Showing papers in "Journal of Mathematical Economics in 1985"

TL;DR: In this paper, the generic existence of general equilibria in incomplete markets was shown for fixed securities under smooth preference assumptions, except for an exceptional set of endowments and securities, a closed set of measure zero.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors propose an example of the contrary: every system of first order partial differential equations of a certain type can be solved by use of an economics principle, and for the case of a single equation their approach is in some sense dual to the usual optimal control method.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a set of m players, m ≧ 3, and Γ is the set of all games without side payments that have a non-empty core, i.e., nonemptiness, individual rationality, reduced game, and converse reduced game.

TL;DR: In this article, it is proved that fair divisions exist in a Pareto optimal and equitable fashion. But the authors do not consider the case where every agent subjectively feels himself to be better off than any one of the others.

TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that there exists a probability measure compatible with a total preorder on a Boolean algebra, if and only if, the Boolean algebra is well bounded, weakly Archimedean, and perfectly separable, this last condition substituting for Villegas' monotone condition used in Chateauneuf and Jaffray.

TL;DR: In this paper, a class of stochastic orders on the set of bivariate distribution functions is defined, and a family of utility functions, coherent with each of the stochastically orders previously defined, is determined.

TL;DR: In this article, land is modelled explicitly as a subset of the plane with anything immobile, from flowers and trees to houses, embedded in it, and the main result demonstrates the existence of prices in L 1 and a partition of land among consumers so that the land market clears.

TL;DR: In this article, the continuity of social choice is reformulated in terms of the quotient topology on profiles of individual preferences induced by the equivalence class corresponding to anonymity, and it is shown that Chichilnisky's impossibility continues to hold.

TL;DR: In this article, rational expectations equilibria are obtained by applying a fixed point argument to state-dependent excess demand functions, which leads to markets approximately clear in a strong sense.

TL;DR: In this article, a model of a dynamic exchange economy is presented, where each consumer is characterized by a feasible set and by an instantaneous demand function, that depends on the price vector, time, and the commodity holding.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the asymptotic characteristics of the relations between the Shapley value and the core of replicated production economies with divisible and indivisible inputs.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors give a general existence theorem for equilibria in social systems with coordination, extending Vind's result, and show that the existence theorem holds for any social system with coordination.

TL;DR: In this article, the Debreu result guaranteeing full measure for the economies with stable and finite number of equilibria is generalized using concepts of measure zero in Banach spaces.

TL;DR: In this paper, a necessary and sufficient condition for consistent choice in terms of revealed preferences is provided. But this condition requires that the revealed preferences satisfy the independence axiom from expected utility theory.

TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that the way in which an allocation is represented (net trades, final allocation, etc.) can affect the design of any realizing mechanism or incentive compatible system, and that a poor choice of representation may impose superfluous conditions and demands upon the realizing mechanism.

TL;DR: In this paper, a characterization of additively separable functions whose quasi concave closure also is additive separable is given, and a characterization for functions whose quasiconvex closure is additive separation is given.