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Open AccessJournal ArticleDOI

CO2 cost pass-through and windfall profits in the power sector

TLDR
In this article, the authors analyzed the implications of the EU ETS for the power sector, notably the impact of free allocation of CO2 emission allowances on the price of electricity and the profitability of power generation.
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This article is published in Climate Policy.The article was published on 2006-01-01 and is currently open access. It has received 642 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Windfall gain & Marginal product.

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What caused the drop in European electricity prices? A factor decomposition analysis

Lion Hirth
- 01 Jun 2018 - 
TL;DR: In this article, an ex-post study of European electricity markets from 2008 to 2015 uses a fundamental power market model to quantify their individual contributions on day-ahead prices and concludes that the single largest factor depressing prices was the expansion of renewable energy.
Journal ArticleDOI

Climate policy and the ‘carbon haven’ effect

TL;DR: In this article, a review of the literature on carbon leakage risk is provided, with an emphasis on border carbon adjustment (BCA) policies. But, their impact on international negotiations is unclear: they could encourage third countries to join the abating coalition or trigger a trade war.
Journal ArticleDOI

Redistribution Effects of Energy and Climate Policy: The Electricity Market

TL;DR: In this article, the authors compare the redistribution effects of two major electricity policies: support schemes for renewable energy sources, and CO2 pricing, and find that while renewables support transfers wealth from producers to consumers, carbon pricing does the opposite, and that moderate amounts of wind subsidies leave consumers better off even if they bear the costs of subsidies.
Journal ArticleDOI

Market Power, Permit Allocation and Efficiency in Emission Permit Markets

TL;DR: The effect of free allocation on price manipulation with market power in both product and permit markets has not been fully addressed in this article, but it is shown that in this case, the threshold for free allocation above which a dominant firm will set the permit price above its marginal abatement costs is below its optimal emissions in a competitive market.
Journal ArticleDOI

Incentives for energy efficiency in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

TL;DR: In this article, the authors explored the incentives for energy efficiency induced by the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) for installations in the energy and industry sectors for the phase 2 of the EU ETS (2008-2012).
References
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Journal ArticleDOI

Allocation, incentives and distortions: the impact of EU ETS emissions allowance allocations to the electricity sector

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors provide a framework to assess the economic incentives and distortions that provisions in NAPs can have on market prices, operation and investment decisions, and use both analytic models to illustrate the effects of the incentives, and results from numerical simulation runs that estimate the magnitude of impacts from different allocation rules.

CO2 price dynamics. The implications of EU emissions trading for the price of electricity

TL;DR: In this paper, the authors analyzed the relationship between EU emissions trading and power prices, notably the implications of free allocation of emissions allowances for the price of electricity in countries of North-western Europe.
Posted Content

The Effect on Asset Values of the Allocation of Carbon Dioxide Emission Allowances

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that owners of existing generation assets may be better off paying for carbon dioxide emission allowances than having them distributed for free, and that it takes just 7.5% of the revenue raised under an auction to preserve the asset values of existing generators.
Journal ArticleDOI

The Effect on Asset Values of the Allocation of Carbon Dioxide Emission Allowances

TL;DR: In this article, the authors show that owners of existing generation assets may be better off by paying for carbon dioxide emission allowances rather than having them distributed for free, and that it takes just 7.5 percent of the revenue raised under an auction to preserve the asset values of existing generators.
Related Papers (5)
Frequently Asked Questions (9)
Q1. What have the authors contributed in "Cp_61_47_sijm.pmd" ?

This article analyses the implications of the EU ETS for the power sector, notably the impact of free allocation of CO 2 emission allowances on the price of electricity and the profitability of power generation. As well as some theoretical reflections, the article presents empirical and model estimates of CO 2 cost pass-through for Germany and The Netherlands, indicating that pass-through rates vary between 60 and 100 % of CO 2 costs, depending on the carbon intensity of the marginal production unit and various other marketor technology-specific factors. 

A main purpose of the free allocation of emissions allowances under the US capand-trade programmes for SO2 and NO x , as well as under the EU ETS for CO 2 , is to obtain thepolitical support of large emitters. 

if the infra-marginal unit is more carbon-intensive than the marginal unit, it suffers from a loss, as the increase in power price is lower than the increase in its carbon costs per MWh; notably if allowances have to be bought on the market. 

The extent to which carbon costs are passed through to power prices also depends on changes in the merit order of the supply curve due to emissions trading. 

CO2costs of gas-generated power have also increased over this period, but less dramatically, i.e. from d4 to d11/MWh (partly due to the relatively low – but constant – emission factor of gas-generated electricity). 

As coal generators benefit from this gas cost-induced increase in power prices, this leads to an overestimation of the pass-through rate of CO2 costs for coal-generated power. 

Earthscanshows the costs of CO 2 allowances required to cover the emissions per MWh generated by a coalfired power plant (with an emission factor of 0.85 tCO 2 /MWh). 

in the latter case, some grandfathering to this inframarginal unit may be justified to break even, depending on the relative carbon intensity of this unit. 

While all generators profit from the higher prices, the effect of a smaller market dominates this effect and therefore slightly reduces their revenues.