Showing papers in "Small Wars & Insurgencies in 2008"
TL;DR: The authors argues that the West is faltering in the "War of Ideas" with global Jihad for the main reason that the messages that we wish to convey lack narrative coherence, which is due to the fact that we misapprehend the nature of the virtual operational environment whereas our opponents possess an intuitive grasp of it as a result of which their structure and method of operations are better adapted and more effective than our own.
Abstract: This paper looks at the virtual dimension of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency. It argues that the West is faltering in the ‘War of Ideas’ with global Jihad for the main reason that the messages that we wish to convey lack narrative coherence. This is a result of the fact that we misapprehend the nature of the virtual operational environment whereas our opponents possess an intuitive grasp of it as a result of which their structure and method of operations are better adapted and more effective than our own. There is no reason, beyond inertia, that this should remain the case.
71 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that the United States rarely held the initiative in the Vietnam War, and that using a classic counter-insurgency strategy would have been fatal from the beginning of the war.
Abstract: More than thirty years after the fall of Saigon, historians still argue about the lessons of the Vietnam War. Most fall into two schools of thought: those who believe that the United States failed to apply enough pressure – military and political – to the Communist government in Hanoi, and those who argue that the Americans failed to use an appropriate counterinsurgency strategy in South Vietnam. Both arguments have merit, but both ignore the Communist strategy, and the result is a skewed picture of what sort of enemy the United States actually faced in Vietnam. The reality is that the United States rarely held the initiative in Vietnam. Hanoi began a conventional troop build up in South Vietnam beginning in the early 1960s, and by the time of the US ground force intervention in 1965 the allies already faced a large and potent conventional Communist army in the South. Simply employing a ‘classic’ counterinsurgency strategy would have been fatal from the beginning. Despite this fact, the US military has te...
67 citations
TL;DR: The FARC-EP as discussed by the authors integrates women into its political and military structure in ways that give them a sense of participation, accomplishment, and satisfaction, but despite their favourable experiences, many women ultimately become disillusioned with the FARC's masculine culture and value system that fails to accommodate their aspirations as women.
Abstract: Traditionally women and children have been seen as victims rather than protagonists in conflict. However, since the 1970s, women and children have assumed an active role as combatants in Colombian insurgencies. This is especially true of the FARC-EP, which integrates women into its political and military structure in ways that give them a sense of participation, accomplishment and satisfaction. Without their contributions, including sexual services, the FARC could probably not survive. However, despite their favourable experiences, many women ultimately become disillusioned with the FARC's masculine culture and value system that fails to accommodate their aspirations as women.
59 citations
TL;DR: The US military went into Iraq with no clear understanding of or preparations for counterinsurgency This fact, combined with poor postwar planning and failure to recognize the early development of the insurgency, severely hamstrung the American effort to secure and stabilize the country Nevertheless, the US Army demonstrated the ability to adapt effectively from the bottom-up at the operational and tactical levels during General George Casey's tenure as commander of Multinational Force-Iraq from 2004 to 2006.
Abstract: The US military went into Iraq with no clear understanding of or preparations for counterinsurgency This fact, combined with poor postwar planning and failure to recognize the early development of the insurgency, severely hamstrung the American effort to secure and stabilize the country Nevertheless, the US Army demonstrated the ability to adapt effectively from the bottom-up at the operational and tactical levels during General George Casey's tenure as commander of Multinational Force-Iraq from 2004 to 2006 Yet despite the success of population-security measures and the development of counterinsurgency doctrine, the military's top leaders in Iraq resisted the implementation of a true population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, opting instead to focus on a ‘transition’ exit strategy It was not until after the transition approach collapsed amid the chaos of 2006 that counterinsurgency, and the utility of force in securing the will of the population, was embraced by America's strategic leadership
37 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors look at the use of armed force in order to stop terrorist activity and conclude that using force makes things worse, and that it complies with the aim of terrorist organizations to provoke the state into overreacting.
Abstract: This article looks at the use of armed force in order to stop terrorist activity. There is little agreement among experts about the importance of the use of force in past counter-terrorism campaigns. Based on limited empirical investigation, it is indicated that police and judiciary measures have been much more frequently used than the military. Concerning the effectiveness of the use of force; there are few indications that it contributes to lessening terrorism. Rather the opposite is the case; the use of force makes things worse. It complies with the aim of terrorist organizations to provoke the state into overreacting. More research is warranted into the specific conditions under which force is used. It remains possible that in very specific circumstances, military force can make a difference.
31 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the role of intervening forces in state-building efforts after state-collapse and civil wars and develop an explanation for failure of statebuilding attempts drawing upon bargaining theory, macrosociological statebuilding theory, and strategic thought.
Abstract: This article examines the role of intervening forces in state-building efforts after state-collapse and civil wars. Based upon a case study from the 30 years of war in Afghanistan, it develops an explanation for failure of state-building attempts drawing upon bargaining theory, macrosociological state-building theory, and strategic thought. The explanation suggests that international state-building attempts condition and shapes a new strategic environment for the local actors. In doing so, the mode of state-building can create incentives for continuing the war or, carried out differently, create incentives for the parties to contribute in building a legitimate state from the rubble of the old state.
29 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the utility of military force in humanitarian and development operations is discussed, between reluctance and necessity, and between necessity and reluctance to use military forces in the field of disaster management.
Abstract: Between reluctance and necessity : the utility of military force in humanitarian and development operations
28 citations
TL;DR: In this article, a small group of British officers, advisors, and trainers guided the forces of the Sultanate of Oman to victory in their conflict with the Marxist insurgents of the People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG).
Abstract: From 1964 to 1975 a small group of British officers, advisors, and trainers guided the forces of the Sultanate of Oman to victory in their conflict with the Marxist insurgents of the People's Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). This campaign provides a clear example of how to effectively support an ally's counterinsurgency efforts with a minimal commitment of men and material. In particular, the critical assistance provided by the British consisted of experienced leadership and skilled technical support personnel as well as a viable strategy for victory. However, more important for the ultimate success of the counterinsurgency campaign was the emergence of new progressive leadership with the accession of Sultan Qaboos. The most important lesson from this study is that while security assistance can reinforce positive political efforts, it is not enough on its own to bring about a victory in an unfavourable political environment.
28 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyse the factors that have led to the current round of insurgency in Balochistan and find that the widespread support that the insurgents have been enjoying and the impunity with which they have been targeting symbols of government authority not only across the entire length and breadth of the province but even outside.
Abstract: Balochistan has been in the midst of a full fledged insurgency for over five years now. Pakistani establishment has tried to project the current insurgency as a tribal mischief being perpetrated by a few feudal lords but the widespread support that the insurgents have been enjoying and the impunity with which they have been targeting symbols of government authority not only across the entire length and breadth of Balochistan but even outside, indicate that there are deep rooted, well defined causes that have led to this insurgency. The paper attempts to analyse the factors that have led to current round of insurgency in Balochistan.
24 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors focus on two common misconceptions which cloud analyses of the recent separatist conflict in Aceh and move towards explaining the causal mechanisms of the Aceh conflict and assessing this model in light of post-Tsunami developments.
Abstract: A clear understanding of what creates a conflict is central to building a lasting peace. This paper targets two common misconceptions which cloud analyses of the recent separatist conflict in Aceh. First, the conflict was not about oil. Resource curse theories help explain the creation of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM), but cannot explain why the conflict remained limited for several years. The lessons here are that what motivates a conflict varies over time and across groups. Second, despite Acehnese history, identity, and global trends, the conflict was not marked by Islam. Instead, the GAM promoted ethnic nationalism and downplayed religion to sustain the conflict and their control of it. The lesson here is how leaders can shape, but cannot determine the identity of movements. Beyond these two misconceptions, I move towards explaining the causal mechanisms of the Aceh conflict and assessing this model in light of post-Tsunami developments.
21 citations
TL;DR: This article argued that the Sri Lankan civil war should be regarded as a war of attrition, as military actions have failed, and possibly will continue to fail, to produce a victor.
Abstract: After decades of fighting, the secessionist war between the government of Sri Lanka and the secessionist movement known as the Tamil Tigers of Eelam continues. Military operations have failed to achieve a decisive victory over the other side. This article aims to prove that the Sri Lankan civil war should be regarded as a war of attrition, as military actions have failed, and possibly will continue to fail, to produce a victor.
TL;DR: The robust approach of the American forces in for example Afghanistan and Iraq is often criticised and compared to the more soft approach of British forces as discussed by the authors, however, there are surprisingly few...
Abstract: The robust approach of the American forces in for example Afghanistan and Iraq is often criticised and compared to the more soft approach of the British forces. However, there are surprisingly few ...
TL;DR: Theorizing about Taliban operations in Afghanistan has its limits and it is possible that Kabul-centric strategies do not adequately address the unique circumstances of each region in the country.
Abstract: Theorizing about Taliban operations in Afghanistan has its limits and it is possible that Kabul-centric strategies do not adequately address the unique circumstances of each region in the country. How exactly has the Taliban gone about attaining its objectives in Kandahar province and how have those approaches evolved since 2002? And how have the Taliban adapted to coalition forces' attempts to compete with the insurgency and stamp it out? The answers to these questions are critical in the formulation of any counterinsurgency approach to Afghanistan.
TL;DR: This conclusion looks at the debate about the utility of force with the conclusions of the contributions in this special volume linking them together with the positions in the debate and outlining further avenues for research.
Abstract: This conclusion looks at the debate about the utility of force. It brings together the conclusions of the contributions in this special volume, linking them together with the positions in the debate and outlining further avenues for research.
TL;DR: The classical repertoire of insurgency types is under-specified, and does not apply well to the case of Pakistan's conduct of insurgency in Kashmir as mentioned in this paper, and the classical repertoire is not suitable for insurgency types.
Abstract: The classical repertoire of insurgency types is under-specified, and does not apply well to the case of Pakistan's conduct of insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan's approach to insurgency has been a con...
TL;DR: A number of reasons have been given for the British Army adopting this mode of warfare as discussed by the authors, but the best explanation is that they were an organic evolution from methods used by British Army in'small wars' throughout the early twentieth century, use of mobile ‘frontier columns' at the operational and tactical level of war being described and recommended by Callwell himself and visible with the Army in practice in operations in India and the Middle East in particular.
Abstract: The period from December 1940 through to the spring of 1941 saw the British Army win a series of rapid and decisive victories over Italian and Vichy French forces in North and East Africa and the Middle East. A key feature of these operations was the extensive British use of fast-moving all-arms mobile formations utilising superior speed and mobility to out-manoeuvre considerably larger Italian formations. A number of reasons have been given for the British Army adopting this mode of warfare, but the paper contends that the best explanation is that they were an organic evolution from methods used by the British Army in ‘small wars’ throughout the early twentieth century, use of mobile ‘frontier columns’ at the operational and tactical level of war being described and recommended by Callwell himself and visible with the Army in practice in operations in India and the Middle East in particular. The inter-war period saw the combination of this model of warfare with post-First World War military technology, n...
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors discuss why Pakistan and India perceive the conflict in Kashmir as a security issue and why they might go to war in the future, and why hostilities exist between them.
Abstract: With the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan a reliable ally to the South in Islamabad has rarely been as important for NATO countries as it is today. General Musharraf's porous borders and his difficulties controlling tribal minorities and religious radicals within his country bode ill for the future stability of the region. Tensions with India meanwhile remain, as do the nuclear arsenals aimed into the hearts of either country. If a nuclear war breaks out in the near future these two countries will likely be at its epicentre and it is therefore vital to understand precisely why hostilities exist between them. One of the major reasons is Kashmir. Understanding how both countries perceive the conflict in Kashmir is essential if one wishes to understand why they have gone to war so frequently in the past and why they might go to war in the future.
TL;DR: The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) no longer practises COIN to any significant extent as mentioned in this paper, and the strict anti-COIN position currently adhered to by the military is hamstringing its own ability to fulfil its new designated tasks and strategic objectives.
Abstract: Not all militaries are able to learn counterinsurgency (COIN). Whether a military has the capacity to do so is determined by specific factors: a favourable political environment; and pragmatism within the respective military. During the 1970s and 1980s, the South African military exhibited both and learned COIN to devastating effect. Post 1990, however, the political environment has proven unfavourable for the continuing of COIN by the new South African National Defence Force (SANDF), and the military no longer practises COIN to any significant extent. Problematically, new commitments in peace support operations, in otherwise insurgent conflicts, are giving rise to a need for many of the COIN skills and tactics discarded during the transition. The strict anti-COIN position currently adhered to by the military is hamstringing its own ability to fulfil its new designated tasks and strategic objectives.
TL;DR: The authors explored the livelihood pathways of serving Ugandan Army soldiers and traces their methods and motivations for enlistment, concluding with reflections on what strategic deception (by both recruits and the Army) may imply for warriors' honour.
Abstract: This article explores the livelihood pathways of serving Ugandan Army soldiers and traces their methods and motivations for enlistment. All were from areas of northern Uganda affected by nearly two decades of violent instability. With the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) increasing recruitment eligibility requirements and taking other measures to improve professionalism, some soldiers enlisted using false credentials and names, travelled to skirt unofficial ethnic quotas, and joined against their family's wishes. The Army's defence reform process was intended to preclude such problems. The article concludes with reflections on what strategic deception (by both recruits and the Army) may imply for warriors' honour.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examined whether existing US Army doctrine adequately fulfilled its role as a guide to tactics in addressing the challenges that Army forces faced in the first 15 months of the war in Iraq.
Abstract: The US Army develops doctrine as a set of fundamental principles that guide its actions in support of national objectives. Recently, those national objectives required stability operations, with increasing scope and frequency. This study examines whether existing US Army doctrine adequately fulfilled its role as a guide to tactics in addressing the challenges that Army forces faced in the first 15 months of the war in Iraq. Field Manual 3-24 Counterinsurgency has remedied many deficiencies, but several remain to be addressed to offer commanders better guidance in the face of the many complex challenges they face in stability operations.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examined the response of the Greek government and made particular reference to Karamanlis's archives and Greek parliamentary proceedings to explore whether Greece was genuinely committed to the settlement of the Cyprus issue and failed due to lack of support or simply ignored the appeals of the Cypriot people.
Abstract: The contemporary history of three countries was marked on July 1974 when the Greek colonels overthrew the legitimate government of Cyprus, Turkey invaded the island to preserve her interests and Greece returned to democracy, but withdrew from NATO. The apathy of her allies was a bitter experience for Greece, considering that the government in Athens was struggling to cope with the consequences of the invasion and Turkey's aggression, as well as with the diplomatic isolation caused by the seven-year dictatorial rule. This paper examines the response of the Greek government and makes particular reference to Karamanlis's archives and Greek parliamentary proceedings. The purpose of the present study is to explore whether Greece was genuinely committed to the settlement of the Cyprus issue and failed due to lack of support or simply ignored the appeals of the Cypriot people and pursued more vital foreign policy objectives, thus contributing to the partition of the island.
TL;DR: In this paper, the concept of fourth generation operations and associated principles are introduced and defined, which are the evolution and extension of third and fourth generation warfare based on a change of tactics, technology, and combatants.
Abstract: This study develops the concepts of fourth generation operations and the associated principles. First, the concept of fourth generation operations is introduced and defined. Fourth generation operations are the evolution and extension of third and fourth generation warfare based on a change of tactics, technology, and combatants. These operations are currently ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the global war on terrorism. Based on the framework of US joint doctrine, the supporting principles of fourth generation operations are developed. This requires the introduction of the principle of Population Perception.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that while hate media clearly contributed to the dynamics that led to genocide, its role should not be overstated, instead it was a part of a larger social process, and violent discourse was at least as important as the availability of weapons in carrying out the genocide.
Abstract: This analytical article asks the question: to what degree did the media contribute to the Rwandan genocide and what might have been done about it? In examining the historical development of mass media in Rwanda, this paper argues that while hate media clearly contributed to the dynamics that led to genocide, its role should not be overstated. While it is commonly believed that hate media was a major cause of the genocide, instead it was a part of a larger social process. The use of violent discourse was at least as important as, for example, the availability of weapons in carrying out the genocide. Put another way, violent discourse was necessary but not sufficient by itself to cause the genocide of 1994. In arguing this thesis, Rwandan history is examined to demonstrate the processes of communication in the formation of destructive attitudes and behaviour. Next, analysis of the methods and content of propaganda campaigns is discussed. Finally, an overview of the requirements and organizations for third p...
TL;DR: For example, there are many calls for other elements of the government to do more to assist the military to restore order and stability and "win the peace" in Iraq and Afghanistan as mentioned in this paper.
Abstract: Today there are many calls for other elements of the government to do more to ‘do their part’, assist the military to restore order and stability and ‘win the peace’ in Iraq and Afghanistan, and pr...
TL;DR: The anti-British rebellion of 1920 has become one of the most important foundational myths of Iraqi nationalism and has been the subject of poetry, theatre, film and folklore and continues to be commemorated and evoked as a symbol of the Iraqi nation state and of Iraqi pride and independence as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: The anti-British rebellion of 1920 has become one of the most important foundational myths of Iraqi nationalism It has been the subject of poetry, theatre, film and folklore and continues to be commemorated and evoked as a symbol of the Iraqi nation state and of Iraqi pride and independence This popular reading of events ignores the realities of the rebellion: that it was a mid-Euphrates, rather than a national, affair and that the motivations, to begin with at least, were far more personal and economic than national Nevertheless, the rebellion's memory has acquired a hallowed place in Iraqi nationalist discourse This article will focus on two points: first, to place the rebellion of 1920 in its correct historical context; second, it will be argued that today's anti-American insurgency will make the same historiographical journey from being a tumultuous and localised event that had no shortage of detractors to becoming a defining symbol of Iraqi nationalism As will be shown, there is already much evi
TL;DR: In this paper, a case study of low-intensity conflicts such as counterinsurgencies is presented, showing that the British Commonwealth security forces succeeded in controlling the number of incidents and the space to force ratio.
Abstract: Low-intensity conflicts such as counterinsurgencies tend to be characterized by a large number of contacts. The sheer number and often inconclusive nature of these incidents makes it difficult to determine whether military operations are effective. This article uses Confrontation as a case study, first building a database of incidents (including contacts) and then analysing the database statistically to identify patterns. This process shows that the British Commonwealth security forces succeeded in controlling the number of incidents and the space to force ratio. They also dominated the contact battle. The article helps to account for the British Commonwealth success at the operational and tactical level.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors introduce the overall puzzle of this special issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies and identify some trends in the development of strategic thought since the end of the cold war.
Abstract: What is the utility of force in modern conflict? This article introduce the overall puzzle of this special issue of Small Wars and Insurgencies. In doing so, it identifies some trends in the development of strategic thought since the end of the cold war. By elaborating on some of the paradoxes of modern military power and the use of force, it also provides a more detailed outline of the articles in this issue.
TL;DR: The just war doctrine has been formulated through the combined writings of theologians, jurists, moralists, and international policy-makers, among others, to establish that war meets certain ethical requirements as discussed by the authors.
Abstract: ‘Just war’ doctrine has been formulated through the combined writings of theologians, jurists, moralists, and international policy-makers, among others, to establish that war meets certain ethical