Showing papers in "Mathematical Social Sciences in 2004"

TL;DR: It is shown that optimal linear taxes on labor income with quasilinear preferences between income and labor and social states based on an advantage function representing reference preferences are computed.

TL;DR: The minimal number of parallel cuts required to divide a cake into n pieces is n-1, and a new 3- person procedure is given that produces an envy- free division, whereby each person thinks he or she receives at least a tied- for- largest piece.

TL;DR: It is conjecture that the limit theorem holds, under rather general conditions, for large classes of variously defined WVGs, other values of the quota, and other measures of voting power.

TL;DR: This paper provides a new characterization of the Talmud rule by means of a new property, called securement, that says that any agent holding a feasible claim will get at least one of her claim.

TL;DR: A whole class of estimators (clockwise repeated median estimators or CRM) for the simple regression model that are immune to strategic manipulation by the agents generating the data are introduced.

TL;DR: The proposed solution constitutes a Nash solution within as well as across groups where groups of individuals bargain with each other, and may be worse off bargaining as a member of a group than bargaining alone in a pure-bargaining situation.

TL;DR: An algorithm to compute the full set of many-to-many stable matchings when agents have substitutable preferences corresponding to a new preference profile, which is obtained after modifying the preferences of a previously identified sequence of firms is proposed.

TL;DR: A simple stochastic model of social network formation by the process of reinforcement learning with discounting of the past finds that small, stable cliques are formed in the limit, for any value of the discounting parameter.

TL;DR: In this article, the classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for finding the constrained egalitarian solution for convex crisp games is adjusted to provide the egalitarian solution of a convex fuzzy game.

TL;DR: It is shown that, for any faithful scoring rule, when the number of participating agents n tends to infinity, the probability that a random profile will be manipulable for a coalition of size Cn α, with 0≤ α C constant, is of order O (1/ n 1/2− α ).

TL;DR: New distribution sensitive measures of literacy are constructed, by extending the analysis along the lines of the measure proposed by Basu and Foster, where the externality depends on the number of literates-per-illiterate in a household.

TL;DR: A binary comparison of two preference aggregation rules, the Borda rule and Dodgson's rule, is provided to avoid the problem of voting cycles and it will be shown that for certain lists of individual preferences the rankings derived from the BordA rule and Dodgers' rule are antagonistic.

TL;DR: By exploiting the Elevator Lemma, it is shown that the constrained equal awards rule is the only rule satisfying exemption, composition down, and converse consistency.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors characterize the set of rules satisfying additivity on the estate and the claims in bankruptcy problems and other related problems and provide new characterizations of the well-known rules based on the principles of equal award, equal loss, and proportionality.

TL;DR: It is shown which properties of implicational systems and overhanging relations are general, and which are specific to hierarchical structures, and characterize canonical implication bases of hierarchies and obtain a similar result for overhangings.

TL;DR: A characterization of the different models of information in the literature in terms of Blackwell's theorem is provided, where a decisionmaker prefers less information to more because the use of σ-algebras as the informational content of a signal is inadequate.

TL;DR: In this article, a generalization of the Mobius inverse and a related tractable formula for the Choquet integral were derived for σ-continuous belief functions on monotone games defined on the set P (N ) of the subsets of N.

TL;DR: It is shown that a simple version of variation aversion, jointly with a myopia axiom allows to derive in an infinite setting a meaningful expression for evaluating income streams.

TL;DR: It turns out that the transformations have to be linear: Only the relative, absolute, and intermediate view and a novel one—reference-point inequality—are coherent.

TL;DR: If one wishes to maximize the total Banzhaf power of the voters and if the authors assume that the at- large representatives will vote as a bloc, then the number of at-large representatives should be roughly the square root of the total number of legislators.

TL;DR: The impact of voters' indifference on the likelihood that majority criterion and scoring rules agree in three candidate elections is considered and it is found that the likelihood of paradoxes decreases when the voters are allowed to report indifference.

TL;DR: This paper demonstrates a similar relation between measures of poverty and downside risk, respectively, and enables those interested in measuring the downside risk of distributions to build upon the wealth of literature on poverty measurement when looking for suitable indices.

TL;DR: An axiomatic characterization of Bayes' Rule that is widely used for updating beliefs is provided, which provides a set of axioms that characterizes Baye's Rule, including Path Independence.

TL;DR: It is proved that the ex ante incentive compatible core and the (interim) incentive compatible coarse core of the matching game are both non-empty.

TL;DR: Two characterizations of a mechanism based on the Dutta-Ray egalitarian solution in the context of a model of provision of a binary good with submodular costs are provided.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors define uniform α -spreads, which are global changes in the income distribution, and give necessary and sufficient conditions for an expected utility maximizer to respect the principle of transfers and to be favorable to uniform α-spreads.

TL;DR: A “range notion” is introduced, which intuitively represents the egalitarianism of the Shapley–Shubik index, and an upper bound on this measure is obtained, and when it is achieved is characterized.

TL;DR: A mixed extension of a finite zero-sum two-player game and the function that assigns to each matrix game its value is characterized by a number of intuitive properties.

TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigated the algorithmic computability of simple games (voting games) and showed that games with a finite carrier are computable, games with both finite winning coalitions and cofinite losing coalitions violate any conceivable notion of anonymity, including finite anonymity and measure-based anonymity.

TL;DR: Formal aspects like boundedness, decomposition, and the interplay between consistency of a surmise relation and the attainment of the maximum value of CA(≤, D ) are investigated and Mathematical reasons for failed, however, heuristically plausible, properties are presented.