We examine a manufacturer's pricing strategies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which the manufacturer is a Stackelberg leader and the retailer is a follower. We show the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer both prefer a dual-channel supply chain. We examine the coordination schemes for a dual-channel supply chain and find that a manufacturer's contract with a wholesale price and a price for the direct channel can coordinate the dual-channel supply channel, benefiting the retailer but not the manufacturer. We illustrate how such a contract with a complementary agreement, such as a two-part tariff or a profit-sharing agreement, can coordinate the dual-channel supply chain and enable both the manufacturer and the retailer to be a win–win.

Implementing coordination contracts in a manufacturer Stackelberg dual-channel supply chain

Pricing policies of a competitive dual-channel green supply chain

Pricing policies in a dual-channel supply chain with retail services

Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse under a two-way revenue sharing contract

Price and quality decisions in dual-channel supply chains

Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes

Optimal fences and joint price and inventory decisions in distinct markets with demand leakage

Optimal decisions in a retailer Stackelberg supply chain

Market segmentation is a key strategic element in the practice of revenue management (RM). After being identified, market segments should be kept separate to prevent demand spillover from high priced segments to low priced segments and the associated revenue loss. Tools to restrict customer migration across segments are referred to as ‘fences’. This paper represents one of the initial efforts to organise the characteristics of fences and to extend the research to more general RM settings. We first present a general picture of fencing in the world of RM and discuss business issues related to the segmentation process, segmentation enforcement and the implementation of fencing in RM. Next, we provide a survey of segmentation variables and use them to develop the discussion of the corresponding fences in the practice of RM. We categorise fences based on purchase patterns, product characteristics and customer characteristics, and lay out a taxonomy, and provide examples using the taxonomy. We suggest that management can look at their particular business situation and decide whether or not fencing is applicable. If fencing is essential, the manager must consider each of the elements listed in the taxonomy and then decide which descriptor best fits the situation. The next step is to choose the optimal fencing decisions (that is, price, inventory and cost devoted to fences) and apply them to the situation in order to improve the firm's financial results.

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1057%2Frpm.2009.25.pdf

Michael Zhang

Papers

Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes

Optimal fences and joint price and inventory decisions in distinct markets with demand leakage

Optimal decisions in a retailer Stackelberg supply chain

Price fencing in the practice of revenue management: An overview and taxonomy

The effect of market segmentation with demand leakage between market segments on a firm’s price and inventory decisions