Showing papers in "Critical Review in 1995"
TL;DR: In this paper, a critique of rational choice theory underestimates the value of unification and the necessity of universalism in science, and the central place of intentionality in social life makes both unification and universalism feasible norms in social science.
Abstract: Green and Shapiro's critique of rational choice theory underestimates the value of unification and the necessity of universalism in science. The central place of intentionality in social life makes both unification and universalism feasible norms in social science. However, “universalism” in social science may be partial, in that the independence hypothesis—that the causal mechanism governing action is context independent—may hold only locally in certain classes of choice domains.
54 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Green and Ian Shapiro have pointed out that alternative explanatory variables such as culture, institutions, and social norms can be incorporated into a more powerful theory, or how they are inconsistent with rational choice theory.
Abstract: Although rational choice theory has enjoyed only modest predictive success, it provides a powerful explanatory mechanism for social processes involving strategic interaction among individuals and it stimulates interesting empirical inquiries. Rather than present competing theories to compare against rational choice, Don Green and Ian Shapiro have merely alluded to alternative explanatory variables such as culture, institutions, and social norms, without showing either how these factors can be incorporated into a more powerful theory, or how they are inconsistent with rational choice theory. It is likely that any eventual theory of the origin and maintenance of social institutions, norms, and values will have to reserve a central place for rational action.
49 citations
Abstract: The rational choice assumption that any chosen behavior can be understood as optimizing material self‐interest is not borne out by psychological research. Expressive motives, for example, are prominent in the symbols of politics, in social relationships, and in the arts of persuasion. Moreover, instrumentality is a mindset that is learned (perhaps overlearned), and can be situationally manipulated; because it is valued in our society, it provides a privileged vocabulary for justifying behaviors that may have been performed for other reasons, and encourages the illusory belief in the universality of rational choice.
47 citations
TL;DR: Green and Shapiro's Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, despite the impressive amount of work that has gone into it, is undercut by a number of serious misunderstandings of the use of the rational choice approach by students of American politics.
Abstract: Don Green and Ian Shapiro's Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, despite the impressive amount of work that has gone into it, is undercut by a number of serious misunderstandings of the use of the rational choice approach by students of American politics. Furthermore, Green and Shapiro adopt an extremely pinched notion of an empirical contribution and an outmoded and idealized view of the scientific method. If their standards were adopted, it would be difficult to allow that anyone in political science has made an empirical contribution, or that political science is a scientific enterprise.
46 citations
TL;DR: Green and Shapiro as discussed by the authors argue that rational choice scholarship in political science is excessively theory-driven: too few of its theoretical insights have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived, but rational choice theorizing has the potential to identify and correct logical inconsistencies and slippages.
Abstract: Donald Green and Ian Shapiro argue that rational choice scholarship in political science is excessively theory‐driven: too few of its theoretical insights have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived. But rational choice theorizing has the potential to identify and correct logical inconsistencies and slippages. It is thus valuable even if the resulting theories are not tested empirically. When Green and Shapiro's argument concerning collective dilemmas and free riding is formalized, it turns out to be deeply flawed and in many respects outright false. Their mistake is common enough: they misclassify a variety of collective dilemmas as prisoner's dilemmas. Because they misunderstand the theory of rational choice, Green and Shapiro allege that it is refuted by empirical findings that, in fact, support it.
29 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that rational choice research often resembles the empirically vacuous practices in which economists engage under the aegis of instrumentalism, and argue that Green and Shapiro's insistence that theoretical constructs should produce accurate predictions may inadvertently lead to instrumentalism.
Abstract: The debate over Green and Shapiro's Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory sustains their contention that rational choice theory has not produced novel, empirically sustainable findings about politics—if one accepts their definition of empirically sustainable findings. Green and Shapiro show that rational choice research often resembles the empirically vacuous practices in which economists engage under the aegis of instrumentalism. Yet Green and Shapiro's insistence that theoretical constructs should produce accurate predictions may inadvertently lead to instrumentalism. Some of Green and Shapiro's critics hint at a better approach, which would eschew predictive testing in favor of testing the applicability of the theory to particular cases.
29 citations
TL;DR: Rational choice theories have been falsified by experimental tests of economic behavior and have not been supported by analyses of behavior in the market as discussed by the authors, and they are not supported by empirical evidence.
Abstract: Rational choice theories have been falsified by experimental tests of economic behavior and have not been supported by analyses of behavior in the market. Politics is an even less fertile field of application for rational choice theories because politics deals with ends as well as means, thus preventing ends‐means rationality; voters have partisan loyalties often “fixed” in adolescence; political benefits have no common unit of measurement; “rational ignorance” inhibits rational choices; and there is no market‐like feedback to facilitate learning. Research comparing public and private efficiency does not support rational choice. Ironically, while law and business schools are now employing better microeconomic theories, political scientists are taking up rational choice theory, regardless of the disconfirming evidence.
26 citations
TL;DR: More than three decades after its advent in political science, rational choice theory has yet to add appreciably to the stock of knowledge about politics as mentioned in this paper, and this failure is attributed to methodological defects rooted in the aspiration to come up with universal theories of politics.
Abstract: More than three decades after its advent in political science, rational choice theory has yet to add appreciably to the stock of knowledge about politics. In Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory we traced this failure to methodological defects rooted in the aspiration to come up with universal theories of politics. After responding to criticisms of our argument, we elaborate on our earlier recommendations about how to improve the quality of rational choice applications. Building on suggestions of contributors to this volume, we lay out an empirically based research program designed to delineate the conditions under which rational choice explanations are likely to be useful.
25 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that rational choice theory is too inattentive to substantive matters and that it is unlikely to generate what they seek: an empirically relevant, coherent theory of political processes and a rational choice paradigm that accommodates other perspectives.
Abstract: Green and Shapiro's argument that rational choice theory is too inattentive to substantive matters is well taken. However, their suggestions for future research are unlikely to generate what they seek: an empirically relevant, coherent theory of political processes and a rational choice paradigm that accommodates other perspectives. To achieve this end, we require a clearer understanding of the practical objectives of our discipline and of the difference between modelling and theorizing about politics, and between science and engineering. Until the “engineering” component of the discipline assumes a more central role, research—whether theoretical, empirical, or any combination of the two—will continue to generate an incoherent accumulation of theorems, lemmas, correlations, and “facts.”
24 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, Green and Shapiro discover a curious gulf between the prestige of rational choice approaches and the dearth of solid empirical findings, and they see rational choice theory as a variant of the equilibrium analysis found in physics, economics, and biology.
Abstract: Donald Green and Ian Shapiro discover a curious gulf between the prestige of rational choice approaches and the dearth of solid empirical findings. But we can understand neither the prestige of rational choice theory nor its pathologies unless we see it as a variant of the equilibrium analysis found in physics, economics, and biology. Only such a global perspective on rational choice theory will reveal its core assumptions and the likely shape of its future in political science. In this light, the growing dominance of rational choice theory in political science is all but inevitable and its pathologies are all but inescapable.
22 citations
TL;DR: According to one model of social theory, the social theorist seeks to give as rich an account as possible of a society's own self-understanding or self-interpretation.
Abstract: According to one model of social theory, the social theorist seeks to give as rich an account as possible of a society's own self‐understanding or self‐interpretation. The second model, by contrast, involves challenging the society's self‐understanding on the basis of a radical vision of ultimate standards of. judgment. Charles Taylor claims that neither of these models should be privileged over the other, that both are equiprimordial ways of theorizing social life. However, Taylor does privilege the first model in his own practice of social theory—which can be summed up in the phrase, “the rhetoric of understanding.”
TL;DR: The purpose of rational choice is to provide a grand theoretical framework for designing human institutions as mentioned in this paper, and attempts were made to extend the theory from markets to politics, but with relatively poor predictions, but impelled game theorists to generalize preferencebased theories to include belief formation.
Abstract: The purpose of rational choice is to provide a grand theoretical framework for designing human institutions. Once theoretical work had shown how markets optimally aggregated preferences, attempts were made to extend the theory from markets to politics. Attempts by Downs and Olson to describe elections and collective action produced relatively poor predictions, but impelled game theorists to generalize preference‐based theories to include belief formation. A consequence of this change is that the theory is no longer purely axiomatic, but draws on insights about human behavior from other disciplines and empirical analysis of the role institutions play in determining beliefs.
TL;DR: The main problem with Green and Shapiro's list lies in the standards they use to evaluate the achievements of rational choice theory as mentioned in this paper, which is deeply questionable and inconsistent with both standard insights in contemporary philosophy of science and the established practice in the most successful empirical sciences.
Abstract: In their survey of empirical research based on rational choice theory, Don Green and Ian Shapiro point to a list of methodological deficiencies or “pathologies.” The main problem with Green and Shapiro's list lies in the standards they use to evaluate the achievements of rational choice theory. These standards are derived from a view of empirical research that is deeply questionable and, in the stated form, inconsistent with both standard insights in contemporary philosophy of science and the established practice in the most successful empirical sciences.
TL;DR: Green and Shapiro's tour de force fails as a convincing critique of rational choice applications in political science because it locks itself into a statistical form of assessment as discussed by the authors, comparing rational choice against an ideal rather than some concrete alternative.
Abstract: Green and Shapiro's tour de force fails as a convincing critique of rational choice applications in political science because it locks itself into a statistical form of assessment. Rather than seeing the constructive side of rational choice theory, both as an engine of theoretical development and as a source of non‐obvious empirical insights about politics, Green and Shapiro depart from the procedure in most sciences, comparing rational choice against an ideal rather than some concrete alternative. Finally, they fail to note the recent emphasis on sophisticated empirical testing of rational choice hypotheses.
TL;DR: Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory as mentioned in this paper is a valuable survey and critique of research in the rational choice tradition, but one that slights that tradition's past and potential contributions to the study of politics.
Abstract: Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory is a valuable survey and critique of research in the rational choice tradition, but one that slights that tradition's past and potential contributions to the study of politics. The authors rightly note limitations of rational choice theory but understate what it has to offer political scientists, for they fail to focus clearly on its essentials; adopt too narrow a basis for evaluating scholarship; and wrongly identify rational choice theory with the shortcomings of some scholarship that makes use of it.
TL;DR: In this paper, Schumpeter's work has been all too selectively appropriated by public choice theorists, and the authors discuss four problems: the deficient rationality of voters, politicians as political entrepreneurs, leadership in democracy and the rise of the political class.
Abstract: Joseph Schumpeter's work has been all too selectively appropriated by public choice theorists Schumpeter criticized the high level of rationality the classical model of democracy imputes to citizens, and he provided an alternative theory, inspiring rational choice theory and allowing for diverse forms of irrationality Following in Schumpeter's footsteps I will discuss four problems: the deficient rationality of voters, politicians as “political entrepreneurs,” leadership in democracy and the rise of the “political class,” and the affinity between democracy and capitalism
TL;DR: A new understanding of the relationship between nationalism and economics emerges by looking at arguments made by Marx, List, and Smith, one that explains the attribution of social importance to economic development by revealing it as a function of nationalism.
Abstract: Accounts that attribute nationalism to capitalism or industrialization face the problem of nationalism in late‐stage capitalist, or as some might say, post‐industrial, societies. While increasing social significance has been attributed to economic growth throughout human history, reasons for this are far from self‐evident. By looking at arguments made by Marx, List, and Smith, a new understanding of the relationship between nationalism and economics emerges—one that explains the attribution of social importance to economic development by revealing it as a function of nationalism.
Abstract: In the last years of his life, Michel Foucault sought to address “ethical” questions, having to do with the self's relation to itself, by trying to locate in the Roman Stoics and other philosophers of antiquity what he called “an aesthetics of existence” By this Foucault meant “the idea of a self which has to be created as a work of art” This article aims at a critical dialogue with the texts that compose this last phase of Foucault's thought, probing the moral and political adequacy of Foucault's Nietzschean vision of the self's aesthetic self‐creation
TL;DR: In this article, Coleman attempted to reconcile rational choice theory with the classical sociological concerns: the relationship between the individual and society, and the historical and normative status of rationality, and identified limits to the rational choice model, and suggests some promising but ultimately unconvincing ways around them.
Abstract: James Coleman attempted to reconcile rational choice theory with the classical sociological concerns: the relationship between the individual and society, and the historical and normative status of rationality. He identifies limits to the rational choice model, and suggests some promising but ultimately unconvincing ways around them. His project does, however, offer an important critique of Weber's theory of bureaucracy, which is of value in analyzing relationships between corporate actors and particular persons.
TL;DR: Sternhell and Sluga as mentioned in this paper show that fascism and Nazism were part of an early twentieth-century intellectual rebellion against universalism, liberalism, and Enlightenment rationalism, but instead of wanting to return to the traditions of the past, as conservatives wished, these intellectuals thought that fascism could transcend modernity.
Abstract: Zeev Sternhell and Hans Sluga show that fascism and Nazism were part of an early twentieth‐century intellectual rebellion against universalism, liberalism, and Enlightenment rationalism. Western technology, values, and political institutions were seen as outmoded, but instead of wanting to return to the traditions of the past, as conservatives wished, these intellectuals thought that fascism could transcend modernity. Sorel, Heidegger, and other fascist modernists offered different radical solutions to what was conceived of as the decadence of liberal Western civilization. It remains an open question whether the discontent with modernity is an intellectual construction or a result of actual defects in modern life itself.
TL;DR: In this article, the similarities between communitarianism and nationalism are explored, and the incompatibility of these theories is demonstrated by showing that the two understandings of freedom and pluralism are diametrically different.
Abstract: As many authors have acknowledged in these pages, Will Kymlicka has produced an admirable attempt to reconcile the differences of communitarians and liberals. However, Kymlicka's synthesis ignores the aspects of each theory which make his task impossible. Particularly, his analysis rests upon a misleading picture of communitarian community and an incomplete appreciation of the divergent liberal and communitarian understandings of freedom and pluralism. In the process of demonstrating the incompatibility of these theories, the similarities between communitarianism and nationalism are explored.
TL;DR: Woodmansee's The Author, Art, and the Market misunderstands the concept of autonomous art: it does not deny art's instrumental role in life, but rather reconceives this role as essentially psychological.
Abstract: Martha Woodmansee's The Author, Art, and the Market misunderstands the concept of autonomous art: it does not deny art's instrumental role in life, but rather reconceives this role as essentially psychological. The work of art becomes an emblem of self‐control, and as such of great social import. But as Richard Goldthwaite's Wealth and the Demand for Art in Italy suggests, this role is traduced by the tendency of capitalism increasingly to eschew the high art exemplified by the Renaissance when there is money to be made in unchallenging, trashy popular culture.
TL;DR: The authors argued that society and economy are fundamentally structures of coercion and governance, with selective perception being employed to choose which interests government will coercively protect, and as a result coercion is ubiquitous.
Abstract: Robert Higgs misunderstands me as suggesting that there is, in all societies, a mathematically constant level of coercion. My argument is that society and economy are fundamentally structures of coercion and governance, with selective perception being employed to choose which interests government will coercively protect. As a result coercion is ubiquitous—ideological preconceptions and material preferences to the contrary notwithstanding. Libertarianism consists of attractive sentiments but sentiments nonetheless. Higgs is participating in the process of determining the uses of government, not in its minimization; a valuable process but not the latter one.
TL;DR: The Social Cage as discussed by the authors examines the behavior of great apes, who, they conclude, prefer freedom and mobility over close social ties, and argues that people may now have a chance to regain the autonomy that evolution has equipped them to enjoy.
Abstract: In The Social Cage, Alexandra Maryanski and Jonathan H. Turner challenge the widespread assumption that humans are by nature “social animals.” They do so by examining the behavior of great apes, who, they conclude, prefer freedom and mobility over close social ties. With the coming of post‐industrial society, according to Maryanski and Turner, people may now have a chance to regain the autonomy that evolution has equipped them to enjoy. Despite weaknesses, mostly involving the ethnographic record and the assumption that men and women share the same natural desire for autonomy, the book is a valuable attempt to return a biological perspective to sociological analysis.
TL;DR: The lack of a nuanced conceptualization of the critical, constructive role of civil authority in the creation and maintenance of open, competitive markets and the virtual absence of a concern for and understanding of the engines of real economic growth, results in scholarship that only weakly articulates the profound linkage between civil authority, open markets, and economic growth as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: Markets, law, and regulation are intimately intertwined. Thus, recent studies (by Morton Keller and Donald McCloskey et al.) of the intersection between public policy and the economy are both necessary and welcome. But the absence in these works of a nuanced conceptualization of the critical, constructive role of civil authority in the creation and maintenance of open, competitive markets, and the virtual absence of a concern for and understanding of the engines of real economic growth, results in scholarship that only weakly articulates the profound linkage between civil authority, open markets, and economic growth.
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that Simpson's idea of a minimal state overseeing various non-liberal communities cannot be realized within the libertarian framework, since communities require some form of hierarchy not only to exist but to generate meaningful culture.
Abstract: Like many libertarian thinkers, Simpson assumes that the minimal state is culturally neutral. This is false. Libertarianism is a theory opposed to hierarchy at the state level. As such, it also undermines the grounds for hierarchy at the community level. Since communities require some form of hierarchy not only to exist but to generate meaningful culture, libertarianism is inherently nonneutral towards culture. From this it follows that Simpson's idea of a minimal state overseeing various nonliberal communities cannot be realized within the libertarian framework. In its place, I defend republicanism, which makes no pretensions toward cultural neutrality.
TL;DR: In Sick Societies, Robert Edgerton argues that the longstanding principle of cultural relativism is misguided and proposes to evaluate both traditional and modern societies in terms of their commitment to providing a satisfying "quality of life" for their members as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: In Sick Societies, Robert Edgerton argues that the longstanding principle of cultural relativism is misguided. In its place, he claims, we need to evaluate both traditional and modern societies in terms of their commitment to providing a satisfying “quality of life” for their members. This essay takes up the merits of Edgerton's thesis by using primate data to analyze and consider human nature, the adaptation thesis, the nature of culture, and, on purely hominoid grounds, the “good” society for humankind.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that, with regard to the attainment of specific socioeconomic outcomes, governmental stipulation of private property rights differs fundamentally from governmental command and control, and they argue that such a stipulation is fundamentally different from a market society.
Abstract: Warren Samuels maintains that every society has a constant amount of coercion and order, which vary only in terms of who gains and who loses, because every society has a government that establishes property rights. In making these arguments, Samuels exaggerates the extent to which governmental decisions predetermine the workings of a market society, and he fails to recognize that, with regard to the attainment of specific socioeconomic outcomes, governmental stipulation of private property rights differs fundamentally from governmental command and control.
TL;DR: Prychitko as discussed by the authors argued that by examining the humanist side of Marx, a socialist case can be made both for the labor managed firm and markets in a postmodern world.
Abstract: Conceptions of self‐management and the labor managed firm (LMF) have not been well received by economists. They have, however, proved to be a continuing (though minority) interest in the socialist movement from Marx onwards. Prychitko claims that by examining the humanist side of Marx, a socialist case can be made both for the LMF and markets in a postmodern world. Such a case rests upon an assumption that self‐management confers competitive advantage by enhancing information sharing (increasingly important in postmodern conditions). The case, though interesting, is not yet made.
TL;DR: Yago and Brock as discussed by the authors argued that the buyout wave did not end primarily because of new restrictive regulations, and that the increased rate of bankruptcies resulting from the buyouts left the economy's overall efficiency unimpaired.
Abstract: The recent exchange between Glenn Yago and James W. Brock over the junk‐bond buyouts of the 1980s missed the mark on a number of points. In reality, neither the buyouts nor their sudden near‐cessation contributed materially to the recession of 1990–91. The buyout wave did not end primarily because of new restrictive regulations. The buyouts had no appreciable effect on real capital formation. And the increased rate of bankruptcies resulting from the buyouts left the economy's overall efficiency unimpaired.