Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules
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In this article, the authors proposed a fee-shifting rule that generates the highest probability of settlement based on the allocation of costs upon the proximity of the court's award to the pretrial announcements.Abstract:
Legal rules for allocating the private costs of civil litigation, or "fee-shifting" rules, provide powerful incentives for settlement. Within the context of a direct-revelation mechanism, the fee-shifting rule that generates the highest probability of settlement bases the allocation of costs upon the proximity of the court's award to the pretrial announcements. This mechanism resembles Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other offer-based rules. In a simple extensive-form game, if the litigants have asymmetric information about the level of damages (probability of prevailing), then Rule 68 increases (decreases) the settlement rate.read more
Citations
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Evidence about Auditor-Client Management Negotiation Concerning Client's Financial Reporting
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Evidence About Auditor–Client Management Negotiation Concerning Client’s Financial Reporting
TL;DR: The authors developed a model of auditor-client accounting negotiation, using the elements of negotiation examined in the behavioral negotiation literature, elaborated to include accounting contextual features indicated in the accounting literature and suggested by interviews with senior practitioners, using a questionnaire structured according to the model to describe the elements, contextual features and associations between the two groups in a sample of real negotiations chosen by 93 experienced audit partners.
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Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach*
TL;DR: In this article, a simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court, and the court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case.
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