Rethinking Britain and the European Union: Politicians, the Media and Public Opinion Reconsidered

TLDR: The authors argue that the embedding of euroscepticism in the UK stems from the long-standing absence of any pro-European faction within the British polity to argue for, or defend, the European Union within the UK national debate.

Abstract: This article re-examines the role of the media in the UK debate on EU membership. It argues that the embedding of euroscepticism in the UK stems neither from a single phase in the UK-EU relationship, nor from the agency of the UK press or its proprietors. Rather, it resulted from the long-standing absence of any pro-European faction within the British polity was able to argue for, or defend, the European Union within the UK national debate. In explaining this, we expand on the concept of 'issue capture' understood as the ability of a vocal minority to dominate the UK's political debate about the EU in the absence of genuine opposition to counteract negative claims and arguments. The findings are drawn from analysis of a dataset that codes more than 16,400 UK newspaper articles published between 1974-2013.

Figures

Figure I: The reporting of the EU by five UK newspapers for selected time periods (aggregate and percentage data).

Table II: Coding Framework for the Magnitude of Positive or Negative Portrayal of the EU in Newspaper Articles

Table I: Coding Framework for Portrayal of the EU in Newspaper Articles

Figure II: The reporting of the EU by five UK newspapers for selected time periods adjusted for by average daily circulation

Figure III: The magnitude of both positive and negative reporting in UK newspapers for selected time periods (as a percentage)

Full text

RethinkingBritainandtheEuropeanUnion:politicians,themediaand
publicopinionreconsidered

PaulCopeland
SchoolofPoliticsandInternationalRelations
QueenMaryUniversityofLondon
MileEndRoad
London
E14NS

And

NathanielCopsey
PoliticsandInternationalRelations
AstonUniversity
B47ET


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Rethinking Britain and the European Union: politicians, the media and public
opinion reconsidered
1
Introduction
For more than 40 years since the British accession to the then Common Market in
1973, the UK’s relationship with the European project could be characterised as
fragile and sceptical. Following Wilson’s brief renegotiation in 1974, the UK’s 1975
referendum produced a majority in favour of continued membership (67 per cent with
a turnout of 65 per cent). Whilst the membership question was never fully dropped, a
cross-party consensus existed, although both the Labour and Conservative parties
contained Eurosceptic factions. The enduring fragile consensus was based on a form
of economic integration that incurred neither large budgetary cost, nor led to an
erosion of Britain’s sovereignty. This grudging cross-party consensus changed in
January 2013. That month, Prime Minister David Cameron announced that if the
Conservative party were to form the government after the 2015 general election, it
would hold an ‘in-or-out’ referendum on the renegotiated terms of Britain’s
membership before the end of 2017. It is worth briefly exploring the recent historical
background to this change.
From the early 1990s to the mid-2010s, EU-wide and UK-specific pressures to hold a
referendum steadily increased. Cameron’s EU referendum promise can be seen as one
instance of several EU-wide political trends that form part of a post-Maastricht shift
across the EU from ‘permissive consensus to constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and
Marks 2009). Within the Member States decisions can no longer be legitimised by
executives and legislatures alone. On EU matters the public demands a say through
referendums (although the call for a UK referendum has as much to do with infighting
within the Conservative Party). Mair (2007) argued that the depoliticisation of EU
politics drove this dynamic. Where there is consensus between mainstream political
parties on EU policies, opposition to the EU shifts towards questioning the
fundamental principles of integration. The argument can be taken further: Kriesi et al.
1
The authors would like to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Dr Anne-Claire
Marangoni and Sara Ewing, comments on earlier drafts by Tim Bale, Simon Bulmer, Tim Haughton
and William Patteson, as well as the three anonymous reviewers of JCMS and the editors.

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argue that the shift in politics, parties and party systems across the EU is driven by
structural competition between the winners and losers of globalisation (Kriesi et al.
2006, p. 921), of which the EU is a regional variant (Schmidt, 2003).
Growing pressure to hold a referendum in the UK has been linked to the growth of
Euroscepticism as a political phenomenon. The rapid growth of British
Euroscepticism is best evidenced by the United Kingdom Independence Party’s
(UKIP) topping the polls in the 2014 European Parliamentary Elections with more
than 27 per cent of the popular vote. For Fontana and Parsons (2015) pressure for a
referendum had been building in the Conservative Party since the early 1990s, as
Euroscepticism became the default position for those who saw themselves as
Thatcher’s heirs after her fall from power in 1990. The ‘mechanisms pointing to a
“Brexit” referendum were largely in place’ by 2005 (Fontana and Parsons, 2015, p.
102) because the Conservative party by then had a clear majority of Eurosceptics,
often with deep connections to the constituency level. This shift in British politics
extended beyond the Conservative party. Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair promised
referendums on both Euro membership (which was never needed because the ‘five
economic tests’ were not met) and the Constitutional treaty (which was negated by the
French and Dutch rejection of it in 2005) (Oppermann, 2008). To prevent a
reoccurrence, in 2011, the Conservative–Liberal Democrat Coalition Government
passed a European Union Act that committed the UK to holding national referendums
before consent could be given to any deeper European integration. In 2012, the same
Coalition Government commissioned a ‘Balance of Competences Review’ to evaluate
what the EU does and how it affects the UK. By the 2010 General Election, even the
pro-European Liberal Democrats began to support the idea of an ‘in or out’
referendum on EU membership to coincide with the next major revision of the treaties
(Glencross, 2015).
Other scholars have pointed to the role of the UK media as key to understanding the
rise of Euroscepticism. For Daddow (2012), increased Euroscepticism can be traced
to Rupert Murdoch and News UK, while for Young (1999) and Forster (2002) the
issue has its origins in the reporting of the right-wing press, which includes the
publications of News UK. For Hawkins (2012: 562) the negative reporting of the EU
in the UK is more problematic than in other EU Member States since the public is the

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least well informed about EU developments. The existing literature suggests that
newspapers and the voters who read them are divided between an indifferent cost–
benefit motivated majority for whom the European Union is a matter of rational
choice on the one hand; and, a vocal minority element within society for whom
almost anything to do with the European Union must be exclusively negative, on the
other.
This brief tour of the literature has set out some of the underlying driving forces that
led to the 2016 UK referendum on EU membership. But as Prosser (2016, p. 197)
argues ‘further empirical investigation into the domestic political structures that drive
the domestic politics of European integration is needed’. We take up this mantle with
regard to just one factor: the role of the media as a vital intermediary between
politicians and the public. In any national debate about membership of the EU, the
media has a significant part to play in informing the public, as well as politicians and
policy-makers, about the reasoned choices that need to be made and their
consequences. And as Gavin (2000) points out, the media is where the public gets its
information on EU affairs. In this article we describe and analyse how the ‘European
issue’ has been reported in the British print media over the 40 years from the mid-
1970s to the mid-2010s. In doing so we provide a longitudinal empirical study that
moves beyond the focus on Rupert Murdoch, the Eurosceptic press, and the political
events of the early 1990s as being the determining factor in the EU debate within the
UK. While each of these are necessary to understand the UK/EU debate, in isolation
of each other they are insufficient and their individual significance could be
overstated. For example, the UK press is an important component of the UK debate
on the EU; but it is not the only determinant – public opinion and national politics are
equally significant. We argue that the relationship between the media, national
politics and public opinion is symbiotic and mutually dependent. We therefore begin
our analysis of the ‘European issue’ in the UK from this assumption, rather than the
supposition that one aspect of the relationship is the determinant of the other two.
The paper investigates empirically whether the EU debate in the UK has succumbed
to a structural bias in favour of Euroscepticism. In doing so, it provides empirical
evidence that helps test the concept of ‘issue capture’ as a means of explaining the
British debate on the EU that was put forward by Copsey and Haughton (2014). Issue-

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capture refers to the way in which a political issue of marginal interest to the
mainstream can be captured and dominated by a minority group, with strongly held
opinions, and for whom it has a particular salience (Copsey & Haughton, 2014, p.
2014). The evidence gathered in our dataset explores this concept and supports the
proposition that ‘issue capture’ has occurred. Central to the process is the absence of a
pro-European faction within the British polity that is able to promote and defend the
EU and to counter Eurosceptic rhetoric. We argue therefore that the growth of
Euroscepticism in the UK is more likely to be the result of this general dynamic,
rather than any single event or the agency of individuals, such as Margaret Thatcher
or Rupert Murdoch.
We proceed as follows. Section I briefly overviews the existing literature on the
question of Britain’s media and the European issue. This exercise not only places our
own work within the wider scholarly context, but it also allows us to explain how we
arrived at our own research puzzle. Section II sets out the methodology with which a
dataset of more than 16,400 press articles (1974–2013) covering the European issue
was compiled. This allows us to explore how British press coverage of the European
issue has varied over time. The relationship between UK attitudes and the EU is
dynamic in that its evolution does not reflect an unchanging, fixed EU; rather it
reflects a process of European integration that is in a state of flux.
Our focus here is
on the particular angle that the journalist took (positive, negative, factual or neutral)
and the magnitude of that position in positive and negative reporting (low, medium
and high). Section III presents the findings of the dataset, which illustrate the areas of
continuity and change in British coverage of the European issue over the 40 years
between the mid-1970s and mid-2010s. In section IV, we contextualise the findings
with data on public opinion and developments within UK national politics. In the
conclusion, we reflect on the significance of our findings for the politics of Britain
and the European Union.
I. The Media, Public Opinion and Political Agenda-Setting
In any national debate about membership of the European Union, the media has a
significant part to play in informing the public, as well as politicians and policy-
makers, about the reasoned choices that need to be made and their consequences.

Frequently asked questions

Q1. What are the contributions mentioned in the paper "Rethinking britain and the european union: politicians, the media and public opinion reconsidered" ?

The UK 's relationship with the European project has been characterised as fragile and sceptical this paper for more than 40 years since the British accession to the then Common Market in 1973. 

Q2. What is the main argument for the idea of an ‘in or out’ referendum?

By the 2010 General Election, even the pro-European Liberal Democrats began to support the idea of an ‘in or out’ referendum on EU membership to coincide with the next major revision of the treaties (Glencross, 2015). 

Q3. What was the percentage of positive reporting in the UK in 1974–75?

In 1974–75 positive reporting was 22.1 per cent, while negative reporting was 16.4 per cent; 1985–86 this shifted to 17.6 and 19 per cent; while14 during 1991–92 such reporting was 18.1 per cent and 18.8 per cent. 

Q4. What is the role of the media in the debate about the EU?

In any national debate about membership of the EU, the media has a significant part to play in informing the public, as well as politicians and policy-makers, about the reasoned choices that need to be made and their consequences. 

Q5. What is the important reason for political actors to adopt media issues?

Walgrave and Van Aelst (2006) argue that the most important reason for political actors to adopt media issues is that media coverage is associated with public opinion. 

Q6. What is the main argument for the decline of the print media?

Despite declining print circulation, the print media continue to be of enormous significance both politically and within the broader societal debates. 

Q7. Why are newspapers more likely to affect policy-makers than other media sources?

due to their in-depth and complete coverage, newspapers are more likely to be able to affect policy-makers than are other media sources (Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006). 

Q8. What is the average number of stories that were covered by the five newspapers?

In sum, across the five newspapers surveyed over the 40-year timeframe, 79.2 per cent of press coverage of the European issue could be described as factual, positive or neutral in nature. 

Q9. What is the relationship between the media, public opinion and agenda-setting in the UK?

The authors consider the relationship between the media, public opinion and agenda-setting in the UK to be more multi-dimensional than a simple linear causality. 

Q10. What percentage of the total newspaper circulation is a factual article?

Such analysis reveals that once readership is taken into consideration, factual articles average 42.1 per cent per cent of the total over the different time periods. 

Q11. What is the role of the media in the debate on the EU?

The authors take up this mantle with regard to just one factor: the role of the media as a vital intermediary between politicians and the public. 

Q12. What is the purpose of the paper?

The paper investigates empirically whether the EU debate in the UK has succumbed to a structural bias in favour of Euroscepticism.