Journal ArticleDOI
On the existence of pure strategy monotone equilibria in asymmetric first-price auctions
Philip J. Reny,Shmuel Zamir +1 more
TLDR
In this article, the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and affiliated one-dimensional signals was established.Abstract:
We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in monotone bidding functions in first-price auctions with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and affiliated one-dimensional signals. By extending a monotonicity result due to Milgrom and Weber (1982), we show that single crossing can fail only when ties occur at winning bids or when bids are individually irrational. We avoid these problems by considering limits of ever finer finite bid sets such that no two bidders have a common serious bid, and by recalling that single crossing is needed only at individually rational bids. Two examples suggest that our results cannot be extended to multidimensional signals or to second-price auctions.read more
Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
Properties of scoring auctions
John Asker,Estelle Cantillon +1 more
TL;DR: A systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour in scoring auctions when suppliers’ private information is multidimensional is provided and it is shown that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products.
Journal ArticleDOI
Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions
Elena Krasnokutskaya,Katja Seim +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors used data from highway procurement auctions subject to California's Small Business Preference program to study the effect of bid preferences on auction outcomes, based on an estimated model of firms' bidding and participation decisions.
Posted Content
First Price Auctions in the Asymmetric N Bidder Case
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors consider the general case where the valuations' distributions may be different and show that every Bayesian equilibrium is an essentially pure equilibrium formed by bid functions whose inverses are solutions of a system of differential equations with boundary conditions.
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Nonparametric Approaches to Auctions
Susan Athey,Philip A. Haile +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, structural econometric approaches to auctions are discussed, including first-price sealed-bid and ascending auctions, including extensions to Dutch auctions, Internet auctions, multi-unit auctions, and multi-object auctions.
References
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Journal ArticleDOI
A theory of auctions and competitive bidding
Paul Milgrom,Robert J. Weber +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, a new general auction model was proposed, and the properties of affiliated random variables were investigated, and various theorems were presented in Section 4-8 and Section 9.
Journal ArticleDOI
Monotone comparative statics
Paul Milgrom,Chris Shannon +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the solution set of an optimization problem to be monotonic in the parameters of the problem, and develop practical methods for checking the condition.
Journal ArticleDOI
On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games
TL;DR: A game is better-reply secure if for every nonequilibrium strategy x * and every payoff vector limit u * resulting from strategies approaching x *, some player i has a strategy yielding a payoff strictly above u i * even if the others deviate slightly from x *.
Journal ArticleDOI
Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
Eric Maskin,John G. Riley +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the existence of monotonic equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions is shown to hold for all bidders in a symmetric equilibrium, in which all buyers share the same bidding behaviour as a function of their valuations.
Journal ArticleDOI
Single Crossing Properties And The Existence Of Pure Strategy Equilibria In Games Of Incomplete Information
TL;DR: In this article, the authors derived sufficient conditions for a class of games of incomplete information, such as first price auctions, to have pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE).