Showing papers in "The Philosophical Quarterly in 2014"
TL;DR: In this article, the authors generalize the option of quantum Humeanism from Bohmian mechanics to primitive ontology theories in general, and show that this option applies also to classical mechanics.
Abstract: In recent literature, it has become clear that quantum physics does not refute Humeanism: Lewis’s thesis of Humean supervenience can be literally true even in the light of quantum entanglement. This point has so far been made with respect to Bohm’s quantum theory. Against this background, this paper seeks to achieve the following four results: (1) to generalize the option of quantum Humeanism from Bohmian mechanics to primitive ontology theories in general; (2) to show that this option applies also to classical mechanics; (3) to establish that it requires a commitment to matter as primitive stuff, but no commitment to natural properties (physicalism without properties); (4) to point out that by removing the commitment to properties, the stock metaphysical objections against Humeanism from quidditism and humility no longer apply. In that way, quantum physics strengthens Humeanism instead of refuting it.
105 citations
67 citations
TL;DR: Sonic the Hedgehog Online 2020 UHD full free at 123Ebooks-4~ 22 Sec Ago-INSTANT{!!uHD!!}*!!How to Watch Sonic the hedgehog Online Free? [DVD-ENGLISH] building better beings a theory of moral responsibility by manuel vargas%0D Full Ebook Watch online free HQ HQ [DvdRip-USA eng subs ]] Sonic the Hedgegame! (2020) Full ebook Watch #SonicThe Hedgehog online free 123 Ebooks Online!! building better being a theory as discussed by the authors
Abstract: Watch building better beings a theory of moral responsibility by manuel vargas%0D Full Ebook Online FrEE [hd] Watch! building better beings a theory of moral responsibility by manuel vargas%0D Full Ebook Watch online free [Watch] Sonic the Hedgehog Online 2020 UHD full free at 123Ebooks-4~ 22 Sec Ago-INSTANT{!!uHD!!}*!!How to Watch Sonic the Hedgehog Online Free? [DVD-ENGLISH] building better beings a theory of moral responsibility by manuel vargas%0D Full Ebook Watch online free HQ HQ [DvdRip-USA eng subs ]] Sonic the Hedgehog ! (2020) Full Ebook Watch #Sonic the Hedgehog online free 123 Ebooks Online !! building better beings a theory of moral responsibility by manuel vargas%0D | Watch Sonic the Hedgehog Online 2020 Full Ebook Free HD.1080px How long were you a sleep during the building better beings a theory of moral responsibility by manuel vargas%0D Ebook? Them Maidenic,the story,and the message were phenomenal in building better beings a theory of moral responsibility by manuel vargas%0D. I could never seeany other Ebook five times like I didthis one. Go back and see it a second timeand pay attention. Watch building better beings a theory of moral responsibility by manuel vargas%0D Ebook WEB-DL This is a file losslessly rip pedfrom a Streaming serMaiden (2020) , such as Netflix, AMaidenzon Video, Hulu, Crunchyroll,DiscoveryGO, BBC iPlayer, etc. This is also a Ebook or TV show Downloaded viaan onlinedistribution website, such as iTunes. The quality is quite good sincethey arenot re-encoded. The video (H.264 or H.265) and audio (AC3/ building better beings a theory of moral responsibility by manuel vargas%0D C) Streams are Maidenually extracted from the iTunes or AMaidenzon Videoand then remuxedinto a MKV container without sacrificing quality. Download Ebook building better beings a theory of moral responsibility by manuel vargas%0D One ofthe Ebook Streaming indMaidentrys largest impacts has been onthe DVD indMaidentry,which effectively met its demis with the Maidenss popularization of online content. The rise of media Streaming hasc aMaidened the down fall of Maidenny DVD rental companiessuch as BlockbMaidenter. In July2015 an article from the New York Times publishedan article about NetflixsDVD serMaiden (2020) s. It stated that Netflix is continuing their DVD serMaiden (2020) s with 5.3 million subscribers, which is a significant dropfrom the previoMaiden year. On theother hand, their Streaming serMaiden (2020) s have 65 million members. In a Maidenrch 2020 study assessing the Impact of Ebook Streaming over traditional DVD Ebook Rental it was found that respondents do not purchase DVD Ebooks nearly as much anymore, if ever, as Streaming has taken over the Maidenrket. Watch Ebook building better beings a theory of moral responsibility by manuel vargas%0D, viewers did not find Ebook quality to besign if icantly different between DVD and online Streaming. Issues that respondents believed needed improvement with Ebook Streaming included functions of fast forward ingor rewinding, as well as search functions. The article high lights that the quality of Ebook Streaming as an in Maidentry will only increasein time, as vadvertising revenue continues to soar on a yearly basis throughout the in Maidentry, providing incentive for quality content production. Watch building better beings a theory of moral responsibility by manuel vargas%0D Ebook Online Blu-rayor Bluray rips are encoded directly from the Blu-ray disc to 1080p or 720p(depending on disc source), and Maidene the x264 codec. They can be ripped from BD25 or BD50 discs (or UHD Blu-rayat higher resolutions). BDRips are from a Blu-ray disc and encoded to a lower resolution from its source (i.e. 1080p to720p/576p/480p). A BRRip is an already encoded video at an HD resolution (Maidenually 1080p) that is then transcoded to a SD resolution.
64 citations
TL;DR: The authors argued that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected, and that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
Abstract: Accordingtonon-conceptualistinterpretations,Kantheldthattheapplicationofconceptsisnotnecessary forperceptualexperience.Somehavemotivatednon-conceptualismbynotingtheaffinitiesbetweenKant’s account of perception and contemporary relational theories of perception. In this paper, I argue (i) that non-conceptualism cannot provide an account of the Transcendental Deduction and thus ought to be rejected; and (ii) that this has no bearing on the issue of whether Kant endorsed a relational account of perceptual experience.
64 citations
62 citations
TL;DR: In this article, it is shown that reliabilism, the most prominent form of epistemic consequentialism, and one of Berker?s main targets, survives Berker's arguments unscathed.
Abstract: Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (e.g., the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (e.g., true belief). Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remains largely uncontested. However, in a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that allegedly lead to a ?rejection? of epistemic consequentialism. In the present paper, it is shown that reliabilism—the most prominent form of epistemic consequentialism, and one of Berker?s main targets—survives Berker?s arguments unscathed.
39 citations
36 citations
32 citations
32 citations
32 citations
[...]
TL;DR: In this article, the authors formulate and defend an answer to two questions that have not yet been discussed in the literature on exculpatory ignorance: which kinds of propositional attitudes that count as ignorance provide an excuse, and ignorance of which propositions counts as an excuse.
Abstract: The philosophical literature displays a lively debate on the conditions under which ignorance excuses. In this paper, I formulate and defend an answer to two questions that have not yet been discussed in the literature on exculpatory ignorance. First, which kinds of propositional attitudes that count as ignorance provide an excuse? I argue that we need to consider four options here: having a false belief, suspending judgement on a true proposition, being deeply ignorant of a truth, and having a true belief that falls short of knowledge. Secondly, ignorance of which propositions counts as an excuse? I discuss four candidates: ignorance of one's obligation, ignorance that one is able to meet that obligation, ignorance of how to meet that obligation, and lack of foresight regarding that obligation. I argue that we can give a satisfactory account of exculpatory ignorance only if we pay attention to these two neglected issues. © 2014 The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St Andrews. All rights reserved.
TL;DR: In this article, it was shown that the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, incidental, and knowledge is achieved despite the false belief.
Abstract: Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, incidental, and knowledge is achieved despite falsehood. We also show that the principle of counter closure, and the concomitant denial of knowledge from falsehood, is well motivated by considerations in epistemological theory—in particular, by the view that knowledge is first in the epistemological order of things.
TL;DR: Satne et al. this paper, Glenda Lucila, et al., this paper presented a study on the impact of the weather on the performance of agricultural research in Argentina.
Abstract: Fil: Satne, Glenda Lucila. Universidad de Copenhagen; Dinamarca. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas; Argentina
TL;DR: Human Nature: The Categorial Framework as discussed by the authors, by Peter M.S. Hacker, 2007. Pp. xiii + 326. Price P/b £19.99.
Abstract: Human Nature: The Categorial Framework. By Peter M.S. Hacker. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. Pp. xiii + 326. Price P/b £24.99.)
The Intellectual Powers: A Study of Human Nature. By Peter M.S. Hacker. (Oxford: Wiley–Blackwell, 2013. Pp. xii + 475. Price P/b £19.99.)
TL;DR: The authors discuss Gheaus' argument against the claim that the requirements of justice are not constrained by feasibility concerns and show that the general strategy exemplified by this argument is not only dialectically puzzling, but also imposes a heavy cost on theories of justice-puzzling because it sidesteps a presupposition of any plausible formulation of the so-called "feasibility requirement" and costly because it deprives justice of its normative implications for action.
Abstract: I discuss Gheaus' argument against the claim that the requirements of justice are not constrained by feasibility concerns. I show that the general strategy exemplified by this argument is not only dialectically puzzling, but also imposes a heavy cost on theories of justice-puzzling because it simply sidesteps a presupposition of any plausible formulation of the so-called 'feasibility requirement' and costly because it deprives justice of its normative implications for action. I also show that Gheaus' attempt to recover this normative force presupposes an epistemic dimension to the feasibility requirement that most proponents of that requirement would reject. © 2014 The Author.
TL;DR: The authors argue that negative existentials do not have truthmakers, and therefore rejecting Truthmaker Maximalism, need not worry Truthmaker embracers, and argue that the conditional that if one embraces Truthmaker, the one ought to embrace Truth-Maximalism is false by considering small worlds where very little, if anything, exists.
Abstract: Truthmaker says that things, broadly construed, are the ontological grounds of truth and therefore, that things make truths true. Recently, there have been a number of arguments purporting to show that if one embraces Truthmaker, then one ought to embrace Truthmaker Maximalism — the view that all nonanalytic propositions have truthmakers. But then if one embraces Truthmaker, one ought to think that negative existentials have truthmakers. I argue that this is false. I begin by arguing that recent attempts by Ross Cameron and Jonathan Schaffer to provide negative existentials with truthmakers by appealing to the world fail. I then argue that the conditional — if one embraces Truthmaker, the one ought to embrace Truthmaker Maximalism — is false by considering small worlds where very little, if anything at all, exists. The conclusion is that thinking that negative existentials do not have truthmakers, and therefore rejecting Truthmaker Maximalism, need not worry Truthmaker embracers. Truth requires an explanation, or ontological ground, of sorts.1 One way of articulating this requirement is to say that things, broadly construed, are the ontological ground of truths and therefore, that things make truths true. Call the claim that things make truths true Truthmaker. Call the claim that all non-analytic truths are made true by things Max, which I’ll formulate as follows: Max. Necessarily, for all non-analytic propositions p, if is true, then there is some thing(s) E and is true in virtue of E2 Recently, there have been a number of arguments purporting to show that if one embraces Truthmaker, then one ought to embrace Max (Mumford 2007: 49; Merricks 2007: 39-67; Dodd 2007; Cameron 2008a: 411-412). Some philosophers who 1For example, Aristotle (1984: 22) says “if there is a man, the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true ... And whereas the true statement is in no way the cause of the actual thing’s existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement’s being true.” W. V. O. Quine (1970: 10-11) echoes this thought when he says “No sentence is true but reality makes it so”. 2I follow custom in allowing that ’ ’ stand for ’the proposition that p’.
TL;DR: The authors argue that cases of multiple thinkers are innocuous and that there is not too much thinking and that the thinking shared between persons and their bodies is exactly what we should expect at the intersection of part sharing and the supervenience of the mental on the physical.
Abstract: Persons think. Bodies, time-slices of persons, and brains might also think. They have the necessary neural equipment. Thus, there seems to be more than one thinker in your chair. Critics assert that this is too many thinkers and that we should reject ontologies that allow more than one thinker in your chair. I argue that cases of multiple thinkers are innocuous and that there is not too much thinking. Rather, the thinking shared between, for example, persons and their bodies is exactly what we should expect at the intersection of part sharing and the supervenience of the mental on the physical. I end by responding to the overcrowding objection, the personhood objection, the personal-pronoun reference problem and the epistemic objection.
TL;DR: This paper examined all the contexts in which Aristotle thought syllogismoi can be used, and argued that, for each context, irreflexivity makes sense as a condition, but for different reasons.
Abstract: Aristotle's definition of syllogismos at Prior Analytics 24b18–20 specifies syllogistic consequence as an irreflexive relation: the conclusion must be different from each premise and any conjunction of the premises. Typically, commentators explain this irreflexivity condition as Aristotle's attempt to brand question-begging syllogismoi illegitimate in argumentative contexts. However, this explanation faces two problems. First, it fails to consider all the contexts in which Aristotle thinks syllogismoi are deployed. Secondly, irreflexivity rules out only some arguments that Aristotle considers question begging. Here I address these problems. First, I examine all the contexts in which Aristotle thinks syllogismoi can be used. Secondly, I argue that, for each context, irreflexivity makes sense as a condition, but for different reasons. Assuming that a condition which holds in each context is a condition on syllogistic consequence tout court, this explains why Aristotle holds syllogistic consequence to be an irreflexive relation.
TL;DR: The authors defend virtue responsibilism against these charges, arguing that human subjects rarely possess virtue-compliant virtues, and that moral virtue obfuscation can lead to skepticism and empirical inadequacy.
Abstract: Some epistemologists—virtue responsibilists—model the intellectual virtues on Aristotelian moral virtues. According to responsibilists, intellectual virtues are stable, excellent dispositions of cognitive character like intellectual courage, open-mindedness, curiosity and creativity. Such virtues figure prominently in responsibilist accounts of knowledge, epistemic justification and proper inquiry. In a recent paper, Mark Alfano argues that because human subjects rarely possess responsibilist virtues, responsibilism skirts skepticism and empirical inadequacy. The present paper defends responsibilism against these charges.
TL;DR: In a series of papers, Eli Hirsch develops a deflationary account of certain ontological debates, specifically those regarding the composition and persistence of physical objects, and argues that these debates are merely verbal disputes between philosophers who fail to correctly express themselves in a common language.
Abstract: In a series of papers, Eli Hirsch develops a deflationary account of certain ontological debates, specifically those regarding the composition and persistence of physical objects. He argues that these debates are merely verbal disputes between philosophers who fail to correctly express themselves in a common language. To establish the truth in plain English about these issues, Hirsch contends, we need only listen to the assertions of ordinary speakers and interpret them charitably. In this paper, I argue that Hirsch’s conclusions rest on a deficient understanding of the principle of charity. On a proper understanding of this principle, we can see that philosophical disagreement on these issues is not merely verbal. Further, it is no serious violation of charity to interpret ordinary assertions on these matters as false, for the beliefs they express can be explained as reasonable mistakes. Throughout I focus on the debate on composition; but my arguments should carry over to the debate on persistence.