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Showing papers in "Psychological Review in 1985"


Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: In this chapter a theory of motivation and emotion developed from an attributional perspective is presented, suggesting that causal attributions have been prevalent throughout history and in disparate cultures and some attributions dominate causal thinking.
Abstract: In this chapter a theory of motivation and emotion developed from an attributional perspective is presented Before undertaking this central task, it might be beneficial to review the progression of the book In Chapter 1 it was suggested that causal attributions have been prevalent throughout history and in disparate cultures Studies reviewed in Chapter 2 revealed a large number of causal ascriptions within motivational domains, and different ascriptions in disparate domains Yet some attributions, particularly ability and effort in the achievement area, dominate causal thinking To compare and contrast causes such as ability and effort, their common denominators or shared properties were identified Three causal dimensions, examined in Chapter 3, are locus, stability, and controllability, with intentionality and globality as other possible causal properties As documented in Chapter 4, the perceived stability of a cause influences the subjective probability of success following a previous success or failure; causes perceived as enduring increase the certainty that the prior outcome will be repeated in the future And all the causal dimensions, as well as the outcome of an activity and specific causes, influence the emotions experienced after attainment or nonattainment of a goal The affects linked to causal dimensions include pride (with locus), hopelessness and resignation (with stability), and anger, gratitude, guilt, pity, and shame (with controllability)

6,982 citations


Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: It is proposed that concepts are coherent to the extent that they fit people's background knowledge or naive theories about the world and to structure the attributes that are internal to a concept.
Abstract: The question of what makes a concept coherent (what makes its members form a comprehensible class) has received a variety of answers. In this article we review accounts based on similarity, feature correlations, and various theories of categorization. We find that each theory provides an inadequate account of conceptual coherence (or no account at all) because none provides enough constraints on possible concepts. We propose that concepts are coherent to the extent that they fit people's background knowledge or naive theories about the world. These theories help to relate the concepts in a domain and to structure the attributes that are internal to a concept. Evidence of the influence of theories on various conceptual tasks is presented, and the possible importance of theories in cognitive development is discussed.

2,471 citations


Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: A real-time visual processing theory is used to analyse real and illusory contour formation, contour and brightness interactions, neon color spreading, complementary color induction, and filling-in of discounted illuminants and scotomas.
Abstract: A real-time visual processing theory is used to analyse real and illusory contour formation, contour and brightness interactions, neon color spreading, complementary color induction, and filling-in of discounted illuminants and scotomas The theory also physically interprets and generalizes Land's retinex theory These phenomena are traced to adaptive processes that overcome limitations of visual uptake to synthesize informative visual representations of the external world Two parallel contour sensitive processes interact to generate the theory's brightness, color, and form estimates A boundary contour process is sensitive to orientation and amount of contrast but not to direction of contrast in scenic edges It synthesizes boundaries sensitive to the global configuration of scenic elements A feature contour process is insensitive to orientation but sensitive to both amount of contrast and to direction of contrast in scenic edges It triggers a diffusive filling-in of featural quality within perceptual domains whose boundaries are determined by completed boundary contours The boundary contour process is hypothesized to include cortical interactions initiated by hypercolumns in Area 17 of the visual cortex The feature contour process is hypothesized to include cortical interactions initiated by the cytochrome oxydase staining blobs in Area 17 Relevant data from striate and prestriate visual cortex, including data that support two predictions, are reviewed Implications for other perceptual theories and axioms of geometry are discussed

995 citations


Journal Article•DOI•
David McNeill1•
TL;DR: This paper argued that gestures and speech are parts of the same psychological structure and share a computational stage, based on the very close temporal, semantic, pragmatic, pathological, and developmental parallels between speech and referential and discourse-oriented gestures.
Abstract: In this article I argue that gestures and speech are parts of the same psychological structure and share a computational stage. The argument is based on the very close temporal, semantic, pragmatic, pathological, and developmental parallels between speech and referential and discourse-oriented gestures. Most of the article consists of a description of these parallels. A concept that unites outer speech and gesture is the hypothesis of inner speech.

934 citations


Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: In this article, a model of how people make judgments under ambiguity in tasks where data come from a source of limited, but not exactly known reliability, is proposed, which assumes an anchoring-and-adjustment process in which data provides the anchor, and adjustments are made for what might have been.
Abstract: : Ambiguity results from having limited knowledge of the process that generates outcomes. It is argued that many real-world processes are perceived to be ambiguous; moreover, as Ellsberg demonstrated, this poses problems for theories of probability operationalized via choices amongst gambles. A descriptive model of how people make judgments under ambiguity in tasks where data come from a source of limited, but not exactly known reliability, is proposed. The model assumes an anchoring-and-adjustment process in which data provides the anchor, and adjustments are made for what might have been. The latter is modeled as the result of a mental simulation process that incorporates the unreliability of the source and one's attitude toward ambiguity in the circumstances. A two-parameter model of this process is shown to be consistent with: Keynes' idea of the weight of evidence, the non-additivity of complementary probabilities, current psychological theories of risk, and Ellsberg's original paradox. The model is tested in four experiments at both the individual and group levels. In experiments 1-3, the model is shown to predict judgments quite well; in experiment 4, the inference model is shown to predict choices between gambles. The results and model are then discussed with respect to the importance of ambiguity in assessing perceived uncertainty; the use of cognitive strategies in judgments under ambiguity; the role of ambiguity in risky choice; and extensions of the model. (Author)

818 citations



Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: This paper provides a detailed theoretical account of the mental rotation of individuals of low and high spatial ability as they solve problems taken from psychometric tests as two related computer simulation models that not only solve the problems, but also match the response times for the two groups.
Abstract: : Strategic differences in spatial tasks can be explained in terms of different cognitive coordinate systems that subjects adopt. The strategy of mental rotation (of the type used in most mental rotation experiments and in some psychometric tests of spatial ability) uses a coordinate system defined by the standard axes of our visual world (i.e. horizontal, vertical, and depth axes). Within this strategy, rotations are performed around one or more of the standard axes. The paper provides a detailed theoretical account of the mental rotation of individuals of low and high spatial ability as they solve problems taken from psychometric tests. The theory is instantiated as two related computer simulation models that not only solve the problems, but also match the response times for the two groups. The simulation models contain modularized units of procedural knowledge called productions, that select and execute the appropriate actions at each knowledge state. Small localized differences between the two models simulate the large quantitative and qualitative differences between the two groups of subjects.

619 citations


Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: In this article, the existence of class variables in personality has been examined and the implications for conceptualizing and investigating the nature and origins of personality are discussed. But, as stated by the authors, "the arguments that generated it, and those that uphold it are applicable to class variables as they often have been explicated, in phenetic terms; by contrast, genetically explicated class variables are not vulnerable to these arguments."
Abstract: In principle, units of personality may be of two varieties: dimensional variables, which involve continuously distributed differences in degree, and class variables, which involve discretely distributed differences in kind. There exists, however, a prevailing and rarely questioned assumption that the units of personality are continuous dimensions and an accompanying prejudice against class variables. We examine this prejudice, the arguments that generated it, and those that uphold it. We conclude that these arguments are applicable to class variables as they often have been explicated, in phenetic terms; by contrast, genetically explicated class variables are not vulnerable to these arguments. We propose criteria for conjecturing and present methods for corroborating the existence of class variables in personality. Specifically, we test a class model of a construct whose conceptual status makes it reasonable to evaluate whether or not the differences between individuals represented by this construct constitute discrete classes. Finally, we examine the implications for conceptualizing and investigating the nature and origins of personality.

500 citations



Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: The evidence suggests that once acquired, such conditional fears might never be eliminated using traditional extinction or countercondit ioning procedures, leading to a renewed emphasis upon the role of experience in human development.
Abstract: Accounts of human fears and phobias based on current conditioning models using data from adults are examined and found wanting. Instead, the characteristics of human phobias resemble the kind of learning found during the amnesic period of infancy. As certain neural systems mature, conditioning begins to exhibit adult characteristics: context dependency, sharp generalization, and rapid extinction. Although direct behavioral control by the early learning systems wanes, the adult learning system seems to be structured at least/partially through the lasting influence of infantile experience. Under (hormonal) stress, residues of early experience are reinstated and incorporated into adult memory where they directly control behavior. This control exhibits infantile characteristics. The evidence suggests that once acquired, such conditional fears might never be eliminated using traditional extinction or countercondit ioning procedures. The view leads to a renewed emphasis upon the role of experience in human development, accepting the disproportionate importance of infant experience as the foundation upon which subsequent learning and cognitive function rest. It is plain from clinical experience that certain patients experience critical incidents in which the fear has an onset. What is particularly interesting is the fact that quite frequently these same people have been exposed to the same stimulus repeatedly in the past without acquiring the fear. It seems that for acute onset fears, there are certain psychological states in which the person is vulnerable to the acquisition of fears. To take a clinical example, in those agoraphobic patients who report an acute onset of fear, one needs to know why the fear arose on the day that it did, at the time that it did. And why do they acquire a fear

322 citations


Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: This article argues that such processes involve phenomena that have been traditionally relegated to the realm of emotion in the major physiological models of motivation, with its taint of subjectivism.
Abstract: Motivation and emotion are viewed as different aspects of a single process in which emotion involves the "readout" of motivational potential inherent in hierarchically organized primary motivational/emotional systems (primes) The most basic readout, Emotion 7, involves adaptive-homeostatic functions In species where communication about the state of certain primes became important, Emotion II, involving their outward expression, evolved With cognition, a third type of readout evolved, Emotion III, involving the direct experience of certain primes A model of the interaction between primes and cognition is presented, and the unique role of language in human motivation-emotion is discussed In recent years there has been a virtual explosion of new information relevant to the analysis of motivation and emotion that has left attempts at theoretical integration far behind In the realm usually termed motivation, there has been increasing realization that behavior can be initiated by external stimuli and cognitive processes as well as by the biological deficits that have served as the cornerstone of the drive-reduction model Mogenson and Phillips (1976) pointed out that any contemporary analysis of motivation must account for behavior based on the expectation of reward (incentive motivation: Bindra, 1968; Bolles, 1972) and for adaptive behavior that anticipates homeostatic deficits before they occur The apparent ability of animals to make responses that anticipate their needs suggests that they must use processes that "represent within the brain the nature of the outside world" (Oatley, 1973, p 12) In this article I argue that such processes involve phenomena that have been traditionally relegated to the realm of emotion The major physiological models of motivation have generally avoided the concept of emotion, with its taint of subjectivism These

Journal Article•DOI•
Roger Ratcliff1•
TL;DR: One particular model, the diffusion model of Ratcliff (1981), is fitted to the data from three published experiments and the results provide a clear interpretation of the reaction time difference in terms of criteria settings, and it is concluded that interpretation of such positive-negative reaction time differences in the absence of a specific model is hazardous at best.
Abstract: The interpretation of the reaction time difference between positive and negative responses in two-choice matching tasks has been the subject of recent controversy. Proctor and his colleagues hold that the difference represents a difference in processing between same and different judgments, whereas Ratcliff and Hacker argued that the difference can be accounted for in terms of criteria settings. In this article, the way in which several models of choice reaction time and matching can account for this reaction time difference is examined and one particular model, the diffusion model of Ratcliff (1981), is fitted to the data from three published experiments. The results of these fits provide a clear interpretation of the reaction time difference in terms of criteria settings. It is concluded that interpretation of such positive-negative reaction time differences in the absence of a specific model is hazardous at best.





Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: A theory of mobility using nonvisual stimuli and cognitive control process is proposed to augment Gibson's (1958, 1979) explanations of visual guidance, to describe the overall processes of guidance by which both blind and sighted travelers move through space.
Abstract: A theory of mobility using nonvisual stimuli and cognitive control process is proposed to augment Gibson's (1958, 1979) explanations of visual guidance. Nonvisual processes are clearly important to the totally blind, who often manage considerable independent mobility in the absence of vision, but are also important to the sighted. Mobility can be directed by visual control stimuli in the ambient optic array, by nonvisual control stimuli, as well as by processes of spatial learning, including stimulus-response (S-R) rote learning, motor plans, schemas, and cognitive maps. The selection of processes and strategies depends on the availability of particular information or on task demands. Attentional processes select stimuli for locomotor control within any particular modality and select between perceptual and cognitive processes. The skill of traveling through the spatial environment, avoiding obstacles, and traveling directly or indirectly toward goals, is a general characteristic of animal behavior and is described here by the term mobility. Although this term has a special connotation within blindness rehabilitation (Welsh & Blasch. 1980), it is used here to describe the overall processes of guidance by which both blind and sighted travelers move through space. The study of mobility encompasses several more traditional research concerns, such as space perception, motor control, and spatial cognition. Until recently there has been little research related to general psychological theory of mobility. A comparison may be made with the study of reading, where considerable research has taken place on component tasks such as letter extraction, word recognition, and eye movements, but where there has been comparatively little interest until recently in the general rules of the process (see Haber, 1978).








Journal Article•DOI•
TL;DR: Cheng as discussed by the authors presented a hypothesis concerning categorization that was supposed to provide an alternative to the automatization hypothesis of Schneider and Shiffrin (1977), and carried out several critical studies showing that the categorization hypothesis was correct, but also showing conclusively that it and several related hypotheses were insufficient to explain a number of key findings.
Abstract: Cheng (1985) presented a hypothesis concerning categorization that was supposed to provide an alternative to the automatization hypothesis of Schneider and Shiffrin (1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). In fact, we carried out in 1977 several critical studies showing that the categorization hypothesis was correct, but also showing conclusively that it and several related hypotheses were insufficient to explain a number of key findings. Although Cheng's review either did not discuss or inappropriately discounted the evidence, the 1977 articles and more recent ones provide a definitive demonstration of automatization.