Showing papers in "International Studies Quarterly in 1989"

The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era

Abstract: The demise of the empiricist-positivist promise for a cumulative behavioral science recently has forced scholars from nearly all the social disciplines to reexamine the ontological, epistemological, and axiological foundations of their scientific endeavors. The “third debate” in the field of international relations parallels this intellectual ferment and constitutes a still maturing disciplinary effort to reconsider theoretical options in a “post-positivist” era. This essay explores the etiology of this debate and critically assesses its implications for current and future theoretical practices. Although the debate has triggered many different responses, the analysis focuses on only one of them—the optimistic response—which both affirms and celebrates the unparalleled theoretical potentialities presumably created by the present intellectual transition. While acknowledging the considerable promise of the third debate, the essay notes that post-positivism offers nearly as many dead ends as it opens promising paths for future research. The essay issues some warnings concerning hazards of misplaced or extravagant theoretical hopes, and it singles out enhanced reflexivity in the scholarly community of international relations as the notable contribution to date of the current theoretical restructuring.

Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital

Abstract: dimensions. These distinctions are elaborated to help explain aspects of the changing nature of present-day capitalism, with particular reference to aspects of transformation in the 1980s and beyond. Partly building upon Robert Cox's analysis of social forces and world orders, and Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony, we seek to explain some of the conditions under which a more "transnational" regime of accumulation and an associated hegemony of transnational capital might develop. Such a hegemony could never be complete because of counterhegemonic forces and contradictory elements in the internationalization of capital. Some requirements for an alternative counter-hegemonic historic bloc are sketched, with suggestions for a research agenda. In this essay we seek to advance the theorization and interpretation of the dynamics and contours of the emerging global political economy, and to outline an agenda for study in this field. Our perspective differs from and can be read as a critique of classical marxism, world systems theory, public choice, and neo-realist theory. Central to our argument is the distinction between direct and structural forms of power and their place within present-day capitalism. Through developing this contrast, in combination with Gramscian concepts-of hegemony historic bloc and the "extended" state-we seek to meet two major challenges. The first is to better integrate domestic and international levels of analysis. We think that a key to the resolution of this problem has been provided by Cox (1987). His analysis of social forces points to a more comprehensive and flexible approach to the question of

The Political Economy of Death Squads: Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror

Abstract: A central theoretical question in the literature on state-sanctioned terror is whether, and under what conditions, repressive violence deters or stimulates a shift in popular support away from the regime and toward the opposition. By combining a rational choice model of the nonelite response to escalating levels of death squad violence with a structural analysis of the global and domestic conditions under which the escalation of state-sanctioned terror can be expected, we demonstrate theoretically that carefully targeted repressive violence may in fact reduce the level of active popular support for the opposition, at least temporarily. However, as the level of repressive violence escalates and its application becomes more indiscriminate, it may in fact produce increases in active support for the opposition because nonelites can no longer assure themselves of immunity from repression by simply remaining politically inert. Thus, they turn to the rebels in search of protection from indiscriminate violence by the state. Why, then, would a regime, itself composed of supposedly rational individuals, pursue a policy of escalating repression if such measures are ultimately counterproductive? We argue that the conditions of structural dependence characterizing these regimes leave them without the institutional machinery, economic resources, or political will to address opposition challenges through more accommodative programs of reform. Thus, escalating repression is perpetrated not because it has a high probability of success but because the weakness of the state precludes its resort to less violent alternatives. The utility of this approach is illustrated with a case study of reform, repression, and revolution in El Salvador.

Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical Inquiry

Abstract: At the apex of foreign policy making in all governments or ruling parties are actors with the ability to commit the resources of the government and the power to prevent other entities within the government from reversing their position-the ultimate decision unit. Although this decision unit may change with the nature of the policy problem and with time, its structure will shape a government's foreign policy. In this paper we propose three types of decision units: predominant leaders, single groups, and multiple autonomous actors. Each of these exists in one of several conditions that help to determine whether the decision unit affects foreign policy largely through the pre-existing knowledge, beliefs, and style of those participating in the unit (a self-contained unit) or whether factors outside the decision unit must be taken into consideration in understanding the results of the decision-making process (an externally influenceable unit). The hypotheses that self-contained units will engage in more extreme foreign policy behavior than externally influenceable units and that single group decision units will show more extreme foreign policy behavior than those comprised of multiple autonomous actors are examined using data from twenty-five nations during the decade from 1959 to 1968. Who makes foreign policy decisions? What is the effect of the decision unit on foreign policy? An examination of how governments and ruling parties around the world make foreign policy decisions suggests that authority is exercised by an extensive array of different entities. Among the decision units are prime ministers, presidents, politburos, juntas, cabinets, inter-agency groups, coalitions, and parliaments. Moreover, within any one government the pertinent decision units often change with time and issue. When cross-national comparisons of governmental decision-making bodies are contemplated, as in the comparative study of foreign policy, the number of possible kinds of decision units becomes formidable. This essay examines one way of classifying decision units, showing how it enhances our ability to differentiate and account for governments' behavior in the foreign Author's Note: This research was funded by a National Science Foundation grant (SES-8618438), the Mershon Center, and the Ohio State University Instructional and Research Computing Center. We would like to thank Greg Peacock for his help with the data analysis as well as Bahgat Korany, Roy Licklider, Jerel Rosati, and Harvey Starr for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of the paper.

Event Count Models for International Relations: Generalizations and Applications

Abstract: International relations theorists tend to think in terms of continuous processes. Yet we observe only discrete events, such as wars or alliances, and summarize them in terms of the frequency of occurrence. As such, most empirical analyses in international relations are based on event count variables. Unfortunately, analysts have generally relied on statistical techniques that were designed for continuous data. This mismatch between theory and method has caused bias, inefficiency, and numerous inconsistencies in both theoretical arguments and empirical findings throughout the literature. This article develops a much more powerful approach to modeling and statistical analysis based explicitly on estimating continuous processes from observed event counts. To demonstrate this class of models, I present several new statistical techniques developed for and applied to different areas of international relations. These include the influence of international alliances on the outbreak of war, the contagious process of multilateral economic sanctions, and reciprocity in superpower conflict. I also show how one can extract considerably more information from existing data and relate substantive theory to empirical analyses more explicitly with this approach.

Toward a Realist Theory of State Action

Abstract: The realities of interdependence dictate that the ability of governments to pursue domestic policies effectively is influenced and constrained by developments in the international system. It is equally evident that the realization of international objectives depends meaningfully on domestic politics and economics. Our purpose in this paper is to lay the foundation for a Realist theory of state action which bridges domestic and international politics. We proceed by positing assumptions about state objectives and deducing strategies relevant to their pursuit. First, we examine conceptions of the state found in classical and structural Realism. Second, we present two models or “faces” of state action which relate the goals of state officials in one arena to the strategies available in the pursuit of such goals in the other. Third, building upon these two models, we put forth several hypotheses which explore the types of challenges to the state that arise in one arena that may trigger responses in the second. Fourth, we introduce variations in domestic and international structures and predict the choice of strategy made by the states across venues. Finally, a concluding section examines the implications of this effort for future Realist inquiry and the study of domestic and international politics.

Joining the Club of Nations: Political Development and International Conflict, 1816–1976

Abstract: This study examines the relationships between regime formation, regime change, and international conflict. A distinction is made between evolutionary and revolutionary state formation processes as well as between revolutionary and evolutionary changes within existing states. It is hypothesized that revolutionary state formations and regime changes result in high levels of post-independence or post-regime change involvement in interstate disputes. On the other hand, evolutionary political development and regime change results in low levels of conflict involvement. These patterns of individual state involvement in international conflict provide new insights into the high correlations between the size of the international system and a variety of interstate conflict attributes. The political development model suggests that the number of interstate conflicts in the system will increase when a large number of states are undergoing revolutionary regime changes, even when there is no change in the number of states in the system. These propositions are tested on data covering nearly all interstate system members in the 1816–1976 period. In addition, the extent to which the political development model accounts for patterns of contagious spread of international conflict is examined. The implications of the relations between internal processes of political development and change and interstate disputes for the study of international politics are examined.

Thucydides and Neorealism

Abstract: The Peloponnesian War has long been viewed as an early exemplar of realist thinking in international politics. More recently, neorealist authors have claimed that Thucydides' history offers timeless insights into the importance of global anarchy in shaping interstate relations, and that these insights anticipate neorealist arguments on order and change in world politics. This article criticizes the neorealist appropriation of The Peloponnesian War . It presents an alternative reading of Thucydides' history. In this reading, the enduring contribution of The Peloponnesian War lies in the insights into power and hegemony embedded in the speeches and debates that interrupt its narrative. This analysis is then used to criticize neorealist understandings of political power and hegemony.

International Relations and the Search for Thinking Space: Another View of the Third Debate

Abstract: Recent debates in International Relations have seen some of the characteristic dichotomies of the discipline under severe and sophisticated challenge. The proposition, for example, that the study of International Relations, is somehow "independent" of mainstream debates on theory and practice in the social sciences is now widely rejected. The disciplines change in attitude on this issue owes much, in the 1980s, to the influences of an as yet small group of scholars who have infused the "third debate" in International Relations with an appreciation for previously "alien" approaches to knowledge and society, drawn from interdisciplinary sources, which repudiate (meta) theoretical dualism in all its forms. Utilizing the sponge term "postpositivism" Yosef Lapid has concentrated on an important aspect of the "third debate," one which has seen positivist based perspectives repudiated in favor of critical perspectives derived, primarily, from debates on the philosophy of science. This paper takes a broader view of the "third debate" in focusing on some of the broader patterns of dissent in social theory that are now evident in its literature. It argues that for all the differences associated with the new critical social theory approaches, theirs is critique with common purpose. Its purpose: to help us understand more about contemporary global life by opening up for questioning dimensions of inquiry which have been previously closed off and supressed; by listening closely to voices previously unheard; by examining "realities" excluded from consideration under a traditional (realist) regime of unity and singularity. Its purpose, reiterated: the search for "thinking space" within an International Relations discipline produced by and articulated through Western modernist discourse.

Anarchy, Authority, Rule

Abstract: International Relations and Political Science are constituted as disciplines on the Hobbesian opposition of anarchy and authority. We reject this opposition and the paradigms of anarchy and authority it has come to authorize. We propose instead a single paradigm of rule to account for the pervasive asymmetries of international relations. We show that in German social thought from Hegel to Weber political society consists in relations of super- and subordination—relations maintained through rules and obtaining in rule. We reformulate Weber's three ideal types of rule, show their relation to independently established types of rule, and apply them to political society generally. We then examine diverse efforts in the recent literature of International Relations to challenge the assumption of anarchy, using the paradigm of rule to clear up numerous terminological and conceptual confusions. Finally, we show how the paradigm of rule facilitates an understanding of such contemporary asymmetries as Soviet-East European and North-South relations.

The Third World in the System of States: Acute Schizophrenia or Growing Pains?

Abstract: This article attempts to locate and understand the place of Third World states in the international system both in terms of their collective impact on the system as the "intruder" element into the Eurocentric system of states and in terms of their role as individual new sovereign states trying to adjust to an international order that can only be defined as an "anarchical society." Often the dual pressures generated by these two roles can make conflicting demands on these states' decision-making centers, which themselves are under severe internal strain due to the lack of "unconditional legitimacy" for both Third World state-structures and the regimes that preside over them. It is argued that an expanded definition of the concept of "security" is essential for the construction of any paradigm that would have sufficient power to explain why Third World states behave as they do within the international system. It is also argued that the present difficulties they face in adjusting to the system of sovereign states is analogous to the growing pains of adolescence rather than to the schizophrenia of the demented.

NATO Burden Sharing and the Forces of Change

Abstract: This article is a policy-relevant elaboration of the theory of collective action, particularly regarding the effects of declining hegemony on international regimes. Analysis of the distribution of defense expenditures in NATO indicates that this theory still provides valuable insights into the operation of the alliance, particularly regarding the role of the United States. Contrary to the conclusion of a series of influential articles, NATO still seems in essence a uniquely privileged group seeking an inclusive public good: regional security through deterrence. But, as theoretically expected, America's contribution to collective security has been sensitive to its declining economic preponderance. The implications of these findings for the future of the alliance are considered. Burden sharing in the North Atlantic alliance has interested political scientists and economists for more than two decades for the light it sheds on the problem of international cooperation and the provision of collective, or public, goods. The distribution of defense expenditures among the allies is, of course, also very important to policy makers and citizens of the allied countries. In this article, we address both groups. The analysis is meant to be a policy-relevant elaboration of the theory of collective action, particularly regarding the effects of declining hegemony on international regimes. But consideration of burden sharing inevitably raises questions about the adequacy of the allies' military capabilities and the role each nation plays in the collective effort, so these topics also receive attention. We first review the history of the debate over burden sharing in the North Atlantic alliance. Then we discuss the theory of collective action, consider its limits in accounting for national defense expenditures, and identify the insights it still provides. Finally, we speculate from this theoretical perspective on future relations between the United States and its European allies.

Critical Reflections on Post-Positivism in International Relations

Abstract: Yosef Lapid clarifies the nature of recent critical reflection on international theory and contributes to opening the discourse on the subject. However, he understates the diversity, the historicism, and the critical nature of post-positivist inquiry and exaggerates the extent to which pluralism, perspectivism and relativism have taken root in international relations. He is also insufficiently critical of post-positivism and does not say enough about the problem of criteria for evaluating alternative explanations. His article is essentially a preface to a larger project, one yet to be undertaken, a project which will need more concrete, self-reflexive, nuanced research that takes post-positivist criticisms seriously and constructs plausible alternative explanations of important subjects.

Income Inequality Among LDCs: A Comparative Analysis of Alternative Perspectives

Abstract: This paper empirically examines several alternative explanations of income inequality among sixty-three less developed countries (LDCs). It finds substantial evidence relating the stock of foreign capital and the rate of economic growth to income distribution in the manner predicted by the newer dependency school and the modernization school, respectively. On the other hand, it fails to find support for the statist perspective, the democracy perspective, and the perspective on distributional coalitions. Instead, military participation and population density are found to exercise a more robust and significant influence in curtailing the income share of the wealthy and in raising the income share of the poor. The implications of these results for the various theoretical traditions are explored. The phenomenon of socioeconomic equality or inequality has been an enduring research concern for economists, sociologists, and political scientists. Cross-national empirical analyses of this phenomenon have focused primarily on income distribution and have been approached from a variety of theoretical and methodological perspectives. Given the diversity of data samples, methods employed, and substantive concerns, the collective research output often appears confusing and, in some cases, downright contradictory. In particular, much of the empirical work tends to relate only to other studies following the same theoretical tradition and thus fails to speak to those belonging to a different school. This paper, therefore, attempts to summarize and compare empirically several leading alternative explanations of cross-national differences in income equality among a sample of sixty-three less developed countries (LDCs). It considers a relatively broad array of perspectives and factors in order to offer a more comprehensive account of income inequality among the LDCs and in order to identify areas of convergence and divergence among the various theoretical traditions treated. The paper has four sections. I first review major alternative explanations of income inequality suggested by the pertinent literature. I then discuss the operational indicators used in the data analyses. I present and discuss the results of these analy

Interests or Institutions: An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC Relations

Abstract: This essay examines the relationship between Congress and the International Trade Commission (ITC). Using the logic of principal-agent theory, we find that rising constituent pressures on Congress to increase trade protectionism have not led to increased political control over the trade bureaucracy. The essay suggests that the absence of this expected relationship between Congress and the ITC may be explained by the historical circumstances under which Congress originally delegated power. We provisionally argue that delegation in the 1930s established rules and norms which continue to influence the range of remedies to which Congress will turn to aid ailing industries. These rules and norms forestall direct congressional involvement in protectionism, thereby insulating the ITC.

Covert Action and Accountability: Decision-Making for America's Secret Foreign Policy

Abstract: This study examines the way in which the United States decides upon and oversees the use of covert action—the pursuit of American foreign policy objectives through secret intervention into the affairs of other nations. First, the definitional nuances of covert action are explored, illustrating the ambiguities inherent in the term. Second, the magnitude of funding for covert action is estimated for the years 1947–86, revealing fluctuations in the attractiveness to policymakers of this “quiet option” as an instrument of foreign affairs. Third, the global targeting priorities for covert action are presented, again disclosing fluctuations but within a broad pattern of primary attention to small, developing nations. With this background, the study then turns to its main focus: the procedures by which the government approves of and reviews covert action. During the Ford and Carter Administrations, this decision process evolved into a complex matrix of checkpoints and overseers, including unprecedented legislative involvement. The Reagan years produced dramatic evidence, however, that these efforts at closer supervision of America's secret foreign policy—the “democratization” of covert action—had fallen short of the goals espoused by reformers. The Iran- contra scandal of 1986–87 cast doubt on the effectiveness of the new oversight procedures and stirred further debate on whether the United States could maintain both a robust secret service and reliable safeguards against the abuse of hidden power.

Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Which Are the Fairest Theories of All?

Abstract: Over the last century our field has borrowed extensively from the epistemelogical foundations of historians, natural scientists, and various forms of positivism. Post-modernism as applied to international relations is a reaction to the excessive claims and aspirations of the “behavioral revolution.” Lapid's essay concisely enumerates and evaluates its counter-claims. Where post-modernism will lead remains problematic. Its stance of methodological and theoretical relativism and its call for the deconstruction of classical and more recent international relations theories could lead to the abandonment of rigorous bases for evaluating additions to knowledge, to an indifference to the realities of international life, and to the promotion of fads. The essay discusses the sources and virtues of theoretical pluralism and argues that in light of the increasing complexity of international relations, our field will necessarily be characterized by a multiplicity of theories. The search for a single, authoritative theoretical or epistemelogical stance is likely to be harmful for the generation of reliable knowledge in the field.

Graphical Argument Analysis: A New Approach to Understanding Arguments, Applied to a Debate about the Window of Vulnerability

Abstract: Arguments and debates about politics are activities central to a democracy Understanding arguments according to common frames of reference is not a straightforward task but demands much critical intelligence and skill To aid in evaluating and criticizing arguments, we present in this paper a quasi-formal analytical methodology that uses a graphical scheme synthesized from the work of Toulmin and others Arguments are analyzed into sets of propositions structurally linked by support, attack, and “warranting” relations This method had advantages over others, since it is well-adapted to informal reasoning and since it helps identify implicit principles of argumentation (warrants), unsupported claims, circularities in reasoning, lines of possible attack, and structural relations between sub-arguments Anyone can use the graphical template of argument elements and relations as a guide in analyzing political (or other) arguments for a variety of critical purposes In this paper, we apply the method to a debate about the strategic window of vulnerability, a debate chosen for its continuing political relevance and the richness of its argument structure We present graphs and their verbal interpretations, and we hope to encourage others to use this method in their own critical research

Regional Vote Support: The Spanish Case

Abstract: Beyond simple description, not much is known about voting for regional parties in Western Europe, despite their importance in many political systems Certainly, efforts to explain systematically a voter's general preference for a regional rather than a national party are virtually nonexistent This paper seeks to rectify that neglect, focusing on the Spanish case, where voting for regional parties is quite prominent Following a brief description of the regional parties in Spain and some theoretical analysis from a comparative perspective, we propose and then test with recent survey data three different hypotheses about regional versus national party support We find that certain sociocultural cleavages, plus economic issues, directly motivate regional vote intention in Spain In addition, we conclude that political involvement in general and concern over the European Community in particular, indirectly influence regional-national party preferences On the basis of these multivariate results, we formulate a two-equation model to account for regional party support

Dependent Development and Foreign Policy: The Case of Jamaica

Abstract: Dependency theory contends that Third World states which are economically dependent on core capitalist countries will develop foreign policy positions consistent with the interests of core countries. Economic dependence produces this outcome, it is argued, because the structures of dependence produce economic and political elites in the peripheral countries whose interests coincide with those of multinational corporations and core country political elites. This article examines the case of Jamaica, which, although extremely dependent economically on the United States, has experienced dramatic changes in its foreign policy since its independence in 1962. The causes of these changes are examined based on interviews with Jamaican elites in 1962, 1974, and 1982, on historical evidence, and on interviews with American policy makers and aluminum company executives. The evidence shows that though the Jamaican business elite strongly favored a very pro-U.S. foreign policy throughout the period, a large segment of the political elite affiliated with Michael Manley's People's National Party moved to a militantly Third World-oriented position that included a major offensive against the aluminum multinationals when the party was in power in the 1970s. It is argued that this policy change was a direct product of the contradictory outcomes of Jamaica's successful pursuit of a dependent development economic strategy in the 1950s and 1960s, and that such challenges to core country economic interests in foreign policy are an inherent feature of dependence which is likely to appear in other cases of successful dependent development.

Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite's Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)

Abstract: Levite's attack on dominant theories of strategic surprise raises significant questions and deserves attention as the first serious revisionist attempt. It fails because his methodology narrows the issue artificially, excludes essential political variables, relies on faulty definitions and standards of comparison, and does not support the assumption that the analysis of success in wartime intelligence would apply to decisions in pre-war crises. The apparent academic rigor of the book, however, abets optimism in wider analytical debates about NATO's vulnerability to surprise, and whether the main problems for strategic stability are aggression and deterrence or accidental war and provocative mobilization. Different decisions in August 1914 and October 1962 illustrate why the fundamental dilemma between choices of avoiding surprise and avoiding war, which Levite ignores, cannot be resolved.

Intelligence and Strategic Surprises Revisited: A Response to Richard K. Betts's "Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy"

Abstract: The point of departure for Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (Levite, 1987) was a review of some twenty-five years of academic research into the surprise phenomenon. This review revealed that a remarkably broad consensus had emerged in the discipline regarding that phenomenon, pertaining most clearly to its ubiquity and high probability of occurence (i.e., inevitability) but also extending to its underlying causes. Studies reflecting this broad consensus were conveniently referred to by Betts as the “orthodox school,” whose origins can be traced back to Roberta Wohlstet-ter's pathbreaking study of Pearl Harbor (Wohlstetter, 1962). As Betts correctly points out, not only the classical studies of surprise but also most of the more recent ones belong to this “orthodox school.” This clearly is not the case with Intelligence and Strategic Surprises (ISS) , which Betts, in his comprehensive and insightful review of the book, classifies as the first member of the “revisionist school” of surprise. In his review, Betts dwells on the differences between the so-called “orthodox” and “revisionist” schools as well as on some specific features of ISS . Making ISS into a one-book “revisionist school” is flattering, if hardly justified.1 In addition, some of the differences Betts sees between the two “schools” are more imagined than real. Still, he does highlight some genuine disagreements between ISS and the orthodox school, although he usually attributes them to the failings of ISS . This response therefore seeks to clarify briefly the areas of agreement and disagreement between ISS and the orthodox school pertaining to methodology and theory as well as to policy implications.

Foreign Creditors and the Politics of Development in Australia and Argentina, 1880–1913

Abstract: Most comparative studies of Australia and Argentina argue that the economic effects of concentrated landholding impede development, and that Australia's greater development is thus attributable to landholders' political defeat at labor's hands. In contrast, this paper argues first that Australian largeholders were primarily destroyed by their creditors, not labor; and second that Argentina and Australian landholders behaved like productive capitalists, not rentiers. Landholders' political behavior, not their economic behavior, affected the later development of agriculture and industry, for large landholders did make productivity-enhancing investments. But in Australia, landholders' political weakness allowed investment markets to be distorted in favor of industry, accelerating industrial development. The Australian and Argentine experiences suggest that a balance of market-led and market-distorting policies are needed to resolve the current Third World debt crisis.

2 x 2 Games of Commitment in World Politics

Abstract: This note expands on a recent article in International Studies Quarterly by Maoz and Felsenthal (1987) that discusses self-binding commitment by actors in three different 2×2 games. I augment their work by adding nine more 2×2 games in which self-binding commitment can be beneficial. In the three games presented by Maoz and Felsenthal, only one party has an incentive to make a self-binding commitment, that commitment is to a dominated strategy, and the other party benefits from the commitment as well. In other situations, however, each of these three characteristics of the commitment tactic can be different. In addition, in nine of the twelve games of commitment, deadlock danger arises in which both players seek to be the only one to establish a self-binding commitment, but if both do so, both are worse off than in the absence of any commitment. Examining the incentives and disincentives to commit oneself in various situations is vital to understanding this important bargaining tactic.