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Interest groups, campaign contributions, and probabilistic voting
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In this article, the authors developed a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral-policy decisions of candidates for office and found that campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy-oriented voters' perceptions of candidates' positions.Abstract:
This essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral-policy decisions of candidates for office. Interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates' policies and opposing groups' donations remain unaltered. Candidates, however, recognize that their policy choices affect contributions. Campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy-oriented voters' perceptions of candidates' positions. In this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates' electoral policies, and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups.read more
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Journal ArticleDOI
Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions
Daron Acemoglu,Daron Acemoglu,Daron Acemoglu,James A. Robinson,James A. Robinson,James A. Robinson +5 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors construct a model of simultaneous change and persistence in institutions, where the main idea is that equilibrium economic institutions are a result of the exercise of de jure and de facto political power.
Posted Content
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
Gene M. Grossman,Elhanan Helpman +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors study the competition between two political parties for seats in a parliament and show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interest groups.
Journal ArticleDOI
Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics
Gene M. Grossman,Elhanan Helpman +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine whether special interest groups are governed by an electoral motive or an influence in their campaign giving, and how their contributions affect the equilibrium platforms, and show that each party is induced to behave as if it were maximizing a weighted sum of the aggregate welfares of informed voters and members of special interests, and the party that is expected to win a majority of seats caters more to the special interests.
Journal ArticleDOI
Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions
Daron Acemoglu,James A. Robinson +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors construct a model to study the implications of changes in political insti? tutions for economic institutions and provide conditions under which economic or policy outcomes will be invariant to changes in the political institutions, and economic institutions them? selves will persist over time.
Journal ArticleDOI
Electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters
TL;DR: In this article, the authors present a model of electoral competition in which candidates raise campaign contributions by choosing policies that benefit interest groups and then expend those contributions to influence voters who are uninformed about the policies.
References
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ReportDOI
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation
TL;DR: The authors showed that the costs of using the political process limit not only the size of the dominant group but also their gains, which is at one level, a detail which is the way Stigler treated it, but a detail with some important implications for entry into regulation and for the price-output structure that emerges from regulation.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Strategy of Ambiguity: Uncertainty and Electoral Competition*
TL;DR: In this article, the authors consider the problem of candidate strategy selection in a spatial model of political choice, where candidate strategy sets are represented by pure strategies and ambiguous strategies over those points, and questions about optimal strategy choice and the equilibrium properties of these choices are entertained.
Book
The spatial theory of voting
TL;DR: The spatial theory of voting as discussed by the authors is an important approach to the study of voting and elections, which is premised on the idea of self-interested choice and provides explicit definitions for these behavioural assumptions to determine the form that voters will take.
Book
Money in congressional elections
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors set forth a theory of how money operates in the electoral politics of Congre based on an examination of campaign-finance data from the 1972, 1974, 1976, 1978 elections.