Showing papers in "Ethical Theory and Moral Practice in 2004"
TL;DR: This article explored the advantages of using a range of actual cases in doing political theory, and pointed out the wisdom that may be embedded in existing practices, and encouraged theorists to confront challenges they might otherwise overlook and to think through the implications of their accounts more fully.
Abstract: This article explores the advantages of using a range of actual cases in doing political theory. This sort of approach clarifies what is at stake in alternative theoretical formulations, draws attention to the wisdom that may be embedded in existing practices, and encourages theorists to confront challenges they might otherwise overlook and to think through the implications of their accounts more fully.
59 citations
TL;DR: In the social sciences, the strong evolutionary and structural necessities of modernization theories have been criticized (Bader, 1995a, 9ff, 14ff), and ethno-religious diversity has re-emerged as an important topic, and contingency, path dependency, and institutional diversity are the new catchwords: institutions and contexts matter.
Abstract: Many recent events dramatically highlight the political and societal importance of ethno-religious divisions that have long been overlooked in political philosophy and modern sociology. The situation has rapidly changed in the past twenty years or so, and the changes affected the dominant style of theorizing. In the social sciences, the strong evolutionary and structural necessities of modernization theories have been criticized (Bader, 1995a, 9ff., 14ff.), ethno-religious diversity has re-emerged as an important topic, and contingency, path dependency, and institutional diversity are the new catchwords: institutions and contexts matter (Bader and Engelen, 2003). In political philosophy, we see indications of a similar contextual turn in recent theories of justice (Shapiro, 1999; Hacker-Cordon, 2003) as well as theories of immigration and incorporation of ethno-national and religious diversity (Walzer, 1994, 1997, 2003; Kymlicka, 1995, 2001, 2002; Carens, 2000; Parekh, 2000; Baubock, 1994; Bader, 1995a, 1995b, 1997, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b; Rosenblum, 2002; Greenawalt, 1995; Spinner-Halev, 2000). In our view, three main reasons generally inspire more contextual approaches in political philosophy: (i) moral pluralism, (ii) under-determinacy of principles, (iii) the complexity of practical reason and judgement.
38 citations
TL;DR: It is argued that, to respect someone's autonomy, any preferences the authors respect must be among that person's current preferences, not a current, but a former or later preference.
Abstract: Honoring a living will typically involves treating an incompetent patient in accord with preferences she once had, but whose objects she can no longer understand. How do we respect her “precedent autonomy” by giving her what she used to want? There is a similar problem with “subsequent consent”: How can we justify interfering with someone's autonomy on the grounds that she will later consent to the interference, if she refuses now? Both problems arise on the assumption that, to respect someone's autonomy, any preferences we respect must be among that person's current preferences. I argue that this is not always true. Just as we can celebrate an event long after it happens, so can we respect someone's wishes long before or after she has that wish. In the contexts of precedent autonomy and subsequent consent, the wishes are often preferences about which of two other, conflicting preferences to satisfy. When someone has two conflicting preferences, and a third preference on how to resolve that conflict, to respect his autonomy we must respect that third preference. People with declining competence may have a resolution preference earlier, favoring the earlier conflicting preference (precedent autonomy), whereas those with rising competence may have it later, favoring the later conflicting preference (subsequent consent). To respect autonomy in such cases we must respect not a current, but a former or later preference.
33 citations
TL;DR: The authors evaluate the economic assumptions of economic theory via an examination of the capitalist transformation of creditor-debtor relations in the 18th century, concluding that the conditions for sustaining these concrete capitalist formations require limits on freedom of contract and the scope of private property rights.
Abstract: This paper evaluates the economic assumptions of economic theory via an examination of the capitalist transformation of creditor–debtor relations in the 18th century. This transformation enabled masses of people to obtain credit without moral opprobrium or social subordination. Classical 18th century economics had the ethical concepts to appreciate these facts. Ironically, contemporary economic theory cannot. I trace this fault to its abstract representations of freedom, efficiency, and markets. The virtues of capitalism lie in the concrete social relations and social meanings through which capital and commodities are exchanged. Contrary to laissez faire capitalism, the conditions for sustaining these concrete capitalist formations require limits on freedom of contract and the scope of private property rights.
32 citations
TL;DR: The authors distinguishes between two rival views about the nature of final value (i.e., the value something has for its own sake) and conditionalism, and argues that conditionalism is the better approach for mainly the following three reasons: First, intrinsicalism is too indiscriminate, which makes it subject to what I call "location problems" of final values.
Abstract: The paper distinguishes between two rival views about the nature of final value (i.e. the value something has for its own sake) — intrinsicalism and conditionalism. The former view (which is the one adopted by G.E. Moore and several later writers) holds that the final value of any F supervenes solely on features intrinsic to F, while the latter view allows that the final value of F may supervene on features non-intrinsic to F. Conditionalism thus allows the final value of F to vary according to the context in which F appears. Given the plausible assumption that there is an intimate tie between final values and appropriate attitudinal responses, it appears that conditionalism is the better approach for mainly the following three reasons: First, intrinsicalism is too indiscriminate, which makes it subject to what I call ‘location problems’ of final value. I illustrate this problem by discussing alleged examples of Moorean organic unities. Second, intrinsicalism evokes symptoms of ‘evaluative schizophrenia’. Third, considerations of theoretical economy tell in favour of conditionalism. Thereafter I respond to some recent challenges to conditionalism. An appendix surveys some meritorious implications that conditionalism offers for various substantial versions of such structurally different views about value as monism, pluralism, and particularism.
32 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the relationship between justice and sustainability, and argue that sustainability itself is about sustaining inter alia justice, and that justice itself requires intergenerationally the sustaining of the conditions of a good life for all.
Abstract: Although this paper attends to some extent to the question whether the global economy promotes or impedes either justice or sustainability, its main focus is on the relationship between justice and sustainability. Whilst sustainability itself as a normative goal is about sustaining inter alia justice, justice itself requires intergenerationally the sustaining of the conditions of a good life for all. At the heart of this is a conception of justice as realising the basic rights of all–in contrast to a more demanding distributive principle or a less demanding principle of not violating the liberty rights or other basic rights of others. Although Pogge’s analysis that the global economy causes harm by failing to realise basic rights is seen as a useful challenge to common libertarian assumptions, the acceptance of other positive correlative duties, following Shue, is advocated. Insofar as the global economy fails to realise basic justice, the question is ‘how far can it realistically be changed?’ and this is a function partly of the moral attitudes of individuals at large.
27 citations
TL;DR: The authors discusses the origins, biases, and effects on contemporary discussions of economics and ethics of the unexamined use of the metaphor "an economy is a machine" as their starting point.
Abstract: This essay discusses the origins, biases, and effects on contemporary discussions of economics and ethics of the unexamined use of the metaphor “an economy is a machine.” Both neoliberal economics and many critiques of capitalist systems take this metaphor as their starting point. The belief that economies run according to universal “laws of motion,” however, is shown to be based on a variety of rationalist thinking that – while widely held – is inadequate for explaining lived human experience. Feminist scholarship in the philosophy of science and economics has brought to light some of the biases that have supported the mechanistic worldview. Possible alternatives to the “an economy is a machine” include “an economy is a creative process” and “an economy is an organism.” Such metaphors are intellectually defensible as guides to scientific inquiry and provide a richer ground for moral imagination.
25 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the obligations flowing from free-trade treaties collide with the cultural and social meanings of food, and that food is not only special because it is necessary for our survival, but also special because food is strongly related to our social and cultural identity.
Abstract: Food trade is of economic importance for both developed and developing countries. Food, however, is a special commodity. Firstly, the lack of food – hunger, under-nourishment, and starvation – is one of the world’s pressing moral problems. But food is not only special because it is necessary for our survival; food is also special because it is strongly related to our social and cultural identity. Two recent transatlantic trade conflicts over food – over the use of artificial growth hormones in beef production and over the use of (modern) biotechnology in food production – show that food is a specific commodity. In these trade-conflicts, the obligations flowing from free-trade treaties collide with the cultural and social meanings of food. Current international trade agreements neglect this point and force countries to fight their case in the field of food safety science. This causes a bias in the discussion. Europe’s resistance towards artificial growth hormones and GM-food is not strictly science based; it is also culture based. For a fair resolution of trade-conflicts, this needs to be accommodated in international trade legislation. With the help of the notion of public reason I defend that (i) precaution with regard to scientific uncertainty, and (ii) the possibility for compulsory labelling with regard to sensitive non-nutritional properties of foodstuffs, need to be incorporated in international food trade regulations.
18 citations
TL;DR: This paper explored the potential of a contextual approach to multicultural conflict and argued that a "deductive" approach accepts standing interpretations of normative principles, whereas a "contextual" approach reinterprets these principles in the light of the circumstances and that, whether or not it promotes social stability, a contextual approach makes us attend to otherwise neglected perspectives and thus yields greater normative insights.
Abstract: This paper explores the potential of a contextual approach to multicultural conflict. It reconstructs two cases that were hotly debated in the Netherlands—‘Islamic’ headscarves for police officers and for court officers—and asks whether a ‘contextual’ approach reaches compromises and thus promotes social stability more easily than a ‘deductive’ approach. The argument is that a ‘deductive’ approach accepts standing interpretations of normative principles, whereas a ‘contextual’ approach reinterprets these principles in the light of the circumstances and that, whether or not it promotes social stability, a contextual approach makes us attend to otherwise neglected perspectives and thus yields greater normative insights.
18 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons by relying on certain background expectations of normality has been made, and it has been argued that default reasons must be understood non-extensionally.
Abstract: This paper addresses a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons (at a first stab, reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined) by relying on certain background expectations of normality I first argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally Thus if default reasons rest on normality claims, those claims won't bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality Their generality depends rather on the contingent distributional aspects of the world, which no theory of reasons should purport to settle Appeals to default reasons cannot therefore uniquely support particularism But this argument also implies that if moral generalism entailed that moral reasons by necessity have invariant valence (in the natural extensional sense), it would be a non-starter Since generalism is not a non-starter, my argument forces us to rethink the parameters of the generalism-particularism debate Here I propose to clarify the debate by focusing on its modal rather than extensional aspects In closing, I outline the sort of generalism that I think is motivated by my discussion, and then articulate some worries this view raises about the theoretical usefulness of the label ‘default reason’
17 citations
TL;DR: This article analyzed public policy discourses on mosque establishment in the Dutch city of Rotterdam and showed how urban-planning discourses, and their specific frames, which came to dominate mosque establishment as a policy issue from the 1980s onwards, created their own set of meanings.
Abstract: The establishment of mosques is an incentive for public discussions on Islam and the presence of Muslims in Western European societies. This article critically reconstructs Public Policy discourses on mosque establishment in the Dutch city of Rotterdam. It shows how urban-planning discourses, and their specific frames, which came to dominate mosque establishment as a policy issue in Rotterdam from the 1980s onwards, created their own set of meanings. The article analyses these discourses in terms of their enabling and constraining roles during a period in which local authorities became more involved in the improvement and placement of new mosques in the Rotterdam area. On the one hand, the urban renewal framework allowed for a substantial improvement in the housing of Islamic religious and cultural practice. On the other hand, urban planning policy discursive practices gave less attention to issues such as visibility and presence that are now at the heart of the heated debates about Muslim populations in Dutch society. More recent discussions on the aesthetics and location of mosques in Rotterdam illustrate how these dominant discourses are not only contestable but are also being contested from all quarters.
TL;DR: In this article, a typology of the ways in which one person's well-being may depend on the material resources of other persons is provided, and the standard Paretian analysis of welfare needs to be modified.
Abstract: In economic analysis, it is usually assumed that each individual’s well-being (mental welfare) depends on her or his own resources (material welfare). A typology is provided of the ways in which one person’s well-being may depend on the material resources of other persons. When such dependencies are taken into account, standard Paretian analysis of welfare needs to be modified. Pareto efficiency on the level of material resources need not coincide with Pareto efficiency on the level of well-being. A change in economic conditions that is Pareto efficient in the standard sense, i.e., with respect to material resources, may nevertheless sacrifice one person’s well-being to that of another. It is shown that under plausible assumptions, Pareto efficiency on the level of well-being may require the reduction of inequality on the level of material resources.
TL;DR: This paper argued that there are serious limits to what political theorists can achieve, even if political theory is not without its uses if we value social criticism, and argued that the contextual approach is less distinctive than its proponents imagine, and less useful than many would suggest.
Abstract: A number of theorists have touted the merits of the contextual approach to political theory, arguing that a close examination of real-world cases is more likely to yield both theoretical insight and practical solutions to pressing problems. This is particularly evident, it is argued, in the field of multiculturalism in political theory. The present paper offers some skeptical reflections on this view, arguing the merits of a view of political theory which sees the contextual approach as less distinctive than its proponents imagine, and less useful than many would suggest. It maintains that there are serious limits to what political theorists can achieve, even if political theory is not without its uses if we value social criticism.
TL;DR: This paper critically discusses an argument that is sometimes pressed into service in the ethical debate about the use of assisted reproduction and concludes that although it addresses important issues, it is highly problematic for the following reasons.
Abstract: This paper critically discusses an argument that is sometimes pressed into service in the ethical debate about the use of assisted reproduction. The argument runs roughly as follows: we should prevent women from using assisted reproduction techniques, because women who want to use the technology have been socially coerced into desiring children - and indeed have thereby been harmed by the patriarchal society in which they live. I call this the argument from coercion. Having clarified this argument, I conclude that although it addresses important issues, it is highly problematic for the following reasons. First, if women are being coerced to desire to use AR, we should eradicate the coercive elements in pro-natalist ideology, not access to AR. Second, the argument seems to have the absurd implication that we should prevent all woman, whether fertile or not, to try to have children. Third, it seems probable that women's welfare will be greater if we let well informed and decision-competent women decide for themselves whether they want to use AR.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors distinguish between two forms of consequentialist teleology and argue that Anderson's claim is either harmless or her argument for the claim is uncompelling, and conclude that consequentialists need not hold that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value.
Abstract: Elizabeth Anderson claims that states of affairs are merely extrinsically valuable, since we value them only in virtue of the intrinsically valuable (e.g.) persons in those states of affairs. Since it considers states of affairs to be the sole bearers of intrinsic value, Anderson argues that consequentialism is incoherent because it attempts to globally maximize extrinsic value. I respond to this objection by distinguishing between two forms of consequentialist teleology and arguing that Anderson's claim is either harmless or her argument for the claim is uncompelling. On the first conception of teleology, consequentialists need not hold that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value, which allows them to deflect this criticism. On the second account of teleology, even assuming that states of affairs are the sole bearers of intrinsic value, Anderson's argument does not necessarily defeat such views.
Journal Article•
TL;DR: The authors argue that moral reason radicalises contextualist moral philosophy by giving it a sociological turn and argue that scientists, politicians and other intellectuals have a duty to take seriously the social presuppositions of free deliberate choice and public opinion and to support cultural minorities with instruments to liberate themselves from their often precarious situation.
Abstract: Contextualist moral philosophers criticise hands-off liberal theories of justice for abstracting from the cultural context in which people make choices. Will Kymlicka and Joseph Carens, for example, demonstrate that these theories are disadvantageous to cultural minorities who want to pursue their own way of life. I argue that Pierre Bourdieu's critique of moral reason radicalises contextualist moral philosophy by giving it a sociological turn. In Bourdieu's view it is not enough to provide marginalised groups or subgroups with equal access to public institutions and specific cultural rights—in some cases this may in fact be detrimental. He contends that scientists, politicians and other intellectuals have a duty to take seriously the social presuppositions of free deliberate choice and public opinion and to support cultural minorities with instruments to liberate themselves from their often precarious situation.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the usual fairness argument does not stand up to scrutiny once various dynamic aspects of competition are taken into account, and that competition turns out to be unfair even if the usual fair argument is upheld.
Abstract: In this paper, we challenge the usual argument which says that competition is a fair mechanism because it ranks individuals according to their relative preferences between effort and leisure. This argument, we claim, is very insufficient as a justification of fairness in competition, and we show that it does not stand up to scrutiny once various dynamic aspects of competition are taken into account. Once the sequential unfolding of competition is taken into account, competition turns out to be unfair even if the usual fairness argument is upheld. We distinguish between two notions of fairness, which we call U-fairness, where ‘U’ stands for the ‘usual’ fairness notion, and S-fairness, where ‘S’ stands for the ‘sequential’ aspect of competition. The sequential unfairness of competition, we argue, comprises two usually neglected aspects connected with losses of freedom: first of all, there is an ‘eclipse’ of preferences in the sense that even perfectly calculating competitors do not carry out a trade-off between effort and ranking; and second, competitive dynamics leads to single-mindedness because the constraints on the competitors’ choices always operate in the sense of increased competitiveness and, therefore, in the direction of an increased effort requirements. We argue (1) that competition is S-unfair even if it is U-fair, (2) that as S-unfairness increases, the ethical relevance of U-fairness itself vanishes, so that (3) by focusing as they usually do on U-fairness alone, economists neglect a deeper aspect of unfairness.
TL;DR: In this paper, a new social and moral-psychological understanding of cultural identity, tailored to the mixed multicultural contexts of every major city today, is proposed, and the idea of prestige-resilience is proposed both as an explanatory concept in the debate on underclass-culture and as a normative concept from which basic moral and ethical thresholds for cultural identity-formation might be deduced.
Abstract: This article proposes a new social- and moral-psychological understanding of cultural identity, tailored to the mixed multicultural contexts of every major city today. Seeking to protect vulnerable cultural groups, theories of multiculturalism have insufficiently assessed the psychological significance of intercultural social comparison, in identity-formation. While plays of prestige are a fact of life for immigrant and gay minorities, not everyone is equally able to cope with ascribed negative prestige. This is shown in an analysis of reactive attitudes towards negative prestige under contrasting conditions (of rough cultural equality, and in underclass-culture). The idea of prestige-resilience is proposed both as an explanatory concept in the debate on underclass-culture and as a normative concept from which basic moral and ethical thresholds for cultural identity-formation might be deduced. Outcomes are considered relevant for psychological analysis of underclass-formation and for multicultural policy-making, specifically in immigrant states.
TL;DR: The embodiment thesis as mentioned in this paper states that moral values underdetermine the obligations and entitlements of individual persons, and that actual social institutions must embody morality by specifying these moral relations.
Abstract: In this essay I articulate and defend a thesis about the nature of morality called “the embodiment thesis”. The embodiment thesis states that moral values underdetermine the obligations and entitlements of individual persons, and that actual social institutions must embody morality by specifying these moral relations. I begin by presenting two thought experiments that elucidate and motivate the embodiment thesis. I then proceed by distinguishing the embodiment thesis from a Rawlsian doctrine about the nature of justice, from the doctrine of moral relativism, and from solutions to the coordination problem of rational choice theory.
TL;DR: Singer as mentioned in this paper argued that if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so.
Abstract: Peter Singer has famously argued that people living in affluent western countries are morally obligated to donate money to famine relief. The central premise in his argument is that, “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so.” The present paper offers an argument to the effect that affluent people ought to support foreign aid projects based on a much weaker ethical premise. The new premise states that, “If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so.” This premise, supplemented with a notion of final value drawing on Amartya Sen's concept of freedom as capabilities and functionings, is conceived as a special version of a weak, egalitarian Pareto principle.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors describe how the emphasis placed by constitutive theory on locality and meaning entails a contextual analysis and demonstrate how a constitutive and contextual approach can enhance our understanding of the moral issues surrounding differentiated citizenship policy.
Abstract: Political theorists, increasingly, are realizing the virtues of contextuality to conceptual analysis. Just as theory may provide useful standards for the assessment of political practices, so may application of theoretical constructs within particular contexts provide a critical corrective to theory. This essay relates work undertaken within sociolegal studies applying a constitutive methodology to such efforts to contextualize political theorizing. The essay describes how the emphasis placed by constitutive theory on locality and meaning entails a contextual analysis. The essay then demonstrates how a constitutive and contextual approach can enhance our understanding of the moral issues surrounding differentiated citizenship policy. While the most obvious cost associated with differentiated citizenship policy is a loss in formal equality, a contextual assessment demonstrates the prospect of an even deeper, though ultimately contingent, moral loss in self-invention.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the possibilities of mutually fruitful dialogue between moral philosophy and ontology, in particular, the ontology of relations The latter copes with the question of how relations relate, whereas moral philosophy often ignores the ontological implications of such crucial relations as "love" and "interpersonality".
Abstract: The essay undertakes to explore the possibilities of mutually fruitful dialogue between moral philosophy and ontology, in particular, the ontology of relations The latter copes with the question of how relations relate, whereas moral philosophy often ignores the ontological implications of such crucial relations as “love” and “interpersonality” The paper proceeds as follows First, the ontology of relations is discussed Second, various examples are analysed From this, a conception of relation instantiation emerges, according to which to determine which relation actually obtains, one has to take into account (a) the context, (b) the specific content or meaning of the relation, and (c) some “action” or “decision” or “mode of existence” of the relata This conception suggests that relation instantiation cannot be explained by a single formula By the help of this conception, Hume's thesis of the identity of “killing relations” between human and nonhuman beings is questioned Then, the relation of love is analysed It is shown that love as a moral relation is perfectly explicable in terms of ontology Moreover, its essence is best captured by the interrelation of the particulars, the relation of love as a universal, and by the relating “action” of the particulars Finally, the alleged relation of universal fraternity (“interpersonality” as such), linking up each human being to all other human beings, is discussed
TL;DR: In this paper, the effects on people's lives of their attitudes towards time and their own embodiment are discussed, and two contrasting literary characters are used to show concretely how people' lives and relationships are affected negatively or positively according to the temporal perspectives they adopt and thus the significance they give to their corporeality.
Abstract: This paper is about the effects on people's lives of their attitudes towards time and their own embodiment. People commonly see time as biform; there is the time of bodily life and the eternal time which transcends mortal life. This division is deeply implicated in the dualistic values that pervade western thought. So, when Nietzsche substitutes a monist notion of time, he profoundly unsettles our cherished values (which, of course, are gendered). Nietzsche's major thrust, I argue, is to elucidate and advocate the more appropriate values that emerge when human existence is understood as entirely earthborn. I use two contrasting literary characters to show concretely how people's lives and relationships are affected negatively or positively according to the temporal perspectives they adopt (and thus the significance they give to their corporeality). I explain how acceptance of human finitude enables a fruitful and rewarding life, while its refusal is life-diminishing. This also makes conceivable a realm beyond gender.
TL;DR: The authors presented an introduction to an issue on the theme "Economics, Justice, and Welfare", with contributions from Elizabeth Anderson, Sven Ove Hansson, Julie Nelson, Nigel Dower and Frans Brom.
Abstract: This article is an introduction to an issue on the theme "Economics, Justice, and Welfare", with contributions from Elizabeth Anderson, Sven Ove Hansson, Julie Nelson, Nigel Dower and Frans Brom. I ...