https://www.sfu.ca/~wainwrig/Econ400/jensen-meckling.pdf

Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

This paper presents a critique of expected utility theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk, and develops an alternative model, called prospect theory. Choices among risky prospects exhibit several pervasive effects that are inconsistent with the basic tenets of utility theory. In particular, people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with outcomes that are obtained with certainty. This tendency, called the certainty effect, contributes to risk aversion in choices involving sure gains and to risk seeking in choices involving sure losses. In addition, people generally discard components that are shared by all prospects under consideration. This tendency, called the isolation effect, leads to inconsistent preferences when the same choice is presented in different forms. An alternative theory of choice is developed, in which value is assigned to gains and losses rather than to final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by decision weights. The value function is normally concave for gains, commonly convex for losses, and is generally steeper for losses than for gains. Decision weights are generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of low prob- abilities. Overweighting of low probabilities may contribute to the attractiveness of both insurance and gambling. EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY has dominated the analysis of decision making under risk. It has been generally accepted as a normative model of rational choice (24), and widely applied as a descriptive model of economic behavior, e.g. (15, 4). Thus, it is assumed that all reasonable people would wish to obey the axioms of the theory (47, 36), and that most people actually do, most of the time. The present paper describes several classes of choice problems in which preferences systematically violate the axioms of expected utility theory. In the light of these observations we argue that utility theory, as it is commonly interpreted and applied, is not an adequate descriptive model and we propose an alternative account of choice under risk. 2. CRITIQUE

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Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk

In this paper, we argue that the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends is critical to its innovative capabilities. We label this capability a firm's absorptive capacity and suggest that it is largely a function of the firm's level of prior related knowledge. The discussion focuses first on the cognitive basis for an individual's absorptive capacity including, in particular, prior related knowledge and diversity of background. We then characterize the factors that influence absorptive capacity at the organizational level, how an organization's absorptive capacity differs from that of its individual members, and the role of diversity of expertise within an organization. We argue that the development of absorptive capacity, and, in turn, innovative performance are history- or path-dependent and argue how lack of investment in an area of expertise early on may foreclose the future development of a technical capability in that area. We formulate a model of firm investment in research and development (R&D), in which R&D contributes to a firm's absorptive capacity, and test predictions relating a firm's investment in R&D to the knowledge underlying technical change within an industry. Discussion focuses on the implications of absorptive capacity for the analysis of other related innovative activities, including basic research, the adoption and diffusion of innovations, and decisions to participate in cooperative R&D ventures. **

/pdf/absorptive-capacity-a-new-perspective-on-learning-and-1n1c9gg9x0.pdf

Absorptive capacity: a new perspective on learning and innovation

The dynamic capabilities framework analyzes the sources and methods of wealth creation and capture by private enterprise firms operating in environments of rapid technological change. The competitive advantage of firms is seen as resting on distinctive processes (ways of coordinating and combining), shaped by the firm's (specific) asset positions (such as the firm's portfolio of difftcult-to- trade knowledge assets and complementary assets), and the evolution path(s) it has aflopted or inherited. The importance of path dependencies is amplified where conditions of increasing retums exist. Whether and how a firm's competitive advantage is eroded depends on the stability of market demand, and the ease of replicability (expanding intemally) and imitatability (replication by competitors). If correct, the framework suggests that private wealth creation in regimes of rapid technological change depends in large measure on honing intemal technological, organizational, and managerial processes inside the firm. In short, identifying new opportunities and organizing effectively and efficiently to embrace them are generally more fundamental to private wealth creation than is strategizing, if by strategizing one means engaging in business conduct that keeps competitors off balance, raises rival's costs, and excludes new entrants. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

/pdf/dynamic-capabilities-and-strategic-management-4iyi34iyh6.pdf

Dynamic capabilities and strategic management

Measuring the efficiency of decision making units

Considers the idea that the uncertainties about economics stem from the need to understand the economics of uncertainty. Also argues that the lack of economic knowledge is largely due to the difficulty in modeling the economic agent's ignorance. The neoclassical model, founded on concepts regarding the individual economic agent and the market, is the starting point for the discussion. It is suggested that a market system is informationally economical and that the individual agent need not know very much about the economic system as a whole because there is far more in it than any one individual can learn. What the individual must know is the motivation and production conditions that define him or her. In addition, the simplification of an individual's decision making processes is possible because the markets have supplied the needed economic information in the form of prices. Also examined is the nonexistence of markets for future goods. This is done by considering the implications for the rest of the system and the reasons for the market's nonexistence. Finally, it is proposed that when uncertainty exists, risk aversion implies that steps will be taken to reduce risks. (SFL)

Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis

The language of the theory of consumers' demand is still somewhat confused despite the great progress that has been made in recent years.2 The basic purpose of the theory is to explain the demand vector d (p, M) chosen by an individual when faced with a price vector p and an income M. Cournot, who introduced the concept of the demand function, and others, simply postulated some properties such as monotonic decrease of demand for any commodity with respect to its own price. The development of utility theory in the second half of the 19th century by Gossen, Jevons, Menger, and Walras and its subsequent reinterpretation on an ordinal basis by Pareto led to an alternative formulation in terms of an ordering of all conceivable commodity bundles. The demand vector for a particular p and M is that vector among all those compatible with the budget limitation which is most preferred. The derivation of demand functions from orderings (expressed as indifference maps or utility functions) became standard and its fruitfulness in yielding implications for demand functions was made evident by the work of Slutzky [14], Hicks and Allen [7], Hotelling [8], and

http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/2550390.pdf

Rational Choice Functions and Orderings1

This paper articulates and applies frameworks for examining whether consumption is excessive. We consider two criteria for the possible excessiveness (or insufficiency) of current consumption. One is an intertemporal utility-maximization criterion: actual current consumption is deemed excessive if it is higher than the level of current consumption on the consumption path that maximizes the present discounted value of utility. The other is a sustainability criterion, which requires that current consumption be consistent with non-declining living standards over time. We extend previous theoretical approaches by offering a formula for the sustainability criterion that accounts for population growth and technological change. In applying this formula, we find that some poor regions of the world are failing to meet the sustainability criterion: in these regions, genuine wealth per capita is falling as investments in human and manufactured capital are not sufficient to offset the depletion of natural capital.

/pdf/are-we-consuming-too-much-3p14sz7bfk.pdf

Are We Consuming Too Much

Stable URL:http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28199821%2912%3A2%3C91%3AWHETSA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-IThe Journal of Economic Perspectives is currently published by American Economic Association.Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtainedprior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content inthe JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/journals/aea.html.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. Formore information regarding JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.http://www.jstor.orgThu Apr 26 15:31:49 2007

/pdf/what-has-economics-to-say-about-racial-discrimination-3qoz0cphrf.pdf

Kenneth J. Arrow

Papers

Limited Knowledge and Economic Analysis

Rational Choice Functions and Orderings1

Are We Consuming Too Much

What Has Economics to Say about Racial Discrimination

Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Choice in Risk-Taking Situations