Showing papers in "Communist and Post-communist Studies in 2016"
TL;DR: In this paper, the role of organized civil society in facilitating citizen engagement in Central and East European new EU member states after the EU accession and the recent economic crises is analyzed using international comparative methodologies and data.
Abstract: The main focus of this article is the role of organized civil society in facilitating citizen engagement in Central and East European new EU member states after the EU accession and the recent economic crises. Using international comparative methodologies and data this article analyses democratic processes in the new member states focussing on the changes in strengths and weaknesses of citizen engagement. It shows the ways in which the post-enlargement process, especially the economic crisis affected the ability of CEE citizens – both directly, and via civil society organisations and trade unions – to be active participants of the multilevel governance processes. It finds that one of the key remaining gaps of the democratization process remains the relative weakness of state–citizens relationship. The impact of the economic crisis on the CEE countries was significant, in particular in regard to financial viability of organised civil society. However, economic crisis also acted as an important mobilization factor, and in all countries under study, civic participation, enabled by civil society and trade unions increased. New initiatives – in particular those tackling corruption and party campaign finance, saw NGOs focussing their advocacy efforts towards the government as well as actively mobilizing and engaging citizens. Across the CEE region, we are seeing gradual social learning, internalization of new norms and emergence of new identities – active citizens engaged with (and if necessary in opposition to) the state – directly (public mobilization and protests) and via organized civil society.
43 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze the changes in the extreme right discourses and framing strategies in relation to their electoral results and argue that during the transition to democracy in the 1990s and partially later in the 2000s, extreme right parties were predominantly focusing on the issues related to national sovereignty and were successful mostly in the context of hostility against groups that could potentially threaten this independence, while their electoral achievements were affected mainly by their internal party stability.
Abstract: This article presents electoral developments and mobilization issues of the extreme right political parties between 1993 and 2016. It analyzes the changes in the extreme right discourses and framing strategies in relation to their electoral results. We argue that during the transition to democracy in the 1990s and partially later in the 2000s, the extreme right parties were predominantly focusing on the issues related to national sovereignty and were successful mostly in the context of hostility against groups that could potentially threaten this independence, while their electoral achievements were affected mainly by their internal party stability. In the late 2000s, the extreme right has, however, begun to adopt a strategy that has bridged nationalist, populist and xenophobic discourses, with stronger success during the economic and refugee crises in Europe.
37 citations
TL;DR: Fascism may be defined as a popular fully authoritarian political system with a personalistic dictator and a cult of the leader, a definition that makes sense conceptually as well as empirically with respect to Putin's Russia and related fascist systems.
Abstract: There is a broad consensus among students of contemporary Russia that the political system constructed by Vladimir Putin is authoritarian and that he plays a dominant role in it. By building and expanding on these two features and by engaging in a deconstruction and reconstruction of the concept of fascism, this article suggests that the Putin system may plausibly be termed fascist. Not being a type of group, disposition, politics, or ideology, fascism may be salvaged from the conceptual confusion that surrounds it by being conceived of as a type of authoritarian political system. Fascism may be defined as a popular fully authoritarian political system with a personalistic dictator and a cult of the leader—a definition that makes sense conceptually as well as empirically, with respect to Putin's Russia and related fascist systems.
32 citations
TL;DR: The role of masculinity in the Putin regime's legitimation strategy became more obvious during the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Masculinity has long been Russian President Vladimir Putin's calling card. At the center of Putin's macho aura is his image as a tough leader who will not allow Western countries to weaken Russia or dictate what Russia's domestic and foreign policies should look like. This article draws attention to the role of masculinity in the Putin regime's legitimation strategy, and how it became more obvious during the escalation of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 and the Russian annexation of Crimea. To the extent that there is a “personality cult” in contemporary Russia, the personality at the center of it is defined in highly gendered terms, shaping the tenor of both domestic and foreign policy.
30 citations
TL;DR: The authors explored the connection between re-Stalinization, historical memory, and a specific version of the post-Soviet neo-medievalism, and argued that re-stalinization is a mass movement that is grounded in the unprocessed memory of Soviet crimes and atrocities.
Abstract: In this article, I explore the interconnection between Putin's politics of re-Stalinization, historical memory, and a specific version of the post-Soviet neo-medievalism. I show that re-Stalinization is a mass movement that is grounded in the unprocessed memory of Soviet crimes and atrocities. The popular myth of the “Great Patriotic War” and the myth of Stalinism as the Golden Age exploited by Putin's memory politics became a gold mine for Putin's kleptocracy. I argue that re-Stalinization and the Kremlin-sponsored ideology of Eurasianism represents two interrelated trends of a complex ideological process. Eurasianism combines Soviet denial of individuality with the idea of a state-dependent patriarchal society and Russian historical messianism. It glorifies the reign of Ivan the Terrible and Stalin. The ‘medievalist’ discourse of Eurasian ideologists, which advocates a return to the medieval society of orders, on the one hand, and the Gothic monsters populating post-Soviet film and fiction, on the other, creates a political language that expresses new attitudes to people in post-Soviet Russia. They depict a new social contract that reconsiders the modern concept of citizenship, and creates a social basis for the criminalization and militarization of Russian society.
30 citations
TL;DR: For example, the authors argued that neither re-Stalinization nor de-stalinization is likely to occur in Putin's Russia, since the regime is unwilling to develop and impose on society historical narratives which promote chauvinism, hypernationalism, and re-stonalinization.
Abstract: Evidence drawn from the intersection of historical memory and politics in Russia underline not only on-going framing battles over the Soviet past. The evidence suggests that the Kremlin is unwilling to develop and impose on society historical narratives which promote chauvinism, hypernationalism, and re-Stalinization. Although such an agenda has some support among incumbent elites and in society, it remains subordinate in terms of political influence as of early 2016. Instead, the regime is now extending support to groups in society and the political establishment which favor a critical assessment of the Soviet era, including Stalinism. This emerging criticism of the Soviet past serves a number of important goals of the leadership, including re-engagement with the West. To this end, the Kremlin recently approved new history textbooks critical of the Soviet past as well as a significant program that memorializes the victims of Soviet repressions. Yet the regime is unlikely to usher in thorough de-Stalinization which would threaten its power. Instead, the Kremlin is attempting to assemble a grand narrative that approves, as well as criticizes – in different measures – each of the regimes that existed in the 20th century (tsarist, communist, and post-communist). This incipient narrative constitutes a form of bricolage, which involves the retrieval and reassembly of diverse, often conflicting, elements to solve a problem. Here the problem is the long-standing, divisive issue of how to evaluate the history of 20th century Russia and its different regimes. The Kremlin now seeks to knit together the diverse identities of these regimes through the unifying historical thread of the Russian state. This act of bricolage also seeks to reconcile the contradictions within each regime: elements of the new narrative can be expected to condemn the inhumanity of Stalin and Stalinism while other facets will extol industrialization and the Great Patriotic War as the achievements of Russian-led Soviet society. From this perspective, neither re-Stalinization nor de-Stalinization is likely to occur in Putin's Russia. Nevertheless, if recent initiatives remain in place, critical assessments of Soviet foreign and domestic policies will become increasingly commonplace.
30 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the recent political participation in Poland focusing on the KOD movement and examine it in the context of civil society concept, arguing that KOD is located between civil and political society on the one hand and drawing strongly on the symbolism of the civil resistance during the last two decades of communism.
Abstract: The paper explores the recent political participation in Poland focusing on the KOD movement. Given that very limited data is available on the impact of citizen participation in political process in Poland, the paper attempts a preliminary assessment of the participation “between elections”. The paper tries to take a snapshot of the KOD movement and to examine it in the context of civil society concept. The paper argues that the KOD movement is located between civil and political society on the one hand. On the other hand, it draws strongly on the symbolism of the civil resistance during the last two decades of communism. The dichotomy of post-communism and the former anti-communist opposition (including former Solidarity and KOR activists) was relevant for the political participation in Poland in the 1990s and 2000s and, as I argue now, has been replaced by new identity conflict between the symbolic politics of nationhood and the liberal Europeanized vision of politics.
25 citations
TL;DR: For example, this article argued that Russian policy toward the Western world is best understood in terms of the capacity of Russia's post-Soviet rulers to achieve two goals that are in implicit tension with each other.
Abstract: Russia's foreign policy does not follow directly from the nature of its internal political system but rather from the interaction of that political system with other political systems. Russian policy toward the Western world is best understood in terms of the capacity of Russia's post-Soviet rulers to achieve two goals that are in implicit tension with each other. They are: a) maximizing the benefit to the Russian state of the country's multifaceted relations with the Western world; and b) securing Russia's status as the undisputed hegemon throughout the country's historical borderlands. These broad policy objectives—shared by Russian liberals and nationalists alike–have been common to both the Yeltsin and Putin administrations, albeit expressed in different ways over time and with differing expectations of being able to reconcile the two. Building upon authoritarian and interventionist patterns established early in the Yeltsin years and reacting to the West's refusal to acknowledge Russian regional primacy, Putin has consolidated an arbitrary personalist regime at home and waged war along the Russian periphery, even at the cost of relations with the Western world. In this respect, Putin's regime may usefully be seen as a “state-nation” with a strong imperial imprint, building upon powerful legacies of Russian political development. The removal of Putin from power will not in se change that regime type or key challenges in Russian–Western relations.
23 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss different aspects of the political evolution of Russian President and former Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the impact of his evolution upon the type of regime that has evolved from soft authoritarianism to a "militocracy" and a "consolidated authoritarian regime".
Abstract: This article discusses different aspects of the political evolution of Russian President and former Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the impact of his evolution upon the type of regime that has evolved from soft authoritarianism to a ‘militocracy’ and ‘consolidated authoritarian regime.’ The article discusses eight contributions to this special issue by placing them within the broader context of how the West misread two areas pertaining to Russia. The first is how the West by wrongly believing that Russia, being a member of G8, the NATO-Russia Council and other Western structures, continued to be interested in becoming a Western political and economic system. The second is the tradition, stretching back to Sovietology, of ignoring and downplaying the issue of how the nationalities question and different nationalisms interact with democratic revolutions, transitions and, specifically, with Russian politics.
The introductory article next discusses the eight contributions within the context of: Russian messianism, the Russkii Mir (Russian World), how and when nationalists and fascists became mainstream in Russian politics, Putin's great power nationalism, Ukrainophobia and Russian chauvinism, historical myths and re-Stalinization of Putin's political system. The final section compares Russia's invasions of Georgia and Ukraine in 2008 and 2014 respectively and the growing xenophobia in Russian foreign policy.
19 citations
TL;DR: The authors investigates a hitherto under-researched field of Tsarist, Soviet and Russian continuity in the denigration of "Ukrainian nationalism" that goes back as far as the early 18th century.
Abstract: The term ‘fascist’ has been misused by both the Soviet totalitarian system and Russian authoritarian nationalist militocracy to such an extent that it is detached from scholarly understanding and openly manipulated for political purposes. In Vladimir Putin's Russia World the term ‘fascist’ is manipulated even further by political technology and massive state control of television that spews Ukrainophobic and anti-Western xenophobic propaganda. The article investigates a hitherto under-researched field of Tsarist, Soviet and Russian continuity in the denigration of ‘Ukrainian nationalism’ that goes back as far as the early 18th century. The article focuses on the Soviet and post-Soviet eras by showing how the growth of Russian nationalism, ‘conservative values’ and anti(Ukrainian)nationalism has taken place during specific periods that have combined re-Stalinization through the glorification of Joseph Stalin and downplaying and ignoring of his mass crimes against humanity with anti-Western xenophobia. Putin's re-Stalinization is therefore in line with a tradition that requires domestic and external enemies to sustain the authoritarian nationalist militocracy.
19 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an empirical investigation was conducted on a panel dataset of 64 Vietnamese provinces and integrates moderated regression analysis, and the empirical results did not fully support the endogenous growth model in cases in which regional per capita income tended to converge across different regions, while improved foreign direct investment inflow, capital investment, and degree of openness did have significant positive impacts on GDP growth.
Abstract: Previous studies have explored regional performance from the perspective of endogenous growth theory. This empirical investigation is conducted on a panel dataset of 64 Vietnamese provinces and integrates moderated regression analysis. Statistically, the empirical results did not fully support the endogenous growth model in cases in which regional per capita income tended to converge across different regions, while improved foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow, capital investment, and degree of openness did have significant positive impacts on GDP growth. This study questions the validity of endogenous growth theory in the early stage of a less developed country. Furthermore, results indicate that internationalization activities positively affect regional performance for provinces that have established special economic zones (SEZs) through liberal state regulation.
TL;DR: The Russian-Ukrainian war has revealed that Ukrainian national identity both ethnic and civil is far stronger than almost anyone thought, while Russian national identity is far more fragmented and weak than most expected as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: No aspect of the Russian–Ukrainian war has proved more unexpected than the revelation that Ukrainian national identity both ethnic and civil is far stronger than almost anyone thought, while Russian national identity is far more fragmented and weak than most expected. That was especially surprising to many because Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine on the assumption that Ukrainians are not a “real” nation unlike Russians and that his actions were advancing the interest of what the Kremlin leader chooses to call “the Russian world”. One result of this discovery has been that the Kremlin has had to take Ukrainian identity more seriously. Another has been that it has gone to great lengths to promote Russian national identity via state-controlled media, but the latter effort has come up short because Moscow's ability to promote Russian identity is limited by the same three factors that have restricted previous Russian rulers: the fundamental weakness of Russian identity, the tensions inherent between identities the state supports and those it fears, and the reactions of the increasingly numerous non-Russian nationalities to any ethnic Russian identifications.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the process of adoption of two minority-relevant laws: the Law on Historic Centre of Prizren and the Law On the Village of Velika Hoca/Hoce e Madhe, and point out the very subtle forms of resistance to the international rule such as exclusion of citizens from participation in decision-making, defining citizenship in ethnic terms or changing the meaning of minority relevant legislation by framing it from the perspective of state and nation-building.
Abstract: This article focuses on the participation of local citizens in Kosovo in the process of state-building and their engagement with the institutions imposed by the international community. While previous literature focuses either on the constitutional and institutional framework or on the more direct forms of local resistance to international intervention, this article looks into more subtle forms of resistance whereby local citizens change the meanings of imposed institutions. To this purpose, this article examines the process of adoption of two minority-relevant laws: the Law on Historic Centre of Prizren and the Law on the Village of Velika Hoca/Hoce e Madhe. By employing a critical frame analysis, this paper points to the very subtle forms of resistance to the international rule such as: exclusion of citizens from participation in decision-making, defining citizenship in ethnic terms or changing the meaning of minority relevant legislation by framing it from the perspective of state- and nation-building. All of these actions resist the international efforts to build Kosovo as a multiethnic state and impugn the legitimacy of the system. These findings indicate the important role of local citizens in creating the sustainable peace.
TL;DR: The authors argues that Russo-Ukrainian relations cannot be normalized until Russians learn to see Ukrainians as neither "good" nor "bad" but just different, as all the people around.
Abstract: The ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, euphemistically called the “Ukraine crisis,” draws attention to its ideological underpinnings that include a historically informed Russian hegemonic view of Ukrainians as “younger brothers” who should be both patronized and censured for improper behavior. The paper examines a particular aspect of this superior attitude as embedded in ethnic stereotypes – both “vernacular”, primarily in folklore, and ideologically constructed, in both cultural and political discourses. In both cases, the structure of stereotypes reflects the dominant position of one group and subjugated position of the other within a more general paradigm of relations between Robinson Crusoe and Friday. A peculiar dialectics implies that a “good” Friday can be civilized and assimilated and become almost equal to Crusoe – “almost the same people”, in a popular Russian parlance about Ukrainians. Yet, a “bad” (“wrong”) Friday should be strongly reviled and thoroughly demonized as a complete evil, manipulated allegedly by hostile (“Western”) Robinsons. The paper argues that the Russo-Ukrainian relations cannot be normalized until Russians learn to see Ukrainians as neither “good” nor “bad” but just different –as all the people around.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors look more closely at the limited changes and innovations that occurred in the decades of the communist regime in Albania and uncover how the traditional ethnographic-folkloric studies of people's culture, marked by intellectual isolation and stigmatized by association with moralist and nationalist ideologies, were mobilized to service the shifting ideological needs and state policies towards the cultural hegemony of the regime.
Abstract: In the standard folkloric and ethnographic tradition of Albanian studies, various efforts to seize an authentic, traditional and popular culture, supposed to have really functioned in a society of official ideology, were devoted primordially to a catalogue of descriptivist and empiricist research, which only served to confirm the ultimate goal of constructing a primarily essentialized national specificity and a particularly antiquated view of national culture. Whereas the long-term continuities in the Albanian studies of people's culture (kultura popullore), which pre-dated and out-lived socialism, together with the ambiguous relationship to anthropology are emphasized elsewhere, in this paper we look more closely at the limited changes and innovations that occurred in the decades of communist regime in Albania. The aim is to uncover how the traditional ethnographic-folkloric studies of people's culture, marked by intellectual isolation and stigmatized by association with moralist and nationalist ideologies, were mobilized to service the shifting ideological needs and state policies towards the cultural hegemony of the communist regime.
TL;DR: The study of parties that label themselves as Marxist-Leninist has, for the most part, subsumed in the exploration of the broader radical (or, far) left tradition in the post-1989 period as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The study of parties that label themselves as Marxist-Leninist has, for the most part been subsumed in the exploration of the broader radical (or, far) left tradition in the post-1989 period In an attempt to bridge this gap in the recent literature on radical left parties, this article attempts to uncover the (non) distinctiveness of Marxism-Leninism by studying empirically two European parties that are self-labelled as Marxist-Leninist – the Greek (KKE) and Portuguese (PCP) Communist parties The central question we explore is whether there are significant similarities between these parties, so as to allow us to speak of Marxism-Leninism's distinctiveness today Overall, the two parties studied here have enough in common to testify to Marxism-Leninism's ongoing distinctiveness with several qualifications, especially concerning ideology
TL;DR: In this article, the substance of the EU's civil society support in post-Soviet Central Asia, a region where various forms of civil society organizations (CSOs) exist, is examined.
Abstract: Over the years, civil society empowerment has become an integral part of the European Union's (EU) external and internal governance as a way to advance democracy and enhance citizen participation. While there has been increasing scholarly attention to the instruments and impact of the EU's civil society support, so far there has been little research on the question what kind of civil society the EU actually promotes. This article intends to fill this gap by examining the substance of the EU's civil society support in post-Soviet Central Asia, a region where various forms of civil society organizations (CSOs) exist. The findings reveal a differentiation between civil society types promoted in EU strategic documents and those that are supported in practice. While at the strategic planning level the EU seeks to strengthen civil society broadly construed, at the program implementation level the (neo-) liberal CSOs are the main beneficiaries. At the same time, the EU customizes its civil society assistance depending on the realities on the ground and at times finds itself empowering state-led civil society, while communal groups rarely benefit from the EU assistance schemes. This has severe implications for the advancement of citizen participation, considering that the actual grass-root initiatives are largely excluded from the EU assistance.
TL;DR: The authors argued that the rise of Jobbik is not a protest phenomenon that simply demonstrates a social disenchantment with the transitional economy, but a unique post-Communist political development that is rooted in elements of Hungarian nationalism.
Abstract: Based on the qualitative research of elite interviews and narrative analysis of Hungarian documents, the main aim of this article is twofold: (1) to elucidate the transformation of Jobbik from a marginal extra-parliamentary youth focused movement to an influential parliamentary party; (2) to discuss the impact of Jobbik's ascension on the main centre-right Fidesz only as a pre-conclusion. It argues that the rise of Jobbik is not a protest phenomenon that simply demonstrates a social disenchantment with the transitional economy. Jobbik's transformation is a unique post-Communist political development that is rooted in elements of Hungarian nationalism. These national elements include underlying social prejudice against Roma and Jews, a preference for paternalistic economic systems, and even attraction to the historical narrative of mythic Turanism in the debate over the origins of Hungarian national identity. Jobbik manipulates all of these national elements for the transformation of its own party identity, emerging as a main challenger to the Fidesz.
TL;DR: The success of Jobbik, an extreme right party in Hungary, is unique in its success compared with other extreme right parties in the Visegrad 4 countries of Central Europe as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The success of Jobbik, an extreme-right party in Hungary, is unique in its success compared with other extreme right parties in the Visegrad 4 countries of Central Europe. In contrast to parties in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland, Jobbik has managed to make substantial electoral gains and is a major player in the National Assembly in Hungary. This paper discusses five factors that show how the rise of Jobbik was possible. They are: a tradition of extreme right political movements, a party cleavage structure shaped by morals rather than socioeconomics, a specific national electoral geography, the negotiation style of the party and finally its reaction on the crisis of traditional democratic parties. In contrast to the other V4 nations, only Hungary has these elements present. This text explores each of these factors in a comparative context to demonstrate how Jobbik was able to take advantage of Hungarian political conditions in a way that extreme right parties in other Central European nations cannot.
TL;DR: The authors investigates the dynamics and volution of issues on the agenda of Baltic environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) since the collapse of communism and illustrates how the dearth of economic opportunities for domestic public has impacted perceptions of nature advocated by the environmental activists, focussing specifically on national perceptions of ownership and the resulting actions appropriating "nature" as a source for economic development, only tangentially attaining environmental outcomes.
Abstract: The paper investigates the dynamics and volution of issues on the agenda of Baltic environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) since the collapse of communism. The past research on Baltic environment activism suggests that these enjoy high visibility because they tapped the core societal views of natural environment as a crucial asset of a nation. As we demonstrate in this paper, the changes in agendas of Baltic environmental non-governmental organisations (ENGOs) make clear that the rhetorical toolbox of ‘national environment’ is often used to mainly achieve greater financial gains for individual members, rather than for society at large. We illustrate how the dearth of economic opportunities for domestic public has impacted perceptions of ‘nature’ advocated by the environmental activists, focussing specifically on national perceptions of ownership and the resulting actions appropriating ‘nature’ as a source for economic development, only tangentially attaining environmental outcomes on the way. The vision that the ‘environment’ is an economic resource allowed ENGO activists to cooperate with the domestic policymaking, while tapping international networks and donors for funding. Throughout the past decades they worked to secure their own and their members' particularistic economic interests and, as we demonstrate, remained disengaged from the political process and failed to develop broader reproach with publics.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that public space is important for marginalised communities in order to ensure visibility and presence in public life, and that minority groups are excluded from democratic procedures which favor majority interests and preferences.
Abstract: This article argues that public space is important for marginalised communities in order to ensure visibility and presence in public life. Often minority groups are excluded from democratic procedures which favour majority interests and preferences. This is not to say that minority interests are incompatible with those of the majority but some marginalised groups are not anchored in public space, can suffer discriminatory treatment and lack the ability to control dominant, usually negative, ascriptions of group identity. This article explores two cases of marginalised communities and access to public space in post-socialist Europe: Roma and the LGBTI communities. Both communities have attempted to ensure their presence in public space through ‘Pride’ parades across Central and Eastern European capitals. The purpose of pride parades is to demand rights as citizens, such as equality and respect, and to ensure visibility in public life. On the one hand, visibility is important for LGBTI communities who remain relatively hidden and fear ‘coming out’. On the other hand, for Roma, who are highly visible, pride offers an opportunity to harness this visibility to challenge prevailing negative stereotypes through an affirmation of group identity.
TL;DR: In this article, the factors influencing the degree of trust in political institutions at three levels of government in the Czech Republic (national, regional and local) in two dissimilar regions in 2009, the year when citizens of Czech Republic experienced the negative impacts of growing unemployment and a substantial decline in real GDP were investigated.
Abstract: This article deals with the factors influencing the degree of trust in political institutions at three levels of government in the Czech Republic (national, regional and local) in two dissimilar regions in the time of economic crisis in 2009, the year when citizens of the Czech Republic experienced the negative impacts of growing unemployment and a substantial decline in real GDP. Two competitive theories - the cultural and the performance explanation - were used as a theoretical framework. The results show that there are significant differences among particular levels of government as well as regions. The influence of both institutional performance, including factors related to economic crisis, and cultural background were found. The influence of contextual factors was also confirmed.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the recollections and public narratives of elderly citizens in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan regarding their understandings, perceptions and everyday experiences during and related to the perestroika years.
Abstract: The primary objective of this chapter is to examine the recollections and public narratives of elderly citizens in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan regarding their understandings, perceptions and everyday experiences during and related to the perestroika years. In so doing, this chapter aims to address the legacy of Soviet perestroika in the CA republics during the post-independence period. This chapter also seeks to tease out the nuances in the polarized official memory discourses of the Soviet past, which has been portrayed on a binary scale of either open criticism or patronizing approval of perestroika. In addition, this chapter aims to reveal the interconnectedness of memory, cognition and historical construction in seeking to demonstrate how they shape respondents’ individual selves.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the political transformations experienced by the Communist Party and the evolution of the radical left in France in the twenty-five years after 1989 and examine the constituent process of the Front.
Abstract: This article examines the political transformations experienced by the Communist Party and the evolution of the radical left in France in the twenty-five years after 1989. Interpreting the Communist Party and Left Front as anti-establishment, that is, opposed to the political elite, but pro-system parties that are not interested in changing the nature of democratic governance. The peculiarities of French communism and its political philosophy are illustrated. Finally, this study considers the constituent process of the Front. At the beginning of the 21st century, the Front plays the role of a political federation to the left of the Socialist Party with positive electoral results.
TL;DR: In the post-Communist region, levels of trust towards national institutions are generally lower compared to the European and international ones as discussed by the authors, which may affect not only the EU's policies towards candidate countries and third countries, but also affect citizen participation during the process of democratization and after joining the EU.
Abstract: The 2004–07 EU enlargement towards the post-communist region showed that the long waiting for EU membership could impact on levels of public support for the EU. This article examines citizens' trust towards national and international institutions after joining the EU in Poland, in comparative perspective. In the post-Communist region, levels of trust towards national institutions are generally lower compared to the European and international ones. Politicians and political parties are the most distrusted actors, undermining the social and political fabric in the region. An overview of political participation and levels of trust with focus on national data sets and the European Social Survey shows that levels of trust are quite low and a share of the population is concerned with sovereignty vis-a-vis EU integration. This analysis addresses how the relationship between citizens and institutions have changed and how this may affect not just the EU's policies towards candidate countries and third countries, but how it can also affect citizen participation during the process of democratization and after joining the EU.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors observed that the German and Chinese case studies manifested a shared trend in large part because they faced comparable challenges and responded with similar citizenship strategies in their quest for national legitimacy and diplomatic recognition.
Abstract: Looking at how divided states competed against each other in the arena of citizenship since 1949, this research observes a number of common trends. The German and Chinese case studies manifested a shared trend in large part because they faced comparable challenges and responded with similar citizenship strategies in their quest for national legitimacy and diplomatic recognition. The policy effectiveness depended on the intensity of inter-state rivalry, the Cold War diplomacy, and the global nationality trends. The tight bipolar system and the strong international cooperation on nationality in Europe (among the socialist and non-socialist blocs) explain why both German states were in more favourable circumstances in asserting their citizenship claim. These two aspects are missing in the Asian context, which explain the absence of the role of the international community in legitimising or supporting the Chinese citizenship rivalry. This paper concludes that citizenship policies in the two German states were shaped in response to one another. As compared to the German case, the Chinese and Taiwanese policies exhibited a more pragmatic and independent character.
TL;DR: The authors compare the Baltic States with Greece, Portugal and Spain to discover whether the type of authoritarian legacy and regime transition has any effect on the way citizens think about the left-right divide in new democracies.
Abstract: By comparing the Baltic States with Greece, Portugal and Spain, we seek to discover whether the type of authoritarian legacy and regime transition has any effect on the way citizens think about the left-right (L-R) divide in new democracies. We argue that while the authoritarian legacy is important, the type of transition and, particularly, the kind of political alliances and party-politicization of issues during the new regime's formative years is more important. Evidence confirms our expectations, even after several cross-validating tests.
TL;DR: It is not the collection of data but emotional axioms which define the nature of the narrative as mentioned in this paper, and Alexander Solzhenitsyn's view on the 1917 Revolution demonstrates this clearly.
Abstract: It is not the collection of data but emotional axioms which defines the nature of the narrative. Alexander Solzhenitsyn's view on the 1917 Revolution demonstrates this clearly. Working on his monumental history of the Russian Revolution, he collected enormous amounts of material which indicated that Russia experienced the complete meltdown throughout 1914–1917 and the brutal Bolshevik dictatorship was among the few viable options to stop the country's complete destruction. Still due to his visceral hatred of the regime, Solzhenitsyn was unable to understand the nature of the events when the outcome was in sharp contrast to his views.