计量经济分析 = Econometric analysis

NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS by Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein Penguin Books, 2009, 312 pp, ISBN 978-0-14-311526-7This book is best described formally as a general explanation of and advocacy for libertarian paternalism, a term coined by the authors in earlier publications. Informally, it is about how leaders, systems, organizations, and governments can nudge people to do the things the nudgers want and need done for the betterment of the nudgees, or of society. It is paternalism in the sense that "it is legitimate for choice architects to try to influence people's behavior in order to make their lives longer, healthier, and better", (p. 5) It is libertarian in that "people should be free to do what they like - and to opt out of undesirable arrangements if they want to do so", (p. 5) The built-in possibility of opting out or making a different choice preserves freedom of choice even though people's behavior has been influenced by the nature of the presentation of the information or by the structure of the decisionmaking system. I had never heard of libertarian paternalism before reading this book, and I now find it fascinating.Written for a general audience, this book contains mostly social and behavioral science theory and models, but there is considerable discussion of structure and process that has roots in mathematical and quantitative modeling. One of the main applications of this social system is economic choice in investing, selecting and purchasing products and services, systems of taxes, banking (mortgages, borrowing, savings), and retirement systems. Other quantitative social choice systems discussed include environmental effects, health care plans, gambling, and organ donations. Softer issues that are also subject to a nudge-based approach are marriage, education, eating, drinking, smoking, influence, spread of information, and politics. There is something in this book for everyone.The basis for this libertarian paternalism concept is in the social theory called "science of choice", the study of the design and implementation of influence systems on various kinds of people. The terms Econs and Humans, are used to refer to people with either considerable or little rational decision-making talent, respectively. The various libertarian paternalism concepts and systems presented are tested and compared in light of these two types of people. Two foundational issues that this book has in common with another book, Network of Echoes: Imitation, Innovation and Invisible Leaders, that was also reviewed for this issue of the Journal are that 1 ) there are two modes of thinking (or components of the brain) - an automatic (intuitive) process and a reflective (rational) process and 2) the need for conformity and the desire for imitation are powerful forces in human behavior. …

Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness

Using a Bayesian likelihood approach, we estimate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for the US economy using seven macro-economic time series. The model incorporates many types of real and nominal frictions and seven types of structural shocks. We show that this model is able to compete with Bayesian Vector Autoregression models in out-of-sample prediction. We investigate the relative empirical importance of the various frictions. Finally, using the estimated model we address a number of key issues in business cycle analysis: What are the sources of business cycle fluctuations? Can the model explain the cross-correlation between output and inflation? What are the effects of productivity on hours worked? What are the sources of the "Great Moderation"?

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Shocks and Frictions in US Business Cycles: A Bayesian DSGE Approach

We investigate conditions sufficient for identification of average treatment effects using instrumental variables. First we show that the existence of valid instruments is not sufficient to identify any meaningful average treatment effect. We then establish that the combination of an instrument and a condition on the relation between the instrument and the participation status is sufficient for identification of a local average treatment effect for those who can be induced to change their participation status by changing the value of the instrument. Finally we derive the probability limit of the standard IV estimator under these conditions. It is seen to be a weighted average of local average treatment effects.

Evolution and Rationality Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results. Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment Effects

List of Figures ix List of Tables xi Preface and Acknowledgments xiii Introduction 1 PART I: VETO PLAYERS THEORY 17 One: Individual Veto Players 19 Two: Collective Veto Players 38 PART II: VETO PLAYERS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 65 Three: Regimes: Nondemocratic, Presidential, and Parliamentary 67 Four: Governments and Parliaments 91 Five: Referendums 116 Six: Federalism, Bicameralism, and Qualified Majorities 136 PART III: POLICY EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 161 Seven: Legislation 165 Eight: Macroeconomic Policies 187 PART IV: SYSTEMIC EFFECTS OF VETO PLAYERS 207 Nine: Government Stability 209 Ten: Judiciary and Bureaucracies 222 Eleven: Veto Players Analysis of European Union Institutions 248 Conclusion 283 Bibliography 291 Index 309

Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work

We test expectations-based reference dependence in market experiments with probabilistic forced exchange. Koszegi and Rabin (2006) predict that when the probability of forced exchange increases, individuals cannot expect to stick with the status quo, and should grow more willing to exchange. This mechanism may eliminate and even reverse the "endowment effect" (Knetsch and Sinden 1984; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1990). In a series of experiments with overall 930 subjects, we show some tentative support for the notion that attitudes toward exchange are influenced by the probability of forced exchange. However, the results are sensitive to small changes in experimental design.

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Randomizing Endowments: An Experimental Study of Rational Expectations and Reference-Dependent Preferences

This project examines the role of heterogeneity in gain-loss attitudes for identifying models of expectations-based reference dependence (Koszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007) (KR). Different gain-loss attitudes lead to different signs for KR comparative statics. Failure to account for the known heterogeneity in gain-loss attitudes is a central confounding factor challenging prior tests of the KR model conducted under the assumption of universal loss aversion. We document heterogeneous treatment effects over gain-loss types in both an initial experiment and an exact replication. Recognizing heterogeneity over types allows us to both recover the KR model’s central predictions, and account for inconsistency across prior empirical tests.

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Heterogeneity of Gain-Loss Attitudes and Expectations-Based Reference Points

This paper surveys experimental literature relating to mergers. We put particular emphasis on discussing whether this literature addresses the issues that are relevant for competition policy. We also include some suggestions as to how the fit between the experiments and the requirements of competition policy research might be improved.

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Merger Policy: What Can We Learn from Experiments?

Social capital is a resource that includes the willingness of members of society to cooperate with each other, even when it is not in their own individual material self-interests to do so, or enforce beneficial social norms, even when this is materially costly for the enforcer. Evidence from economic choice experiments suggests that affect may play an important role in the individual-level decision process that generates these behavioral tendencies. Negative affective responses to uncooperative behavior can lead to a breakdown in social capital, if there is no option to punish. Given a punishment option, however, individuals discipline uncooperative types, even though it is materially costly to do so. This can completely counteract the tendency for social capital to decline in repeated interactions. Positive affect, triggered by punishing uncooperative types, appears to play a role in generating this socially beneficial willingness to sanction.

Affect and the motivational foundations of social capital

In this paper, we propose a decision framework where people are individually asked to either actively consent to or dissent from some pro-social behavior We hypothesize that confronting individuals with the choice of whether to engage in a specific pro-social behavior contributes to the formation of issue-specific altruistic preferences, while simultaneously involving a commitment The hypothesis is tested in a large-scale field experiment on blood donations We find that this "active-decision" intervention substantially increases the actual donation behavior of people who had not fully formed preferences beforehand

Lorenz Goette

Papers

Randomizing Endowments: An Experimental Study of Rational Expectations and Reference-Dependent Preferences

Heterogeneity of Gain-Loss Attitudes and Expectations-Based Reference Points

Merger Policy: What Can We Learn from Experiments?

Affect and the motivational foundations of social capital

Active Decisions and Pro-Social Behavior