Showing papers in "Interest groups & Advocacy in 2020"
TL;DR: The Comparative Interest Group-survey project (CIGsurvey) as mentioned in this paper is a large scale survey of interest groups in 9 European countries and at the European Union level.
Abstract: This article discusses the methodology and practice behind planning and executing the Comparative Interest Group-survey project (CIG-survey). The CIG-survey includes surveys among national populations of organized interests in 9 European countries and at the European Union level. Although surveys are a useful and reliable way to collect data on a variety of topics, there are also numerous pitfalls and challenges in surveying interest groups, especially across multiple countries. Despite the prominent use of surveys in interest group research, systematic reflections on this method are scarce and data sets are not always properly archived or openly accessible. This article elaborates upon the practical implications and reflects on the lessons learnt during from the implementation of the CIG-survey. Moreover, we highlight how the fuzzy boundaries of interest communities obfuscate sampling and that surveying interest organizations requires researchers to navigate through a specific organizational context to reach and motivate respondents. We also demonstrate how a careful survey plan can positively affect response rates and enable the creation of robust comparative data sets.
33 citations
TL;DR: In this article, an analysis of more than 72,000 reported ministerial meetings and nearly 1000 lobbying clients and consultants reveals major discrepancies between these two sources of information about lobbying in the UK.
Abstract: The government of the UK is reputed to be among the world’s most transparent governments. Yet in comparison with many other countries, its 5-year-old register of lobbyists provides little information about the lobbying activity directed at the British state. Further, its published lists of meetings with government ministers are vague, delayed, and scattered across numerous online locations. Our analysis of more than 72,000 reported ministerial meetings and nearly 1000 lobbying clients and consultants reveals major discrepancies between these two sources of information about lobbying in the UK. Over the same four quarters, we find that only about 29% of clients listed in the lobby register appear in the published record of ministerial meetings with outside groups, and less than 4% of groups disclosed in ministerial meetings records appear in the lobby register. This wide variation between the two sets of data, along with other evidence, contribute to our conclusion that the Government could have made, and still should make, the lobby register more robust.
16 citations
TL;DR: The INTERARENA research project as discussed by the authors mapped interest group access to the administration, parliament and the news media across several countries, including the US, Spain, Italy, and Canada.
Abstract: Studies of the political role of interest groups rely on mapping their presence in politics. This article presents the INTERARENA research project which mapped interest group access to the administration, parliament and the news media across several countries. The project departed from a definition of access that emphasized the role of gatekeepers in different political arenas.
The article discusses the ambitions of the research project and the subsequent choice of empirical indicators for political access. In addition, it presents the data sources used and provides an overview of the data collected. The described datasets are available online for other researchers interested in empirical mapping of group access to politics.
10 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present an overview of lobbying during U.S. regulatory policymaking, including during OIRA’s review of proposed government regulations, and provide several descriptive statistics from a lobbying dataset that covers January 2005 to June 2011.
Abstract: We introduce readers to an advocacy tactic that is largely unknown to scholars: lobbying the U.S. President’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). We first present an overview of lobbying during U.S. regulatory policymaking, including during OIRA’s review of proposed government regulations. Second, we introduce readers to a data source that allows scholars to track lobbying during OIRA’s regulatory review, and we provide several descriptive statistics from a lobbying dataset that covers January 2005 to June 2011. Third, we highlight different applications of these data, including our efforts to integrate the data with other information sources. We close by encouraging interest groups scholars to take advantage of these largely untapped data, which are more accessible today than even a few years ago and to connect these data with other available sources both inside and outside of the regulatory process.
9 citations
TL;DR: The LDA will turn 25 years old on December 19, 2020 as mentioned in this paper, and between 1998 and 2018, organizations and lobbying firms filed more than one million reports, providing information on the activity of 47,555 organizations, 6834 lobbying firms, and 47,479 individual lobbyists.
Abstract: The Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) will turn 25 years old on December 19, 2020. Between 1998 and 2018, organizations and lobbying firms filed more than one million reports. These reports provide information on the activity of 47,555 organizations, 6834 lobbying firms, and 47,479 individual lobbyists. The interest group scholarly community has put the LDA data to good use over the course of a quarter century of observation. Yet, lobbying disclosures have not been fully leveraged to generate new discoveries about the politics of interest groups, advocacy, legislative studies, and public policy. In this article, we provide an overview of the lobbying disclosure process by describing the idiosyncrasies of the data’s nested and complex structure and the limitations of what information is actually reported. We then assess recent research using LDA data, provide advice on completing research at different levels of analysis, document important changes in data reliability and structure over time, and introduce replication tools to support further research. As the time horizon of lobbying disclosure panel data continues to grow, the LDA—especially when combined with other sources—is an increasingly fruitful way to observe money in politics, legislative behavior, corporate political activity, political consulting, and individual lobbyists engaged in policy advocacy.
9 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyze differences in the use of access points or venues by interest groups and argue that the venues differ by the extent to which they encourage lobbying from different interest groups.
Abstract: The EU offers a variety of access points through which interest groups can attempt to influence policy-making. In this paper, we analyze differences in the use of these access points, or venues, by interest groups. Considering the roles played by different EU institutions along the policy cycle, we argue that the venues differ by the extent to which they encourage lobbying from different interest groups. Analyzing survey responses by more than 700 European interest associations, we find that the distribution of access-seeking by business and non-business actors differs across venues. Reflecting its pivotal role at the pre-proposal stage, the Commission encourages non-business organizations to spend much of their finite lobbying resources. In the context of the European Parliament, non-business groups are not only interested in influencing its decisions, but also in connecting to ordinary Members of the European Parliament. Business groups, for their part, apply greater resources to the rapporteurs. Finally, we show that business groups also allocate their resources to regulatory agencies at the implementation stage in the policy process, where incomplete legislative contracts are finalized and non-business groups’ resources are depleted.
8 citations
TL;DR: This article examined whether federated, political and non-political voluntary associations faced density dependence in both membership and the number of affiliated organizations at the state level and found evidence that density dependence was a common concern for voluntary associations of all types.
Abstract: Recent research applying the energy–stability–area (ESA) model to politically oriented, federated voluntary membership associations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has found that these organizations had additional capacity for membership. Yet, this approach does not tell us whether associations’ organizational densities restricted the growth and formation of new federated chapters because of density dependence, a finding common in modern ESA studies. Furthermore, it is not clear whether other voluntary associations, such as fraternal orders, faced similar challenges. Here, we begin to explore these questions by examining whether federated, political and non-political voluntary associations faced density dependence in both membership and the number of affiliated organizations at the state level. We find evidence that density dependence was a common concern for voluntary associations of all types. Both in terms of the number of local-level federated groups and, to a lesser extent, membership, these groups were so successful that environmental resources eventually limited their growth during this pivotal era for the development of pressure groups and civic participation in the USA.
8 citations
TL;DR: The authors describe the major kinds of data that have proven useful to scholars studying interest group behavior and influence in bureaucratic politics, how to obtain them, and challenges that we as users have encountered in working with these data.
Abstract: The US government creates astonishingly complete records of policy creation in executive agencies. In this article, we describe the major kinds of data that have proven useful to scholars studying interest group behavior and influence in bureaucratic politics, how to obtain them, and challenges that we as users have encountered in working with these data. We discuss established databases such as regulations.gov, which contains comments on draft agency rules, and newer sources of data, such as ex-parte meeting logs, which describe the interest groups and individual lobbyists that bureaucrats are meeting face-to-face about proposed policies. One challenge is that much of these data are not machine-readable. We argue that scholars should invest in several projects to make these datasets machine-readable and to link them to each other as well as to other databases.
8 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce an automated process to estimate the industry of interest groups, using only their names, and then employ a supervised learning method that produces a reliable set of estimations of the sector of more than six hundred thousand interest groups in the states.
Abstract: A number of strides have been taken in recent years to measure interest group populations in the American states, but sorting these groups by economic sector requires substantial investment in time and personnel. This paper introduces an automated process to estimate the industry of interest groups, using only their names. We discuss the advantages and hurdles of using automated methods and then employ a supervised learning method that produces a reliable set of estimations of the sector of more than six hundred thousand interest groups in the states. We validate these estimates in a number of ways, showing that they closely correlate to datasets employed in the literature, can replicate published results and reflect real-world events.
7 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that in the context of a complex and differentiated understanding of democracy, the two common standards that are used to guide ethical dealing with government, being truthful and acting in the public interest, are misguided.
Abstract: Following the “systemic turn,” democratic theory has moved away from simplistic accounts of the “public interest” as something that can be discovered through the right procedure or the right context where self-interest is bracketed. Instead, it focuses on the ways in which the terms of social cooperation are co-negotiated according to different standards in different sites of social interaction. Against this background, we revisit the question of what ethical obligations businesses have when lobbying government. We argue that in the context of a complex and differentiated understanding of democracy, the two common standards that are used to guide ethical dealing with government—being “truthful” and acting in the “public interest”—are misguided. Instead, we claim that the standard that should guide businesses in lobbying is corruption avoidance. We understand corruption, however, in broader terms than suitcases full of cash, or quid pro quo arrangements. Instead, building on Mark Warren’s definition of corruption in democracy as “duplicitous exclusion,” we offer a typology of how lobbying practices can exclude people in a corrupting manner, pointing toward an ethical framework business actors can use to avoid contributing to the corruption of democratic norms and procedures. The ethics of lobbying according to this model will be mainly concerned with not undermining democracy’s second-order competence through practices of duplicitous exclusion.
7 citations
TL;DR: The authors introduced a new dataset that facilitates the measurement of lobbying activities by foreign entities: information extracted from lobbying reports submitted under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), which requires that lobbyists representing foreign entities submit semi-annual reports detailing all their lobbying contacts.
Abstract: Foreign entities are among the most active interest groups that lobby policymakers in the US government. There is a long history of concern about foreign powers’ influence on public opinion and government policies in the USA, but little is known about the scope and magnitude of their influence. I introduce a new dataset that facilitates the measurement of lobbying activities by foreign entities: information extracted from lobbying reports submitted under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). The FARA requires that lobbyists representing foreign entities submit semi-annual reports detailing all their lobbying contacts. I highlight the difference in the disclosure requirements between the Lobbying Disclosure Act and the FARA and provide detailed guidance on how to extract information from reports submitted under the FARA. FARA data provide a unique opportunity to address unresolved questions in studies of interest groups as well as foreign entities’ lobbying activities in the USA.
TL;DR: The authors reviewed the literature featuring quantitative interest group research at the national and subnational level in the United States and made recommendations on methods and discussed the limitations of prevailing measures, and pointed out that money is a central resource in politics, every attempt should be made to include organization or sector financial resources when investigating the relative strength of groups in policymaking.
Abstract: This article reviews the literature featuring quantitative interest group research at the national and subnational level in the United States. We direct scholars to existing resources and techniques. Additionally, we make recommendations on methods and discuss the limitations of prevailing measures. The appropriate measure is driven by the research question and data availability. However, since money is a central resource in politics, every attempt should be made to include organization or sector financial resources when investigating the relative strength of groups in policymaking.
TL;DR: The MapLight dataset as mentioned in this paper contains some 130,000 such positions taken on thousands of bills between the 109th and 115th Congresses (2005-2018) and explains how scholars can address these to make appropriate use of the data.
Abstract: The transparency organization MapLight records instances of organizations taking positions for and against legislation in Congress. The dataset comprises some 130,000 such positions taken on thousands of bills between the 109th and 115th Congresses (2005–2018). The depth and breadth of these data potentially give them wide applicability for answering questions about interest group behavior and influence as well as legislative politics more broadly. However, the coverage and content of the data are affected by aspects of MapLight’s research process. This article introduces the MapLight dataset and its potential uses, examines issues related to sampling and other aspects of MapLight’s research process, and explains how scholars can address these to make appropriate use of the data.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a roadmap of the main conceptual and methodological choices involved in studying lobbying coalitions and distinguish three main approaches to identify coalescing actors: a preference similarity approach, a behavioural approach, and an organisational approach.
Abstract: Treating interest groups mainly as independent units of observation overlooks highly frequent coalition activities between actors and risks affecting the results of studies of lobbying and political influence. Yet, conceptualising and measuring lobbying coalitions is inherently difficult. In order to facilitate important future research, this article provides a roadmap of the main conceptual and methodological choices involved in studying lobbying coalitions. It distinguishes three main approaches to identify coalescing actors: a preference similarity approach, a behavioural approach, and an organisational approach. The article presents concrete operationalisations of coalitions from these vantage points and provides empirical evidence that various forms of cooperation activities on specific issues, as well as general cooperation structures, are highly frequent in lobbying in European countries. The article is relevant for scholars of interest groups and political advocacy more broadly by informing the design of new research on lobbying strategies, access, or influence.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss the use of web collection of interest group statements on bills as a data source and demonstrate the collection process and the merits and limitations of employing written statements as identificatory data.
Abstract: This article discusses web collection of interest group statements on bills as a data source. Written statements allow the identification of actors active in policy-making as well as those actors’ positions, lobbying coalitions and issue saliency. These data also can contribute to the measurement of interest groups’ influence on legislation. Taking web collection from the German parliament’s and ministries’ web pages as an example, we demonstrate the collection process and the merits and limitations of employing written statements as identificatory data. Our analysis of statements submitted by interest groups, private firms and policy experts to four federal ministries and the respective parliamentary committees in the years 2015 and 2016 reveals differences between parliamentary and ministerial consultations. Although ministries have invited written statements for fewer draft laws than parliamentary committees, they received far more statements from interest groups. The reason is that German ministries often issue open calls, in which all actors are given the opportunity to comment on legislation, whereas the German parliament invites selected interest group representatives and other experts. As a further result, ministries are mostly contacted by business groups, whereas parliamentary committees use their gatekeeper function to balance interests.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined why and how a regulation on retail banking fees, commissions, and charges emerged in Turkey after a long period of regulatory forbearance, and they argued that the regulatory policy change was a product of a policy regime change with the Ministry emerging as a veto player, as it redefined the institutional arrangements in the policymaking process, and imposed its preferences and its stricter policy approach.
Abstract: This article examines why and how a regulation on retail banking fees, commissions, and charges emerged in Turkey after a long period of regulatory forbearance. The article shows that when regulatory forbearance caused stasis, and the “statist”, exclusionary policymaking context limited consumer groups’ access to the policymaking process, consumer groups challenged the policy regime of the banking sector and the regulator by appealing to another state actor, the Ministry of Customs and Trade. The Ministry took advantage of an opportunity structure to pass a new consumer protection law which assigned a de facto mandate on the regulatory agency to regulate fees, commissions, and charges. The article argues that the regulatory policy change was a product of a policy regime change with the Ministry emerging as a veto player, as it redefined the institutional arrangements in the policymaking process, and imposed its preferences and its stricter policy approach. As such, the article contributes to our understanding of the conditions of how diffuse interest groups can trigger regulatory policy change, but more importantly policy regime change.
TL;DR: The case for emails as a form of (big) data in the interest group field is made and best practices for compiling and analyzing datasets of interest group emails are discussed.
Abstract: Modern interest groups frequently utilize email communications with members as an organizational and informational tool. Furthermore, the nature of email communications—frequent, abundant, and simple to collect—makes them an excellent source of data for studies of interest groups. Nevertheless, despite the substantive importance and methodological possibilities of email communications, few interest group scholars have taken advantage of this data source due to the lack of a comprehensive, systematic database of email texts. This article makes the case for emails as a form of (big) data in the interest group field and discusses best practices for compiling and analyzing datasets of interest group emails. The article also introduces the Political Group Communication Database—the first large scale database of interest group and think tank email communications—and discusses the utility of this (and related) data for answering perennial and newly emergent questions in the interest group field.
TL;DR: In this article, the United Negro College Fund (UNCF) is described as an organization established to raise funding, awareness, and engage in policy advocacy on behalf of Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs).
Abstract: Through the use of qualitative content analysis, we highlight the various advocacy strategies of and technologies of resistance utilized by the United Negro College Fund (UNCF), an organization established to raise funding, awareness, and engage in policy advocacy on behalf of Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs). Providing an overview of the literature on minoritized policy advocacy, as well as highlighting the dearth of inquiry on minoritized organizations that engage in policy advocacy on behalf of and in consortium with HBCUs, this article highlights the work of the UNCF, its history, and its evolving role in policy advocacy to combat policy borne out of predominantly White policy arenas. We identify the ways UNCF challenge deficit narratives about HBCUs and the minoritized populations these institutions serve as well as offer concrete strategies and technologies of resistance that can be used for engaging in policy advocacy on behalf of minoritized organizations and communities.
TL;DR: This article examined the link between policy uncertainty and interest groups' demand for lobbyists with previous government experience, using complementary sets of panel analysis of lobbying activity by companies in four economic sectors over an 11-year period.
Abstract: Interest groups spend large sums of money hiring lobbyists often as a form of insurance against the risk of undesirable policy change. This theory of lobbying as political insurance needs systematic testing. Previous experience serving in government makes lobbyists more valuable as providers of political insurance. The insurance theory of lobbying thus points to an empirical link between policy uncertainty and interest groups’ demand for these “revolving-door lobbyists” with previous government experience. I examine this link using complementary sets of panel analysis of lobbying activity by companies in four economic sectors over an 11-year period. They draw on a sector-specific and time-variant measure of policy uncertainty based on analyzing companies’ discussions of policy risks in annual 10-K filings submitted to the US Securities and Exchange Commission. In all four sectors companies’ preference for revolvers increases in response to policy uncertainty relative to conventional lobbyists.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors focus on the effects of issue-level factors instead, and argue that higher levels of conflict lead interest groups to lobby both supporters and opponents, emphasizing that the reason to do so lies in interest groups desire to gain or maintain prominence within a policy subsystem, rather than in persuasion attempts.
Abstract: Do interest groups prefer to interact with party political supporters or opponents, and why do they do so? Recent research has provided different explanations and mixed findings for this question, highlighting the role of institutional contexts and differences between interests. Here, we focus on the effects of issue-level factors instead. We hypothesize that higher levels of conflict lead interest groups to lobby both supporters and opponents. Our argument emphasizes that the reason to do so lies in interest groups’ desire to gain or maintain prominence within a policy subsystem, rather than in persuasion attempts. Analyzing quantitative and qualitative data on the lobbying targets for 80 Dutch interest groups on more than 300 issues, we find support for our theoretical claims. When the level of conflict is high, prominence often trumps persuasion. These findings suggest that interest groups, by contacting many different parties, can contribute to policy making in positive ways.
TL;DR: In this paper, a case study of the European Union (EU) is presented, which shows that although the relationship between professionals and the beneficiaries of their services is central to the ethics of any profession, the codes of conduct developed by the EU associations neglect lobbyists' obligations towards those whose interests they represent.
Abstract: The regulation of lobbying activities nowadays represents an internationally recognized standard of good governance. Such measures usually consist of mandatory public registers of lobbyists, meant to increase scrutiny and account-holding over the activities of lobbyists in the political and policy arena. In parallel to public regulation, industry-led initiatives have proliferated in recent years, in the form of private codes of conduct sponsored by professional lobbyists’ associations. However, existing research on lobbying regulation has largely ignored these developments. The article addresses this research gap. It proposes that codes of conduct developed by practitioners’ associations should be assessed through a professional ethics framework and tests this approach in a case study of the European Union (EU). Findings shows that, although the relationship between professionals and the beneficiaries of their services is central to the ethics of any profession, the codes of conduct developed by the EU associations neglect lobbyists’ obligations towards those whose interests they represent. Having been created in response to the threat of public regulation, these private codes sought to reassure the EU institutions of lobbyists’ integrity, leading to a narrow interpretation of ‘ethical’ lobbying as not exercising a corrupting influence over public officials or the public decision-making process.
TL;DR: In this paper, fourteen sets of authors review these data sources and offer advice on how best to make use of them, including reports filed as required by the Administrative Procedures Act, Federal Election Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, Foreign Agents Registration Act, and the Lobbying Disclosure Act, as well as data collected by the Center for Responsive Politics, Comparative Agendas Project, the Comparative Interest Groups survey project, INTERARENA, INTEREURO, MapLight, the National Institute on Money in State Politics, the Political Group Communication Database and the Wesleyan Media
Abstract: Technological advances, increasing amounts of online governmental records, and transparency efforts by nonprofit organizations have led to a new abundance of data sources for studying the political activities of interest groups. In this special issue, fourteen sets of authors review these data sources and offer advice on how best to make use of them. The data sources discussed include reports filed as required by the Administrative Procedures Act, the Federal Election Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and the Lobbying Disclosure Act, as well as data collected by the Center for Responsive Politics, the Comparative Agendas Project, the Comparative Interest Groups survey project, INTERARENA, INTEREURO, MapLight, the National Institute on Money in State Politics, the Political Group Communication Database, and the Wesleyan Media Project.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose methods for measuring the policy agendas of interest groups using the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) system to allow valid comparisons in policy agendas across issues, time, and systems.
Abstract: The rapid expansion of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) has drastically increased data availability on the policy agendas of government outputs. These data are coded using a system to allow for valid comparisons in policy agendas across issues, time, and systems. However, less data are available for interest groups outputs, and that data have mostly been limited to the USA. In this paper, we propose methods for measuring the policy agendas of interest groups using the CAP system. Scholars can estimate the policy content of interest group activities by linking them to existing CAP datasets. These data can be used to compare the distribution of policy attention of interest groups and the institutions they attempt to influence. Because the CAP datasets are highly detailed and widely available, researchers can examine interest group activities at low costs. Furthermore, we discuss higher-cost methods of coding interest group policy outputs that may be of interest to scholars.
TL;DR: In this paper, qualitative interviews with 39 health interest organizations, representing a broad spectrum of group types, resources and access to decision-makers, analyze evaluations of the perceived gains and risks associated with media strategies.
Abstract: Interest groups depend on visibility for political influence and organizational growth. The current hybrid media landscape presents both opportunities and constraints for visibility and influence. For organized interests, if, when and how to use established media involves a continuous evaluation of different media strategies, as well as evaluations of how to best combine media and non-media platforms for efficient, multi-platform advocacy campaigns. Through qualitative interviews with 39 health interest organizations, representing a broad spectrum of group types, resources and access to decision-makers, this study analyses evaluations of the perceived gains and risks associated with media strategies. Although all interviewees value media visibility, their actual access to the established news media varies significantly. In the current media landscape, which is characterized by hyper-competition and hybridity, we find that it is primarily the well-resourced organizations, with storytelling expertise, which gain and prioritize visibility in the established media. Other organizations, independent of other group characteristics, seek visibility by increasingly becoming networked content distributors to bypass established media and target specific publics to promote organizational aims.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that mortality anxiety may still have an important place in the literature, but not in the way it was originally intended, namely to understand the political strategies of interest organizations.
Abstract: This paper explores how the concept of ‘mortality anxiety’ fits into the literature on interest groups. Most of the relevant literature has used mortality anxiety as a proxy for organizational survival. Recent studies, however, highlight that this is not a very accurate proxy, hereby questioning the overall usefulness of the concept for the literature. This paper argues that mortality anxiety may still have an important place in the literature, but not in the way it was originally intended, namely to understand the political strategies of interest organizations. Organizations which fear for their survival, we argue, should make substantially different strategic choices than organizations absent of this fear. As a consequence, mortality anxiety is still a critical variable for the interest groups and non-profit literature. We empirically illustrate our argument based on data from a survey project in five countries (N = 2904): Belgium, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, and Slovenia.
TL;DR: The authors found that private interests seeking selective benefits are more likely to hire multi-client lobbyists than public interests seeking collective benefits, and that public interest groups prefer single-client agents when one controls for lobbyist pay levels, number of former legislators hired, and 501(c)(3) status.
Abstract: The kinds of benefits that groups seek from government predict the kinds of lobbyists they hire. Group benefits are linked to lobbyist selection for three reasons: groups attempt to maximize economic efficiency and preserve political agency, but have different levels of a priori influence with elected legislators. These motivations, which are not disentangled here, imply that private interests seeking selective benefits are more likely to hire multi-client lobbyists than public interests seeking collective benefits. I find strong support for this expectation by exploring the lobbyist hiring decisions of more than 80,000 groups. I then show that public interest groups prefer single-client agents when one controls for lobbyist pay levels, numbers of former legislators hired, and 501(c)(3) status. This last test suggests that private and public interests engage in genuinely different forms of advocacy, independent of material resources or restrictions on nonprofit lobbying.
TL;DR: This article found that American Indians seek representation via lobbying on a wide range of issues, including, but not limited to, Indian gaming, and they posit that these findings support prior work on the political incorporation of American Indians as they seek representation on public policy issues.
Abstract: American Indian nations, as pre-constitutional sovereigns, occupy a unique place in the USA. While tribal governments are able to exercise numerous rights as independent nations, they are often affected by policy decisions at the federal and state level. Yet little is known about the specific efforts of American Indians to seek representation in state legislative decision making. We address this shortcoming by answering two related questions. First, do American Indians and Native organizations lobby for public policy at the state level? If they do lobby, as we expect, do they focus solely on gaming given its role in providing an important source of economic development, or do they seek representation on a wide range of issues? Using data from the California legislature for the years 2000–2012, our findings suggest that American Indians seek representation via lobbying on a wide range of issues, including, but not limited to, Indian gaming. We posit that these findings support prior work on the political incorporation of American Indians as they seek representation on public policy issues.
TL;DR: Three of the most commonly used and comprehensive data sources on group-sponsored advertising in the USA, noting the strengths and weaknesses of each, are reported on.
Abstract: Interest groups scholars often want to track the political involvement of groups through their advertising, but there is no one source that covers the universe of advertising. We report here on three of the most commonly used and comprehensive data sources on group-sponsored advertising in the USA, noting the strengths and weaknesses of each. These data sources are the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Web site, the Wesleyan Media Project, and the Facebook ad library. We focus on both the completeness of the information provided and the ease of accessing the information. We conclude that the strengths of each database differ. FCC data are good for a comprehensive view of a particular state or media market. WMP data are great for information on television spending and content, while the Facebook library, in spite of bugs, provides the best data on digital ad spending and content.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide an introduction to the FEC data source, a discussion of how other scholars have used the data, and a case study to generate guidance on the challenges and potential solutions associated with accessing and analyzing these data.
Abstract: Disclosure requirements under US federal campaign finance laws and subsequent court rulings have created greater transparency into the financing of campaigns that allow election watchdog groups to monitor and track the flow of money to and by outside groups. These requirements also have generated an extensive new source of quantitative data for scholars to use. Because of the substantial increase in spending by outside groups, it is both timely and important to examine the influence of independent expenditures on election outcomes, political behavior, and fairness in the democratic process. To evaluate and understand the impact of this spending, researchers must be aware of the scope and limitations of the campaign finance data collected by the Federal Election Commission (FEC). This article provides scholars who would like to use FEC data to answer some of these questions with an introduction to the data source, a discussion of how other scholars have used the data, and a case study to generate guidance on the challenges and potential solutions associated with accessing and analyzing these data.