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Analysis of non-aligned double JPEG artifacts for the localization of image forgeries

TLDR
A forensic algorithm to discriminate between original and forged regions in JPEG images, under the hypothesis that the tampered image presents a non-aligned double JPEG compression (NA-JPEG).
Abstract
In this paper, we present a forensic algorithm to discriminate between original and forged regions in JPEG images, under the hypothesis that the tampered image presents a non-aligned double JPEG compression (NA-JPEG). Unlike previous approaches, the proposed algorithm does not need to manually select a suspect region to test the presence or the absence of NA-JPEG artifacts. Based on a new statistical model, the probability for each 8 × 8 DCT block to be forged is automatically derived. Experimental results, considering different forensic scenarios, demonstrate the validity of the proposed approach.

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Analysis of Non-Aligned Double JPEG Artifacts for
the Localization of Image Forgeries
T. Bianchi
#1
,A.Piva
#2
#
Dept. of Electronics and Telecommunications, University of Florence, Via S. Marta 3, 50139 Firenze, Italy
National Inter-University Consortium for Telecommunications, Via S. Marta 3, 50139 Firenze, Italy
1
tiziano.bianchi@unifi.it
2
alessandro.piva@unifi.it
Abstract—In this paper, we present a forensic algorithm to dis-
criminate between original and forged regions in JPEG images,
under the hypothesis that the tampered image presents a non-
aligned double JPEG compression (NA-JPEG). Unlike previous
approaches, the proposed algorithm does not need to manually
select a suspect region to test the presence or the absence of NA-
JPEG artifacts. Based on a new statistical model, the probability
for each 8 × 8 DCT block to be forged is automatically derived.
Experimental results, considering different forensic scenarios,
demonstrate the validity of the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
The availability of easy-to-use image processing tools al-
lowing to modify the content of digital images is today so
large that the diffusion of fake contents through the digital
world is becoming increasing and worrying. Such a possibility
raises several problems in all the fields in which the credibility
of images should be granted before using them as sources of
information, like insurance, law and order, journalism, medical
applications.
In the last years many image forensic techniques have been
proposed as a means for revealing the presence of forgeries in
digital images through the analysis of statistical and geometri-
cal features, JPEG quantization artifacts, interpolation effects,
demosaicing traces, feature inconsistencies, etc. [1].
Since the majority of digital images is stored in JPEG
format, several forensic tools have been designed to detect
the presence of tampering in this class of images. The forgery
is revealed by analyzing some artifacts introduced by JPEG
recompression occurring when the forged image is generated;
in particular, such artifacts can be categorized into two classes,
according to whether the second JPEG compression uses a
DCT grid aligned with the first compression or not. The
first case will be referred to as aligned double JPEG (A-
DJPG) compression, whereas the second case will be referred
to as non-aligned double JPEG (NA-DJPG) compression.
Approaches belonging to the first category include [2], where
the author proposes to detect areas which have undergone
a double JPEG compression by recompressing the image at
different quality levels and looking for the presence of so-
called ghosts, and [3],[4], where double JPEG compression
WIFS‘2011, November 29th-December 2nd, 2011, Foz do
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2011 IEEE.
is detected analyzing the statistics of blockwise DCT coeffi-
cients. The presence of non-aligned double JPEG compression
has been investigated in [5],[6] and [7], that detect particular
distortions in blocking artifacts, in [8], where the shift of
the primary JPEG compression is determined via a demixing
approach, and in [9], where the periodicity of blockwise DCT
coefficients is studied.
However, the above algorithms rely on the hypothesis to
know the right location of the forgery area, for example by
applying a segmentation of the image under test before the
forensic analysis [6], or they are just designed to decide if
the whole image has been doubly JPEG compressed [ 5][7],
so that the correct localization of the forgery in a tampered
image is still an open issue. To the best of our knowledge, only
some forensic algorithms designed to work in the presence
of aligned double JPEG compression are able to localize a
tampered area: in [3] and [4] two methods are proposed for
the automatic localization of tampered regions with a fine-
grained scale of 8 × 8 blocks.
In this paper, we propose then the first forensic tool that,
differently from previous works, can reveal a tampering at a
local level, without any prior information about the location
of the manipulated area, in the presence of non-aligned double
JPEG compression. The output of the algorithm is a map that
gives the probability, or the likelihood, for each 8 × 8 image
block to be tampered. The proposed algorithm can be applied
in different forensic scenarios, in which either the presence
or the absence of NA-JPEG artifacts at a local level can be
interpreted as evidence of tampering.
II. F
ORENSIC SCENARIOS
In order to correctly interpret the presence or the absence of
artifacts due to double compression, in the following analysis
we will consider two different scenarios.
A first scenario is that in which an original JPEG image,
after some localized forgery, is saved again in JPEG format.
We can assume that the forger disrupts the JPEG compression
statistics in the tampered area: examples could be a cut and
paste from either a non compressed image or a resized image,
or the insertion of computer generated content. In this case,
DCT coefficients of unmodified areas will undergo a double
JPEG compression thus exhibiting double quantization (DQ)
artifacts, while DCT coefficients of forged areas will result

from a single compression and will likely present no DQ
artifacts. In the following, we will refer to this case as the
single compression forgery (SCF) hypothesis.
A second scenario is that of image splicing. In this kind
of forgery, it is assumed that a region from a JPEG image
is pasted onto a host image that does not exhibit JPEG
compression statistics, and that the resulting image is JPEG
recompressed. In this case, the forged region will exhibit
double compression artifacts, whereas the non manipulated
region will present no such artifacts. In the following, we will
refer to this second case as the double compression forgery
(DCF) hypothesis.
Under the SCF hypothesis, NA-DJPG artifacts will be
present if the original image is randomly cropped before being
recompressed in JPEG format. Under the DCF hypothesis,
assuming that the forged region is randomly pasted in the new
image, there is a probability of 63/64 that the 8×8 block grids
of the host image and of the pasted region will be misaligned,
and thus that the forged region will exhibit NA-DJPG artifacts.
III. S
INGLE AND DOUBLE JPEG COMPRESSION MODELS
In this section, we will describe the statistical model used to
characterize NA-DJPG artifacts. We will also introduce some
simplifications that will be useful in defining the proposed
detection algorithm, as well as some modifications needed to
take into account the effects of rounding and truncation errors
between the first compression and the second compression.
A. JPEG Compression Model
The JPEG compression algorithm can be modeled by three
basic steps [10]: 8 × 8 block DCT of the image pixels,
uniform quantization of DCT coefficients with a quantization
matrix whose values depend on a quality factor QF , entropy
encoding of the quantized values. The image resulting from
decompression will be obtained by the inverse of each step
in reverse order: entropy decoding, dequantization, inverse
block DCT. In the following analysis, we will consider that
quantization is achieved by dividing each DCT coefficient by
a proper quantization step Q and rounding the result to the
nearest integer, whereas dequantization is achieved by simply
multiplying by Q.
Let us then assume that an original uncompressed image
I is JPEG compressed with a quality factor QF , and then
decompressed. Since entropy encoding is perfectly reversible,
the image obtained after JPEG decompression can be modeled
as follows:
I
1
= D
1
00
D(Q(D
00
I)) + E
1
= I + R
1
. (1)
In the above equation, D
00
models an 8 × 8 block DCT with
the grid aligned with the upper left corner of the image, Q(·)
and D(·) model quantization and dequantization processes,
respectively, and E
1
is the error introduced by rounding and
truncating the output values to eight bit integers. The last quan-
tity R
1
can be thought of as the overall approximation error
introduced by JPEG compression with respect to the original
image. In the above chain, if we neglect rounding/truncation
(R/T) errors, the only operation causing a loss of information
is the quantization process Q(·).
Let us now analyse the artifacts that appear in the presence
of a double non-aligned JPEG compression, due to the interac-
tion of successive quantization and dequantization processes.
B. NA-DJPG Compression
In the case of NA-DJPG compression, we can assume that
the original image I has been JPEG compressed with a quality
factor QF
1
using a DCT grid shifted by (r, c), 0 r 7 and
0 c 7, with respect to the upper left corner, so that the
image obtained after JPEG decompression can be represented
as:
I
1
= D
1
rc
D
1
(Q
1
(D
rc
I)) + E
1
(2)
where D
rc
I are the unquantized DCT coefficients of I and Q
1
,
D
1
denote that a proper quantization matrix corresponding to
the quality QF
1
was used.
We then assume that the image has been again JPEG
compressed with a quality factor QF
2
, but now with the block
grid aligned with the upper left corner of the image. If we
consider the DCT coefficients of the second compression after
entropy decoding, no noticeable artifacts are present. However,
if we consider the image after the second decompression, i.e.,
I
2
= I
1
+ R
2
, and we apply a block DCT with alignment
(r, c),wehave
D
rc
I
2
= D
1
(Q
1
(D
rc
I)) + D
rc
(E
1
+ R
2
). (3)
Since the JPEG standard uses 64 different quantization steps,
one for each of the 64 frequencies within a 8 × 8 DCT, the
DCT coefficients will be distributed according to 64 different
probability distributions. According to the above equation,
each unquantized DCT coefficient obtained by applying to the
doubly compressed image I
2
a block DCT with alignment
(r, c) (i.e. the same alignment of the first compression) will
be distributed as
p
Q
(x; Q
1
)=p
1
(x) g
Q
(x) (4)
where Q
1
is the quantization step of the first compression,
g
Q
(x) models the distribution of the overall approximation
error, i.e, the term D
rc
(E
1
+ R
2
), models convolution, and
p
1
(v)=
v+Q
1
/2
u=vQ
1
/2
p
0
(u) v = kQ
1
0 elsewhere
(5)
models the distribution of the DCT coefficients after quanti-
zation by Q
1
and dequantization, being p
0
(u) the distribution
of the original unquantized coefficients.
If we model the approximation error as the sum of the R/T
error in the DCT domain plus the quantization error due to
uniform quantization with quantization step Q
2
, by invoking
the central limit theorem we can assume that the R/T error is
Gaussian distributed with mean μ
e
and variance σ
2
e
, and thus
the approximation error is Gaussian distributed with mean μ
e
and variance σ
2
e
+ Q
2
2
/12, i.e.,
g
Q
(x)=
1
2π(σ
2
e
+ Q
2
2
/12)
e
(xμ
e
)
2
/(σ
2
e
+Q
2
2
/12)
(6)

In the absence of NA-DJPG compression, that is if the image
did not undergo a first JPEG compression with alignment
(r, c), the unquantized DCT coefficients obtained by applying
a shifted block DCT can be assumed distributed approximately
as the original unquantized coefficients, that is
p
NQ
(x)=p
0
(x) (7)
since a misalignment of the DCT grids usually destroys the
effects of quantization [11].
C. Simplified Model
Although the model in (4) is quite accurate, it requires the
knowledge of the distribution of the unquantized coefficients
p
0
(u), which may not be available in practice. However, it
is possible to make same simplifications in order to obtain a
model less dependent from the image content.
Indeed, if we can assume that the histogram of the original
DCT coefficients is locally uniform, that is p
0
(u) is smooth,
we can simplify
p
1
(x)
Q
1
p
0
(x) x = kQ
1
0 elsewhere
(8)
Hence, if we assume that the JPEG approximation error due
to the last compression is smaller than Q
1
, and thanks to (7),
we have that (4) can be simplified to
p
Q
(x; Q
1
) n
Q
(x) · p
NQ
(x),x=0. (9)
where n
Q
(x)=n
Q,0
(x) g
Q
(x) and
n
Q,0
(x)
Q
1
x = kQ
1
0 elsewhere
(10)
In Fig. 1 the models proposed in (4), (9), and (7) are com-
pared with the histograms of unquantized DCT coefficients of
a NA-DJPG compressed and a singly compressed image: in
both cases there is a good agreement between the proposed
models and the real distributions.
IV. F
ORGERY LOCALIZATION ALGORITHM
In the following, we will assume that for each DCT coeffi-
cient x of an image, we know both the probability distributions
of x conditional to the hypothesis of being tampered, i.e.,
p(x|H
1
), and the probability distributions of x conditional to
the hypothesis of not being tampered, i.e., p(x|H
0
).
The above conditional distributions are given by (4) and
(7), according to whether we are considering the SCF or the
DCF hypothesis. For example, under the DCF hypothesis we
have p(x|H
1
)=p
Q
(x; Q
1
) and p(x|H
0
)=p
NQ
(x).Inthe
following, for the sake of simplicity, we will always assume
the DCF hypothesis, i.e. p(x|H
0
) denotes the distribution of
singly compressed coefficients, and p(x|H
1
) is the distribution
of doubly compressed coefficients.
Given p(x|H
1
) and p(x|H
0
), a DCT coefficient x can be
classified as belonging to one of the two models according to
the value of the likelihood ratio
L(x)=
p(x|H
1
)
p(x|H
0
)
. (11)
−20 −15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15 20
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
unquantized DCT value
frequency
h
Q
p
Q
p
Q
simplified
h
NQ
p
NQ
Fig. 1. Example of NA-DJPG compression model: h
Q
and h
NQ
denote the
histograms of unquantized DCT coefficients of a NA-DJPG compressed and
a singly compressed image, respectively. The distributions obtained according
to equations (4), (9), and (7) are in good agreement with these data.
If multiple DCT coefficients within the same 8 × 8 block
are considered, by assuming that they are independently dis-
tributed we can express the likelihood ratio corresponding to
the block at position (i, j) as
L(i, j)=
k
L(x
k
(i, j)) (12)
where x
k
(i, j) denotes the kth DCT coefficient within the
block at position (i, j)
1
. Such values form a likelihood map
of the JPEG image with resolution 8 × 8 pixel, which can be
used to localize possibly forged regions within the image.
By using the simplified model described in Section III-C, it
is possible to approximate the likelihood ratio as either L(x)=
1/n
Q
(x) (in case of SCF hypothesis) or L(x)=n
Q
(x) (in
case of DCF hypothesis). The likelihood map obtained using
such simplifications can be expressed as
L(i, j)
k
n
Q
(x
k
(i, j))
b
(13)
where b = 1 (SCF) or b =1(DCF), and depends only
on compression parameters, i.e., Q
1
, Q
2
, having removed
any dependencies from the image content. Hence, even if
approximated, the adoption of the simplified models can lead
to a more robust localization of possibly forged regions.
A. Estimation of Model Parameters
The models described in Section III require the estimation
of some parameters in order to be applied in practice. Among
these parameters, p
0
(u), Q
2
, μ
e
, and σ
e
are common to
both p(x|H
1
) and p(x|H
0
), whereas Q
1
is required only to
characterize the distribution of doubly quantized coefficients.
Moreover, we should determine the shift (r, c) between the
1
With a slight abuse of notation, we use the same symbol L(x) even if
for different k we have different likelihood functions. The same convention
is used in (13) when referring to n(x).

first compression and the last compression in order to compute
the unquantized DCT coefficients as in (3).
As to Q
2
, we will assume that it is available from the JPEG
image header. As to the shift (r, c), we will assume that it has
already been estimated, e.g. using the methods described in
[9][8]. As to the other parameters, they are estimated according
to the following procedures.
1) Estimation of Q
1
: The estimation of the quantization
step of the primary compression is crucial for the correct
modeling of doubly compressed regions. When dealing with
a possibly forged image, usually there is no prior knowledge
regarding the location of such regions. An image block could
include an original area, as well as a tampered one. Thus, the
distribution of the DCT coefficients of a tampered image can
be modeled as a mixture of p(x|H
1
) and p(x|H
0
), i.e.,
p(x; Q
1
)=α · p(x|H
0
)+(1 α) · p(x|H
1
; Q
1
) (14)
where α is the mixture parameter and we have highlighted the
dependence of p(x|H
1
) from Q
1
. Based on the above model,
the maximum likelihood estimate of Q
1
can be obtained as
ˆ
Q
1
=argmax
Q
1
x
log[α
opt
p(x|H
0
)+(1 α
opt
)p(x|H
1
; Q
1
)]
(15)
where α
opt
is the optimal mixture parameter. For each Q
1
,
the optimal mixture parameter can be estimated using an
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm.
Since Q
1
is a discrete parameter with a limited set of pos-
sible values, the minimization in (15) can be solved iteratively
by trying every possible Q
1
and using the corresponding α
opt
.
In order to estimate the complete quantization matrix, the
above minimization problem is separately solved for each of
the 64 DCT coefficients within a block.
2) Estimation of p
0
(u): Following the observations in [11],
we propose to approximate the distribution of the unquantized
DCT coefficients using the histogram of the DCT coefficients
of the decompressed image computed after the DCT grid
is suitably shifted with respect to the upper left corner. In
particular, we will use a shift of ±1 with respect to the
estimated shift (r, c) of the primary compression, where the
sign of the increment is chosen so as to keep the shift values
between 0 and 7 and to avoid the case (0, 0).
3) Estimation of μ
e
and σ
e
: The true values of both μ
e
and σ
e
should be estimated by relying on the primary JPEG
compression, which in general is not available when observing
the tampered image. In practice, we found that they can
be well approximated by measuring the R/T error on the
tampered image. The rationale is that both μ
e
and σ
e
are
mainly determined by the coarse-grained statistics of the image
content, which usually are little affected by tampering.
By looking at equation (1), given as input the quantized
DCT coefficients of the observed image C
2
we can think to
compute the term E
2
by reconstructing the image with infinite
precision as D
1
00
D(C
2
), which can be approximated by using
floating point arithmetic, and taking the difference with the
image I
2
which is obtained by rounding and truncating to 8
bit precision the floating point values.
V. E
XPERIMENTAL RESULTS
For the experimental validation of the proposed work, we
have built an image dataset composed by 100 non-compressed
TIFF images, having heterogeneous contents, coming from
three different digital cameras (namely Nikon D90, Canon
EOS 450D, Canon EOS 5D) and each acquired at its highest
resolution; each test has been performed by cropping a central
portion with size 1031 × 1031: this choice allows us to still
have a 1024 × 1024 image after randomly cropping a number
or rows and columns between 0 and 7.
Starting from this dataset, we have created manipulated
images exhibiting NA-DJPG artifacts, following both SCF
and DCF hypotheses. As to the NA-DJPG SCF dataset, each
original image is JPEG compressed with a given quality factor
QF
1
(using the Matlab function imwrite); the image is
randomly cropped by removing a number of rows and columns
between 0 and 7; the central portion of size 256 × 256
is replaced with the corresponding area from the original
TIFF image; finally, the overall “manipulated” image is JPEG
compressed with another given quality factor QF
2
.Inthis
way, the image will result NA-DJPG compressed everywhere,
except in the central region where it is supposed to be forged.
The creation of the DCF datasets is dual with respect to the
above procedure. Each original image is JPEG compressed
with a given quality factor QF
1
; the central portion of size
256 ×256 is cut with a random shift with respect to the JPEG
grid and pasted onto the TIFF image so as to respect both the
alignment of the image content and the alignment with the
DCT grid; finally, the overall “manipulated” image is JPEG
compressed with another given quality factor QF
2
. In this way,
the central region of the image, which is supposed to be forged,
will result NA-DJPG compressed.
In all the above datasets, QF
1
and QF
2
are taken from the
sets [50, 60,...90] and [50, 60,...100], respectively, achiev-
ing 30 possible combinations of (QF
1
,QF
2
) for each of the
100 tampered images.
The selection of a proper performance metric is fundamental
for evaluating the performance of the method. Our algorithm
provides as output, for each analyzed image, a map that
represents the likelihood of each 8 × 8 block to be forged.
After a thresholding step, a binary detection map is achieved,
that locates which are the blocks detected as tampered. By
assuming to have for each analyzed image the corresponding
binary mask whose 32 × 32 central portion indicates forged
blocks, a comparison between the algorithm output detection
map and the known tampering mask will allow to estimate the
error rates of the forensic scheme, measured as false alarm
probability P
fa
and missed detection probability P
md
. These
two probabilities can be computed by measuring the following
parameters: n
NMF
: number of blocks not manipulated, but
detected as forged; n
MNF
: number of blocks manipulated, but
not detected as forged; n
I
: number of blocks in the image
(16384 in our tests); n
M
: number of manipulated blocks (1024
in our tests). Starting from these figures, the error probabilities

TABLE I
AUC
ACHIEVED BY THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM USING THE STANDARD
MODEL UNDER THE
SCF HYPOTHESIS.
QF
2
50 60 70 80 90 100
QF
1
50 0.58 0.79 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.99
60 0.51 0.61 0.87 0.98 0.99 0.99
70 0.48 0.50 0.62 0.92 0.98 0.99
80 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.61 0.95 0.99
90 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.55 0.98
TABLE I I
AUC
ACHIEVED BY THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM USING THE SIMPLIFIED
MODEL THE UNDER
SCF HYPOTHESIS.
QF
2
50 60 70 80 90 100
QF
1
50 0.71 0.85 0.94 0.98 0.99 0.99
60 0.59 0.71 0.89 0.97 0.99 1.00
70 0.52 0.56 0.71 0.94 0.99 1.00
80 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.69 0.97 0.99
90 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.51 0.57 0.99
are given by:
P
fa
=
n
NMF
n
I
n
M
P
md
=
n
MNF
n
M
and the correct detection probability is: P
d
=1 P
md
.
For depicting the tradeoff between the correct detection
rate P
d
and the false alarm rate P
fa
the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curve is considered. Since the ROC curve
is a two dimensional plot of P
d
versus P
fa
as the decision
threshold of the detector is varied, we adopt the area under
the ROC curve (AUC) in order to summarize the performance
of the detector with a unique scalar value.
In the following, we will compare the AUC values obtained
using the standard map in (12) and the simplified map in
(13): to the best of our knowledge, these are the first methods
that permit to localize possibly forged areas by relying on
non-aligned double JPEG compression, so other methods can
not be compared with our schemes. In all cases, likelihood
maps are obtained by cumulating different numbers of DCT
coefficients for each block, starting from the DC coefficient
and scanning the coefficients in zig-zag order.
The AUC values achieved for different QF
2
under the SCF
hypothesis are shown in Fig. 2: when QF
2
is sufficiently high
(> 80), NA-DJPG artifacts can be effectively used to localize
traces of tampering. When comparing the two approaches, the
simplified map appears more robust than the standard map
for lower QF
2
values. As to the effects of the cumulation of
different DCT coefficients, the best results are obtained by
considering the first 6 coefficients with the simplified map:
when considering a higher number of coefficients the AUC
values decrease, suggesting that NA-DJPG artifacts can not
be reliably detected at the higher frequencies.
In order to assess the effects of different QF
1
val-
ues, the AUC values obtained for different combinations of
(QF
1
,QF
2
), using the first 6 DCT coefficients to compute
the likelihood map, are reported in Tables I-II. For ease of
50 60 70 80 90 100
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
QF
2
AUC
1 coeff.
6 coeff.
15 coeff.
(a)
50 60 70 80 90 100
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
QF
2
AUC
1 coeff.
6 coeff.
15 coeff.
(b)
Fig. 2. AUC achieved for different QF
2
using different numbers of DCT
coefficients in the SCF scenario: (a) proposed algorithm with standard map;
(b) proposed algorithm with simplified map.
reading, for each combination of (QF
1
,QF
2
) the highest AUC
value between the two considered approaches is highlighted
in bold. In this case, the simplified map achieves always the
best performance except in three cases. Noticeably, it is not
possible to achieve AUC values significantly greater than 0.5
when QF
2
<QF
1
. However, it suffices QF
2
QF
1
10 to
achieve an AUC value very close to one, which means that in
this case forged areas can be localized with great accuracy.
In Fig. 3, we provide the AUC values under the DCF
hypothesis. In this case the performance of forgery localization
is much lower than under the SCF hypothesis, allowing to
localize traces of double compression only when QF
2
is very
high (> 90).
A. Examples
The algorithm has also been tested on a set of images
representing realistic cases of forgery; in Figure 4 an example
of a tampered image is shown: the likelihood map clearly
reveals that the pyramid is a tampered object, and it also shows
some false alarms in the background, due to the low intensity
variance in this area that does not allow a correct estimation

Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI

An Overview on Image Forensics

TL;DR: The aim of this survey is to provide a comprehensive overview of the state of the art in the area of image forensics by classifying the tools according to the position in the history of the digital image in which the relative footprint is left: acquisition- based methods, coding-based methods, and editing-based schemes.
Journal ArticleDOI

Image Forgery Localization via Fine-Grained Analysis of CFA Artifacts

TL;DR: A forensic tool able to discriminate between original and forged regions in an image captured by a digital camera is presented, based on a new feature measuring the presence of demosaicking artifacts at a local level and a new statistical model allowing to derive the tampering probability of each 2 × 2 image block without requiring to know a priori the position of the forged region.
Book ChapterDOI

Double JPEG Detection in Mixed JPEG Quality Factors Using Deep Convolutional Neural Network

TL;DR: A novel deep convolutional neural network is proposed for double JPEG detection using statistical histogram features from each block with a vectorized quantization table, which handles mixed JPEG quality factors and is suitable for real-world situations.
Journal ArticleDOI

Toward image phylogeny forests: Automatically recovering semantically similar image relationships

TL;DR: A new algorithm is introduced that automatically handles sets of images comprising different related images, and outputs the phylogeny trees associated with them, and group them in distinct trees of processing history.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Image forgery detection

TL;DR: The field of digital forensics has emerged to help restore some trust to digital images and the author reviews the state of the art in this new and exciting field.
Book ChapterDOI

Statistical tools for digital forensics

TL;DR: This work describes several statistical techniques for detecting traces of digital tampering in the absence of any digital watermark or signature, and quantifies statistical correlations that result from specific forms ofdigital tampering.
Journal ArticleDOI

Exposing Digital Forgeries From JPEG Ghosts

TL;DR: A technique to detect whether the part of an image was initially compressed at a lower quality than the rest of the image is described, applicable to images of high and low quality as well as resolution.

Estimation of Primary Quantization Matrix in Double Compressed JPEG Images

TL;DR: It is explained in this paper, how double compression detection techniques and primary quantization matrix estimators can be used in steganalysis of JPEG files and in digital forensic analysis for detection of digital forgeries.
Journal ArticleDOI

Fast, automatic and fine-grained tampered JPEG image detection via DCT coefficient analysis

TL;DR: This paper proposes detecting tampered images by examining the double quantization effect hidden among the discrete cosine transform (DCT) coefficients, and is the only one to date that can automatically locate the tampered region.
Related Papers (5)
Frequently Asked Questions (14)
Q1. What contributions have the authors mentioned in the paper "Analysis of non-aligned double jpeg artifacts for the localization of image forgeries" ?

In this paper, the authors present a forensic algorithm to discriminate between original and forged regions in JPEG images, under the hypothesis that the tampered image presents a nonaligned double JPEG compression ( NA-JPEG ). 

Since Q1 is a discrete parameter with a limited set of possible values, the minimization in (15) can be solved iteratively by trying every possible Q1 and using the corresponding αopt. 

By assuming to have for each analyzed image the corresponding binary mask whose 32 × 32 central portion indicates forged blocks, a comparison between the algorithm output detection map and the known tampering mask will allow to estimate the error rates of the forensic scheme, measured as false alarm probability Pfa and missed detection probability Pmd. 

As to the effects of the cumulation of different DCT coefficients, the best results are obtained by considering the first 6 coefficients with the simplified map: when considering a higher number of coefficients the AUC values decrease, suggesting that NA-DJPG artifacts can not be reliably detected at the higher frequencies. 

Since the ROC curve is a two dimensional plot of Pd versus Pfa as the decision threshold of the detector is varied, the authors adopt the area under the ROC curve (AUC) in order to summarize the performance of the detector with a unique scalar value. 

(11)If multiple DCT coefficients within the same 8 × 8 block are considered, by assuming that they are independently distributed the authors can express the likelihood ratio corresponding to the block at position (i, j) asL(i, j) = ∏ k L(xk(i, j)) (12)where xk(i, j) denotes the kth DCT coefficient within the block at position (i, j)1. 

The likelihood map obtained using such simplifications can be expressed asL(i, j) ≈ ∏ k nQ(xk(i, j)) b (13)where b = −1 (SCF) or b = 1 (DCF), and depends only on compression parameters, i.e., Q1, Q2, having removed any dependencies from the image content. 

The authors can assume that the forger disrupts the JPEG compression statistics in the tampered area: examples could be a cut and paste from either a non compressed image or a resized image, or the insertion of computer generated content. 

if the authors can assume that the histogram of the original DCT coefficients is locally uniform, that is p0(u) is smooth, the authors can simplifyp1(x) ≈ { Q1p0(x) x = kQ10 elsewhere (8)Hence, if the authors assume that the JPEG approximation error due to the last compression is smaller than Q1, and thanks to (7), the authors have that (4) can be simplified topQ(x;Q1) ≈ nQ(x) · pNQ(x), x = 0. (9) where nQ(x) = nQ,0(x) ∗ gQ(x) andnQ,0(x) { Q1 x = kQ10 elsewhere (10)In Fig. 1 the models proposed in (4), (9), and (7) are compared with the histograms of unquantized DCT coefficients of a NA-DJPG compressed and a singly compressed image: in both cases there is a good agreement between the proposed models and the real distributions. 

the authors should determine the shift (r, c) between the1With a slight abuse of notation, the authors use the same symbol L(x) even if for different k the authors have different likelihood functions. 

Given p(x|H1) and p(x|H0), a DCT coefficient x can be classified as belonging to one of the two models according to the value of the likelihood ratioL(x) = p(x|H1) p(x|H0) . 

In all cases, likelihood maps are obtained by cumulating different numbers of DCT coefficients for each block, starting from the DC coefficient and scanning the coefficients in zig-zag order. 

For the experimental validation of the proposed work, the authors have built an image dataset composed by 100 non-compressed TIFF images, having heterogeneous contents, coming from three different digital cameras (namely Nikon D90, Canon EOS 450D, Canon EOS 5D) and each acquired at its highest resolution; each test has been performed by cropping a central portion with size 1031 × 1031: this choice allows us to still have a 1024× 1024 image after randomly cropping a number or rows and columns between 0 and 7. 

2) Estimation of p0(u): Following the observations in [11], the authors propose to approximate the distribution of the unquantized DCT coefficients using the histogram of the DCT coefficients of the decompressed image computed after the DCT grid is suitably shifted with respect to the upper left corner.