Showing papers in "World Politics in 1965"

Political Development and Political Decay

Abstract: Among the laws that rule human societies,” de Tocqueville said, “there is one which seems to be more precise and clear than all others. If men are to remain civilized or to become so, the art of associating together must grow and improve in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions is increased.”1 In much of the world today, equality of political participation is growing much more rapidly than is the “art of associating together.” The rates of mobilization and participation are high; the rates of organization and institutionalization are low. De Tocqueville's precondition for civilized society is in danger, if it is not already undermined. In these societies, the conflict between mobilization and institutionalization is the crux of politics. Yet in the fast-growing literature on the politics of the developing areas, political institutionalization usually receives scant treatment. Writers on political development emphasize the processes of modernization and the closely related phenomena of social mobilization and increasing political participation. A balanced view of the politics of contemporary Asia, Africa, and Latin America requires more attention to the “art of associating together” and the growth of political institutions. For this purpose, it is useful to distinguish political development from modernization and to identify political development with the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures. Rapid increases in mobilization and participation, the principal political aspects of modernization, undermine political institutions. Rapid modernization, in brief, produces not political development, but political decay.

A Developmental Approach to Political Systems

Abstract: During the past decade two tendencies have come to dominate the field of comparative politics. One of these is the concern for theoretical explication and methodological rigor, and the second is the emphasis on field studies of the “emerging,” “new,” and “non-Western” nations. The theoretical tendency has largely taken the form of applications of "systems" theory to the study of politics, and the chief criticism of this approach has been that it is a static theory, not suitable for the analysis and explanation of political change.

The Dictator and Totalitarianism

Abstract: Significantly, we have few if any studies of the totalitarian O dictator as a personality type. It may be that we are little closer to a working psychological model of him than Plato took us with his brilliant sketch of the ideal type of the “tyrant” in The Republic. The contemporary literature on totalitarianism does, of course, contain materials that are relevant to the problem of characterization of the totalitarian dictator. Yet no frontal attack appears to have been made upon the problem. The purpose of the present article is to argue the need for one, and to do this in the context of a critical reexamination of the theory of totalitarianism. In the course of it I shall put forward some ideas of possible use in developing a conception of the dictator as a personality type.

International Law and Assumptions about the State System

Abstract: Most writers on international relations and international law still examine the relationship between international law and politics in terms of the assumption that law either should or does function only as a coercive restraint on political action. Textbook writers on general international politics like Morgenthau, and Lerche and Said, as well as those scholars who have specialized in international law like J. L. Brierly and Charles De Visscher, make the common assumption that international law should be examined as a system of coercive norms controlling the actions of states. Even two of the newer works, The Political Foundations of International Law by Morton A. Kaplan and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and Law and Minimum World Public Order by Myres S. McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, in spite of an occasional reference to the non-coercive aspects of international law, are developed primarily from the model of international law as a system of restraint. Deriving their conception of the relationship between international law and political action from their ideas on the way law functions in domestic communities, most modern writers look at international law as an instrument of direct control. The assumption that international law is or should be a coercive restraint on state action structures almost every analysis, no matter what the school of thought or the degree of optimism or pessimism about the effectiveness of the international legal system. With an intellectual framework that measures international law primarily in terms of constraint on political action, there is little wonder that skepticism about international law continues to increase while creative work on the level of theory seems to be diminishing.

U.S. Business Interests in Cuba and the Rise of Castro

Abstract: Private investment in Latin America by citizens of the United States, as well as in other less-developed areas of the world, is widely regarded as a valuable—if not an indispensable—component of the overall U.S. foreign assistance program. By quickly identifying and exploring promising new business opportunities, and by providing financial resources and human skills required to translate them into going ventures, U.S. investment activities can make a vital contribution to economic development. Recognizing the role of private investment in furthering its national interests, the U.S. government has for a number of years sought to promote the flow of new investment: a rapidly growing investment guarantee program, direct government loans to eligible private investors, and investment information services are some of the instruments employed by the government in pursuing this objective. To provide additional incentives, a bill currently before Congress stipulates that U.S. investors making certain kinds of new investments in eligible, less-developed countries would be permitted to deduct 30 per cent of the cost of the investment from their total federal income-tax obligations.

The Policy Sciences of Development

Abstract: These first three volumes of a promising series are strong evidence that the policy sciences of development are beginning to emerge as an identifiable problem-oriented frame of reference, intersecting every specialized field of knowledge. The goals of development are gaining clarity; the historical perspective deepens; the interdependence of conditioning factors is better understood; the probable lines of future growth are more fully projected; and the invention and evaluation of policies designed to maximize or at least to achieve minimum results are forging ahead. The editors of each volume have woven theory and data into coherent patterns, and many essays—such as the chapters by Marx, Riggs, Lerner, and Pool—are sharply centered on the hitherto underdeveloped topics with which they come to grips. The Almond-Coleman model of political development lurks meaningfully in the wings.

The International Bank in Political Perspective

Abstract: Although the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been in existence for nearly two decades, the political aspects of its activities have received scant attention. Most of the literature on IBRD operations has been written by economists, who quite naturally emphasize the economic aspects. Political scientists, to the extent that they have discussed it at all, have described most of its operations as removed “from the sphere of international or domestic politics.” The purpose of the following analysis is to determine in what respects the activities of the International Bank may be described as “political.” Such a determination would be useful in three ways. First, it would, it is hoped, stimulate research on international organizations as actors in international politics; second, it would require revision of the standard explanations of the evolution of international development aid programs; and third, it would aid in evaluating the argument for more multilateral aid which assumes that such aid is “nonpolitical.”

The Concept of Preparation: Some Questions about the Transfer of Systems of Government

Abstract: Arecent commentator has suggested that the value to political science of looking at new states is that “one is forced to deal with the most basic questions of politics—the entire set of questions involved in the creation and maintenance of political societies.” Certainly this appears to be true time and again. One is forced to look at the largest questions to the smallest, both because they are vivid and apparent, and because they are also urgent. The basic problem of obligation—why we do things we do not want to do, and allow unpleasant things to be done to us by political leaders, or why we accept the authority of power—is for us either a matter of analysis or of sociological inquiry. Clearly it is more than that in a new state. There the question is a living one, sometimes for a large minority, sometimes for many small sections or groups. The state and the nation are not, as yet, one. Rousseau or Hobbes have come to life.

The “Satisfied” and “Dissatisfied” States Negotiate International Law: A Case Study

Abstract: Peace will be achieved, virtually all Western leaders say upon issuing a general statement on foreign policy, when all men learn to obey a common law. The achievement of world peace through world law is a popular solution to the problems of world politics of our times. However, creating a viable international law that all or even most states are willing to obey has proved difficult.

The Role of Social Science in China Scholarship

Abstract: In 1959, the tenth anniversary of the Communist take-over in China, Howard Boorman reviewed Western scholarship on Chinese politics in an essay subtitled “Some Remarks on Retarded Development.” 1 Although a good deal has taken place in Western rese0arch since that time—and the Chinese Communists have, through their actions, generated considerably more subject matter—I am inclined to give my essay the same subtitle. Many books and articles on China have been published since 1959, but social science analysis has neither “staged a take-off” nor begun “the drive to maturity,” to borrow two of W. W. Rostow's terms. In fact, in my opinion social science has yet to achieve “the preconditions for take-off” from which it can begin to theorize about China.

Parties and Pressure Groups in Weimar and Bonn

Abstract: In the last forty years, Germany has had three radically different political systems. In each case, the party system, better than any other single index, reflects the style of politics of that period. The highly splintered, multiparty system of Weimar mirrors perfectly the extreme ideological dissension and radicalism of postwar German politics. The one-party system of the Third Reich epitomizes the attempt to destroy the individual's traditional social ties and then to absorb him totally in a coordinated movement. Finally, the two-party system of Bonn reflects the growing social and political consensus concerning the more pragmatic and concrete political goals of postHitlerian Germany. Although these three political systems are intimately related, the main question for us is why the democratic party systems of Weimar and Bonn are so different. The party systems are unintelligible, however, without an understanding of the patterns of pressure-group politics as well.

Neo-Destour Leadership and the “Confiscated Revolution”

Abstract: When Philippe Herreman of Le Monde spoke of Tunisia's “confiscated revolution” in 1958,1 he was referring to the rivalry of President Bourguiba and the vigorous union leader Ahmed Ben Salah. Three years later their differences were overcome and Ben Salah emerged as Minister of Planning and Finance, one of the most powerful positions in the government. The social revolution envisaged by the highly privileged and colorful labor leader in 1956 had been confiscated in 1958 and became the cornerstone of Tunisian domestic policy in 1961. Such have been the gyrations of the one-party system in Tunisia and in other African states.

People and Population

Abstract: The human population is the base of human existence This, when considered, seems an inescapable proposition But in the minds of most men it must have an absurd remoteness The process of population has seemed like primordial creation itself, hardly a thing to be touched by mere scruple Beyond the scope of any deliberation, the peopling of the earth has, for mankind as a whole, remained unquestioned as the earth, an axiom behind which there was no going and from which all proceeded But according to a relentless gathering of awareness, as witnessed in an abundance of recent writings, it appears that history has marched to a new point The condition of the world is being modified by a constellation of emergencies, and any observation and reflection on them, any rough glance at the outlines of trends in the life of the world, points to the swelling flood of population as the central reality in every perspective on the future

Sartre on Colonialism

Abstract: In the fifth volume of his collected essays, Jean-Paul Sartre has brought together thirteen pieces written during the last ten years and dealing with the problems of colonialism and decolonization. They range from prefaces or reviews of books to polemical articles and interviews on the Algerian question and French politics; as is to be expected, they vary widely in quality as well as importance. Some of them are perhaps better seen as documents, testimonials of Sartre's courageous stand against the policies of successive French cabinets toward Algeria. At a time when the majority of the French people and of their leaders were striving to avoid seeing or acknowledging the profound moral issues confronting them, Sartre's voice was among the few raised to point out the real problems, to remind Frenchmen of their own recent experience under the Nazis, and to warn them against imitating those Germans who "did not know" what was happening at Dachau and Auschwitz. At the time of the Hungarian revolt of 1956, Sartre did not let his commitment to Marxism and to the left still his voice or his conscience. During the Algerian war, in the late 1950's, he became once again the conscience and the voice of French humanism and French culture. He and his collaborators and friends kept up the intellectual (and sometimes material) contact between France, as a nation and as an idea, and her rebellious colonial subjects.

Clausewitz: A Bibliographical Survey

Abstract: The vitality of the social sciences in the United States has not prevented some of its most influential pioneers from becoming unread classics. A widespread preference for textbook treatment and up-to-theminute analysis plays its part; but if the reader does want to turn to the originals, he often finds that they are not readily available. Complete and scholarly editions of writers who pursued new directions of inquiry are rarer than might be supposed—even in their native language. The situation is particularly bad when it comes to foreign authors. A writer's theories and insights may be transmitted through one or two major works, while the rest of his output is ignored, so that his thoughts are analyzed in isolation, without benefit of the preliminary sketches, correspondence, and marginal studies that would give depth and suppleness to the interpretation. Until recently Rousseau and Tocqueville have been in this position; another case in point is Max Weber, ignorance of whose fertile theorizing has misled more than one commentator. Still another, and extreme, example of intellectual discontinuity is provided by Clausewitz. Much of his work has never been published; even in German most of it is out of print; little of it has ever been translated. The result has been the partial loss of a remarkable historical and theoretical achievement. To the American reader, in particular, Clausewitz rarely means more than the “philosopher of war,” a famous name associated with one or two cliches backed up by little of substance. Repeated attempts to outline Clausewitz's thought, or to present the “essential Clausewitz” in the form of excerpts, have never been of more than doubtful value, if only because his methodology and dialectic are scarcely less interesting than the conclusions they reach. It would be pointless to attempt the impossible once again. On the other hand, a brief survey of Clausewitz's writings and of the literature concerning him may provide a useful introduction to his theories and to the manner in which for the past 150 years they have influenced the study and the waging of war.

Foreign Policy-Making and Administrative Politics

Abstract: Serious literature about foreign policy, when it is not primarily historical, can be classed in three ways. It is either pragmatic, attempting to solve specific problems through a mastery of specific data; or it is what I will call unitary, arguing for comprehensive solutions on the basis of some general vision of the truth; or it is pluralistic, asserting the value of many approaches and denying the certainty of any one.

Democratic Stability and Instability: The French Case

Abstract: The outstanding characteristic of the French political system is its historical instability. Constitutional monarchy was overthrown by a revolution, replaced by a republic, which in turn quickly evolved into a dictatorship, and when it too was dismissed by an armed uprising, the interminable squabbles among the monarchist factions allowed another republic to come into existence by default. But for an “accident” of history this republic too would have given way to a dictatorship through the bloodless medium of the coup d'etat, but while the republic tottered on in the interwar period the life-span of its governments was calculated in terms of months rather than years, and with its “collapse” under the coup de grâce of military defeat a new dictatorship immediately sprang up to take its place, to be succeeded by another republic lasting for thirteen years amid constantly recurring cabinet crises, then falling in the wake of an eminently successful revolution, out of which emerged the present regime. Here we have what sociologists might label the “institutionalization of instability”, interpreted by a number of leading writers on French politics as the product of a deep-seated conflict between the “two Frances”, whether these two political subcultures are viewed as the parties of mouvement and of I'ordre etabli, or as the “administrative and representative traditions.”

The Progress of European Integration

Abstract: On June 15, 1964, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development adopted its Final Act. General Principle 10 of this Act contains the following recommendation: “Regional economic groupings, integration or other forms of economic co-operation should be promoted among developing countries as a means of expanding their intra-regional and extra-regional trade and encouraging their economic growth and their industrial and agricultural diversification."1 The Act expresses the discontent of the developing nations with the existing state of affairs and their readiness to experiment with new forms of regional economic cooperation.

Old Realities and New Myths

Abstract: SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S recent excursion into the analysis of foreign policy has been hailed as a breath of fresh air that sweeps away the cobwebs of cant and misunderstanding. The history of postwar foreign policy explains why such a study is needed. The inspiring successes and inventive genius of the first Truman Administration-an era unparalleled in American history for resourceful and courageous adaptation to changing circumstances-have been succeeded by disarray and confusion in American foreign policy. Both the early postwar stereotypes and the grand design of policy are breaking down. Thus the Senator's objective-an objective of unmasking old myths and clarifying new realities-is necessary and salutary. But has the Senator reached his goal or has he rather obscured old realities and created new myths? Has he clarified the failings of our foreign policy since i950 or is he preparing the way for the mistakes of the late i960's? Has he analyzed the mistaken assumptions, the lost opportunities, and the changed contours of the problems or has he compounded the set of errors? Has he exorcised true myths or instead ghosts-pale reflections of positions that have been rejected for a decade? Has he correctly outlined the differences between the foreign policies of Stalin and Khrushchev or has his analysis falsified both positions? Has Senator Fulbright's use of social science produced deeper understanding of the problems of statecraft or has it produced misleading oversimplifications and erroneous generalizations? Matters that are very important and also very complex, such as international politics, naturally produce passionate dispute. One therefore often wants to write circumspectly in order to lower the fever of the debaters. There is also a proper role for the deliberately controversial piece. This is sometimes an important means for forcing re-examination of beliefs that are very deeply held. Senator Fulbright's book essays such a role. So does this review article.

Peace and War

Abstract: In the preface to Paix et Guerre entre les nations Raymond Aron writes that: “Mon but est de comprendre la logique implicite des relations entre collectivites politiquement organisees.” As an effort to comprehend the implicit logic of state relations, Paix et Guerre is clearly one of the most ambitious works to appear in recent years. In terms of sheer scope, it has few—if indeed, any—serious competitors among general treatises on international relations. Moreover, in terms of substantive accomplishments, it is in many respects one of the most impressive works to appear in a long time. It is impressive if only because of the critical function it performs. Few theories of significance directly or indirectly relating to “l'institution belliqueuse” escape Aron's attention and criticism.1Paix et Guerre is impressive for the way in which it seeks to encompass and to organize the disparate materials making up the study of international relations and, in particular, for the manner in which it attempts to comprehend certain behavior— diplomatic-strategic action—from diverse points of view. It is equally impressive for its awareness that the progress of a discipline generally and the utility of comparative study particularly depend on drawing clear and precise distinctions and devising useful classifications. Finally, Paix et Guerre is impressive for the perceptiveness with which it analyzes contemporary international politics. Aron's chapters on the diplomacy and strategy of the nuclear age—“le monde fini”—form a model of political analysis. Not the least of its virtues is the modesty of the conclusions drawn and the disavowal of oracular pretensions. The same modesty characterizes Aron's theoretical endeavors. If a pervasive skepticism is applied to the theories of others, and particularly to “les grandes hypotheses,” Aron is almost as skeptical of his own efforts to lay bare “les conditions des choix historiques.” In large measure, Paix et Guerre is a sustained and often brilliant effort to demonstrate the limits of our present knowledge. That effort performs a much needed service.

The International Pattern of Authority

Abstract: The broad question posed here is how authority is distributed in the world and what shifts may be occurring in its pattern of distribution. Mainly, of course, authority is today allocated according to the Western State System, characterized in its legal mechanics by territorial rule among equals and in its political philosophy by consent of the governed. Conveniently dated from the Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution, the system is now more widespread than ever before.

Arms Control and the Developing Countries

Abstract: THE detonation of Peking's first atomic devices in recent months has provoked renewed widespread discussion of the dangers of the further spread of nuclear weaponry. Speculation has flourished about who would be next-Sweden? Japan? Israel? Or perhaps India, which has become the first nonnuclear country to build a chemical separation plant? Cost estimates put nuclear weapons within reach of the poorest nations within a few years.1 Governments have issued solemn pronouncements about the need to design further international agreements to prevent nuclear proliferation. The President of the United States made use of a high-level committee to advise him how to deal with the problem. There is good reason to become nervous about the prospect of a five-, six-, seven-, ten-, or twenty-nation nuclear world, notwithstanding minority arguments that such a situation might increase stability. There seems to be a consensus that such an environment would furnish to individual political and military leaders, of varying degrees of personal stability, integrity, or responsibility, new and potentially disastrous opportunities for mischief on a grand scale. The present proclivity of some small states to invoke the possibility of thermonuclear war if they do not have their way could turn from rhetoric to reality. So to have a threatening disease under control at one site, as we now temporarily do, by no means guarantees preventing its outbreak at a variety of other sites. In short, the further spread of nuclear weapons cannot be regarded by responsible nations as anything but a profound complication at best, a lethal menace at worst. But even though the impulse to suppress the further spread of nuclear weapons to the smaller countries is a sound one, it is not clear that it has been well thought out in a broader political and strategic context. Prescriptions that focus only on nuclear weapons, or only on

Worker-Management Councils in Indonesia

Abstract: Numerous articles and books have been written on workermanagement cooperation. 1 It may be of interest to students of industrial and political relations to study such arrangements in Asian countries. This article will discuss such an arrangement in one of the Asian countries—i.e., worker-management councils ( dewan perusahaan ) in Indonesia, as they have developed from 1960 up to June 1964.

New Trends in International Affairs

Abstract: The impulse to question the conventional wisdom about world problems has in recent years reflected the perfectly normal dissatisfaction with the way things were going. The temptation has been great to question the rationality of a system preserved against disastrous collapse only, it seemed, by shared knowledge of how disastrous the consequences of collapse would be. (One is reminded of the young lady at the ball who was asked by her escort what it was that held up her strapless evening gown. When she replied that it was “gravity”, he queried the principle. “Gravity”, he said, “should make it fall down.” Her response perhaps describes the contemporary dilemma: “sOh, I don't mean Newton's gravity, but the gravity of my situation if the darned thing doesn't work.”) The phenomenon is, perhaps, described as “self-preventing prophecy.” The fact that the phenomenon has seemed to work thus far is hardly an adequate response to those who are uneasy about its reliability, as no one can fail to be.

Coexistence and Cooperation in International Law

Abstract: The political scientist and the politician of our day both tend to be skeptical of international law. The political scientist, who is interested in studying the distribution of power, sees in the classic rules of international law neither an adequate description of the conduct of states nor an effective prescription for ordering national conduct. The politician, who is interested in the exercise of power, finds it difficult to realize what he considers vital national interests within the traditional legal framework. Both scholars and practitioners apparently feel that the older rhetoric of international law—nonintervention, peaceful settlement of disputes, the law of war—is to a great extent irrelevant to a world in turmoil. Bombings without declaration of war, illegal reprisals, campaigns of political assassination, and military intervention to crush internal revolt are accepted as part of the backdrop of world conflict. It seems increasingly clear that the classic rules of international law and the basic political and moral principles on which they rest are now used less and less by the great powers even as points of reference. Nothing sounds more old-fashioned than Secretary Stimson's remarks of less than forty years ago, in advising against the establishment of a national intelligence service, that “gentlemen don't read each other's mail.”

The Styles of American International Thought: Mahan, Bryan, and Lippmann

Abstract: BECAUSE of heightened involvement of the United States in world affairs during the period between the Spanish-American War and World War I, American political thought expanded to include the dimension of international politics. In the process three different styles of thought emerged. Each style was equipped with its characteristic view of the nature of international politics, the nature and role of war, views of human nature, a method of social and political analysis, and proposals for dealing with the problems of world politics. One was deterministic, pessimistic, and realistic. It viewed man from the point of view of his limitations, and politics from the point of view of power and force. The second was utopian, optimistic, and moralistic. It tended to emphasize the role of morality in politics, and to stress the perfectibility of man. It sought to achieve a world without war, a political "heaven on earth." It was soft-hearted and democratic, and, if the first style was sometimes crusty and cranky, this second style was not infrequently naive and platitudinous. The third style was pragmatic, sociological, and almost scientific in its approach. It was neither overly optimistic nor pessimistic. It put its faith in knowledge and analysis, recognizing the role of power in political life, but tempering that awareness with concern for the equally important ethical and emotional dimensions of politics. The existence of these three styles simultaneously in American thought has, in part, reflected the fluctuations in American international relations. The Deterministic style was conservative and toughminded. From Theodore Roosevelt to John Foster Dulles it has, on and off, held sway in American life. The Utopian style was reform-oriented, reflecting in large part a basic populism frequently recurring in American politics. From Woodrow Wilson to the Women's March for Peace, Utopianism has been characteristic of a large part of American attitudes toward world affairs. Pragmatism in world affairs has only recently assumed major proportions in American foreign affairs. John