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Congress and the Bureaucracy: A Theory of Influence
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Arnold as mentioned in this paper examines the interactions between members of the House of Representatives and members of upper bureaucracy in respect to the geographical allocation of federal expenditures, and the methodology employed is ingenious and persuasive.Abstract:
"[An] excellent book .Arnold seeks to examine the interactions between members of the House of Representatives and members of the upper bureaucracy in respect to the geographical allocation of federal expenditures..The methodology employed is ingenious and persuasive."-David Fellman, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Scienceread more
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Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House
Gary W. Cox,Mathew D. McCubbins +1 more
TL;DR: Cox and McCubbins as mentioned in this paper view the majority parties in the House as a species of "legislative cartel" and argue that the majority party has all the structural advantages.
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The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets
TL;DR: In this article, the authors provide a theory of legislative institutions that parallels the theory of the firm and contract theory of contractual institutions, and explain why, given the peculiar form of bargaining problems found in legislatures, specific forms of nonmarket exchange prove superior to market exchange.
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Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers
David Epstein,Sharyn O'Halloran +1 more
TL;DR: The first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches was proposed by Epstein and O'Halloran as discussed by the authors, who examined major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992 and described the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy.
Book
Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives
Gary W. Cox,Mathew D. McCubbins +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors argue that the majority party has cartelized agenda power in the U.S. House since the adoption of Reed's rules in 1890 and present a series of empirical tests of that theory's predictions.
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Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees
Richard L. Hall,Frank Wayman +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors develop a view of the member-donor relationship that questions the theoretical underpinnings of the vote-buying hypothesis itself and suggest two alternative claims: (1) the effects of group expenditures are more likely to appear in committee than on the floor; and (2) the behavior most likely to be affected is members' legislative involvement, not their votes.