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Citation: Susen, S. (2017). Remarks on the Nature of Justification: A Socio-Pragmatic
Perspective. In: Cloutier, C., Gond, J-P. and Leca, B. (Eds.), Justification, Evaluation and
Critique in the Study of Organizations: Contributions from French Pragmatist Sociology.
Research in the Sociology of Organizations. (pp. 349-381). Emerald. ISBN 9781787143807
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Permanent repository link: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/17836/
Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/S0733-558X20170000052010
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REMARKS ON THE NATURE
OF JUSTIFICATION:
A SOCIO-PRAGMATIC
PERSPECTIVE
Simon Susen
ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this essay is to reflect on the nature of justification. To
this end, the analysis
draws
on
Luc
Boltanski
and
Laurent
Thévenot
’s
De
la
justification. Les économies de la grandeur
1
[On Justification: Economies
of Worth
2
]. More specifically, the article aims to examine
the
extent
to
which
Boltanski
and
Thévenot
’s
conceptual framework, widely
known as ‘the
sociology of critical capacity’,
3
permits us to demonstrate that processes of
justification
4
are vital to the symbolically mediated construction
—
that is,
to both the conceptual and the empirical organization
5
—
of social life. In
order to prove the validity of this contention, the inquiry explores the
meaning of ‘justification’ in relation to the following dimensions: (1)
existence,
(2) ethics, (3) justice, (4) perspective, (5) presuppositions, (6)
agreement,
(7) common worlds, (8) critique, (9) practice and (10)
justification itself. By way of conclusion, the article maintains that processes
of justification constitute an essential ingredient of human reality.
Keywords: Boltanski and Thévenot; justification; organization; pragmatic
sociology of critique; socio-pragmatic; worth
SETTING THE SCENE
Before examining Boltanski and Thévenot’s sociological approach in detail, it
is worth providing a concise definition of the concept of ‘justification’. In the
most general sense, the term ‘justification’ refers to the act of providing reasons
for the validity, legitimacy and defensibility of (a) an action, (b) a belief and/or
(c) a social arrangement. In other words, justificatory practices emerge in rela-
tion to (a) empirical and behavioural, (b) conceptual and ideological and/or
(c)
conventional and institutional processes and structures.
It is striking, however, that, within the history of intellectual thought, most
prominent accounts of justification — notably, their philosophical variants — tend
to focus on its epistemological, rather than its sociological, dimensions.
Consequently, they tend to conceive of ‘justification’ in terms of ‘the justification of
beliefs’ [b], rather than in terms of ‘the justification of human actions’ [a] and/or
‘the justification of social arrangements’ [c]. Among the most noteworthy, and also
most influential, epistemological theories of justification are the following:
•
infinitism,
6
which posits that beliefs can be justified to the extent that they are
situated within unlimited chains of reasons and reason-giving;
•
evidentialism,
7
which argues that beliefs can be justified to the extent that
their cogency can be demonstrated on the basis of evidence, of which there are
different forms;
•
externalism,
8
which suggests that beliefs can be justified to the extent that
they make reference to, and thereby implicitly or explicitly acknowledge their
dependence upon, factors that are external to a person;
•
internalism,
9
which sustains that beliefs can be justified to the extent that
they can be defended by virtue of a subject’s internal states or reasons;
•
coherentism,
10
which affirms that beliefs can be justified to the extent that they
cohere with other beliefs within a general system of beliefs, to which individual
or collective actors subscribe in a regular, consistent and categorical manner;
•
foundationalism,
11
which maintains that beliefs can be justified to the extent
that they correspond to a set of core underlying assumptions, upon which
practices, convictions and norms are based and with respect to which they can
be vindicated;
•
foundherentism,
12
which
—
as a combination of foundationalism and coher-
entism
—
contends that beliefs can be justified to the extent that they are
embedded in a system of both foundationally constituted and logically inter-
connected presuppositions.
From a sociological perspective, justifications cannot be dissociated from the
social contexts in which the actors providing them are situated and to which they
make implicit or explicit reference. Thus, far from being reducible to
merely epistemological matters, justificatory practices emerge in relation to and
are embedded within (a) empirical and behavioural, (b) conceptual and ideolog-
ical, as well as (c) conventional and institutional processes and structures. The
fact
that
Boltanski
and
Th
é
venot’s De
la
justification.
Les
é
conomies
de
la
gran-
deur
13
[On Justification: Economies of Worth
14
] offers the first fine-grained,
multi-layered and systematic sociological account of the role of
justificatory
practices in human life forms should be reason enough to take this oeuvre seri-
ously. Drawing on Boltanski and Thévenot’s approach, the following sections aim
to contribute to a socio-pragmatic understanding of ‘justification’ by focusing on
10 key dimensions.
1.
THE JUSTIFICATION OF EXISTENCE
The most fundamental form of justification is the justification of existence. Its
centrality is due to the fact that existence is the ontological precondition for the
human being-in-the-world. As subjects capable of reflection and self-
justification, we are able to give reasons for our actions, beliefs and convictions.
The acceptability of the behavioural, ideological and institutional dimensions of
our existence is conditional upon symbolically mediated processes of explanation,
validation and confirmation. As interpretive beings, we constantly seek to make
sense of different facets of the universe. We project hermeneutically assembled
standards and values upon reality
—
not only in relation to ourselves, when
immersed in the experience of our subjectivity, but also in relation to others, when
participating in the daily construction of normativity.
It is only insofar as our existence acquires a minimal degree of legitimacy that
we are able to function within the potentially fragile boundaries imposed upon us
by our reference groups within the wider context of society. ‘It is the question of
the legitimacy of an existence, an individual’s right to feel justified in existing as
he or she exists’,
15
which is crucial to our ability to explore the objective,
normative and subjective dimensions of our place in the universe. If we are
deprived of approval and legitimacy, we are in no position to live meaningful lives
supported by networks of recognition and sociality. Our right to justification
16
expresses our right to a self-determined mode of being, whose quest for autonomy
cannot be dissociated from its confinement within varying degrees of heteronomy.
If we lacked both the competence and the desire to justify ourselves for what we
do, think and believe in, we would not be in a position to convert the daily
experience of what is, and what is not, into the challenge of reflecting and acting
upon what ought, and what ought not, to be. The justification of our existence, or
of particular aspects of our existence, constitutes a sine qua non of our capacity
to attribute meaning to our lives.