Linear Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round SIMECK Variants

TLDR: In this paper, the authors showed that the security of SIMECK is not as good as its predecessors SIMON and SPECK, and presented a linear attack in this senario.

Abstract: SIMECK is a family of 3 lightweight block ciphers designed by Yangi¾?et al. They follow the framework used by Beaulieu et al. from the United States National Security Agency NSA to design SIMON and SPECK. A cipher in this family with K-bit key and N-bit block is called SIMECKNi¾?/i¾?K. We show that the security of this block cipher against linear cryptanalysis is not as good as its predecessors SIMON. More precisely, while the best known linear attack for SIMON32/64, using Algorithm 1 of Matsui, covers 13 rounds we present a linear attack in this senario which covers 14 rounds of SIMECK32/64. Similarly, using Algorithm 1 of Matsui, we present attacks on 19 and 22 rounds of SIMECK48/96 and SIMECK64/128 respectively, compare them with known attacks on 16 and 19 rounds SIMON48/96 and SIMON64/128 respectively. In addition, we use Algorithm 2 of Matsui to attack 18, 23 and 27 rounds of SIMECK32/64, SIMECK48/96 and SIMECK64/128 respectively, compare them with known attacks on 18, 19 and 21 rounds SIMON32/64, SIMON48/96 and SIMON64/128 respectively.