RUUT VEENHOVEN
IS HAPPINESS RELATIVE? j
(Accepted 28 March, 1990)
ABSTRACT. The theory that happiness is relative is based on three postulates: (1)
happiness results from comparison, (2) standards of comparison adjust, (3) standards of
comparison are arbitrary constructs. On the basis of these postulates the theory
predicts: (a) happiness does not depend on real quality of life, (b) changes in living-
conditions to the good or the bad have only a shortlived effect on happiness, (c) people
are happier after hard times, (d) people are typically neutral about their life. Together
these inferences imply that happiness is both an evasive and an inconsequential matter,
which is at odds with corebeliefs in present-day welfare society.
Recent investigations on happiness (in the sense of life-satisfaction) claim support
for this old theory. Happiness is reported to be as high in poor countries as it is in rich
countries (Easterlin), no less among paralyzed accident victims than it is among lottery
winners (Brickman) and unrelated to stable livingconditions (Inglehart and Rabier).
These sensational claims are inspected but found to be untrue. It is shown that: (a)
people tend to be unhappy under adverse conditions such as poverty, war and isolation,
(b) improvement or deterioration of at least some conditions does effect happiness
lastingly, (c) earlier hardship does not favour later happiness, (d) people are typically
positive about their life rather than neutral.
It is argued that the theory happiness-is-relative mixes up 'overall happiness' with
"contentment'. Contentment is indeed largely a matter of comparing life-as-it-is to
standards of how-life-should-be. Yet overall hapiness does not entirely depend on
comparison. The overall evaluation of life depends also on how one feels affectively
and hedonic level of affect draws on its turn on the gratification of basic bio-psycho-
logical needs. Contrary to acquired 'standards' of comparison these innate 'needs' do
not adjust to any and all conditions: they mark in fact the limits of human adaptability.
To the extend that it depends on need-gratification, happiness is not relative.
The issue
INTRODUCTION
A common theme in writings on happiness is that happiness is 'relative'.
This theory was already advanced by early Greek philosophers, in par-
ticular Epicures and the Stoics. Through the ages it figured in philosophy
and literature. For a review see Tatarkiewics (1975, ch. 11). Today the
theory lives on in the social sciences as well: in economics (i.a. Easterlin,
1974; Van Praag
et aL,
1979), political science (i.a. Feierabend and
Feierabend, 1966; Davies, 1969; Gur, 1970), in sociology (i.a. Runci-
Social Indicators Research
24:1 --34, 1991.
9 1991
Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherhmds.
RUUT VEENHOVEN
man, 1966; Manning Gibbs, 1972; Ipsen, 1978; Parducci, 1968) and in
psychology (i.a. Unger, 1970; Brickman and Campbell, 1971; Brickman
et al.,
1978; Derme, 1979; lnglehart and Rabier, 1984).
The theory holds that happiness does not depend on objective good,
but rather on subjective comparison. As such, happiness is seen as both
futile and evasive: 'futile' because a happy life is then not necessarily a
good life, 'evasive' because standards tend to rise with success, leaving
the individual as unhappy as before. In this view, there is little sense in
trying to promote happiness.
Though held in great respect intellectually, this theory is seldom
followed in practice. Personally, we all try to improve our situations in
the hope of getting happier. Collectively, we require the (welfare) state
to maximize material comfort, legal protection and social security in the
belief that such 'social progress' will make life more satisfying. So there
is something odd about this theory. This article tries to find out what it
is.
Approach
To that end paragraph 2 presents a resum6 of the theory: its basic
postulates, main inferences and ideological implications. Next para-
graph 3 tests four main hypotheses derived from the theory: It appears
that the theory fits the data badly. Paragraph 4 explains why: it
enumerates three basic theoretical flaws and mentions some sources of
misunderstanding.
Concept of Happiness
Any discussion of the theory requires that we first define happiness.
Happiness is conceived here as
the degree to which an individual judges
the overall quality of his life favorably.
In other words: how well he likes
the life he leads. As such, happiness can also be called 'life-satisfaction'.
When this evaluation of life crystallizes into a stable view, we can speak
of happiness as an 'attitude' towards one's life.
There is evidence that the
overall
evaluation of life draws on two
more or less distinct sources of information: how well one feels
generally and how favourable one compares with various standards of
IS HAPPINESS RELATIVE?
success. These aspect-appraisals are referred to as 'components' of
happiness. The affective component is the 'degree to which the various
affects a person experiences are pleasant' and will be called hedonic
level The cognitive component is the 'degree to which an individual
perceives his aspirations to be met' and is labelled contentment. These
concepts are described in more detail in Veenhoven, 1984a, 22--28.
This definition of happiness has of course consequences at the
empirical level. When considering evidence for the theory that happi-
ness is relative, I will focus on investigations that have measured this
particular phenomenon. Elsewhere I have described criteria for the
valid measurement of happiness as defined here (Veenhoven, 1984a:
ch. 4). Only studies which meet these demands are considered in this
article.
2. THE THEORY "HAPPINESS IS RELATIVE"
The theory can be summarized in three basic postulates and four
inferences:
2.1. Postulates
Happiness results from comparison. The evaluation of life is a more or
less conscious mental process and involves assessment of the degree to
which perceptions of life-as-it-is meet the individual's standards of
what-life-should-be. The better the fit, the happier the person.
Standards of comparison adjust. Standards follow perception of reality.
If living conditions are seen to improve, standards rise. If conditions are
seen to get worse, standards are lowered. Adjustment follows with
some delay.
Standards of comparison are arbitrary. Standards of comparison are
individual mental constructs which do not necessarily fit any real
requirements for a good life. People may want things that are actually
bad for them and fail to want that they in fact need. This is especially
likely if propaganda and fashion seduce them to reach out for the
wrong things.
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2.2.
Inferences
Happiness is insensitive to actual quality of life. Because standards of
comparison are arbitrary, the judgements based on them are arbitrary
as well. Hence people can be subjectively happy in objectively bad
condition, or feel unhappy in good ones. Happiness is a coinage of the
brain.
Happiness cannot be raised enduringly. Because standards adjust,
changes to the better or worse have only a shortlived effect on
happiness. In the long run any improvements are overhauled by a raise
of standards,
Happiness builds on hardship. Because standards of comparison anchor
in earlier experience, people tend to be happier after hard times. The
worse life was earlier, the lower ones standards and the more favour-
able the judgement of present life,
Happiness tends to the neutral. Because standard adjust continually,
people are typically 'neutral' about their life, rather than 'positive' or
'negative'. Over their lifetime happy periods balance unhappy periods.
Z3. Variations
The theory has several variations, figuring under different names. The
variations concern specific assumptions about standards of comparison
and rules for calculating success. Proponents of the theory that happi-
ness is relative tend to shift between these variations as it suits their
argument. Thus they have always managed to escape falsification.
Standards of comparison. Different assumptions have been made about
the standards people use in evaluating their life. Most of these assump-
tions draw on research in related fields.
Comparison with others. A common view is that people compare
themselves to others: in particular to compatriots of about the same age
and social class. This 'social comparison' is seen to focus on observable
IS HAPPINESS RELATIVE?
and socially valued matters such as job prestige and the material level
of living. The better off people perceive themselves to be relatively, the
happier they feel.
Because it is differences vis ~ vis others that makes happy or
unhappy rather than the actual quality of life, collective changes for the
better or worse do not affect happiness. Therefore, social progress
cannot raise happiness. Happiness for everybody is impossible, the
happiness of one requiring the unhappiness of another. General happi-
ness can at best be optimized by distributing social rewards in such a
way that a comparison is favorable for most citizens, for instance by
preventing conspicious consumption by a few very wealthy compatriots.
A present day formulation of this old idea is the theory of 'relative
deprivation' that arose from research on satisfaction with one's social
status (i.a. Runciman, 1966).
Comparison with earlier living conditions.
Another view is that people
compare their situation with earlier ones. They look for a change for
the better or worse. The more improvement they see in their life, the
happier people are. Expectations are, of course, highly dependent on
information and opinions provided by others and are therefore very
liable to fashion, manipulation and rumour.
Again, happiness is unrelated to objective conditions of life, but a
matter of optimism or pessimism. The gloomier one was, the happier
one is. Lasting improvement of happiness is unlikely. Changes for the
better tend to raise expectations and thus do not materialize in greater
happiness. Overstressing of progress by mass-media and politicians may
even cause an inflation of aspirations and thus result in a decline of
happiness.
This old idea has presently been applied in accounts of political
discontent (i.a. Geschwender, 1964).
Comparison with aspirations.
A related view is that people make
comparisons with their aims in life: called 'life-goals' or 'aspirations'.
The more they think they are getting what they want, the happier they
are. Aspirations are seen to draw on all earlier mentioned standards,
but to have their own dynamics as well. In line with the economists'
postulate of 'endless needs', aspirations are believed to rise infinitely.