: On February 6, 2004, President George W. Bush created the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction to advise and assist him in performing his presidential duties. This report analyzes the establishment and organizational requirements set forth in the presidential mandate, and its relationship to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA). On March 31, 2005, the commission submitted its final report to the President, which contained 74 recommendations for reforming the U.S. intelligence community. This report will be updated to reflect any commission activities.

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Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction: Establishment and Composition

Plant pathology has developed a wide range of concepts and tools for improving plant disease management, including models for understanding and responding to new risks from climate change. Most of these tools can be improved using new advances in artificial intelligence (AI), such as machine learning to integrate massive data sets in predictive models. There is the potential to develop automated analyses of risk that alert decision-makers, from farm managers to national plant protection organizations, to the likely need for action and provide decision support for targeting responses. We review machine-learning applications in plant pathology and synthesize ideas for the next steps to make the most of these tools in digital agriculture. Global projects, such as the proposed global surveillance system for plant disease, will be strengthened by the integration of the wide range of new data, including data from tools like remote sensors, that are used to evaluate the risk of plant disease. There is exciting potential for the use of AI to strengthen global capacity building as well, from image analysis for disease diagnostics and associated management recommendations on farmers' phones to future training methodologies for plant pathologists that are customized in real-time for management needs in response to the current risks. International cooperation in integrating data and models will help develop the most effective responses to new challenges from climate change. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Phytopathology, Volume 60 is August 2022. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

Climate Change Effects on Pathogen Emergence: Artificial Intelligence to Translate Big Data for Mitigation.

Characterized by extreme uncertainty, the Covid-19 outbreak raises important ethical conflicts. In this article, we reflect on these conflicts and the different interests involved in the current scenario. Our critical analysis is based on global bioethics, and focused on Brazil, where public health issues have not been properly integrated with international diplomacy. The simplistic opposition between health and economy has been used as a decisionmaking strategy and to establish measures to control the virus. However, there are several variables in this context, and an ethical guideline becomes necessary, especially for the decisions made by politicians in the country.

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Desafios e conflitos bioéticos da covid-19: contexto da saúde global

Synthetic biology has the potential to positively transform society in many application areas, including medicine. In common with all revolutionary new technologies, synthetic biology can also enable crime. Like cybercrime, that emerged following the advent of the internet, biocrime can have a significant effect on society, but may also impact on peoples' health. For example, the scale of harm caused by the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic illustrates the potential impact of future biocrime and highlights the need for prevention strategies. Systematic evidence quantifying the crime opportunities posed by synthetic biology has to date been very limited. Here, we systematically reviewed forms of crime that could be facilitated by synthetic biology with a view to informing their prevention. A total of 794 articles from four databases were extracted and a three-step screening phase resulted in 15 studies that met our threshold criterion for thematic synthesis. Within those studies, 13 exploits were identified. Of these, 46% were dependent on technologies characteristic of synthetic biology. Eight potential crime types emerged from the studies: bio-discrimination, cyber-biocrime, bio-malware, biohacking, at-home drug manufacturing, illegal gene editing, genetic blackmail, and neuro-hacking. 14 offender types were identified. For the most commonly identified offenders (>3 mentions) 40% were outsider threats. These observations suggest that synthetic biology presents substantial new offending opportunities. Moreover, that more effective engagement, such as ethical hacking, is needed now to prevent a crime harvest from developing in the future. A framework to address the synthetic biology crime landscape is proposed.

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A Systematic Review of the Criminogenic Potential of Synthetic Biology and Routes to Future Crime Prevention

The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the world's vulnerability to biological catastrophe and elicited unprecedented scientific efforts. Some of this work and its derivatives, however, present dual-use risks (i.e., potential harm from misapplication of beneficial research) that have largely gone unaddressed. For instance, gain-of-function studies and reverse genetics protocols may facilitate the engineering of concerning SARS-CoV-2 variants and other pathogens. The risk of accidental or deliberate release of dangerous pathogens may be increased by large-scale collection and characterization of zoonotic viruses undertaken in an effort to understand what enables animal-to-human transmission. These concerns are exacerbated by the rise of preprint publishing that circumvents a late-stage opportunity for dual-use oversight. To prevent the next global health emergency, we must avoid inadvertently increasing the threat of future biological events. This requires a nuanced and proactive approach to dual-use evaluation throughout the research life cycle, including the conception, funding, conduct, and dissemination of research.

Rapid Proliferation of Pandemic Research: Implications for Dual-Use Risks.

Author(s): Evans, Sam Weiss; Beal, Jacob; Berger, Kavita; Bleijs, Diederik A; Cagnetti, Alessia; Ceroni, Francesca; Epstein, Gerald L; Garcia-Reyero, Natalia; Gillum, David R; Harkess, Graeme; Hillson, Nathan J; Hogervorst, Petra AM; Jordan, Jacob L; Lacroix, Genevieve; Moritz, Rebecca; OhEigeartaigh, Sean S; Palmer, Megan J; van Passel, Mark WJ

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Embrace experimentation in biosecurity governance

Biology can be misused, and the risk of this causing widespread harm increases in step with the rapid march of technological progress. A key security challenge involves attribution: determining, in the wake of a human-caused biological event, who was responsible. Recent scientific developments have demonstrated a capability for detecting whether an organism involved in such an event has been genetically modified and, if modified, to infer from its genetic sequence its likely lab of origin. We believe this technique could be developed into powerful forensic tools to aid the attribution of outbreaks caused by genetically engineered pathogens, and thus protect against the potential misuse of synthetic biology. A key security challenge with biosecurity threats is determining the responsible actor. In this Perspective, the authors review recent developments in using genetic sequence to assign a lab-of-origin and the potential protection it provides against misuse of synthetic biology.

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Jacob L. Jordan

Papers

Embrace experimentation in biosecurity governance

The biosecurity benefits of genetic engineering attribution.