Showing papers in "The Philosophical Quarterly in 2009"
TL;DR: In the dark ages perceptual experiences were supposed to consist in the direct awareness of sense data, which are as they appear to be as mentioned in this paper, with error blamed solely on the intellect.
Abstract: In the dark ages perceptual experiences were supposed to consist in the direct awareness of sense data, which are as they appear to be. Perceptual infallibility was the creed, with error blamed solely on the intellect. Eventually these doctrines were swept aside by the reformation. Perceptual experiences were conceived instead as fallible, testifying (sometimes wrongly) about the subject’s familiar external environment. The thesis that experiences have representational content was firmly nailed to the seminar-room door. Early reformers took this thesis to consist in the subject’s acquisition of dispositions to believe propositions about her environment, but later reformers rejected any such reduction. Then came the recent (and inevitable) counter-reformation. While conceding that the reformers had a point against sense data, the reactionary counter-reformers reaffirmed the doctrine of perceptual infallibility. Perceptual experience itself, they said, despite
180 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that high-level content can directly inform the phenomenal character of perception, and argued in favour of the liberal view that highlevel content directly informed the perception of perception and argued that the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality.
Abstract: The phenomenal character of perceptual experience involves the representation of colour, shape and motion. Does it also involve the representation of high-level categories? Is the recognition of a tomato as a tomato contained within perceptual phenomenality? Proponents of a conservative view of the reach of phenomenal content say ‘No’, whereas those who take a liberal view of perceptual phenomenality say ‘Yes’. I clarify the debate between conservatives and liberals, and argue in favour of the liberal view that high-level content can directly inform the phenomenal character of perception.
151 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, it is argued that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content, and that it can be true or false.
Abstract: It is widely agreed that perceptual experience is a form of intentionality, i.e., that it has representational content. Many philosophers take this to mean that like belief, experience has propositional content, that it can be true or false. I accept that perceptual experience has intentionality; but I dispute the claim that it has propositional content. This claim does not follow from the fact that experience is intentional, nor does it follow from the fact that experiences are accurate or inaccurate. I end by considering the relationship between this question and the question of whether experience has non-conceptual content.
146 citations
TL;DR: Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories as mentioned in this paper, and it is also an empirical virtue of philosophical theories, but it has no evidential value in typical philosophical contexts, such as ontological simplicity.
Abstract: Parsimony is a virtue of empirical theories. Is it also a virtue of philosophical theories? I review four contemporary accounts of the virtue of parsimony in empirical theorizing, and consider how each might apply to two prominent appeals to parsimony in the philosophical literature, those made on behalf of physicalism and on behalf of nominalism. None of the accounts of the virtue of parsimony extends naturally to either of these philosophical cases. This suggests that in typical philosophical contexts, ontological simplicity has no evidential value.
75 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences: the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents, the issue of why we should believe it, and what the contents are of experiences.
Abstract: I address three interrelated issues concerning the contents of experiences. First, I address the preliminary issue of what it means to say that experiences have contents. Then I address the issue of why we should believe that experiences have contents. Finally, I address the issue of what the contents of experiences are.
72 citations
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors defend the claim that we can perceive causality against the objection that its arcane features are unlikely to be represented in experience, and argue that the data provided by Albert Michotte's experiments on perceptual causality do not establish this thesis.
Abstract: The thesis that we can visually perceive causal relations is distinct from the thesis that visual experiences can represent causal relations. I defend the latter thesis about visual experience, and argue that although they are suggestive, the data provided by Albert Michotte's experiments on perceptual causality do not establish this thesis. Turning to the perception of causality, I defend the claim that we can perceive causation against the objection that its arcane features are unlikely to be represented in experience.
70 citations
TL;DR: The authors defend Melia's thesis that the role of mathematics in scientific theory is to index quantities, and that even if mathematics is indispensable to scientific explanations of concrete phenomena, it does not explain any of those phenomena.
Abstract: We defend Joseph Melia's thesis that the role of mathematics in scientific theory is to ‘index’ quantities, and that even if mathematics is indispensable to scientific explanations of concrete phenomena, it does not explain any of those phenomena. This thesis is defended against objections by Mark Colyvan and Alan Baker.
49 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a general account of the relation between moral desirability, feasibility and obligation within a conception of justice, and analyse feasibility, a complex idea including different types, domains and degrees.
Abstract: To be justifiable, the demands of a conception of human rights and global justice must be such that (a) they focus on the protection of important human interests, and (b) their fulfilment is feasible. I discuss the feasibility condition. I present a general account of the relation between moral desirability, feasibility and obligation within a conception of justice. I analyse feasibility, a complex idea including different types, domains and degrees. It is possible to respond in various ways if the fulfilment of basic socioeconomic human rights against severe poverty seems at first to be infeasible.
45 citations
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it is a proper part, and then they argue that both notions represent genuine metaphysical possibilities.
Abstract: I first explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it is a proper part. I then explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it both is and has a proper part. Given two well recognized assumptions, I argue that both notions represent genuine metaphysical possibilities. Finally I consider, but dismiss, some possible objections.
42 citations
TL;DR: The authors argue that even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect-switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not include natural-kind properties, such as being a tomato.
Abstract: John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect-switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties. I also argue that even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect-switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not include natural-kind properties, such as being a tomato.
37 citations
TL;DR: Unlike the overall framework of Ernest Nagel's work on reduction, his theory of intertheoretic connection still has life in it as mentioned in this paper, and it handles cases where reduction requires complex representation of a target domain.
Abstract: Unlike the overall framework of Ernest Nagel's work on reduction, his theory of intertheoretic connection still has life in it. It handles aptly cases where reduction requires complex representation of a target domain. Abandoning his formulation as too liberal was a mistake. Arguments that it is too liberal at best touch only Nagel's deductivist theory of explanation, not his condition of connectability. Taking this condition seriously gives a powerful view of reduction, but one which requires us to index explanatory power to sciences as they are formulated at particular times. While we may thereby reduce more than philosophers have supposed, we must abandon hope (as Nagel did) of saying anything useful about reductionism.
TL;DR: A series of arguments designed to show that rather than appealing to fundamental distributional properties one should appeal to tiny and short-lived tropes are presented.
Abstract: The problem of qualitative heterogeneity is to explain how an extended simple can enjoy qualitative variation across its spatial or temporal axes, given that it lacks both spatial and temporal parts. I discuss how friends of extended simples should address the problem of qualitative heterogeneity. I present a series of arguments designed to show that rather than appealing to fundamental distributional properties one should appeal to tiny and short-lived tropes. Along the way, issues relevant to debates about material composition, persistence over time and existence monism are discussed.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors elucidate the dispute between dialectical foundationalists and egalitarians, and defend a broadly egalitarian stance against several prominent objections, including the claim that all asserted propositions require defence when challenged.
Abstract: ‘Dialectical foundationalists’, including Jonathan Adler, Robert Brandom, Adam Leite and Michael Williams, claim that some asserted propositions do not require defence just because an interlocutor challenges them. By asserting such a proposition, the speaker shifts the burden of proof to the interlocutor. ‘Dialectical egalitarians’ claim that all asserted propositions require defence when challenged. I elucidate the dispute between dialectical foundationalists and egalitarians, and I defend a broadly egalitarian stance against several prominent objections.
TL;DR: In this paper, the parity thesis is rejected and a hybrid approach is proposed, where possible worlds are taken as concrete Lewisian worlds and impossibilities are represented as set-theoretic constructions out of them.
Abstract: Accounts of propositions as sets of possible worlds have been criticized for conflating distinct impossible propositions. In response to this problem, some have proposed to introduce impossible worlds to represent distinct impossibilities, endorsing the thesis that impossible worlds must be of the same kind; this has been called the parity thesis. I show that this thesis faces problems, and propose a hybrid account which rejects it: possible worlds are taken as concrete Lewisian worlds, and impossibilities are represented as set-theoretic constructions out of them. This hybrid account (1) distinguishes many intuitively distinct impossible propositions; (2) identifies impossible propositions with extensional constructions; (3) avoids resorting to primitive modality, at least so far as Lewisian modal realism does.
TL;DR: Physicalism can safely make do with no more than a weak global formulation of supervenience as discussed by the authors, and this is to be favoured over alternative formulations of physicalism, such as propositional attitudes or intentions.
Abstract: We provide a formulation of physicalism, and show that this is to be favoured over alternative formulations. Much of the literature on physicalism assumes without argument that there is a fundamental level to reality, and we show that a consideration of the levels problem and its implications for physicalism tells in favour of the form of physicalism proposed here. Its key elements are, first, that the empirical and substantive part of physicalism amounts to a prediction that physics will not posit new entities solely for the purpose of accounting for mental phenomena, nor new entities with essentially mental characteristics such as propositional attitudes or intentions; secondly, that physicalism can safely make do with no more than a weak global formulation of supervenience.
TL;DR: This article showed that humans see causal interactions ill the same sense as that in which we can hear speech, and that causal perception, like, speech perception, is a form of categorical perception.
Abstract: Cart humans see causal interactions? Evidence oil the visual perception of causal interactions, from Michotte to contemporary work, is best interpreted as showing that we call see some causal interactions ill the same sense as that in which we can hear speech. Causal perception, like, speech perception, is a form of categorical perception.
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine four arguments against fictional realism and present a version of fictional realism which can withstand those arguments, and present an alternative to fictional realism that can withstand them.
Abstract: Fictional realism, i.e., the view that because fictions exist, fictional characters exist as well, has recently been accused of leading to inconsistency generated by phenomena of indeterminacy and inconsistency in fiction. We examine in detail four arguments against fictional realism, and present a version of fictional realism which can withstand those arguments.
TL;DR: In this article, a new argument for an expressivist account of epistemic modals is developed, which starts from a puzzle about epistemic models which Seth Yalcin recently presented.
Abstract: I develop a new argument for an expressivist account of epistemic modals, which starts from a puzzle about epistemic modals which Seth Yalcin recently presented. I reject Yalcin's own solution to the puzzle, and give a better explanation based on expressivism concerning epistemic modals. I also address two alleged problems for expressivism: do embeddings of epistemic modals pose a serious threat to expressivism, and how can expressivism account for disagreements about statements containing epistemic modals?
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that noncognitiveivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs.
Abstract: Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucial structural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting for subjects' certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge have independently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection. We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view which incorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith's challenge, it is unlikely that ‘purer’ and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed.
TL;DR: The authors argue that imaginative resistance is a pragmatic phenomenon, and that it works in a way very similar to Paul Grice's widely analysed "conversational implicature" phenomenon.
Abstract: We experience resistance when we are engaging with fictional works which present certain (for example, morally objectionable) claims. But in virtue of what properties do sentences trigger this ‘imaginative resistance’? I argue that while most accounts of imaginative resistance have looked for semantic properties in virtue of which sentences trigger it, this is unlikely to give us a coherent account, because imaginative resistance is a pragmatic phenomenon. It works in a way very similar to Paul Grice's widely analysed ‘conversational implicature’.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend the double effect and a so-called "strict" definition of intention: A intends an effect if and only if A has it as an end or believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal sequence that will result in A's end.
Abstract: I defend the doctrine of double effect and a so-called ‘strict’ definition of intention: A intends an effect if and only if A has it as an end or believes that it is a state of affairs in the causal sequence that will result in A's end. Following Kamm's proposed ‘doctrine of triple effect’, I distinguish an intended effect from an effect that motivates an action, and show that this distinction is morally significant. I use several contrived cases as illustrations, but my position does not depend on intuitive judgements about them. Instead, it follows from the view that the moral permissibility of an action depends at least partly on how it forms the agent's character. I also respond to some objections presented by Harris, Bennett, McIntyre, Thomson and Scanlon to the doctrine of double effect.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors take a close look at the nature of visual content, and discuss the view that visual experiences have only existential contents, the view of visual experiences having either singular or gappy contents, and a proposal about visual content inspired by Kaplan's well known theory of indexicals.
Abstract: My purpose is to take a close look at the nature of visual content. I discuss the view that visual experiences have only existential contents, the view that visual experiences have either singular or gappy contents, and the view that visual experiences have multiple contents. I also consider a proposal about visual content inspired by Kaplan's well known theory of indexicals. I draw out some consequences of my discussion for the thesis of intentionalism with respect to the phenomenal character of visual experience.
TL;DR: In this article, the authors defend the traditional just war doctrine according to which the independence between the in-bello and ad-bellum codes reflects the moral equality between just and unjust combatants.
Abstract: My claim is that despite powerful arguments to the contrary, a coherent moral distinction between the jus in bello code and the jus ad bellum code can be sustained. In particular, I defend the traditional just war doctrine according to which the independence between the in bello and ad bellum codes reflects the moral equality between just and unjust combatants and between just and unjust non-combatants. In order to establish this, I construe an in bello proportionality condition which can be satisfied by just and unjust combatants alike.
TL;DR: The authors argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non-cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too, not only about use but also about meaning.
Abstract: Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non-cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non-cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non-cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non-cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too.
TL;DR: In this article, it has been shown that backwards time travel can occur without causal loops and that no causal loops occur in the worlds where backward time travel does not cause causal loops.
Abstract: It has sometimes been suggested that backwards time travel always incurs causal loops. I show that this is mistaken, by describing worlds where backwards time travel occurs and yet no causal loops occur. Arguments that backwards time travel can occur without causal loops have been given before in the literature, but I show that those arguments are unconvincing.
TL;DR: This article found that people are more likely to describe an action as intentional if it has had a bad outcome than a good outcome, and to blame bad outcomes than to praise a good one.
Abstract: Joshua Knobe found that people are more likely to describe an action as intentional if it has had a bad outcome than a good outcome, and to blame a bad outcome than to praise a good one. These asymmetries raised numerous questions about lay moral judgement. Frank Hindriks recently proposed that one acts intentionally if one fails to comply with a normative reason against performing the action, that moral praise requires appropriate motivation, whereas moral blame does not, and that these asymmetries are normal features of a theory of intentional action, not anomalies. I present two empirical studies revealing asymmetries in lay judgements of intentionality and moral blameworthiness; these cannot be explained by Hindriks' theory of intentional action.
TL;DR: In the first Critique, Kant argues that the conditions required for having certain kinds of mental episodes are sufficient to guarantee that there are objects in space outside us as discussed by the authors, and the best recent versions of this reading, and argue that each suffers from apparently fatal flaws.
Abstract: In the ‘Refutation of Idealism’ chapter of the first Critique, Kant argues that the conditions required for having certain kinds of mental episodes are sufficient to guarantee that there are ‘objects in space’ outside us. A perennially influential way of reading this compressed argument is as a kind of causal inference: in order for us to make justified judgements about the order of our inner states, those states must be caused by the successive states of objects in space outside us. Here I consider the best recent versions of this reading, and argue that each suffers from apparently fatal flaws.