Showing papers in "Mathematical Social Sciences in 1986"

TL;DR: The game theory for the social sciences is well known book in the world, of course many people will try to own it as mentioned in this paper. But why should they wait for some days to get or receive the book that you order? Why should you take it if you can get the faster one?

TL;DR: In this article, a new model of a cooperative game with a continuum of players is developed, in which only finite coalitions -one containing only finite numbers of players -are permitted to form.

TL;DR: Several alternative notions of exact choice sets generated by a fuzzy preference ordering are discussed and corresponding notions of rationalizability of exact choices in terms of fuzzy preference orderings are discussed.

TL;DR: In this article, it was proved that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and the proof made a strong use of reduced games of cooperative games without side payments.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the dynamical structure of various linear and nonlinear theories of economic cycles and demonstrate the existence of a limit cycle by utilizing the Poincare´-Bendixson theorem.

TL;DR: In this article, the scale type of the dependent variable is replaced by the assumption that a certain statement involving the scale is meaningful, which leads to a general theory of the relation between the scale of a scale and the meaningfulness of statements involving it.

TL;DR: In this paper, the concept of the core of a game is introduced by considering the least convex ǫ-tax game, where the imposed tax is proportional to the relative reward to the coalition for its formation from the individuals.

TL;DR: In this paper, the voting problem is reduced to an analysis of three kinds of operator classes and their mutual relations, and the functional analogues well known in the theory of Arrow's paradox results are established.

TL;DR: In this article, a proof exactly analogous to Nash's proof for the existence of equilibria in finite non-cooperative games with von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities was presented.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors evaluate the optimality of four classes of decision rules: the expert rule, the balanced expert rules, the simple majority rule, and the restricted simple majority rules.

TL;DR: In this article, the main axiom of displayed envy-freeness is shown to be a strong support for the Vickrey-rules in auctions and public tenders, and it is shown that the actually applied rules (e.g. the rules of public tender in the Federal Republic of Germany) do often violate these rules.

TL;DR: In this paper, the existence of noncooperative equilibria is established and the possibility that the activity of markets will depend upon the physical properties of a commodity which might serve as a money is considered.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors re-examine the relationship between the expected value of the Leontief inverse, ( I - A ) −1, and its true value when A is a stochastic input-output matrix.

TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that under the single transferable vote the probability of occurence of a no-show paradox is very high in situations where the outcome under the one-dimensional left-right voting behavior differs from that under plurality.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that the 9I canonical decomposition can be expressed as n-ary (relative) interactions between n-irreducible terms associated with the projective intervals of P (F ).

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate the possibility of implementing social choice functions via a refinement of maximin behavior, and propose a necessary condition, as well as a set of sufficient conditions for a social choice function to be implemented.

TL;DR: In this article, the Kemeny and Snell model of ordinal ranking is extended to include a preference strength component, which is accomplished by expanding the ranking space to allow for the incorporation of dummy objects in the object listing.

TL;DR: In this paper, it is shown that the capacity of a committee is determined by the combinatorial structure of the committee, and the general criteria are simplified to a simple arithmetical formula for symmetric committees.

TL;DR: In this article, an explicit formula for all linear symmetric values is established and is then used to show that, in the definition of the Shapley value, the efficiency and dummy axioms may be replaced by a projection axiom, a monotonicity axiom and Roth's (1977) strategic risk neutrality axiom.

TL;DR: The term "reconstructability analysis" (RA) has evolved as a generic term for all aspects of a methodology whose aim is to deal with the various problems associated with the relationship between systems perceived as wholes and their various subsystems (parts of the wholes) as discussed by the authors.

TL;DR: In this article, the compatibility between a group of axioms characterizing rational behavior under complete ignorance and the independence axiom was studied, and it was shown that these requirements are indeed compatible, but conjointly imply that the decision-maker only exhibits zones of either pure optimism or pure pessimism or indecisive patterns of behavior.

TL;DR: Criteria for choosing among several competing measures, the issue of relative predictive stringency, estimation bias and stability, and optimization procedures for fitting a priori predictions to data are explored.

TL;DR: In this paper, a profit-responsive selection mechanism for a dynamic model of competition among techniques is defined for a class of symmetrie economic environments, and an auxiliary function is presented whose maxima correspond to the stable equilibria of the original dynamic system.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors extend early results of Pfaltz to obtain an axiomatic characterization of a consensus function based on an iterated maximal lower bound operator, and relate this function to a recent consensus proposal of Bonacich.

TL;DR: In this paper, a short proof of Thon's characterization of the Gini index is given, and the proof is used to show that Thon is correct. But this proof is limited.

TL;DR: It is shown that the self-regulating causal recursion underlying population dynamics defines a reducibly discontinuous dynamical system, and that the effects of discontinuity are essential in the survival or destruction of ecosystems.

TL;DR: In this article, the relationship between dynamic programming and strategic market games is developed and applied to problems in money, banking and insurance, and problems are noted with the concept of perfect equilibrium.

TL;DR: The authors propose a definition for lexicographic probability relations and discuss the question, under what conditions is a probability relation lexico-geographic. But they do not define a lexicon.

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider a game model of a trade of one good between two firms, where both players first set prices and then choose quantities to be traded at the other player's price.