I have developed "tennis elbow" from lugging this book around the past four weeks, but it is worth the pain, the effort, and the aspirin. It is also worth the (relatively speaking) bargain price. Including appendixes, this book contains 894 pages of text. The entire panorama of the neural sciences is surveyed and examined, and it is comprehensive in its scope, from genomes to social behaviors. The editors explicitly state that the book is designed as "an introductory text for students of biology, behavior, and medicine," but it is hard to imagine any audience, interested in any fragment of neuroscience at any level of sophistication, that would not enjoy this book. The editors have done a masterful job of weaving together the biologic, the behavioral, and the clinical sciences into a single tapestry in which everyone from the molecular biologist to the practicing psychiatrist can find and appreciate his or

Principles of Neural Science

Recent studies of eye movements in reading and other information processing tasks, such as music reading, typing, visual search, and scene perception, are reviewed. The major emphasis of the review is on reading as a specific example of cognitive processing. Basic topics discussed with respect to reading are (a) the characteristics of eye movements, (b) the perceptual span, (c) integration of information across saccades, (d) eye movement control, and (e) individual differences (including dyslexia). Similar topics are discussed with respect to the other tasks examined. The basic theme of the review is that eye movement data reflect moment-to-moment cognitive processes in the various tasks examined. Theoretical and practical considerations concerning the use of eye movement data are also discussed.

/pdf/eye-movements-in-reading-and-information-processing-20-years-3z5ay8hdwc.pdf

Eye movements in reading and information processing: 20 years of research.

Miller (1956) summarized evidence that people can remember about seven chunks in short-term memory (STM) tasks. How- ever, that number was meant more as a rough estimate and a rhetorical device than as a real capacity limit. Others have since suggested that there is a more precise capacity limit, but that it is only three to five chunks. The present target article brings together a wide vari- ety of data on capacity limits suggesting that the smaller capacity limit is real. Capacity limits will be useful in analyses of information processing only if the boundary conditions for observing them can be carefully described. Four basic conditions in which chunks can be identified and capacity limits can accordingly be observed are: (1) when information overload limits chunks to individual stimulus items, (2) when other steps are taken specifically to block the recoding of stimulus items into larger chunks, (3) in performance discontinuities caused by the capacity limit, and (4) in various indirect effects of the capacity limit. Under these conditions, rehearsal and long-term memory cannot be used to combine stimulus items into chunks of an unknown size; nor can storage mechanisms that are not capacity- limited, such as sensory memory, allow the capacity-limited storage mechanism to be refilled during recall. A single, central capacity limit averaging about four chunks is implicated along with other, noncapacity-limited sources. The pure STM capacity limit expressed in chunks is distinguished from compound STM limits obtained when the number of separately held chunks is unclear. Reasons why pure capacity estimates fall within a narrow range are discussed and a capacity limit for the focus of attention is proposed.

/pdf/the-magical-number-4-in-short-term-memory-a-reconsideration-3704b9phuz.pdf

The magical number 4 in short-term memory: a reconsideration of mental storage capacity.

Traditional approaches to human information processing tend to deal with perception and action planning in isolation, so that an adequate account of the perception-action interface is still missing On the perceptual side, the dominant cognitive view largely underestimates, and thus fails to account for, the impact of action-related processes on both the processing of perceptual information and on perceptual learning On the action side, most approaches conceive of action planning as a mere continuation of stimulus processing, thus failing to account for the goal-directedness of even the simplest reaction in an experimental task We propose a new framework for a more adequate theoretical treatment of perception and action planning, in which perceptual contents and action plans are coded in a common representational medium by feature codes with distal reference Perceived events (perceptions) and to-be-produced events (actions) are equally represented by integrated, task-tuned networks of feature codes – cognitive structures we call event codes We give an overview of evidence from a wide variety of empirical domains, such as spatial stimulus-response compatibility, sensorimotor synchronization, and ideomotor action, showing that our main assumptions are well supported by the data

https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/S0140525X01000103

The Theory of Event Coding (TEC): a framework for perception and action planning.

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The outside world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the governing laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Several lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual \"filling in,\" visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception.

A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness-Authors' Response-Acting out our sensory experience

Recent work indicates that covert visual attention and eye movements on the one hand, and covert visual attention and visual working memory on the other hand are closely interrelated. Two experiments address the question whether all three processes draw on the same spatial representations. Participants had to memorize a target location for a subsequent memory-guided saccade. During the memory interval, task-irrelevant distractors were briefly flashed on some trials either near or remote to the memory target. Results showed that the previously flashed distractors attract the saccade's landing position. However, attraction was only found, if the distractor was presented within a sector of +/-20 degrees around the target axis, but not if the distractor was presented outside this sector. This effect strongly resembles the global effect in which saccades are directed to intermediate locations between a target and a simultaneously presented neighboring distractor stimulus. It is argued that covert visual attention, eye movements, and visual working memory recruit the same spatial mechanisms that can probably be ascribed to attentional priority maps.

On the spatial interaction of visual working memory and attention: Evidence for a global effect from memory-guided saccades

For decades, the cognitive and neural sciences have benefitted greatly from a separation of mind and brain into distinct functional domains. The tremendous success of this approach notwithstanding, it is self-evident that such a view is incomplete. Goal-directed behaviour of an organism requires the joint functioning of perception, memory and sensorimotor control. A prime candidate for achieving integration across these functional domains are attentional processes. Consequently, this Theme Issue brings together studies of attentional selection from many fields, both experimental and theoretical, that are united in their quest to find overreaching integrative principles of attention between perception, memory and action. In all domains, attention is understood as combination of competition and priority control ('bias'), with the task as a decisive driving factor to ensure coherent goal-directed behaviour and cognition. Using vision as the predominant model system for attentional selection, many studies of this Theme Issue focus special emphasis on eye movements as a selection process that is both a fundamental action and serves a key function in perception. The Theme Issue spans a wide range of methods, from measuring human behaviour in the real word to recordings of single neurons in the non-human primate brain. We firmly believe that combining such a breadth in approaches is necessary not only for attentional selection, but also to take the next decisive step in all of the cognitive and neural sciences: to understand cognition and behaviour beyond isolated domains.

https://royalsocietypublishing.org/doi/pdf/10.1098/rstb.2013.0053

Attentional selection in visual perception, memory and action: a quest for cross-domain integration

Perceptual stability and postsaccadic visual information: Can man bridge a gap?

While the importance of the prefrontal cortex for ‘higher-order’ cognitive functions is largely undisputed, no consensus has been reached regarding precise specification of these functions. For example, although some degree of regional specialization within the frontal lobe seems inevitable, by and large, most attempts to map specific cognitive functions onto neuroanatomical and/or cytoarchitectonic subdivisions have been disappointing. This is true, not only for data derived from human neuropsychological studies, but also from lesion and electrophysiological studies in the monkey and, more recently, from functional neuroimaging experiments in man. That is not to say, of course, that associations have never been drawn between specific cognitive functions and particular regions of the prefrontal cortex, but only that the level of consistency across different studies is often rather lower than for investigations focussing on more posterior cortical areas.

Executive Control and the Frontal Lobe: Current Issues

Monitoring the environment for visual events while performing a concurrent task requires adjustment of visual processing priorities. By use of Bundesen’s (1990) Theory of Visual Attention, we investigated how monitoring for an object-based brief event affected distinct components of visual attention in a concurrent task. The perceptual salience of the event was varied. Monitoring reduced the processing speed in the concurrent task, and the reduction was stronger when the event was less salient. The monitoring task neither affected the temporal threshold of conscious perception nor the storage capacity of visual short-term memory nor the efficiency of top-down controlled attentional selection.

/pdf/effects-of-monitoring-for-visual-events-on-distinct-1rdcyzs6rp.pdf

Werner X. Schneider

Papers

On the spatial interaction of visual working memory and attention: Evidence for a global effect from memory-guided saccades

Attentional selection in visual perception, memory and action: a quest for cross-domain integration

Perceptual stability and postsaccadic visual information: Can man bridge a gap?

Executive Control and the Frontal Lobe: Current Issues

Effects of monitoring for visual events on distinct components of attention