Showing papers in "Foreign Policy Analysis in 2016"

The Foreign Policy of State Recognition: Kosovo’s Diplomatic Strategy to Join International Society

Abstract: This article explores the policies and activities undertaken by Kosovo as it seeks diplomatic recognition under conditions of contested statehood and transitional international order. Existing debates about diplomatic recognition—in particular, how independent sovereign statehood is achieved—generally rest upon systemic factors, normative institutions, and the preferences of great powers. In contrast, we argue that the experience of Kosovo presents a more complex and less predetermined process of international recognition, in which the agency of fledgling states, diplomatic skill, timing, and even chance may play a far more important role in mobilizing international support for recognition than is generally acknowledged. In building this argument, we explore Kosovo’s path to contested independence and examine the complex process of diplomatic recognition, as well as highlight the hybrid justifications for recognizing Kosovo’s statehood and independence. Without downplaying the importance of systemic factors, this article contributes to a critical rethinking of norms and processes related to state recognition in international affairs, which has implications for a broad range of cases.

The ontological (in)security of similarity : Wahhabism versus Islamism in Saudi foreign policy.

Abstract: It has long been argued that identity matters in international relations. Yet how identity impacts enmity and conflict among states remains the subject of debate. The existing literature asserts that differences in identity can be a source of conflict, whereas convergence and similarity lead to cooperation. Nevertheless, empirical evidence from the Middle East has long defied this hypothesis. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which prides itself on being an Islamic model and claims Islamic leadership, has opposed the rise to power of Islamist movements in the Middle East. To address this paradox, this article builds on the growing literature on ontological security to propose a theoretical framework explaining how similarity can generate anxiety and identity risks. This framework, I argue, moves beyond traditional regime security approaches to reveal that security is not only physical but also ontological. I then illustrate the argument through a comparison of Saudi identity risks in the wake of the Iranian revolution (1979) and the ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in Egypt (2012). Ultimately, these cases provide intriguing insights into foreign policy behavior during critical situations.

Gender, International Status, and Ambassador Appointments

Abstract: Focusing on ambassador appointments, the aim of this pioneering article is to address some fundamental questions about where men and women are positioned in diplomacy. Most of the gender-related diplomacy studies are limited to individual Ministry of Foreign Affairs and say little about diplomacy as an aggregate set of practices. We draw on theories of gender and positional status to ask whether there are gender patterns in ambassador appointments—with men occupying positions of higher military and economic status than women—much like the ones found in other institutions. Our analyses are based on a unique data set containing almost 7,000 ambassador appointments, made by the fifty highest ranked countries in terms of GDP in 2014. The results show that female ambassadors are less likely to occupy high-status ambassadorships than men. In short, gender patterns, linked to power and status, are present also in ambassador appointments. Diplomacy studies need to do much more to address the presence and impact of gender in international affairs.

Aiding Strangers: Generalized Trust and the Moral Basis of Public Support for Foreign Development Aid

Abstract: Why do publics in donor countries support development foreign aid? Focusing on material factors, ideology, and identities, the literature has largely neglected the moral basis of foreign aid attitudes. I argue that generalized trust, defined as the belief in the integrity and trustworthiness of people, is a crucial component of the moral calculus of publics in donor countries. Using data from independently conducted surveys of global (World Values Survey) and American mass publics (Core Values Project Survey), I show that generalized trusters are more likely to aid the have-nots of the world than those who lack trust in people. This finding indicates that the bonds of trust expand the boundaries of global justice. By illuminating the role generalized trust plays in shaping donor public attitudes towards development foreign aid, this study helps improve the political economy, ideology, and identity models of aid, contributing to the literatures on foreign aid and foreign policy attitudes, and to theories of cosmopolitan global justice.

Soft Power, Religion, and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East

Abstract: This study presents the first systematic analysis of the public opinion dimension of soft power competition in the contemporary Middle East. Building on the scholarship on perceptions of foreign states and Arab public opinion, it proposes a series of hypotheses about sectarian identity, religious worldviews, and anti-Americanism as determinants of attitudes toward Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in the context of regional rivalry. It then presents multivariate probit estimations utilizing Pew Global Attitudes Survey to test these hypotheses. The findings suggest that religious identity and worldviews directly affect favorability ratings of these three powers in the Arab Middle East. While Sunnis favor Saudi Arabia and Turkey over Iran, religious individuals demanding Islamic law favor the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, anti-Americanism translates into lower support for Saudi Arabia and Turkey, but greater support for Iran. Democratic attitudes have no influence over perceptions of these three powers indicating the limits of democracy promotion as a foreign policy tool.

Democratic Participation in the Air Strikes Against Islamic State: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Abstract: Although over sixty partners have joined the US-led coalition against the Islamic State (IS), only a handful of states was willing to carry out air strikes against IS-targets. This article aims to explain the pattern of democratic participation in the air campaign. It builds on the rich literature on military burden sharing and democratic peace theory to develop a multi-causal model, which is tested with Qualitative Comparative Analysis. The results of the analysis suggest that the pattern of participation in the air strikes results from a complex interplay between alliance politics, threat perception and domestic institutional constraints. The threat posed by foreign fighters and a strong interest in a good relationship with the US constituted important incentives to participate in the air strikes, while a high level of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions inhibited participation. Furthermore, states that were situated in Russia's immediate vicinity refrained from participating, in spite of their strong dependence on the US' security guarantee. Lastly, the analysis did not provide convincing evidence that partisan politics had an impact on participation in the air strikes.

The Politics of Brazilian Foreign Policy and Its Analytical Challenges

Abstract: Starting from the perspective that foreign policy is a public policy, this article discusses the conceptual and political implications of the new configuration of Brazilian foreign policy. Therefore, we abandon its automatic association with the cruder versions of realism and bring it to the field of politics, thus recognizing that its formulation and implementation fall into the dynamics of governmental choices which, in turn, stem from negotiations within coalitions, bargaining, disputes, and agreements between representatives of diverse interests. As a result, we remove foreign policy from a condition linked to inertial and supposedly self-evident and/or permanent national interests (which would be protected from injunctions of cyclical nature related to partisan politics) and undress it of features generally attributed to so-called state policies. Finally, we suggest ways for an innovative research agenda on the role of diplomatic agency, political institutions, and nonstate actors in Brazil’s foreign policy.

Scrutinizing a Policy of “Engagement Without Recognition”: US Requests for Diplomatic Actions With De Facto States

Abstract: De facto states are conventionally perceived as illegal entities, usually ignored by the rest of the world and therefore also isolated and severely sanctioned in most cases. We investigate US foreign-policy engagement with Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Somaliland, and Transnistria and explore when, why, and how interactions between the United States and “places that do not exist” has taken place. This is done by extensively using WikiLeaks diplomatic cables from 2003– to 2010 as a primary information source. We assume that by engaging and not recognizing, the US has sought to increase its leverage and footprint in conflicts that somehow affect its national interests. This engagement approach is presumably most successful when targeted adversaries turn out to be agents of peace and stability, or when strategic calculus outweighs the rationale for the conventional treatment of sovereign anomalies.

A Comparative Analysis of Soft Power in the MENA Region: The Impact of Ethnic, Sectarian, and Religious Identity on Soft Power in Iraq and Egypt

Abstract: This study explores the relationship between ethnic, sectarian, and religious identities and soft power in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region in the immediate aftermath of the Arab Uprisings. Utilizing original public opinion surveys conducted in Egypt and Iraq in 2012, we find that identity-based allegiances play a major role in groups’ choices regarding which countries’ increasing involvement in the region are seen favorably and which countries are seen as an ideal model for the region. Sunnis are likely to view Turkey and Saudi Arabia positively in both regards, whereas Shiites are more supportive of Iran. But our results also suggest that crosscutting cleavages should not be overlooked: Sunni Kurds are less likely to hold positive attitudes toward Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Our findings also show that Copts, a religious minority in Egypt, hold positive attitudes toward the United States and negative ones toward Saudi Arabia and Iran. These findings contribute to both the theoretical literature on soft power and the debates on international competition for influence in the MENA region by emphasizing the role of ethnic and religious identities in shaping attitudes toward international actors.

Beyond the Water’s Edge: How Political Parties Influence Foreign Policy Formulation in Belgium

Abstract: Based on the growing scholarly recognition of domestic influences on foreign policy, political parties are considered to be among the main drivers behind foreign policy in most parliamentary democracies. In order to understand party influences on the governmental foreign policy agenda, we examine what determines the congruence between party manifestos and the ensuing government agreements in Belgium from 1978 to 2008. We find that a combination of variables related to political parties’ negotiation position during government formation and regarding their ideological left-right position co-determine their impact on the content of the coalition agreement in terms of foreign policy priorities. This study shows that political parties differ in their foreign policy priorities and that they compete to see these priorities included in the future government’s policy program.

The Flipside of Flip-Flopping: Leader Inconsistency, Citizen Preferences, and the War in Iraq

Abstract: In recent years, the term “flip-flopper” has become increasingly prominent. Politicians employ the term in an attempt to make their opponents look unattractive to voters. The question of whether this tactic works, however, remains unanswered. Existing research demonstrates that citizens do not like inconsistency as a matter of principle, but we know little about its effects in practice. In this paper, I conduct an experiment that allows me to ascertain the effect of a leader’s inconsistency on citizens’ assessments. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, I find that citizens do not always react negatively to a leader who changes his position. Instead, they are generally indifferent between a consistent and an inconsistent politician provided that the leader supports the citizen’s preferred policy in the current time period.

Brazil’s Soft-Power Strategy: The Political Aspirations of South–South Development Cooperation

Abstract: By trading upon the principles of South-South cooperation, Brazil is widely viewed as having gained a positive image worldwide. Brazil’s South-South development cooperation was one of the foreign policy instruments it used to raise this profile. However, studies of the generation of soft power are still lacking in the international relations literature, and where empirical research exists it focuses more on the results of soft power strategies than on how soft power is created. Therefore, this article explores how Brazil’s soft power strategy is conceptualized in Brazil’s development cooperation discourse and how it is operationalized through South-South development activities. This research uses a triangulation method combining the analysis of official documents, academic studies and interviews to conclude that the Brazilian government under President Lula (2003-2011) influenced the organization of its cooperation agency and guided it towards sectors and targets that contribute to the creation of positive outcomes. This article contributes to the debate on the state’s behavior in soft power, that is, the ‘behavior’ of the Brazilian government in the design of its cooperation agency’s activities, thus also contributing to knowledge about the relationship between an agent’s behavior and the outcomes of a country’s policy of ‘soft empowerment’.

Conditional Relationships Between Drought and Civil Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

Abstract: Much of the literature on climate change adaptation claims the destabilizing consequences of environmental crises are mitigated by sociopolitical conditions that influence a state's susceptibility to scarcity-induced violence. However, few cross-national studies provide evidence of conditional scarcity-conflict relationships. This analysis of drought severity and civil conflict onset in sub-Saharan Africa (1962–2006) uncovers three sociopolitical conditions that influence the link between environmental scarcity and civil conflict: social vulnerability , state capacity , and unequal distribution of resources . Surprisingly, we find drought does not exacerbate the high risk of conflict in the vulnerable, incapable, and unequal states thought to be especially susceptible to increased scarcity. Instead, drought negates the peace-favoring attributes of stable states with less vulnerable populations. During severe drought, states with sociopolitical conditions that would otherwise favor peace are no less likely to suffer conflict than states with sociopolitical conditions that would otherwise increase the risk of violence. These findings, which are robust across several measures of these sociopolitical concepts, suggest environmental scarcity is most likely to increase the risk of conflict where populations have more to lose relative to periods with more favorable weather.

Public Support for Economic Sanctions: An Experimental Analysis

Abstract: What are the determinants of public support for the government’s foreign policy? We shed light on this question using experiments investigating public support for economic sanctions. Our results suggest that humanitarian concerns are associated with individuals’ decisions to support the use of sanctions against a target country. We find that high levels of public pain in the target country have a negative relationship with the likelihood of supporting sanctions, and tailored sanctions, which aim to shift damage from the targeted country’s population to its leadership, have a higher probability of support than comprehensive sanctions. At the same time, policy effectiveness shapes public support, but only indirectly—through individuals’ subjective evaluations rather than given estimates of policy success. When subjective evaluations of effectiveness are higher, sanctions receive more public support. Recalled effectiveness, on the other hand, has no direct effect on the decision to support the sanction policy.

Paradiplomacy as a provincial state-building project: The case of Yunnan’s relations with the Greater Mekong Subregion

Abstract: This article examines Yunnan’s relations with the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) countries grouped in the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) GMS Program. While locating the analysis in the context of paradiplomacy, this article makes two claims. First, it argues that—unlike subnational governments in federal states—Yunnanese authorities do not use domestic opportunity structures to develop the province’s international agency. Instead, they pursue paradiplomacy as a subnational state-building project, designed to extract economic assistance from the central state. Second, it asserts that—unlike other Westphalian states—the Chinese government has recognized the benefits of paradiplomacy as a way to enhance the structural competitiveness of its borderland provinces in the regional economy. In doing so, it has proactively deployed provincial authorities in the multilevel governance of the GMS Program. At the same time, the central government has remained at the center of Yunnan’s external relations through providing funding and preferential policies for Yunnan’s internal and external economic projects and defining the parameters of Yunnan’s cooperation with the GMS countries and the ADB.

The Limits of Radical Parties in Coalition Foreign Policy: Italy, Hijacking, and the Extremity Hypothesis

Abstract: Scholars increasingly suggest that coalition governments produce more extreme foreign policies than single-party governments. Extremity is especially likely when governments include radical parties that take extreme positions on foreign policy issues and are “critical” to the government’s survival, as the radical parties push the centrist ones toward the extremes. A look at Italy’s Second Republic provides an important counterpoint to the extremity hypothesis. In three high-profile cases of military operations—Albania 1997, Kosovo 1999, and Afghanistan 2006–08—Italy had a center-left government that depended on radical parties for its survival. In all cases, the radical parties opposed military operations but did not prevent the government from acting by forcing the government’s fall. Our article seeks to explain the limits of leftist radical parties in Italy’s Second Republic. We argue first that radical parties are reluctant to threaten or force government collapse as this can lead to an opposition coalition coming to office and voters’ being blamed for the outcome. Second, we claim that foreign policy has been less important to radical parties than domestic issues. Finally, we argue that radical parties have appealed to their voters through theatrical politics and have affected the implementation of military operations.

Regime Type and Diaspora Politics: A Dyadic Approach

Abstract: Why do some diaspora groups, but not others, play a prominent role in the formalization of cooperative political ties between their country of origin and their country of residence? This article adopts a novel dyadic approach to the study of diaspora politics by arguing that diaspora politics are simultaneously structured by regime type in the country of origin and in the country of residence. Diaspora groups can play a prominent role in the formalization of cooperative foreign policy ties between their country of origin and their country of residence in democracy–democracy dyads (i.e., when the country of origin and the country of residence are both democratic). In all other dyads (including authoritarian–authoritarian), diaspora groups’ political impact on the formalization of cooperative foreign policy ties tends to be limited. The democracy–democracy dyad approximates a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition; nationalism and international economic strategies adopted by the country of origin help shape diaspora politics. This article examines all four regime type dyads by focusing on diaspora politics in authoritarian Malaysia and democratic United States, which have notable populations of Chinese and of Indian origin.

Nigeria and “Illusory Hegemony” in Foreign and Security Policymaking: Pax-Nigeriana and the Challenges of Boko Haram

Abstract: Western observers of African foreign and security policy formation are often perplexed by African regimes’ reactions to insurgencies: the actions of the latter are often read to be duplicitous and self-damaging—and thus irrational—by the former. This article suggests that one cause for this perception rests in the often incomplete appreciation for certain Global South states’ self-identities as “regional hegemons,” which compels them to make foreign and security policy decisions based on maintaining the semblance of power projection capabilities to those in their intended spheres of influence. Particularly, this article suggests that when Global South states possess the realist attributes of a hegemon (military power, economic strength, and a large population) but lack the liberal attributes of a hegemon (the legitimacy for rightful rule), they often undertake a process here termed “illusory hegemony” or foreign and security policy prevarication. Yet, this pursuit of illusory hegemony frequently has the opposite unintended effect of undermining, rather than improving, the perception of rightful rule. This article combines an analysis of current events with International Relations theory and foreign policymaking analysis to present a case study on how Nigeria’s pursuit of its grand strategy of Pax-Nigeriana is being retarded by Boko Haram and the Chibok kidnappings, specifically as a result of Nigeria’s projection of “illusory hegemony.”

When Can Idea Entrepreneurs Influence Foreign Policy? Explaining the Rise of the “Turkic World” in Turkish Foreign Policy

Abstract: This study aims to shift the focus of scholarship on ideas and foreign policy from its overwhelming concern with domestic structures and institutional setup toward a greater awareness of the importance of changing national identity conceptions. I argue that Turkey’s foreign policy toward the post-Soviet Turkic Eurasia has been influenced by an ideational factor—the idea of the “Turkic World.” Advocated by nonstate actors, “Turkic World” was rapidly internalized by a wide range of political actors in Turkey in the 1990s. Despite the eventual fading of the geopolitical importance of the region for Turkey and the rise to power of a political party with Islamist roots, the idea has gained a “taken for granted” status in Turkey’s foreign policy interests and practices. I argue that idea entrepreneurs can influence foreign policy when two conditions are met: first, when a critical juncture prompts decision makers to search for a new foreign policy framework and second, when the evolving national identity conceptions of the ruling elite overlap with the general premise of the idea entrepreneurs’ proposals. In this case, “Turkic World” has not only provided Turkish decision makers with a pragmatic foreign policy course but also spoken to their changing “worldviews.”

Are All Foreign Policy Innovators Created Equal? The New Generation of Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurship

Abstract: This study revisits Carter and Scott’s model of congressional foreign policy entrepreneurship (2004, 2009, 2010) to evaluate how a new generation of legislative innovators, including Senators Rand Paul and Ted Cruz, may influence US foreign policy. Specifically, this study proposes two new types of foreign policy entrepreneurs in Congress—“revolutionaries” and “mercenaries”—and examines their different motivations, policy objectives, and strategies to attempt to influence or change state behavior. Case evidence suggests that in a new era of partisanship and polarization, more complex models of players, strategies, and measures of success are needed.

Keeping Up With Which Joneses: Spatial Diffusion of Rule of Law Through Economic International Organizations

Abstract: I develop a theory of spatial diffusion of the rule of law, where “space” is conceptualized as shared memberships in economic international organizations (IOs). I argue that the rule of law diffuses as a result of economic competition and socialization. Outside evaluators, such as international leaders, activists, and most importantly, international firms and investors, often assess states’ attractiveness as a business venue by comparing them to similar states. The natural reference group for such comparisons is not just geographical neighbors, but also states with shared memberships in economic IOs. Responding to this evaluation, states identify members of their own reference groups and view them as competition for investment. As a result, states within the same reference groups converge on issues related to lowering domestic economic risks, which are referred to by the umbrella term “domestic rule of law.” The resulting process of policy convergence is further aided by socialization. Socialization may involve emulation of policies of similar states or “active” learning through norm entrepreneurs, who use the reference groups for both evaluation and access to their target audiences. I capture the theorized spatial processes using a multiparametric spatiotemporal autoregressive model (m-STAR) and find support for the prediction.

Do Hawks and Doves Deliver? The Words and Deeds of Foreign Policy in Democracies

Abstract: What are the domestic determinants of international conflict? I employ elements of salience theory to build an issue emphasis approach to foreign policy. I argue that parties and candidates in democracies credibly signal their foreign policy position prior to their election and that leaders live up to their foreign policy position. Significant research explains how both the behavior of other states and domestic political institutions may constrain leaders, so there are reasons to doubt leaders may be able to match deeds with words. Some scholars have integrated measurements of partisanship into their theoretical explanations, but extant scholarship has not effectively introduced the foreign policy position of the executive into the equation. Using this approach, we can connect competing foreign policy platforms to conflict behavior in a new way. I estimate initiation of militarized interstate disputes by democracies from 1951–2000 in the empirical test, and the results provide support for the hypothesis.

The Balance Strikes Back: Power, Perceptions, and Ideology in Georgian Foreign Policy, 1992–2014

Abstract: Tbilisi’s recent foreign policy presents analysts working from a balance-of-power perspective with something of a puzzle: with Russia very much the regionally dominant power, against the predictions of structural-systemic theories, small state Georgia has ended up balancing against, rather than bandwagoning with, great power Moscow. As a result, domestic, ideological explanations that implausibly ignore or minimize interstate considerations of power have predominated in analyses of Tbilisi’s foreign policy. In response, this essay examines Georgia’s post-Soviet foreign policies from a neoclassical realist theoretical viewpoint, combining systemic, balance-of-power and domestic ideological factors: throughout the period under review, Tbilisi’s policies were thus due to ideologically conditioned perceptions of shifting power-political realities in its neighborhood, with an ideological adherence to liberal norms playing a particularly important role in distorting these perceptions during the Saakashvili administration. Through this combination of power and ideology, neoclassical realism ends up providing a more comprehensive and continuous account of Tbilisi’s shifting policies since 1992 than either domestic or alternative realist frameworks, like balance-of-threat theory, or omnibalancing; as an important implication, Georgia’s, and other former Soviet states’ continued pro-Western orientation will depend as much on their perceptions of the West’s continued commitment to regional power projection as on domestic ideological preferences.

Threat Consensus and Rapprochement Failure: Revisiting the Collapse of US–North Korea Relations, 1994–2002

Abstract: Why do states that make a deliberate effort to pursue rapprochement sometimes fail? This article dissects US–North Korea relations between 1994 and 2002 as one way to better understand how deliberate decisions to dramatically improve relations with a historical adversary go awry. This vastly understudied period in US–North Korea relations started in late 1994 with an ambitious agreement to move toward diplomatic normalization through a gradual process based on reciprocal “action for action,” abruptly ending in 2002 with mutual acrimony and the resumption of long-standing hostility. Why did reciprocity strategies by both sides in the intervening period fail to deliver the promised relational change? The seemingly obvious explanation—a lack of consensus among US policy elites about North Korea policy—does not fit with what actually happened. Moreover, theories of rapprochement that might have anticipated success in the US–North Korea case cannot readily explain why rapprochement failed without resorting to situation-specific factors, which undermines their explanatory power. At the same time, theories of rapprochement that would have correctly predicted failure, on the basis of identity incompatibility or other unfavorable conditions, offer an incomplete account of events. Such rapprochement pessimists struggle to explain why the United States would seek rapprochement with North Korea if the prospects of success were so predictably dim, why the Clinton administration would settle on the rapprochement approach it did, and why it would simultaneously pursue rapprochement while publicly promoting North Korea as a threat. …

Killing the Messenger: Regime Type as a Determinant of Journalist Killing, 1992–2008

Abstract: What countries are most dangerous for journalists? Both conventional wisdom and extant literature on political violence, democracy, and reporter fatalities suggest that more democratic systems should make journalists safer. However, we argue that a more democratic context makes it easier for journalists to pursue stories that put them at risk and that they are thus more likely to be killed by actors trying to avoid the spotlight and exposure. Conversely, autocratic regimes provide fewer opportunities to pursue dangerous leads, thereby reducing the chance of being killed. Using novel cross-national data on the number of journalist killings between 1992 and 2008, we find that these arguments are generally supported when controlling for other factors that affect the killing of journalists, such as poor governance and political conflict.

Turkish Soft Balancing Against the EU? An Analysis of the Prospects for Improved Transatlantic Security Relations

Abstract: Turkey is increasingly criticized for obstructing communication and coordination between the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Using soft balancing theory and drawing on fieldwork and semistructured elite interviews conducted in Turkey, this article provides an in-depth analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy that leads to an impasse in NATO–EU coordination. It identifies three main reasons behind the Turkish foreign policy on the topic: (1) Turkey’s resentment for its exclusion from European security developments, (2) the uncertainties revolving around Turkey’s EU membership prospects and the subsequent lack of trust toward the EU, and (3) the unresolved Cyprus problem. This article concludes that the provision of a credible roadmap for Turkey’s EU membership and the resolution of the Cyprus conflict are central for breaking the NATO–EU security impasse, both of which seem unlikely in the short to medium run.

Competing Identities and Security Interests in the Indo–US Relationship

Abstract: The United States and India have forged a remarkably close security relationship since 2000, given the previous hostility of India to American foreign policy in general. Indian state identity until the mid-1990s was shaped by nonalignment and antipathy to the US-led liberal economic order. If identity is the source of interests, then how do states adopt policies that conflict with core elements of their identity when geopolitical shifts push states to adapt to a new regional balance of power? We argue that India did this by activating parts of the state identity that were compatible with American state identity and de-emphasizing those elements that were incompatible. But in doing so, Indian state identity changed, which impacts future foreign policy choices. This case illustrates the reciprocal relationship between security interests and state identity. We use content analysis of ten years of Indian media to demonstrate that the depiction of the US–Indian relationship increasingly focused on the democratic shared values of both states, despite beginning with an emphasis on military cooperation.

Deadly Triangles: The Implications of Regional Competition on Interactions in Asymmetric Dyads

Abstract: Why do minor powers ever resist the demands of major powers? Although recent work has begun to provide answers to this question, we argue that research has missed a vital piece of bargaining dynamics in dyadic research: third-party influence. Using spatial modeling techniques with the Militarized Interstate Dispute and International Crisis Behavior datasets, we improve upon previous models of asymmetric conflict by showing that the presence of a neighboring rival of a minor power, and the relationship that rival has with a major power, conditions the likelihood that weak actors choose to fight the strong. The recent examples of Pakistan and Iraq, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, serve as ideal types in which minor powers are respectively less and more likely to resist the demands of major powers. We find quantitative support that regional rivalries can act as both constrainers and enablers for minor powers when bargaining with major powers.

The Foreign Policy Attitudes of Indian Elites: Variance, Structure, and Common Denominators

Abstract: Foreign policy belief systems have received much attention. Yet nearly all work examines attitudes in western democracies, chiefly the United States. The current security environment requires that we ask whether the foreign policy views of individuals in other nations—particularly regional powers—are similar in structure to those found in the US case. This article does so for the Indian case. Drawing on studies of US opinion, we develop a set of claims and test them on an original data set on Indian elites. We make four contributions. First, we show that Wittkopf’s framework applies to the Indian case. Second, we demonstrate how this framework can be made more generally applicable by revising its emphases on different types of internationalism and on rethinking the meaning of isolationist preferences. Third, we place the Indian case in comparative perspective. And last, we model the dimensions of Indian attitudes as a function of domestic ideology. Results of our analyses provide insights into the structure of foreign policy belief systems outside the Global North.

Beyond Norms: A Configurational Analysis of the EU’s Arab Spring Sanctions

Abstract: This paper explores and explains the EU’s use of sanctions in response to the Arab Spring in 13 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) states. A Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) shows that a combination of historical factors and human rights violations contributed to the EU’s decision to impose sanctions in Libya and Syria, while transitional void seems to have been the most important trigger for sanctions in Egypt and Tunisia. The absence of both transitional void and historical economic coercion explains why the EU has refrained from imposing sanctions in negative cases such as Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Exposing the complex causality of the EU’s Arab Spring sanctions, this paper nuances the EU’s self-proclaimed normative foreign policy approach and demonstrates that combinations of factors matter for explaining the EU’s decision to invoke sanctions in the MENA region.