Showing papers in "Journal of Conflict Resolution in 2009"
TL;DR: The authors recast civil war in a dyadic perspective, and consider how nonstate actor attributes and their relationship to the state influence conflict dynamics, finding support for many of their conjectures.
Abstract: Theories of conflict emphasize dyadic interaction, yet existing empirical studies of civil war focus largely on state attributes and pay little attention to nonstate antagonists. We recast civil war in a dyadic perspective, and consider how nonstate actor attributes and their relationship to the state influence conflict dynamics. We argue that strong rebels, who pose a military challenge to the government, are likely to lead to short wars and concessions. Conflicts where rebels seem weak can become prolonged if rebels can operate in the periphery so as to defy a government victory yet are not strong enough to extract concessions. Conflicts should be shorter when potential insurgents can rely on alternative political means to violence. We examine these hypotheses in a dyadic analysis of civil war duration and outcomes, using new data on nonstate actors and conflict attributes, finding support for many of our conjectures.
582 citations
TL;DR: This paper found that shelled and nonshelled villages experience a 24 percent reduction in post-treatment mean insurgent attacks relative to control villages and that commonly cited triggers for insurgent retaliation, including the lethality and destructiveness of indiscriminate violence, are either negatively correlated with insurgent attacks or statistically insignificant.
Abstract: Does a state's use of indiscriminate violence incite insurgent attacks? To date, most existing theories and empirical studies have concluded that such violence is highly counterproductive because it creates new grievances while forcing victims to seek security, if not safety, in rebel arms. This proposition is tested using Russian artillery fire in Chechnya (2000 to 2005) to estimate indiscriminate violence's effect on subsequent patterns of insurgent attacks across matched pairs of similar shelled and nonshelled villages. The findings are counterintuitive. Shelled villages experience a 24 percent reduction in posttreatment mean insurgent attacks relative to control villages. In addition, commonly cited “triggers” for insurgent retaliation, including the lethality and destructiveness of indiscriminate violence, are either negatively correlated with insurgent attacks or statistically insignificant.
461 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors show that geographic factors (such as location, terrain, and natural resources) interact with rebel fighting capacity and together play a crucial role in determining the duration of conflict.
Abstract: Why do some armed civil conflicts last longer than others? Drawing on a contest success function model, we show that geographic factors (such as location, terrain, and natural resources) interact with rebel fighting capacity and together play a crucial role in determining the duration of conflict. Using precisely dated duration data in event history models and geographic data for the conflict location, we find that conflicts located at considerable distance from the main government stronghold, along remote international borders and in regions with valuable minerals last substantially longer. In addition, we find that rebel military capacity in its own right increases the prospects of a civil conflict ending within a short time period. Our findings imply that the distances an army must travel to project power, rebel fighting capacity, and characteristics of conflict region affect how a civil war is fought and who will prevail.
323 citations
TL;DR: Findings provide solid evidence and a mechanism for the hypothesis that terrorism introduces nondemocratic attitudes threatening minority rights and suggest that psychological distress plays an important role in political decision making and should be incorporated in models drawing upon political psychology.
Abstract: Does exposure to terrorism lead to hostility toward minorities? Drawing on theories from clinical and social psychology, we propose a stress-based model of political extremism in which psychological distress—which is largely overlooked in political scholarship—and threat perceptions mediate the relationship between exposure to terrorism and attitudes toward minorities. To test the model, a representative sample of 469 Israeli Jewish respondents was interviewed on three occasions at six-month intervals. Structural Equation Modeling indicated that exposure to terrorism predicted psychological distress (t1), which predicted perceived threat from Palestinian citizens of Israel (t2), which, in turn, predicted exclusionist attitudes toward Palestinian citizens of Israel (t3). These findings provide solid evidence and a mechanism for the hypothesis that terrorism introduces nondemocratic attitudes threatening minority rights. It suggests that psychological distress plays an important role in political decision making and should be incorporated in models drawing upon political psychology.
279 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate what it is about democracies that make them particularly vulnerable to terrorism from abroad and suggest that states that exhibit a certain type of foreign policy behavior, regardless of their regime type, are likely to attract transnational terrorism.
Abstract: This article takes a closer look at the relationship between democracy and transnational terrorism. It investigates what it is about democracies that make them particularly vulnerable to terrorism from abroad. The authors suggest that states that exhibit a certain type of foreign policy behavior, regardless of their regime type, are likely to attract transnational terrorism. States that are actively involved in international politics are likely to create resentment abroad and hence more likely to be the target of transnational terrorism than are states that pursue a more isolationist foreign policy. Democratic states are more likely to be targeted by transnational terrorist groups not because of their regime type per se but because of the type of foreign policy they tend to pursue. The empirical analysis provides support for the argument.
233 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors empirically examined how natural resources affect the severity of armed civil conflict and found that drug cultivation in the conflict area is associated with less severe conflicts but that gemstone mining and oil and gas production increase the severity.
Abstract: This article empirically examines how natural resources affect the severity of armed civil conflict. It finds that drug cultivation in the conflict area is associated with less severe conflicts but that gemstone mining and oil and gas in the conflict zone production increase the severity of conflicts. Most severe are secessionist conflicts in regions with hydrocarbon production. Interestingly, oil and gas production outside the conflict zones is related to less severe conflicts. Measured at the country level, none of the resource variables has an effect on conflict severity. These results have four implications. First, availability of natural resources affects the severity of armed civil conflict. Second, the location of resources is crucial to their impact on conflict. Third, the type of resource matters. Above all, it seems that natural resources affect conflict severity by altering incentives for both the rebel group and the state.
199 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigated the effect of group concentration on conflict and found that the effect is driven by the strategic advantages for group coordination that the spatial proximity of group members provides.
Abstract: The literature suggests that geographically concentrated groups face a higher likelihood of conflict. While this finding seems to be commonly accepted, there is no clear consensus that explains why this is the case. Two competing mechanisms have been proposed: first, a motivation-driven mechanism, where the existence of a well-defined group territory makes the group more likely to fight for it; and second, an opportunity-driven link, where concentration facilitates group coordination for collective action. This article aims to resolve this controversy by developing new settlement pattern indicators based on Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data. Using conflict data at the level of ethnic groups, I show that there is clear evidence in favor of the opportunity mechanism. Thus, the effect of group concentration on conflict seems to be driven by the strategic advantages for group coordination that the spatial proximity of group members provides.
193 citations
TL;DR: The authors examined the link between subnational poverty and the location of civil war events, using the ACLED dataset, which breaks internal conflicts down to individual events at the local level, and found that sub-national poverty is associated with civil war.
Abstract: This article examines the link between subnational poverty and the location of civil war events. Drawing on the ACLED dataset, which breaks internal conflicts down to individual events at the local...
187 citations
TL;DR: The authors review the problems arising from excessive aggregation in studies of civil war, and outline how disaggregation promises to provide better insights into the causes and dynamics of civil wars, using the articles in this special issue as examples.
Abstract: We introduce the contributions to this special issue on “Disaggregating Civil War.” We review the problems arising from excessive aggregation in studies of civil war, and outline how disaggregation promises to provide better insights into the causes and dynamics of civil wars, using the articles in this special issue as examples. We comment on the issue of the appropriate level of disaggregation, lessons learned from these articles, and issues for further research.
170 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, a new dataset of geo-referenced politically relevant ethnic groups, covering the entire world during the period from 1951 through 2005, was constructed and analyzed, showing that the conflict probability of marginalized groups increases with the demographic power balance compared to the group(s) in power.
Abstract: Previous quantitative research on ethnic civil war relies on macro-level proxies in an attempt to specify the conditions under which ethnic minorities rebel. Going beyond an exclusive focus on minorities, the present study employs Geographic Information Systems (GIS) as a way to model ethnic center—periphery dyads that confront governments with excluded groups. We construct and analyze a new dataset of geo-referenced politically relevant ethnic groups, covering the entire world during the period from 1951 through 2005. Our results show that the conflict probability of marginalized groups increases with the demographic power balance compared to the group(s) in power. Furthermore, the risk of conflict increases with the distance from the group to the capital, and the roughness of the terrain in the group's settlement area. We also find that while the results for demographic group strength hold for all ethnic civil wars, the geographic factors apply for territorial ethnic conflicts only.
149 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that countries provide civil nuclear assistance for three strategic reasons: to strengthen their allies and alliances, strengthen their relationship with enemies of enemies, and to strengthen existing democracies and bilateral relationships with these countries (if the supplier is also a democracy).
Abstract: When and why do states transfer nuclear technology, materials, and knowledge to other states for peaceful purposes? This question is important given the recent finding that countries receiving nuclear aid are more likely to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons. I argue that countries provide civil nuclear assistance for three strategic reasons: to strengthen their allies and alliances, to strengthen their relationship with enemies of enemies, and to strengthen existing democracies and bilateral relationships with these countries (if the supplier is also a democracy). I test these arguments using statistical analysis and a new data set on more than 2,000 bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreements signed between 1950 and 2000. The findings offer robust empirical support for my argument and very little support for the competing explanation rooted in norms and nonproliferation. This article enhances scholarly understanding of how and why nuclear weapons spread and encourages further research on the suppl...
TL;DR: In this article, a simple logic of the technical and strategic advantages that potential nuclear proliferators can gain by importing nuclear materials and technology from more advanced nuclear states is presented. But the authors do not consider the effect of sensitive nuclear transfers on nuclear proliferation.
Abstract: Why do nuclear weapons spread? Using new data on sensitive nuclear transfers, this article analyzes the determinants of nuclear proliferation. The author first describes a simple logic of the technical and strategic advantages that potential nuclear proliferators can gain by importing nuclear materials and technology from more advanced nuclear states. The author then shows that sensitive nuclear transfers are an important determinant of nuclear proliferation. In broader terms, the author find strong support for a supply-side approach to nuclear proliferation. States that are better able to produce nuclear weapons, due to either international assistance or domestic capacity, are more likely to do so.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose a new typology for insurgent groups to explain why in such remarkably similar conflicts, Sri Lanka and Aceh, the impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was so different.
Abstract: In this article we propose a new typology for insurgent groups to explain why in such remarkably similar conflicts—Sri Lanka and Aceh—the impact of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was so different. We argue that two principal factors shape all rebel groups by defining their incentive structures: the efficiency of the return on investment of the primary source(s) of support and the group's territorial objectives. The former factor is especially strong in explaining the different choices made by the LTTE and GAM. In Sri Lanka, the availability of lucrative resources outside the country has made the LTTE leadership inimical to compromise, threatened by relief aid, and less reliant on the local population. Lacking access to such high-return funding sources, GAM on the other hand was more closely linked to the needs of the local population and found greater value in both outside aid and a comprehensive settlement.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the effect of biased versus neutral mediation on the content of peace agreements and concluded that neutral mediators, who are engaged primarily because of their interest to end the war, will have incentives to hasten the reaching of an agreement to the expense of its quality.
Abstract: This study examines the effect of biased versus neutral mediation on the content of peace agreements. The author argues that neutral mediators, who are engaged primarily because of their interest to end the war, will have incentives to hasten the reaching of an agreement to the expense of its quality. By contrast, biased mediators, seeking to protect their proteges, will take care to ensure that there are stipulations in an agreement guaranteeing the interest of “their” side or use their particular access and leverage to make their side agree to costly concessions. Biased mediation processes are therefore more likely than neutral mediation processes to lead to elaborated institutional arrangements that are generally considered conducive to democracy and durable peace, such as power sharing, third-party security guarantees, and justice provisions. Empirical analysis, covering the 1989—2004 period and building on data from 124 peace agreements, supports these claims.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors quantitatively evaluate the nuclear peace hypothesis and find that while nuclear weapons promote strategic stability, they simultaneously allow for more risk-taking in lower intensity disputes.
Abstract: Do nuclear weapons reduce the probability of war? This article quantitatively evaluates the nuclear peace hypothesis. The results indicate that the impact of nuclear weapons is more complicated than is conventionally appreciated. Both proliferation optimists and pessimists find confirmation of some of their key claims. When a nuclear asymmetry exists between two states, there is a greater chance of militarized disputes and war. In contrast, when there is symmetry and both states possess nuclear weapons, then the odds of war precipitously drop. When combined, these findings provide support for the existence of the stability—instability paradox. Evidence suggests that while nuclear weapons promote strategic stability, they simultaneously allow for more risk-taking in lower intensity disputes.
TL;DR: A recent wave of scholarly literature has argued forcibly that the European Union's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) represents an attempt on the part of the EU to balance against the United States as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: A recent wave of scholarly literature has argued forcibly that the European Union’s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) represents an attempt on the part of the EU to “balance” against the United States. According to such analyses, the EU is reacting to American global preeminence by building up its military capacities to enhance its own ability to play a significant, autonomous role in international affairs. This article takes issue with such claims. It points, first, to significant theoretical and methodological shortcomings inherent in the work of the “soft balancers.” Second, and more fundamentally, it subjects this work to careful empirical scrutiny and illustrates how the soft balancers have fundamentally misunderstood ESDP. Finally, it illustrates how such misinterpretations result from a failure to appreciate the profound impact that institutional structures wield over substantive outcomes in international security affairs.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a strategic approach to nuclear Proliferation with the goal of reducing the number of nuclear arsenals in the world and the amount of nuclear material to be produced.
Abstract: Authors’ Note: We are grateful for generous financial support from the Department of Political Science at the University of California at San Diego, the Government Department at Georgetown University, the University of California’s Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, and the Project on Managing the Atom and the International Security Program both at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. Journal of Conflict Resolution Volume 53 Number 2 April 2009 151-160 © 2009 SAGe Publications 10.1177/0022002708330039 http://jcr.sagepub.com hosted at http://online.sagepub.com A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation
TL;DR: This article found that nuclear weapons increase diplomatic status without much affecting whether states fight, and that nuclear status is bound to influence the distribution of influence since states fashion their own bargains, and nuclear status reflects existing tensions, biasing upward the apparent impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict.
Abstract: Contrasting claims about the consequences of nuclear weapons rely on different interpretations about how leaders respond to risk, uncertainty, and the balance of power. Nuclear optimists use deterrence theory to argue that proliferation can promote stability and inhibit the use of force. Pessimists argue that proliferation precipitates nuclear hubris, accident, or anger that heightens the risk of war. It is also possible that nuclear weapons have no net effect on dispute propensity. Since states fashion their own bargains, nuclear status is bound to influence the distribution of influence. Proliferation also reflects existing tensions, biasing upward the apparent impact of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict. Instrumenting for the decision to proliferate, the authors find that nuclear weapons increase diplomatic status without much affecting whether states fight.
TL;DR: The authors reviewed new quantitative research on nuclear proliferation, noting improved analysis and lingering problems, highlighting the 1999 Kargil war to explore dangers of relying on stock data sets and the need for research on statistical outliers.
Abstract: Studies of nuclear proliferation share five serious problems First, nuclear programs' initiation and completion dates are ambiguous and difficult to code, but findings are rarely subjected to sufficient robustness tests using alternative codings Second, independent variables overlook important factors such as prestige and bureaucratic power and often use poor proxies for concepts such as the nonproliferation regime Third, methodologies and data sets should be tightly coupled to empirical questions but are instead often chosen for convenience Fourth, some findings provide insights already known or believed to be true Fifth, findings can ignore or gloss over data crucial for policy making and wider debates This article reviews new quantitative research on nuclear proliferation, noting improved analysis and lingering problems It highlights the 1999 Kargil war to explore dangers of relying on stock data sets and the need for research on statistical outliers It concludes with a future research agenda a
TL;DR: In this article, the authors argue that the inability of politicians to commit credibly to postconflict peace inhibits investment and, hence, slows recovery, and they test this framework with duration analysis of an original data set of economic recovery, with two key results.
Abstract: Increasingly, scholars studying civil conflicts believe that the pace of postconflict economic recovery is crucial to a return to peaceful politics. But why do some countries' economies recover more quickly than others'? The authors argue that the inability of politicians to commit credibly to postconflict peace inhibits investment and, hence, slows recovery. In turn, the ability of political actors to eschew further violence credibly depends on postconflict political institutions. The authors test this framework with duration analysis of an original data set of economic recovery, with two key results. First, they find that postconflict democratization retards recovery. Second, outright military victory sets the stage for a longer peace than negotiated settlements do. This research deepens the understanding of the bases of economic recovery and conflict recidivism in postconflict countries and points to future research that can augment this knowledge further still.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate whether the length of time states have nuclear weapons influences their behavior and the behavior of opponents in militarized disputes, and they show that while acquiring nuclear weapons makes states significantly more likely to reciprocate militarized challenges and have their challenges reciprocated, over time, the effect reverses.
Abstract: This article evaluates whether the length of time states have nuclear weapons influences their behavior and the behavior of opponents in militarized disputes. Using multiple statistical models and illustrative cases, the article shows that, while acquiring nuclear weapons makes states significantly more likely to reciprocate militarized challenges and have their challenges reciprocated, over time, the effect reverses. In contrast to a static understanding of nuclear weapons, this variation in outcomes over time highlights the difficulties presented by nuclear proliferation.
TL;DR: This article examined the relationship between ethnic polarization and civil war by using an agent-based computational model and found that when saliency is fixed, conflict onset is twice as high at low levels of polarization compared to when salience is permitted to vary across individuals as a function of relative income.
Abstract: This article examines how the relationship between ethnic polarization and civil war could be moderated by different degrees of ethnic salience. Using an agent-based computational model, we analyze the polarization–conflict relationship when ethnic salience is ‘‘fixed’’—high for every member of two nominally rival ethnic groups— and ‘‘variable’’—permitted to vary across individuals as a function of relative income. We find that (1) when salience is fixed, conflict onset is twice as high at low levels of polarization compared to when salience is permitted to vary, with the difference decreasing at high levels of polarization; (2) the relationship between conflict onset and the range over which we calculate variable salience is positive and robust for low and moderate levels of polarization; (3) the relationship between polarization and conflict onset is robust even under minority domination, if one holds salience fixed; and (4) holding ethnic salience fixed effectively amplifies the negative effect of polarization on economic performance.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors assess crisis outcomes from 1945 to 2000 using the International Crisis Behavior data set and find that nuclear actors are more likely to prevail when facing a non-nuclear state.
Abstract: Nuclear weapons' effects on an actor's success in coercive diplomacy are in part a function of how nuclear weapons change the perceived costs of conflict. The authors argue that states can improve their allotment of a good or convince an opponent to back down and have shorter crises if their opponents have greater expected costs of crisis. Noting that nuclear weapons increase the costs of full-escalation scenarios but decrease their probability, it is uncertain what impact nuclear weapons should have on expected costs of conflict. The authors assess crisis outcomes from 1945 to 2000 using the International Crisis Behavior data set. The evidence confirms that nuclear actors are more likely to prevail when facing a nonnuclear state. The expected duration of crisis in such asymmetric directed dyads is substantially smaller than the duration of crisis for actors in nonnuclear dyads. Nuclear actors in asymmetric dyads are also more likely to prevail than states in symmetric nuclear dyads.
TL;DR: The authors built on past framing research to probe the impact of casualty frames on the public's willingness to expend additional "blood and treasure" in an ongoing war, and found that the rhetoric of “sunk co...
Abstract: This article builds on past framing research to probe the impact of casualty frames on the public’s willingness to expend additional “blood and treasure” in an ongoing war. The rhetoric of “sunk co...
TL;DR: This article investigated the psychological effects of a set of societal beliefs termed the ethos of conflict, which develops in the context of intractable conflict, as, for example, the Israeli-Arab conflict.
Abstract: This study investigates the psychological effects of a set of societal beliefs termed the ethos of conflict, which develops in the context of intractable conflict—as, for example, the Israeli—Arab conflict. The premise was that the ethos of conflict constitutes a type of ideology that serves as a powerful prism through which individuals perceive the reality of an intractable conflict. The study's findings confirmed this premise, showing that participants with a high level of ethos of conflict tended to perceive photos depicting encounters between Jews and Palestinians differently than did those with a low level of ethos of conflict. The former tended to perceive the Palestinians as more aggressive, to blame them more for such attributed aggressiveness, and to explain this perceived aggressiveness more in terms of internal and stable causes. They also tended to stereotype Palestinians more negatively and Jews more positively.
TL;DR: Obermeyer, Murray, and Gakidou as mentioned in this paper examined estimates of wartime fatalities from injuries for thirteen countries and found that the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) estimates are too low by a factor of three.
Abstract: In a much-cited recent article, Obermeyer, Murray, and Gakidou (2008a) examine estimates of wartime fatalities from injuries for thirteen countries. Their analysis poses a major challenge to the battle-death estimating methodology widely used by conflict researchers, engages with the controversy over whether war deaths have been increasing or decreasing in recent decades, and takes the debate over different approaches to battle-death estimation to a new level. In making their assessments, the authors compare war death reports extracted from World Health Organization (WHO) sibling survey data with the battle-death estimates for the same countries from the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). The analysis that leads to these conclusions is not compelling, however. Thus, while the authors argue that the PRIO estimates are too low by a factor of three, their comparison fails to compare like with like. Their assertion that there is “no evidence” to support the PRIO finding that war deaths have ...
TL;DR: This article found that exposure to information about losses inherent in continuing the conflict induces high willingness to acquire new information about possible solutions to the conflict, higher willingness to reevaluate current positions about it, and more support for compromises than the exposure to neutral information or to information of neutral information.
Abstract: One of the most important psychological barriers to conflict resolution is the rigid structure of the sociopsychological repertoire that evolves in societies immersed in intractable conflict. This article examines ways to overcome the rigidity of this repertoire in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Specifically, in line with the prospect theory, the authors assumed that elicitation of beliefs about losses stemming from the continuing conflict may bring about a process of “unfreezing.” To test this assumption, an exploratory study with a national sample of the Israeli-Jewish population and two subsequent experimental studies were conducted. The results demonstrated that exposure to information about losses inherent in continuing the conflict induces higher willingness to acquire new information about possible solutions to the conflict, higher willingness to reevaluate current positions about it, and more support for compromises than the exposure to neutral information or to information about...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present alternative estimates for the demand for UN and non-UN peacekeeping, using three-way fixed-effects models, which account for the country, year, and conflict region, provide the best estimates.
Abstract: This article presents alternative estimates for the demand for UN and non-UN peacekeeping. Generally, three-way fixed-effects models, which account for the country, year, and conflict region, provide the best estimates. The demand for UN peacekeeping is primarily influenced by the contributions of other nations (i.e., spillins), with spillin elasticity not significantly different from 1. For non-UN peacekeeping, both spillins and country-specific interests in the conflict region influence contributions. These peacekeepers’ interests include trade and FDI concerns, along with proximity to the conflict. Peacekeeping missions appear partitioned: UN missions for global public benefits and non-UN missions for peacekeeper-specific benefits.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors point out that targets sometimes make concessions when third parties offer assistance, and that unreliable third parties may explain deterrence failure in the case of the Iran nuclear deal.
Abstract: Why do targets sometimes make concessions when third parties offer assistance? Both the extended deterrence and alliance literatures point to unreliable third parties to explain deterrence failure ...
TL;DR: In this article, the authors demonstrate that domestic coalition shifts are a critical path to peace, using survival analysis techniques on Bennett and Stam's (1996) war-level data set of wars (1862-1990) and a new belligerent-level dataset (1945-2006).
Abstract: The authors’ theory contributes an alternative domestic politics pathway to traditional bargaining models of war termination. In bargaining models, the rational updating process that produces an overlapping bargaining space can develop a significant lag, which extends the war beyond a logical ending point. The authors posit that a change in the domestic governing coalition is often necessary to kick-start this updating process once it has become bogged down through preference, information, and entrapment obstacles. The authors demonstrate that domestic coalition shifts are a critical path to peace, using survival analysis techniques on Bennett and Stam’s (1996) war-level data set of wars (1862-1990) and a new belligerent-level data set of wars (1945-2006). These tests show that because war policies can become institutionalized over time, there is a very strong link between coalition shifts and war termination.