Showing papers in "Filosofia Unisinos in 2018"
TL;DR: The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played an important role in the development of memory research in the last couple of decades and as mentioned in this paper proposes a more systematic discussion of the relationship between memory and mental time-travel from the point of view of philosophy.
Abstract: The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played an important role in the development of memory research in the last couple of decades. Despite its growing importance in psychology, philosophers have only begun to develop an interest in philosophical questions pertaining to the relationship between memory and mental time travel. Thus, this paper proposes a more systematic discussion of the relationship between memory and mental time travel from the point of view of philosophy. I start by discussing some of the motivations to take memory to be a form of mental time travel. I call the resulting view of memory the mental time travel view. I then proceed to consider important philosophical questions pertaining to memory and develop them in the context of the mental time travel view. I conclude by suggesting that the intersection of the philosophy of memory and research on mental time travel not only provides new perspectives to think about traditional philosophical questions, but also new questions that have not been explored before.Keywords: mental time travel, memory, episodic memory, philosophy of memory.
18 citations
TL;DR: The definition of evolution is discussed and the Modern Synthesis (or neo-Darwinian theory) is described, and a new approach based on network theory is presented, with potential applications to the study of biological and cultural systems.
Abstract: This article discusses the use of evolutionary theory in the cognitive science of religion (CSR), with special attention to critical issues and new developments. In the first part of the article, I will discuss the definition of evolution and describe the Modern Synthesis (or neo-Darwinian theory). In the next part, I will consider various evolutionary perspectives in CSR, including evolutionary psychology, sexual selection, gene-culture co-evolution, and cultural evolution. In the final part, I will turn to the problems with the Modern Synthesis and present a new approach based on network theory, with potential applications to the study of biological and cultural systems. Keywords: cognitive science of religion, evolution, modern synthesis, cultural evolution, gene regulatory networks, evo-devo, deep learning.
13 citations
TL;DR: The epistemic structure of society, with its division of epistemic and cognitive labour, can help us deal with the citizenry incompetence threat that many contemporary conceptions of democracy suffer as long as a certain intellectual character is possessed by the citizens as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: The epistemic structure of society, with its division of epistemic and cognitive labour, can help us deal with the citizenry incompetence threat that many contemporary conceptions of democracy suffer as long as a certain intellectual character is possessed by the citizens. Keywords: expert testimony, collective deliberation, intellectual virtue, democracy.
11 citations
TL;DR: The article points to several problematic issues that CSR must needs address, such as how to better demarcate when the folk are anthropomorphizing versus simply attributing agency and how CSR’s insistence that the folk represents supernatural agents as disembodied minds places it at odds with the overwhelming and devastating evidence to the contrary.
Abstract: This article reviews and discusses the various ways by which researchers in the cognitive science of religion have empirically demonstrated that neurotypical humans (a.k.a., the folk) represent supernatural agents through the cognitive analogical processes of anthropomorphism. These include attributing a human-like mind, human-like physical and mental limitations, and human-like sociability. Additionally, the article points to several problematic issues that CSR must needs address, such as how to better demarcate when the folk are anthropomorphizing versus simply attributing agency, and how CSR’s insistence that the folk represents supernatural agents as disembodied minds places it at odds with the overwhelming and devastating evidence to the contrary. Keywords: anthropomorphism, supernatural agent representations, theory of mind, embodiment.
9 citations
TL;DR: In this article, Ricoeur's hermeneutical phenomenology has significance for philosophy of mind, in particular for recent theories of enactivism, one of the most significant latest developments in cognitive theory.
Abstract: This paper aims to show that Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutical phenomenology has significance for philosophy of mind, in particular for recent theories of enactivism, one of the most significant latest developments in cognitive theory While philosophy of mind often finds its inspiration in hermeneutics and phenomenology, especially in Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s, the later development of hermeneutical phenomenology under the influence of Gadamer and Ricoeur, as it evolved into the theory of the interpretation of narratives and lived existence, is often lost sight of in recent debates about embodied cognition I defend the thesis, however, that combining Ricoeur’s phenomenology with enactivism shows that embodied cognition has an intrinsic ethico-political aspect The central argument is that, if we take that imagination and narrative lie at the heart of basic embodied cognition as interaction with the world (planning, motor skills, coordination), as both recent theories of enactivism and Ricoeur hold, then embodied cognition or the way in which we experience and gain knowledge in embodied cognitive relations with the world is ethically and politically significant in that it gets shaped by the ethical and political contexts in which these relations take place (eg, cultural body images and morals in subcultures) These contexts contain ethical and political narratives and our imaginations are influenced by and work with these narratives in order to gain knowledge This essay thus attempts to explore some of the possibilities of phenomenological hermeneutics for the philosophy of mind today Keywords: phenomenology, hermeneutics, philosophy of mind, embodied cognition, ethico- political world
8 citations
TL;DR: A cognitive scientific approach to religion reveals the moral role of religion in human evolutionary history and provides insight into the continuing influence of religion on human affairs as mentioned in this paper, which makes religion, and moral worldviews more generally, profoundly important, but also makes them dangerously problematic.
Abstract: A cognitive scientific approach to religion reveals the moral role of religion in human evolutionary history and provides insight into the continuing influence of religion in human affairs. While morality can be understood and justified apart from any religious foundation, religion cannot be separated from its moral function. After setting out the evolved cognitive bases of religious beliefs and behaviors, a model for the nexus between religion and morality is developed. From this it follows that religions constitute moral worldviews that emerge from and tap into deep moral and emotional instincts. This makes religion, and moral worldviews more generally, profoundly important, but also makes them dangerously problematic. A case study of the intersection of religion, race, and politics in contemporary American presidential politics will be used to explicate these ideas. Keywords: religion, morality, cognitive science, evolution, worldviews.
8 citations
TL;DR: This paper used Sosa's theory of knowledge as a fully apt belief to construct a plausible debunking argument for religious belief on the assumption that religious belief is formed simply through processes theorized by CSR.
Abstract: One of the contentious philosophical issues surrounding the cognitive science of religion (CSR) is whether well-confirmed CSR theories would debunk religious beliefs. These debates have been contentious in part because of criticisms of epistemic principles used in debunking arguments. In this paper I use Ernest Sosa’s respected theory of knowledge as fully apt belief—which avoids objections that have been leveled against sensitivity and safety principles often used in debunking arguments—to construct a plausible debunking argument for religious belief on the assumption that religious belief is formed simply through processes theorized by CSR. But, in fact, most believers also rely on arguments of various sorts, and their beliefs are not debunked. Keywords: debunking argument, cognitive science of religion, Ernest Sosa.
8 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that the bias in the field of religious studies has skewed the field in favor of the idiosyncratic over the recurrent, of the idiographic over the systematic, and of the interpretive over the explanatory.
Abstract: Religious studies’ collective advocacy on behalf of diversity and inclusion stands in poignant contrast to its persisting exclusionary ethos (within most quarters of the field) concerning questions of method. A legacy of prohibitions in religious studies about who can study religions and about how they must proceed when doing so has tended to curb innovation. Born of protectionism or special pleading or outright religious impulses, such prohibitions have skewed the field in favor of the idiosyncratic over the recurrent, of the idiographic over the systematic, and of the interpretive over the explanatory. My long-standing interest in the promise of the cognitive sciences for studying religion has been, in part, to redress those imbalances. Redressing imbalances, however, does not involve dismissing the idiosyncratic, the idiographic, or the interpretive, but only suggests, first, that they are not the whole story and, second, that greater attention to the recurrent, the systematic, and the explanatory will enrich – not eliminate – our understandings and our inquiries. The first of those two propositions follows from the second. My aim in this paper is to substantiate that second proposition. Keywords: cognitive science of religion, explanatory pluralism, interpretive exclusivism, empirical findings.
7 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that a concept of consciousness is formed from a set of signaling games and is assigned a sense, from which its extensional reference can be postulated.
Abstract: Following an account of signaling games, one can show how meaning emerges and is preserved on the basis of the interactions between individuals and their environments It is here argued that, as all concepts, a concept of consciousness is formed from a set of signaling games and is assigned a sense, from which its extensional reference can be postulated It will be helpful to understand the contrast between what we may call a representationalist account of consciousness and an enactivist account As argued, a consciousness state can be assumed and fixed by intensional reference Thus, although the notion of consciousness may be explanatorily excluded, in principle, from a neurobiological language, it remains relevant in a semantic way This is a consequence of what we may call the semantic gap between the mental and the physical Keywords: concept, sense, reference, enaction, mind, neurophenomenology
6 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the question "Why is belief in God not a delusion?" and present the clinical definition of delusion and underline the fact that it exempts cultural beliefs from clinical diagnosis.
Abstract: My aim in this paper is to consider the question ‘Why is belief in God not a delusion?’. In the first half of the paper, I distinguish two kinds of religious belief: institutional and personal religious belief. I then review how cognitive science accounts for cultural processes in the acquisition and transmission of institutional religious beliefs. In the second half of the paper, I present the clinical definition of delusion and underline the fact that it exempts cultural beliefs from clinical diagnosis. Finally, I review cognitive models of the intuitive attribution of mental disorders and how they support cultural exemption. Through the comparison of the models of cultural acquisition of religious beliefs and of cultural exemption in the attribution of delusion I intend to make it clear that we can provide an answer to our motivating question: even though some institutional religious beliefs may seem as strange as the most florid delusions, humans can readily recognize that they are not the product of mental dysfunction due to the fact that their acquisition and transmission is embedded within a cultural context. Keywords: religious belief, clinical delusion, cultural learning, folk psychiatry.
5 citations
TL;DR: The authors investigated the extent to which the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and Donald Davidson's semantic holism (DSH) harmonize and concluded that common cognitive neural/psychological processes are explanatorily relevant in proposed meaning-theories for any discourse, and those processes need semantic supplementation with reference to external and naturalistic factors (biological, cultural, environmental etc.).
Abstract: This article investigates the extent to which the cognitive science of religion (CSR) and Donald Davidson’s semantic holism (DSH) harmonize. We first characterize CSR, philosophical semantics (and more specifically DSH). We then note a prima facie tension between CSR and DSH’s view of First-Person Authority (that we know what is meant when we speak in a way that we do not when others speak). If CSR is correct that the causes of religious belief are located in cognitive processes in the mind/brain, then religious insiders might have no idea what they are talking about: only the scholar of CSR would have a chance of knowing what they ‘really’ mean. The article argues that the resolution to this problem is to take seriously DSH’s rejection of semantic bifurcation, specifically rejecting the idea that religious and non-religious language can be sharply distinguished. We conclude by supporting the following claims: (i) common cognitive neural/psychological processes are explanatorily relevant in proposed meaning-theories for any discourse, and (ii) those processes need semantic supplementation with reference to external and naturalistic factors (biological, cultural, environmental etc.).Keywords: cognitive science of religion, cognitive theory, holism, semantics, philosophy of language, religious studies, theory of religion.
TL;DR: This article explored the controversial relationship between Schelling and Hegel with respect to the role of negativity and proposed an alternative synchronic reading which approached this relationship not in terms of surpassing, subordination or perversion but rather presents it as an inversion.
Abstract: Paper explores the controversial relationship between Schelling and Hegel with respect to the role of negativity. By rejecting the common framework, according to which, one of the authors is usually presented as either advancing or preceding the other, it argues for an alternative synchronic reading which approaches this relationship not in terms of surpassing, subordination or perversion but rather presents it as an inversion . By discussing (a) the negativity of reflection, (b) the ontological interpretation of the transcendental object and (c) the application of dialectics, it proposes an amphibolic elaboration of commonly shared presuppositions—a movement following a similar path yet in converse directions, which in its own turn challenges our common understanding of German idealism. Keywords: Schelling, Hegel, inversion, concept, negativity, reflection, dialectics.
TL;DR: In this article, a common pattern of some of the main arguments used by the parties involved and challenge their assumptions is revealed, and it is shown that those arguments are all equally impotent to settle the question about the number of things.
Abstract: Metaphysicians still discuss about the number of things. According to monists, there is one thing, either fundamental (Priority Monism) or exclusionary (Existence Monism). According to pluralists, there are many things, either fundamental (Priority Pluralism) or exclusionary (Existence Pluralism). The claims of cardinality of these views are, presumably, metaphysical claims, which means, presumably, that they are necessarily true, if true at all. In this paper, I unravel a common pattern of some of the main arguments used by the parties involved and challenge their assumptions. By doing this, I intend to show that those arguments are all equally impotent to settle the question about the number of things because their conclusions are not necessary truths as they are meant to be. These views, at the very most, can be presented and defended as consistent ways of saying how many things, apparently, might be.Keywords: cardinality, fundamentality, existence, monism, pluralism, nihilism.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that implicit prospection is a rudimentary form of mental time travel and that the role that implicit pre-planning plays in the production of intentional actions helps explain guidance control and moral responsibility.
Abstract: The debate about moral responsibility for one’s actions often revolves around whether the agent had the ability to do otherwise. An alternative account of moral responsibility, however, focuses on the actual sequence that produces the agent’s action and which criteria it must fulfil for the agent to be considered morally responsible for her action. Mental Time Travel allows the agent to simulate a possible future scenario; therefore, it is relevant for the selection of a course of action. I will argue that implicit prospection is a rudimentary form of Mental Time Travel and that the role that implicit prospection, or non-rudimentary forms of Mental Time Travel, plays in the production of intentional actions helps explain guidance control and, hence, moral responsibility.Keywords: implicit prospection, guidance control, feeling the future, plan, intention.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the concept of episodic memory as awareness, based on Peter Hacker's distinction of perception and sensation and his account of memory, and whether memory can be taken as an own-body subjective perception, which, therefore, challenges the conception of memory as stored information in the brain and the idea that we could somehow perceive our memories.
Abstract: Mental time travel (MTT) is quite a novel label in Philosophy The notion was set by experimental psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist Endel Tulving in the 1980s and refers to the ability to be aware of subjective past and future events Tulving’s view on memory and consciousness provides an important conceptual distinction founded in experimentally observed data In this paper I discuss (1) his concept of episodic memory as awareness, based on Peter Hacker’s distinction of perception and sensation, and his account of memory, and (2) whether memory can be taken as an own-body subjective perception, which, therefore, challenges the conception of memory as stored information in the brain and the idea that we could somehow perceive our memories The main puzzle is: if awareness is a conscious state that involves veridical perception of present inner or outer states/events, how can we conceive awareness of past and future events? This discussion aims to contribute to Tulving’s conception of MTT by clarifying the conceptual foundations on which we can understand memory Keywords: memory, episodic memory, awareness, private experiences
TL;DR: The authors argue that doing the lesser evil in politics is always permitted and even required, and call this view "pragmatism" and defend it against "purism" which claims that it is never permissible to do (the lesser) evil.
Abstract: In this article I argue that doing the lesser evil in politics is always permitted and even required. I call this view “pragmatism”. I defend it against “purism”, which claims that it is never permissible to do (the lesser) evil. I reject three arguments for purism, which are based on Alan Gewirth’s principle of intervening action, on an alleged epistemic difference between doing and allowing evil, and on rule-consequentialism. I also address Terrance McConnell’s and Thomas Hill Jr.’s attempts to constrain pragmatism by claiming that doing the lesser evil is not always permitted or required. Although those constraints may apply to most spheres of action, I contend that they do not apply to political action. Keywords: lesser evil, politics, purism, pragmatism.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the notion of necessitation relations between universals cannot provide an adequate response to two major difficulties that are presented to any realist account of laws: the identification problem and the inference problem.
Abstract: In this paper, I analyze the conception of laws of nature known as DTA theory. According to the proposal advanced by Dretske (1977), Tooley (1977) and Armstrong (1983), laws of nature ought to be identified as necessitation relations between universals. My aim is to argue that this notion cannot provide an adequate response to two major difficulties that are presented to any realist account of laws: the identification problem and the inference problem. More precisely, I hold that both Tooley’s Platonist theory of universals and Armstrong’s Aristotelian theory of universals collapse in the face of the inference problem, even though they offer elegant solutions to the identification problem. Basically, this problem consists in explaining how it is possible for statements about abstract relations between universals to entail statements about concrete regularities. I also maintain that the root of the drawbacks faced by the DTA theory lies in the distinction between nomological and metaphysical necessity, as well as the dissociation between the nature of a property and its causal profile. Finally, I point out that these drawbacks must not prevent us from searching for a realist understanding of the laws of nature. Keywords: laws of nature, necessitation, inference problem, Tooley, Armstrong.
TL;DR: O artigo procura analisar a nocao de intencionalidade segundo a teoria de Umwelt de Jakob von Uexkull as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: O artigo procura analisar a nocao de intencionalidade segundo a teoria de Umwelt de Jakob von Uexkull. Seguindo tambem o naturalismo biologico de John Searle, o objetivo e explicitar o significado filosofico da nocao de Umwelt e mostrar que ela pode oferecer uma abordagem alternativa as tradicionais perspectivas intelectualistas da intencionalidade que entendem ser ela uma propriedade interna e representacional dos estados mentais. De acordo com uma perspectiva filosofica nao representacionalista da intencionalidade, procura- se tambem tracar a relacao ancestral entre as nocoes de Umwelt e enacao. A proposta do artigo e, com efeito, explorar os elementos conceituais que podem ser derivados da nocao de Umwelt em filosofia da mente e mostrar que ela significa uma estrutura intencional sem mediacao de representacao interna dos estados do organismo. Palavras-chave: intencionalidade, Umwelt , Uexkull, filosofia, mente.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors start from the assumption that the concept of risk implies an entanglement between facts and values, which is not an arbitrary assumption since it can directly be deduced from the standard notion of risk.
Abstract: This paper begins with the assumption that the concept of risk implies an entanglement between facts and values. This is not an arbitrary assumption since it can directly be deduced from the standard notion of risk. The value-ladenness of risk raises at least two further issues: the first one concerns the scales adopted to evaluate the severity of risks; the second concerns the commensurability/comparability of risks to human health and the environment. Some additional light is shed on those issues by asking what would happen if the models used in risk analysis were understood as fictions limited by the values that they can include. From this point of view, controversies on the limited scope of standard risk assessments are not only descriptive but also evaluative.Keywords: commensurability, comparability, fiction, models, risk, values.
TL;DR: In this article, Gomes elaborou uma concepcao sobre o livre-arbitrio e argumentou que sua existencia and consistentecom descobertas cientificas recentes, especialmente na neurociencia.
Abstract: Este artigo tem como tema o trabalho de Gilberto Gomes sobre o livre-arbitrio. Em umaserie de contribuicoes que tiveram um impacto significativo na respectiva literatura, Gomeselaborou uma concepcao sobre o livre-arbitrio e argumentou que sua existencia e consistentecom descobertas cientificas recentes, especialmente na neurociencia. Neste artigo,questiono uma afirmacao de Gomes sobre sua concepcao sobre o livre-arbitrio, a saber,que se trata de uma concepcao compatibilista. Busco mostrar que Gomes nao usa o termo“compatibilismo” como e habitual na literatura contemporânea sobre o livre-arbitrio,isto e, como a tese segundo a qual o livre-arbitrio pode existir ainda que o determinismoseja verdadeiro. Ademais, a concepcao sobre o livre-arbitrio desenvolvida por Gomes tem,efetivamente, um compromisso incompatibilista. Argumento que, mais do que uma meraelucidacao terminologica, reconhecer o elemento incompatibilista presente na propostade Gomes suscita questoes importantes sobre os detalhes da proposta e tambem ajuda areconhecer uma limitacao de sua defesa da existencia do livre-arbitrio. Palavras-chave: livre-arbitrio, determinismo, compatibilismo, incompatibilismo.
TL;DR: In this article, the problem of perception as virtual action and insertion into the being of matter, that is, into a reality in which there are only real actions, is examined.
Abstract: The present article approaches Bergson’s theory of perception in terms of its ambiguous or paradoxical aspects. More precisely, it intends to examine the problem of perception as “virtual action” and, at the same time, as insertion into the being of matter, that is, into a reality in which there are only “real actions”. By establishing a distinction between levels of argumentation in the philosopher’s text, that is, between a methodological level and an ontological level, the article seeks to solve the difficulties found in Bergson’s theory of perception. For this purpose, it is necessary to discuss the author’s metaphysical theses, his metaphysics of memory. Keywords: real, Bergson, perception, virtual.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that Sorensen's blockage theory can handle both the Yale and the Bilkent puzzles, plus another one that I put forward (the donut puzzle) which instead is fatal to Aranyosi's position.
Abstract: In his famous book Seeing Dark Things: The Philosophy of Shadows (2008), Roy Sorensen put forward a ‘blocking theory of shadows’, a causal view on these entities according to which a shadow is an absence of light caused by blockage. This approach allows him to solve a quite famous riddle on shadows, ‘the Yale puzzle’, that was devised by Robert Fogelin in the late 1960s and that Sorensen presents in the form mentioned by Bas van Fraassen (1989). Istvan Aranyosi has recently criticized Sorensen’s solution to the Yale puzzle, on the grounds that it does not resist another version of the riddle, that Aranyosi calls ‘the Bilkent puzzle’. A new perspective on shadows, the ‘Material Exstitution View’, that allegedly permits to solve both puzzles, could be adopted as an alternative. In this paper I will show that Sorensen’s blockage theory can actually handle both the Yale and the Bilkent puzzle, plus another one that I put forward (‘the donut puzzle’), which instead is fatal to Aranyosi’s position. As Sorensen puts it, nothing aside from the original blockage of light is needed. Keywords: Aranyosi, blockage theory, material exstitution view, shadow, Sorensen, Yale puzzle.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine Hume's claims about the nature of moral sentiments (mainly in T 3.1.2) using as a foil the Kantian challenge to all material practical principles: they are all of the same type, being based on self-love and making all choices, including moral ones, hedonically fungible.
Abstract: In this paper I examine Hume’s claims about the nature of moral sentiments (mainly in T 3.1.2) using as a foil the Kantian challenge to all material practical principles: they are all of the same type, being based on self-love and making all choices, including moral ones, hedonically fungible. The paper explores Hume’s views on pleasure as constitutive of moral sentiment as an answer to that challenge arguing that for him only pleasure is essentially valuable for beings like us. It thus grounds a notion of value which, through a “progressive or dynamic” view of human nature, informs a conception of moral pleasure – a “taste in character traits” – as a distinctive type of pleasure that is not amenable to a mere quantitative criterium to guide moral choice. Keywords: Hume’s moral philosophy, moral sentiments, human nature, Kant.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that Carruthers's version of NSS is problematic on its own, independently of the plausibility of competing theories of valence, and that valence might also be grounded in bodily, sensory representations.
Abstract: Valence is a key construct in the affective sciences and in the philosophy of emotion. Carruthers (2011, 2017) has recently offered an account of the nature of valence. He defends a (representational) version of what might be called the non-sensory signal theory of valence (NSS). According to the latter, valence is identified with inner signals—which are not themselves perceptual nor conceptual states of any sort—which mark sensory representations as good or bad. In this paper, I argue that Carruthers’s version of NSS is problematic on its own, independently of the plausibility of competing theories of valence. Carruthers’s arguments to the effect that valence is non-sensory fail to rule out the hypothesis that, together with arousal, valence might also be grounded in bodily, sensory representations. Carruthers’s claim that valence is not a sensory item in the furniture of the mind needs to be then more thoroughly substantiated.Keywords: affect, valence, arousal, interoception.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors identify the commonalities and differences in the neural correlates of mental time travel and those of the three main subjective time processing systems, namely metric timing, ordinal timing and autobiographical timing.
Abstract: Mental time travel (MTT) is the ability of remembering personal past events or thinking about possible personal future happenings. This mental property is possible due to our capacity to be aware of subjective time, which enables us to experience the flow of time, to conceive non-present times, and to process time as a dimension of real world phenomena. Temporal cognition encompasses the mental functions which rely on temporal information enabling the experience of the temporal flow and the processing of the temporal dimension of external phenomena. Given the broad range of our time experiences and, hence, the broad scope of our temporal cognition, it is expected that certain kinds of temporal information can be of particular importance when we mentally transport ourselves to events in the past or future, whereas others could be unrelated to this mental property. The present paper seeks to situate the process of MTT within human temporal cognition. This will be done by identifying the commonalities and differences in the neural correlates of MTT and those of the three main subjective time processing systems, namely metric timing, ordinal timing and autobiographical timing.Keywords: mental time travel, time perception, temporal cognition.