Proceedings ArticleDOI
A model and architecture for conducting hierarchically structured auctions
Paul D. Ezhilchelvan,Santosh K. Shrivastava,Mark Cameron Little +2 more
- pp 129-137
TLDR
The paper develops a distributed systems architecture for dependable Internet based online auctions, meeting the requirements of data integrity, responsiveness, fairness and scalability, and selects a suitable auction model that treats sellers and buyers symmetrically.Abstract:
The paper develops a distributed systems architecture for dependable Internet based online auctions, meeting the requirements of data integrity, responsiveness, fairness and scalability. It is well known that a tree-based, recursive design approach caters well for scalability requirements. With this observation in mind, the paper develops an approach that permits an auction service to be mapped on to globally distributed auction servers. The paper selects a suitable auction model that treats sellers and buyers symmetrically. This symmetry enables a computational node to play at one level of the tree the role of a seller by dealing with a group of potential buyers as well as to play the role of a potential buyer at the next higher level. Such a symmetric auction (also known as a double auction) is used for supporting a standard auction to be carried out in a hierarchic manner. An architecture is developed and basic algorithms and protocols are presented.read more
Citations
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Customer-Driven Sensor Management
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Proceedings ArticleDOI
A dependable distributed auction system: architecture and an implementation framework
TL;DR: The paper develops a distributed system architecture and proposes an implementation framework for conducting dependable Internet based online auctions, meeting the requirements of scalability and service integrity.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Design and evaluation of a QoS-adaptive system for reliable multicasting
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a reliable multicast protocol whose objective is to deliver a message to all intended destinations, despite possible crashes of the sender and other processes, and communication failures.
Design and Evaluation of a QoS-Adaptive System for Reliable Multicasting
TL;DR: This paper presents and studies a reliable multicast protocol whose objective is to deliver a message to all intended destinations, despite possible crashes of the sender and other processes, and communication failures.
Proceedings Article
A Hierarchical distributed communication architecture for real-time auctions.
TL;DR: This paper presents a new hierarchical distributed communication architecture, called AHS (Auction Handling System), based on clusters, which uses the IRC channels and protocol facilities in order to support real-time auction applications (RTA).
References
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Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
TL;DR: In this article, Klemperer et al. provide an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject.
Book
Computer Networks: A Systems Approach
Larry L. Peterson,Bruce S. Davie +1 more
TL;DR: Computer Networks: A Systems Approach, Fifth Edition, discusses the key principles of computer networking and expands coverage of the topics of utmost importance to networking professionals and students, including P2P, wireless, security, and applications.
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TL;DR: Since lost packets are recovered by local retransmissions as opposed to retransmission from the original sender, end-to-end latency is significantly reduced, and the overall throughput is improved as well.
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Bargaining under Incomplete Information
TL;DR: This paper presents and analyzes a bargaining model of bilateral monopoly under uncertainty that implies an offer strategy of each party that is monotonic in its own reservation price and depends on its assessment of the opponent's reservation price.
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Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation
TL;DR: The economic incentives facing participants in auction mechanisms are analyzed, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation of values by buyers or sellers, but not both, and for single- but not multi-unit bids.
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