From representation to emergence: complexity’s challenge
to the epistemology of schooling
Deborah Osberg, Gert Biesta and Paul Cilliers (2008)
Educational Philosophy and Theory, Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 213-
227
DOI: 10.1111/j.1469-5812.2007.00407.x
From Representation to Emergence: Complexity’s challenge to the
epistemology of schooling
Deborah Osberg, Gert Biesta and Paul Cilliers
Abstract
In modern,Western societies the purpose of schooling is to ensure that
school-goers acquire knowledge of pre-existing practices, events, entities
and so on.The knowledge that is learned is then tested to see if the learner
has acquired a correct or adequate understanding of it. For this reason, it can
be argued that schooling is organised around a representational
epistemology: one which holds that knowledge is an accurate representation
of something that is separate from knowledge itself. Since the object of
knowledge is assumed to exist separately from the knowledge itself, this
epistemology can also be considered ‘spatial.’ In this paper we show how
ideas from complexity have challenged the ‘spatial epistemology’ of
representation and we explore possibilities for an alternative ‘temporal’
understanding of knowledge in its relationship to reality. In addition to
complexity, our alternative takes its inspiration from Deweyan ‘transactional
realism’ and deconstruction. We suggest that ‘knowledge’ and ‘reality’ should
not be understood as separate systems which somehow have to be brought
into alignment with each other, but that they are part of the same emerging
complex system which is never fully ‘present’ in any (discrete) moment in
time. This not only introduces the notion of time into our understanding of
the relationship between knowledge and reality, but also points to the
importance of acknowledging the role of the ‘unrepresentable’ or
‘incalculable’. With this understanding knowledge reaches us not as
something we receive but as a response, which brings forth new worlds
because it necessarily adds something (which was not present anywhere
before it appeared) to what came before. This understanding of knowledge
suggests that the acquisition of curricular content should not be considered
an end in itself. Rather, curricular content should be used to bring forth that
which is incalculable from the perspective of the present. The epistemology
of emergence therefore calls for a switch in focus for curricular thinking,
away from questions about presentation and representation and towards
questions about engagement and response.
Introduction
In modern, Western societies schooling is almost invariably organised as an
epistemological practice. Educational institutions present knowledge about
the world ‘outside’ and for that very reason they rely upon a representational
epistemology. This is an epistemology which holds that our knowledge
‘stands for’ or represents a world that is separate from our knowledge itself.
Since the object of knowledge is assumed to exist in a separate space from
the knowledge itself, this epistemology can also be considered ‘spatial.’ In
this paper we show how ‘complexity theory’
1
has challenged the spatial
epistemology of representation and we explore possibilities for an alternative
understanding of knowledge in its relationship to reality. Our alternative
takes its inspiration from complexity, Deweyan ‘transactional realism’ and
deconstruction. With complexity we suggest that ‘knowledge’ and ‘the world’
should not be understood as separate systems which somehow have to be
brought into alignment with each other, but that they are part of the same
evolving complex system. This not only introduces the notion of time into our
understanding of the relationship between knowledge and reality, but also
points to the importance of acknowledging the role of the unrepresentable or
the ‘radically non-relational.’
We should make clear, however, that in pointing out the incompatibility
between complexity and representational epistemology, we do not mean to
suggest that we can do without representations in schools. All we are
suggesting is that we need to review the meaning of our representations in
the educational sphere, and hence the representational character of
schooling. Our interest is primarily in articulating an epistemology that helps
us think about knowledge, representation, education and the world that does
not result in, or seek, closure. To put it differently, we are trying to articulate
a different ethic or ‘way of being’ in education, that is less concerned with
representing the real than it is with living it out in different ways.
This is an argument more complicated than we will be able to develop in full
in this paper. Nevertheless, we have begun to approach this task firstly by
providing a very brief account of education as a ‘re/presentational’ practice,
in order to make it clear what we are arguing against. Using perspectives
from complexity we then show that all representations of complex
phenomena ultimately betray their object (see Cilliers, 1998), and in doing
this we address the question of what sort of epistemology is required if we
would drop the conventional understanding of knowledge as reflecting or
representing a pre-given world. We argue that complexity itself suggests an
‘emergentist’ alternative to representational epistemology. This alternative
comes close to Dewey’s transactional realism (see Biesta & Burbules, 2003).
However it seems to lead to the more radical conclusion that because
knowing is transactional, there will always necessarily be something that
cannot make its appearance in the domain of representation. That however
we order the world, there will always be more ordering yet to come. That
there cannot be a notion of any final order. To conclude the paper, we
suggest that this alternative to representational epistemology—which could
be called an ‘emergentist’ epistemology— could lead to a different way of
understanding educational practice since we find education (becoming
educated) is no longer about understanding a finished universe, or even
about participating in a finished and stable universe. It is the result, rather,
of participating in the creation of an unfinished universe.
Knowledge and Representation
Before discussing our ‘emergentist’ alternative to representational
epistemology, we need to clarify briefly what we mean by representation,
since this is an extremely broad concept with an extensive philosophical past.
We want to talk about representation in a fairly restricted sense. Firstly, we
want to talk about this concept as something external and ‘public’ (see
Hacking, 1983, pp. 132–133). In this regard we are excluding internal
mental representations or thoughts. Secondly, we are restricting the concept
of representation to include only those forms of representation that claim to
be likenesses of the things they represent. This is because external or public
representations can include anything that can be examined or regarded,
including art-works that aim to distort or challenge conventional
understandings of reality. But we also want to stretch the concept a little, to
include not only physical objects like drawings, photographs, maps, films,
tape-recordings, and scientific or other models but also elegant theories
about electrons, gravitational forces, language and so on. Although one could
argue that there is a difference between models and theories, we are
purposely conflating these two concepts, since both, in our understanding,
are representations which intend to help us understand the world as it really
is. The purpose of both is to enable our movement towards a knowledge/
understanding of what the world is really like, once and for all. It is only
when we use truth as a criterion to judge between alternative
likenesses/representations (rather than, for example, usefulness), and when
we understand truth to mean correspondence with reality, that we end up
with an epistemology that can be called representational.
In contrast to this representational epistemology—which could also be called
a ‘spatial epistemology’ since it depends on a correspondence between
knowledge and reality—we propose that complexity suggests a temporal
epistemology which implies that the quest for knowledge is not in order that
we may develop more accurate understandings of a finished reality, as it is.
Rather, the quest for knowledge is about finding more and more complex and
creative ways of interacting with our reality. Through doing this—through
intervening in our own realities—we find out how to create more complex
realities with which we can interact in yet more complex and creative ways.
The point is that, from a complex systems perspective, there are no final
solutions, only ongoing interactions leading to increasingly more complex
interactions (and ‘solutions’). The key issue, for us, is that this is not how
knowledge is commonly understood in Western educational institutions.
Education as a Re/Presentational Practice
Many if not most of our Western, modern educational practices and
institutions seem to rely upon a representational epistemology (see Biesta &
Osberg, 2007). What is significant here is, first of all, that they rely upon an
epistemology rather than, say, a political, ethical or relational theory, and
thus configure schooling in terms of the transmissions and acquisition of
knowledge (there are, of course, some noticeable exceptions, particularly in
the more radical forms of progressive education). Secondly, this
epistemology is representational in that it is assumed that what is presented
in education stands for something else: it stands for something in the world
‘out there’, and therefore is a representation.
One could argue that from a historical perspective educational practices were
initially practices of presentation (see Mollenhauer, 1983). For long periods,
new generations could learn through direct participation in existing ways of
life, by mingling, competing and working with adults in the ‘real’ world (and
in some cultures and settings this is still the way in which new generations
learn). Mollenhauer argues, however, that in the sixteenth and seventeenth
century the position of children in society changed. What disappeared was
the situation in which children were direct participants in life. What emerged
instead was a separate sphere or educational world especially for children,
where they could be educated for later participation in real life (this first
happened for the elites and only by the end of the nineteenth and the
beginning of the twentieth century for the masses). Mollenhauer’s claim is
that it was only when a separate educational world was constructed, that the
question of representation became a central educational question. After all,
once we take children out of ‘real life’, but still want to prepare them for ‘real
life,’ we need in some way to represent ‘real life’ within the confines of the
world of the child. Since we obviously cannot get the whole world into the
school, we have to select which forms of life to represent in the school. We
must select what is valuable from what isn’t, and we must then represent
this selection in appropriate sequences and formats. It is in precisely this
respect that we would say that the central rationale for education is in terms
of a representational epistemology: what and how best to represent ‘the
world’?
There are, however, at least two sets of arguments that, in a sense,
challenge the idea of schooling as representation. First, there are arguments
from the point of view of learning. The main insight—relatively old, but for
some reason education needs to be reminded of it from time to time—is that
teaching does not determine learning. What students learn may have a link
with what teachers teach, but the two are not necessarily identical. Through
their participation in educational practices learners learn much more and