Experimental Studies: 2. Experiment in psychology 3. Experiments on perceiving III Experiments on imaging 4-8. Experiments on remembering: (a) The method of description (b) The method of repeated reproduction (c) The method of picture writing (d) The method of serial reproduction (e) The method of serial reproduction picture material 9. Perceiving, recognizing, remembering 10. A theory of remembering 11. Images and their functions 12. Meaning Part II. Remembering as a Study in Social Psychology: 13. Social psychology 14. Social psychology and the matter of recall 15. Social psychology and the manner of recall 16. Conventionalism 17. The notion of a collective unconscious 18. The basis of social recall 19. A summary and some conclusions.

Remembering. A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology, Cambridge (University Press) 1964.

The 2008 crash has left all the established economic doctrines - equilibrium models, real business cycles, disequilibria models - in disarray. Part of the problem is due to Smith’s "veil of ignorance": individuals unknowingly pursue society’s interest and, as a result, have no clue as to the macroeconomic effects of their actions: witness the Keynes and Leontief multipliers, the concept of value added, fiat money, Engel’s law and technical progress, to name but a few of the macrofoundations of microeconomics. A good viewpoint to take bearings anew lies in comparing the post-Great Depression institutions with those emerging from Thatcher and Reagan’s economic policies: deregulation, exogenous vs. endoge- nous money, shadow banking vs. Volcker’s Rule. Very simply, the banks, whose lending determined deposits after Roosevelt, and were a public service became private enterprises whose deposits determine lending. These underlay the great moderation preceding 2006, and the subsequent crash.

The Economic Institutions of Capitalism

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The Theory of Industrial Organization

Acceptance of technological agency: Beyond the perception of utilitarian value

Quantitative analysis of negotiation concession behavior is performed based on empirical data with the purpose of providing simple and intuitive decision support in electronic negotiations Previous work on non-linear concave preferences and subsequent concession crossover provides a theoretical basis for the model The authors propose a model which quantifies the remaining concession potential for each issue and a generalization of the model which permits the memory/decay of past concessions These models permit the analysis of negotiators' concession behavior Using the proposed models, it was possible to quantitatively determine that negotiators in the authors' negotiation case exhibit concession crossover issues and thus have a tendency to give concessions on issues with the most remaining concession potential This finding provides empirical evidence of concession crossover in actual concessions and the corresponding model permits the design of a simple and intuitive prediction methodology, which could be used in real world negotiations by decision support systems or automated negotiation agents

Quantitative Concession Behavior Analysis and Prediction for Decision Support in Electronic Negotiations

Negotiation is a flexible mechanism for facilitating effective economic exchanges. Electronic negotiations allow participants to negotiate online and use analytical support tools in making their decisions. Software agents offer the possibility of automating negotiation process using these tools. The purpose of this work is to make progress towards outlining design-theoretical principles for agent-enhanced negotiation systems (AENS). This paper describes an electronic marketplace named DIANA (Deal-making system Incorporating Agents in Negotiations and Auctions) that allows involving software agents in negotiations. It also presents the results of experiments in agent-to-human negotiations. Various types of agents have been configured and paired up with human counterparts for negotiating product sale. The paper discusses the results and presents a set of rules for the design of AENS.

Design of software agent-populated electronic negotiation system and evaluation of human --- to - agent negotiations

The use of auctions in procurement results in price reduction as well as the reduction in the cost and the time required to complete transactions. In many situations, price-only auctions resulted in the violation of the contracts or even contractors' bankruptcies. This is one reason for the introduction of multi-attribute auctions as well as auctions-followed-by negotiations. Auction theory is based on two assumptions which assure that auctions are efficient mechanisms, guarantee efficient solutions, and produce the best possible results for bid-takers. In practice these assumptions are often violated. The contribution of this paper is to propose a procedure for auctions-followed-by negotiations which retains important auction features such as process transparency and efficiency while allowing for increased social welfare. The unique feature of the procedure is the introduction of the win-win phase in which the market participants may attempt to make joint improvements to efficient solutions obtained from auctions.

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Gregory E. Kersten

Papers

Acceptance of technological agency: Beyond the perception of utilitarian value

Quantitative Concession Behavior Analysis and Prediction for Decision Support in Electronic Negotiations

Design of software agent-populated electronic negotiation system and evaluation of human --- to - agent negotiations

On winners and losers in procurement auctions

Reasons for rejecting Pareto-improvements in negotiations