Showing papers in "History of the Human Sciences in 1995"
Journal Article•
TL;DR: Harold Bloom explores our Western literary tradition by concentrating on the works of twenty-six authors central to the Canon as discussed by the authors, and places Shakespeare at the center of the Western Canon.
Abstract: Harold Bloom explores our Western literary tradition by concentrating on the works of twenty-six authors central to the Canon. He argues against ideology in literary criticism; he laments the loss of intellectual and aesthetic standards; he deplores multiculturalism, Marxism, feminism, neoconservatism, Afrocentrism, and the New Historicism. Insisting instead upon "the autonomy of the aesthetic, " Bloom places Shakespeare at the center of the Western Canon. Shakespeare has become the touchstone for all writers who come before and after him, whether playwrights poets or storytellers. In the creation of character, Bloom maintains, Shakespeare has no true precursor and has left no one after him untouched. Milton, Samuel Johnson, Goethe, Ibsen, Joyce, and Beckett were all indebted to him; Tolstoy and Freud rebelled against him; and Dante, Wordsworth, Austen, Dickens, Whitman, Dickinson, Proust, the modern Hispanic and Portuguese writers Borges, Neruda, and Pessoa are exquisite examples of how canonical writing is born of an originality fused with tradition. Bloom concludes this provocative, trenchant work with a complete list of essential writers and books - his vision of the Canon.
518 citations
Journal Article•
462 citations
TL;DR: The 15th Discourse and Reflexivity Workshop (University of Sheffield, September 1992) as discussed by the authors provided helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, which is the basis for this paper.
Abstract: and participants in the 15th Discourse and Reflexivity Workshop (University of Sheffield, September 1992) for making helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. In this version pages are counted according to the published numbers with breaks following the published version.
416 citations
51 citations
TL;DR: The four opening papers given at the conference "Science's Social Standing", held at the University of Durham on 2-4 December 1994 as discussed by the authors, are presented in Section 2.1.
Abstract: This section presents the four opening papers given at the conference 'Science's Social Standing', held at the University of Durham on 2-4 December 1994.
46 citations
TL;DR: For example, this article argued that the native brain has its analogue in the European child's cerebrum; in many respects his mental attributes are similar to those of a child, and the embedding of racial differences in a matrix of neurological or intellectual capacity continued well into the 20th century.
Abstract: regression suggested the spectre of becoming ’primitive’, a racial condition the ’savage’ peoples indigenous to the colonies were thought to inhabit. The paradigm of European superiority constructed the ’primitive’ as the irrational, childish, or ape-like; ’savage’, sometimes conflated with ’simple’ or ’natural’, was defined by contrast with the ’civilized’ standards of European colonizers. Thus in 1895 Dr T. Duncan Greenlees, superintendent of Grahamstown Asylum in the Cape, wrote: ’The native brain has its analogue in the European child’s cerebrum; in many respects his mental attributes are similar to those of a child’ (1895: 75).2 The embedding of racial differences in a matrix of neurological or intellectual capacity continued well into the 20th century.3 Evolutionary theory, capturing and then proliferating the idea of higher and lower life-forms, primitive and civilized races, was strongly implicated in the
30 citations
TL;DR: This paper showed that the best example or focus of each "basic color term" tended to be the same across the tested languages, though boundaries varied considerably, and if the number of BCTs was smaller than 11, there were constraints on their co-distribution.
Abstract: In 1969 Brent Berlin and Paul Kay published Basic Color Terms: Their Universality and Evolution, in which they reported the results of an experimental programme,’ which tested their hypothesis that ’color words translate too easily among various pairs of unrelated languages for the extreme linguistic relativity thesis to be valid’ (2). Their results, they claimed, supported the hypothesis, casting doubt on the widely held belief that each language segments the colour continuum arbitrarily and independently of other languages. Using mapping experiments (the ’boundaries’ and ’best examples’ of colour categories marked on transparent acetates placed over a colour chart) they showed that the best example or focus of each ’Basic Color Term’ (hereafter referred to as BCT) tended to be the same across the tested languages, though boundaries varied considerably. Defining BCTs in terms of their foci, they showed that all languages contain ’basic’ colour terms, ranging in number from two to eleven. Hence the difference between languages was reduced to their number of BCTs, though the set of 11 was a universal.2 Moreover, if the number of BCTs was smaller than 11, there were constraints on their co-distribution, the number of
28 citations
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TL;DR: Although some may snipe and others carp, there can be no denying the proposition that science is the best procedure yet discovered for exposing fundamental truths about the world as discussed by the authors, and that science has shown itself to be of enormous power for the elucidation and control of nature.
Abstract: Although some may snipe and others carp, there can be no denying the proposition that science is the best procedure yet discovered for exposing fundamental truths about the world. By its combination of careful experimentation guided by theory, and its elaboration and improvement of theory based on the experiments it has inspired, it has shown itself to be of enormous power for the elucidation and control of nature. There appear to be no bounds to its competence: it can comment on the origin and end of the world, on the emergence, evolution and activities of life, and it can even, presumably, account for the activities and beliefs of sociologists. This claim of universal competence may seem arrogant, but it appears to be justified. No other mode of discovery has proved to be so effective or to contribute so much towards the achievement of the aspirations of humanity. Foremost among these achievements is the continually renewed reinforcement of the view that the human brain is such a powerful instrument that it can illuminate whatever it selects as its object of study, including itself. A second major achievement is the demonstration that the world is a rational place, and although it may be too complex globally to be subject to much prediction, science continually reaffirms the view that structures and events can be explicated. Third, of course, in this awesome load of achievements is the rich
22 citations
TL;DR: Othering is an idea originally connected with literary studies through the work of Edward Said, and later elaborated in post-colonial theory as mentioned in this paper, and it has been used by historians to define themselves.
Abstract: ’By not being Others we define ourselves. We have always done so’ (Barkan, 1994:180). Historians have started to use the idea of the Other in their accounts of national identity, quietly commandeering an idea originally connected with literary studies through the work of Edward Said, and later elaborated in post-colonial theory. By means of this body of work historians have appropriated the idea of Othering. Their serene disinterest in the origins of the thesis and the kind of psychological mechanism it assumes, is probably just one more example of the profession’s endearing lack of interest in the theoretical models it
TL;DR: In a subsequent empirical study of the social psychology of fascism, Billig (1979) repeated Smith's original assessment, saying that ‘The Authoritarian Personality as mentioned in this paper was the most influential book on fascism.
Abstract: career following publication certainly bears this out. There were many subsequent studies of authoritarianism (see reviews by Titus and Hollander, 1955; Kirscht and Dillehay, 1967; Cherry and Byrne, 1977). There were evaluative and critical assessments (Christie and Jahoda, 1954). There were furious controversies (Christie, 1956 and Eysenck, 1956). And the story as a whole took up some 80 pages of a major textbook (Brown, 1965). In a subsequent empirical study of the social psychology of fascism, Billig (1979) repeated Smith’s original assessment, saying that ‘The Authoritarian Personality
TL;DR: This article argued that a judicious infusion of pragmatist ideas into the sociology of knowledge would shore up both its shaky epistemological claims and its inadequate social psychology, arguing that the epistemology resources of John Dewey's instrumentalist version of pragmaticism can rebut charges of relativism, and Mead's social behaviourism has frequently been seen as a way of replacing Mannheim's vague perspectivism with a more substantial social psychological conception of the generalized other.
Abstract: An awareness of the similarities between Karl Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge and American pragmatism has long been a familiar feature of discussions of the sociology of knowledge. Not surprisingly, critics of pragmatism see Mannheim’s Wissenssoziologie as making the same sort of epistemological errors as John Dewey and his followers (cf. Child, 1947:22; Hinshaw,1944: 82). Proponents of pragmatism, conversely, often contend that a judicious infusion of pragmatist ideas into the sociology of knowledge would shore up both its shaky epistemological claims and its inadequate social psychology. More specifically, the epistemological resources of John Dewey’s instrumentalist version of pragmatism have been invoked as a means by which the sociology of knowledge can rebut charges of relativism, and Mead’s social behaviourism has frequently been seen as a way of supplanting Mannheim’s vague perspectivism with a more substantial social psychological conception of the ’generalized other’.’ 1
TL;DR: The authors argued that psychology cannot avoid making assumptions which can be investigated only in a speculative way; but they must never resort to metaphysical explanations because such explanations lead to endless wrangling and for many purposes are not needed.
Abstract: doctrine in spite of seeming inconsistencies. The problem arises because on the surface James seems to be contradicting himself by claiming both that psychology without metaphysics is impossible and that to become a science psychology must be treated positivistically and avoid metaphysics. The solution I argue for turns upon a distinction between metaphysical assumptions and metaphysical explanations: psychologists cannot avoid making assumptions which can be investigated only in a speculative way; but they must never resort to metaphysical explanations because such explanations lead to endless wrangling and for many purposes are not needed. James draws the distinction between metaphysics and psychology epistemologically, between the speculative and the verifiable. Psychology deals with what is verifiable, but the objects which it studies are also objects of speculative inquiry. It must be emphasized that the boundary between psychology and metaphysics as drawn in Principles is a provisional one. It is a needed protection because of psychology’s infantile condition. A more mature psychology and, it must be added, a more mature metaphysics, would find many areas of fruitful interaction.
Abstract: Over the last 30 years, leftist humanists and social scientists have increasingly challenged the authority that the natural sciences enjoy throughout society, especially in the academy. Originally, most of these challenges concerned the role that natural scientists played in weapons research, environmental degradation, and gender and racial discrimination. However, recently more principled challenges have been made to the very content and method of science by a group of interdisciplinary scholars in the field of ’Science & Technology Studies’, or STS (Fuller, 1993). Until a couple of years ago, scientists largely ignored this mounting body of work in their own public writings. However, in 1992, two prominent works of science popularization, Wolpert (1992) and Weinberg (1992), devoted entire chapters to describing the threat posed by the academic left critique of science, conveying the general impression that it constituted a frontal assault on ’civilization as we know it’ (Fuller, 1994, offers an STS response). Paul Gross and Norman Levitt, a distinguished American biologist and mathematician, have
TL;DR: To believe what one reads about the recent public exchanges between scientists and sociologists (starting with, say, Irwin, 1994), one would think that the sociology of science is primarily a research programme designed to put an end to science as we know it as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: To believe what one reads about the recent public exchanges between scientists and sociologists (starting with, say, Irwin, 1994), one would think that the sociology of science is primarily a research programme designed to put an end to science as we know it. Without denying that some sociologists may privately harbour such aspirations, nevertheless such a characterization badly distorts the motives behind the creation and promotion of our field. In both the United States and the United Kingdom, the early classics in the
TL;DR: The furniture argument as discussed by the authors is a variation of what Edwards, Ashmore and Potter call the furniture argument, and it has been used in many realist arguments with an anti-realist opponent.
Abstract: I’m told I’m in a dilemma. I’m a realist who employs a variation of what Edwards, Ashmore and Potter call the furniture argument (Edwards, Ashmore and Potter, 1995). When I’m in an argument with an anti-realist I don’t bang on the furniture, although I see the force of the gesture: I tend to throw objects at my opponent. For reasons I note below I think it is a much more effective strategy. But the point is much the same and it is open to the response that Edwards, Ashmore and Potter present:
TL;DR: The use of the word 'we' is common in everyday speech as mentioned in this paper, and its use is gendered: Giddens (1992: 53) notes that men normally speak in terms of &dquo;I&dqo;, whereas female narratives of self tend to be couched in termsof &dqs;we&dqs.
Abstract: ’We’ is a small word, common in everyday speech. It is even more common in utopian discourse, and satirized in its dystopian counterpart. Postmodern theory, following Derrida, suggests that ’we’ is repressive of difference and thus dangerous, since difference is presumed good, and ignoring or repressing it bad. Yet ’we’ embodies not just a sense of common identity, but the possibility of collective agency. Moreover, its use is gendered: Giddens (1992: 53) notes that ’men normally speak in terms of &dquo;I&dquo;, whereas female narratives of self tend to be couched in terms of &dquo;we&dquo; ’.
TL;DR: The psychologist's dilemma as mentioned in this paper is the tendency of psychologists to confuse their analyses of subjective experience with the nature of reality, and it has been identified as a major obstacle in the development of modern scientific psychology.
Abstract: William James, one of the major founders of modern scientific psychology, spoke often about ’the psychologist’s fallacy’ (e.g. James, 1983a [1884]:161-7; James, 1983b [1890] : 195-6). This fallacy resulted (and still results) from the tendency of psychologists to confuse their analyses of subjective experience with the nature of reality. A related, though less attended, problem revolved for James (and still revolves) around what I shall call ’the psychologist’s dilemma’. Although other psychologists have been sensitive to this dilemma, both in James’s time and more recently, perhaps no other thinker has felt and pondered it
TL;DR: The relationship between psychology and phenomenology has been examined in the context of phenomenology and psychology as discussed by the authors, and three relational determinants within the complicated entanglement of psychology and the phenomenology can be discerned.
Abstract: If we are to write of ’phenomenological psychology’ we first require a clarification of the relationship between phenomenology and psychology. That is not easy: for these two elements are highly variable along synchronic and diachronic dimensions (cf. Graumann, 1991; Herzog, 1992). Even before Edmund Husserl made the step from descriptive psychology in his Logical Investigations (1900-1) to the transcendental phenomenology in his Ideas (1913) there were differing conceptions of the nature of psychology and of phenomenology. The meaning of ’phenomenological psychology’ was even less clear. Viewed historically, three relational determinants within the complicated entanglement of psychology and phenomenology can be discerned. First of all, for Husserl phenomenology is merely a propaedeutic, a transitional stage on the way to a pure (philosophical) phenomenology. Secondly, within the phenomenological movement there are not a few psychologists who see things exactly in
TL;DR: Radical empiricism, in the original sense in which William James intended it, is a metaphysical proposition which defines the task of psychology as the scientific study of consciousness as discussed by the authors, and it is also a statement about the more general relation of experience to scientific knowledge as well as an epistemological position which James used to critique the shortcomings of the experimentalist attitude.
Abstract: Radical empiricism, in the original sense in which William James intended it, is a metaphysical proposition which defines the task of psychology as the scientific study of consciousness. It is also a statement about the more general relation of experience to scientific knowledge as well as an epistemological position which James used to critique the shortcomings of the experimentalist attitude. Its essential feature is that, within the domain of science, it admits as inaccessible any claims that lie outside the range of human experience, while it forbids the exclusion of any phenomena that lie within the range of human experience, including the experience of consciousness, itself, in all its varied manifestations. Radical empiricism cannot be understood, however, without reference to the
TL;DR: The authors suggest ways of tackling issues posed by a conference on science's social standing, and by the controversial background it springs from, by way of a general and usable contribution, to suggest ways to tackle issues.
Abstract: What can an historian do, by way of a general and usable contribution, to suggest ways of tackling issues posed by a conference on science’s social standing, and by the controversial background it springs from? There are a couple of strategies which seem less than helpful for any frame-setting stage of discussion. The first would be to pretend to speak for the profession as a whole, to make claims prefaced by ’Historians tend to think ...’. There are numerous and various
TL;DR: For instance, the authors argues that the power of Weber's argument rests not upon the methodological defence of value freedom, which remains ambiguous and open to objection, but upon the fact that he pays closer attention to "material" and institutional conditions of intellectual production than is customary.
Abstract: ’Value freedom’ has been the object of fierce criticism to the point where the notion appears largely discredited, at least as a methodological doctrine. The standard objections raised in the critique of positivism seem unanswerable. Indeed our post-positivist political and ethical sensibilities rob us of any motivation to defend ’value freedom’. It is an idea objectionable on politicoethical as well as methodological grounds. Yet I shall argue that some of the arguments Weber advances in its defence are still interesting; first, because they address questions about politics and ethics in a way which goes beyond the universalism/particularism divide still today characterizing social scientific debate about matters which are not of a purely ’technical’ nature; and second, because they raise a series of uncomfortable questions about the position from which social science (or indeed science generally) can intervene in public debate and the effectiveness of that intervention. With regard to both aspects, the power of Weber’s argument rests not upon the methodological defence of value freedom, which remains ambiguous and open to objection, but upon the fact that he pays closer attention to ’material’ and institutional conditions of intellectual production than is customary. Reading Weber in this way, I shall suggest, at least
TL;DR: In this article, Hacking shows how memory is intertwined with history and biography, and how identification becomes a matter of "hooking of a narrative onto a person in the dock".
Abstract: In Rezvriting the Soul, Ian Hacking (1995) shows how memory is intertwined with history and biography. Hacking writes that in the contemporary era even the ’lowest of the low’ the deviant, lawbreaker and madman (not to speak of the taxpayer) now merits a biography, albeit one that is inscribed in the dossier, medical file and criminal record. Such biographies are mass produced and written by impersonal hands, often in the face of their subjects’ resistance. As Hacking puts it, identification becomes a matter of ’hooking of a narrative onto a person in the dock’.’ It also can be said that the ’highest of the high’, such as former US President Richard Nixon, can find themselves meriting profane biographies that they wished had never been written. During the Watergate investigations, Nixon