Position Auctions with Consumer Search
Susan Athey,Glenn Ellison +1 more
Reads0
Chats0
TLDR
The authors examines a model in which advertisers bid for "sponsored-link" positions on a search engine and the value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about rm qualities and search optimally.Abstract:
This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for \sponsored-link" positions on a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about rm qualities and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare benets of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of other auction design questions are discussed.read more
Citations
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising, and show that it has a unique equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG.
Journal ArticleDOI
Understanding the paradigm shift to computational social science in the presence of big data
TL;DR: It is argued against the assertion that theory no longer matters and some new research directions are offered that can allow business analysts and researchers to achieve frequent, controlled and meaningful observations of real-world phenomena.
Journal ArticleDOI
Prominence and consumer search
TL;DR: In this article, the authors examine the implications of "prominence" in search markets and find that making a firm prominent will typically lead to higher industry profit but lower consumer surplus and welfare.
Journal ArticleDOI
Optimal Information Disclosure
Luis Rayo,Ilya Segal +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a sender randomly draws a "prospect" characterized by its profitability to the sender and its relevance to a receiver, and the receiver observes only a signal provided by the sender, and accepts the prospect if his Bayesian inference about the prospect's relevance exceeds his opportunity cost.
Journal ArticleDOI
Contextual Inference in Markets: On the Informational Content of Product Lines
TL;DR: The authors identify informational asymmetries under which apparently anomalous behaviors, such as the compromise effect and choice overload, arise as market equilibria, and identify the reasons why consumers violate naive formulations of standard choice theoretic principles.
References
More filters
Journal ArticleDOI
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
TL;DR: In this article, the authors investigate the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising, and show that it has a unique equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players as the dominant strategy equilibrium of VCG.
Journal ArticleDOI
Multi-Item Auctions
TL;DR: In this paper, a collection of items is to be distributed among several bidders, and each bidder is to receive at most one item, and it has been shown that there is a unique vector of equilibrium prices that is optimal, in a suitable sense, for the bidderers.
ReportDOI
Search, obfuscation, and price elasticities on the internet
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine the competition between a group of Internet retailers who operate in an environment where a price search engine plays a dominant role and show that for some products in this environment, the easy price search makes demand tremendously price sensitive.
Proceedings ArticleDOI
Truthful auctions for pricing search keywords
TL;DR: This work presents a truthful auction for pricing advertising slots on a web-page assuming that advertisements for different merchants must be ranked in decreasing order of their (weighted) bids.