In this paper, the authors present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model, and argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.
Abstract:
Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.
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Q1. What is the Fregean model of confused identity?
Using the t-language, the Fregean theorist can assign implicit identity beliefs to nonlinguistic agents if such are required, for example, to explain their behavior.
Q2. What is the virtue of the stronger version of the Frege model?
It is a virtue of the stronger version that it gives a uniform account of success and failure characteristic of mental representations involving identity and distinctness.
Q3. What is the interpretationist view of confused thinking?
The local interpretationism envisaged here, as applied to object-confusion, holds that the Frege model provides the best and most intuitive theoretical description of the confused thinker’s internal mental state, at a particular level of abstraction.
Q4. What is the mechanism that underlies many important cognitive tasks?
The mechanism underlies many important cognitive tasks, such as recognition, expectation, and inference (cf. Lawlor 2001; Recanati 2012).
Q5. What is the motivation for doing away with propositional beliefs?
Since this argument fails the motivation for doing away with propositional belief is no longer a factor and the authors are free to use them to explain corepresentational capacities and their characteristic failures.