Reproducibility is a defining feature of science, but the extent to which it characterizes current research is unknown. We conducted replications of 100 experimental and correlational studies published in three psychology journals using high-powered designs and original materials when available. Replication effects were half the magnitude of original effects, representing a substantial decline. Ninety-seven percent of original studies had statistically significant results. Thirty-six percent of replications had statistically significant results; 47% of original effect sizes were in the 95% confidence interval of the replication effect size; 39% of effects were subjectively rated to have replicated the original result; and if no bias in original results is assumed, combining original and replication results left 68% with statistically significant effects. Correlational tests suggest that replication success was better predicted by the strength of original evidence than by characteristics of the original and replication teams.

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Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science

The measurement of meaning

In his Preface the author' says that he started out to review all the more important theories upon the topics ordinarily discussed under human motivation but soon found himself more and more limited to the presentation of his own point of view. This very well characterizes the book. It is a very personal product. It is an outline with some defense of the author's own thinking about instincts and appetites and sentiments and how they function in human behavior. And as the author draws so heavily upon James and McDougall, especially the latter, the book may well be looked upon as a sort of sequel to their efforts. There is a thought-provoking distinction presented between instinct and appetite. An instinct is said to be aroused always by something in the external situation; and, correspondingly, an appetite is said to be aroused by sensations from within the body itself. This places, of course, a heavy emphasis upon the cognitive factor in all instinctive behaviors; and the author prefers to use the cognitive factor, especially the knowledge of that end-experience which will satisfy, as a means of differentiating one instinct from another. In this there is a recognized difference from McDougall who placed more emphasis for differentiation upon the emotional accompaniment. The list of instincts arrived at by this procedure is much like that of McDougall, although the author is forced by his criteria to present the possibility of food-seeking and sex and sleep operating both in the manner of an appetite and also as an instinct. The Shand-McDougall concept of sentiment is taken over and used in the explanation of moral motivation. There is the development within each personality of a sentiment for some moral principle. But this sentiment is not a very powerful motivating factor. It is reinforced by social pressures and by religion, which is treated as an effort of finite man to live in harmony with the infinite reality. Those whose psychological thinking is largely in terms of McDougall will doubtless find this volume a very satisfying expansion; but those who are at all inclined to support their psychological thinking by reference to experimental studies will not be so well pleased. The James-Lange theory, for example, is discussed without mention of the many experimental studies which it has provoked. Theoretical sources appear in general to be preferred to experimental investigations.

Human MotivationThe Mind in Action: A Study of Motives and Values. A. Campbell Garnett

https://www.psychologytoday.com/files/attachments/3382/kashdan-rottenberg-2010-psychological-flexibility-cpr.pdf

Psychological flexibility as a fundamental aspect of health.

Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing, but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.

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Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory

A meta-analysis assessed whether exposure to information is guided by defense or accuracy motives. The studies examined information preferences in relation to attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors in situations that provided choices between congenial information, which supported participants' pre-existing attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors, and uncongenial information, which challenged these tendencies. Analyses indicated a moderate preference for congenial over uncongenial information (d=0.36). As predicted, this congeniality bias was moderated by variables that affect the strength of participants' defense motivation and accuracy motivation. In support of the importance of defense motivation, the congeniality bias was weaker when participants' attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors were supported prior to information selection; when participants' attitudes, beliefs, or behaviors were not relevant to their values or not held with conviction; when the available information was low in quality; when participants' closed-mindedness was low; and when their confidence in the attitude, belief, or behavior was high. In support of the importance of accuracy motivation, an uncongeniality bias emerged when uncongenial information was relevant to accomplishing a current goal.

/pdf/feeling-validated-versus-being-correct-a-meta-analysis-of-4d21q5xr45.pdf

Feeling validated versus being correct: a meta-analysis of selective exposure to information.

General action and inaction goals can influence the amount of motor or cognitive output irrespective of the type of behavior in question, with the same stimuli producing trivial and important motor and cognitive manifestations normally viewed as parts of different systems. A series of experiments examined the effects of instilling general action and inaction goals using word primes, such as "action" and "rest." The first 5 experiments showed that the same stimuli influenced motor output, such as doodling on a piece of paper and eating, as well as cognitive output, such as recall and problem solving. The last 2 experiments supported the prediction that these diverse effects can result from the instigation of general action and inaction goals. Specifically, these last 2 studies confirmed that participants were motivated to achieve active or inactive states and that attaining them decreased the effects of the primes on behavior.

/pdf/increasing-and-decreasing-motor-and-cognitive-output-a-model-ndv2itxaxp.pdf

Increasing and Decreasing Motor and Cognitive Output: A Model of General Action and Inaction Goals

This research examined the hypothesis that situational achievement cues can elicit achievement or fun goals depending on chronic differences in achievement motivation. In 4 studies, chronic differences in achievement motivation were measured, and achievement-denoting words were used to influence behavior. The effects of these variables were assessed on self-report inventories, task performance, task resumption following an interruption, and the pursuit of means relevant to achieving or having fun. Findings indicated that achievement priming (vs. control priming) activated a goal to achieve and inhibited a goal to have fun in individuals with chronically high-achievement motivation but activated a goal to have fun and inhibited a goal to achieve in individuals with chronically low-achievement motivation.

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The effects of chronic achievement motivation and achievement primes on the activation of achievement and fun goals.

General action and inaction concepts have been shown to produce broad, goal-mediated effects on cognitive and motor activity irrespective of the type of activity. The current research tested a model in which action and inaction goals interact with the valence of incidental moods to guide behavior. Over four experiments, participants' moods were manipulated to be positive (happy), neutral, or negative (angry or sad), and then general action, inaction, and neutral concepts were primed. In Experiment 1, action primes increased intellectual performance when participants experienced a positive (happy) or neutral mood, whereas inaction primes increased performance when participants experienced a negative (angry) mood. Including a control-prime condition, Experiments 2 and 3 replicated these results measuring the number of general interest articles participants were willing to read and participants' memory for pictures of celebrities. Experiment 4 replicated the results comparing happiness with sadness and suggested that the effect of the prime's adoption was automatic. Overall, the findings supported an interactive model by which action concepts and positive affect produce the same increases in active behavior as inaction concepts and negative affect.

Positive mood + action = negative mood + inaction: effects of general action and inaction concepts on decisions and performance as a function of affect.

This research examined whether describing past actions as ongoing using the imperfective aspect (rather than describing them as completed using the perfective aspect) promotes memory for action-relevant knowledge and reenactment of these actions in a future context. In Experiment 1, participants who used the imperfective aspect to describe their strategy on a prior interpersonal task were more likely to use this strategy on a later task than were participants who used the perfective aspect to describe their prior strategy. Experiment 2 demonstrated that describing behaviors on a task using the imperfective rather than the perfective aspect increased willingness to resume that task by improving memory for task contents. The last two experiments showed that the effects of the imperfective aspect on memory decayed over time and that the imperfective aspect facilitated performance of a future behavior only when the described past behavior was relevant to the future behavior. Thus, the effects of aspect are moderated by memory decay and are behavior-specific.

/pdf/what-i-was-doing-versus-what-i-did-verb-aspect-influences-4675b7pyoe.pdf

William Hart

Papers

Feeling validated versus being correct: a meta-analysis of selective exposure to information.

Increasing and Decreasing Motor and Cognitive Output: A Model of General Action and Inaction Goals

The effects of chronic achievement motivation and achievement primes on the activation of achievement and fun goals.

Positive mood + action = negative mood + inaction: effects of general action and inaction concepts on decisions and performance as a function of affect.

What I Was Doing Versus What I Did Verb Aspect Influences Memory and Future Actions