Journal ArticleDOI
Moral Hazard in Teams
TLDR
In this article, the authors study moral hazard with many agents and focus on two features that are novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition, and show that competition among agents (due to relative evaluations) has merit solely as a device to extract information optimally.Abstract:
This article studies moral hazard with many agents. The focus is on two features that are novel in a multiagent setting: free riding and competition. The free-rider problem implies a new role for the principal: administering incentive schemes that do not balance the budget. This new role is essential for controlling incentives and suggests that firms in which ownership and labor are partly separated will have an advantage over partnerships in which output is distributed among agents. A new characterization of informative (hence valuable) monitoring is derived and applied to analyze the value of relative performance evaluation. It is shown that competition among agents (due to relative evaluations) has merit solely as a device to extract information optimally. Competition per se is worthless. The role of aggregate measures in relative performance evaluation is also explored, and the implications for investment rules are discussed.read more
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Book ChapterDOI
Chapter 27 Financial structure and product market competition
TL;DR: The industry equilibrium (IE) models are presented that directly extend the single firm paradigm by analyzing financial structure choice in the context of an industry equilibrium that takes into account the investment decisions of all firms in the industry.
Posted Content
Scholarships or Student Loans? Subsidizing Higher Education in the Presence of Moral Hazard
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Journal ArticleDOI
Tractability in Incentive Contracting
Alex Edmans,Xavier Gabaix +1 more
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Journal ArticleDOI
Endogenous Determinants for Renegotiating Concessions: Evidence from Local Infrastructure
TL;DR: In this article, a case study of a light rail system is analyzed to understand how and why renegotiations of local concessions occur by examining the specific characteristics of contracts (endogenous determinants).
Journal ArticleDOI
The Internal Economy of Large Firms
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors review, and try to explain in relatively non-technical terms, some of the recent developments in economic theory that bear on the internal economics of firms.
References
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Posted Content
Production, information costs, and economic organization
Armen A. Alchian,Harold Demsetz +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors present a set of reprint articles for which IEEE does not hold copyright. Full text is not available on IEEE Xplore for these articles, but full text can be found on the Internet Archive.
Journal ArticleDOI
Moral Hazard and Observability
TL;DR: In this article, the role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered, and a necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived.
Posted Content
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
TL;DR: The canonical agency problem can be posed as follows as discussed by the authors : the agent may choose an act, aCA, a feasible action space, and the random payoff from this act, w(a, 0), will depend on the random state of nature O(EQ the state space set), unknown to the agent when a is chosen.
Journal ArticleDOI
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
TL;DR: The concept of perfect equilibrium point has been introduced in order to exclude the possibility that disequilibrium behavior is prescribed on unreached subgames [Selten 1965 and 1973]. Unfortunately this definition of perfectness does not remove all difficulties which may arise with respect to unreached parts of the game.
Journal ArticleDOI
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
TL;DR: In this article, a notion of "favorableness" of news is introduced, characterized, and applied to four simple models: the arrival of good news about a firm's prospects always causes its share price to rise, more favorable evidence about an agent's effort leads the principal to pay a larger bonus, buyers expect that any product information withheld by a salesman is unfavorable to his product, and bidders figure that low bids by their competitors signal a low value for the object being sold.