SeRLoc: secure range-independent localization for wireless sensor networks

TLDR: This is the first work that provides a security-aware range-independent localization scheme for WSN, and it is shown that SeRLoc is robust against severe WSN attacks, such as the wormhole attack, the sybil attack and compromised sensors.

Abstract: In many applications of wireless sensor networks (WSN), sensors are deployed un-tethered in hostile environments. For location-aware WSN applications, it is essential to ensure that sensors can determine their location, even in the presence of malicious adversaries. In this paper we address the problem of enabling sensors of WSN to determine their location in an un-trusted environment. Since localization schemes based on distance estimation are expensive for the resource constrained sensors, we propose a range-independent localization algorithm called SeRLoc. SeRLoc is distributed algorithm and does not require any communication among sensors. In addition, we show that SeRLoc is robust against severe WSN attacks, such as the wormhole attack, the sybil attack and compromised sensors. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first work that provides a security-aware range-independent localization scheme for WSN. We present a threat analysis and comparison of the performance of SeRLoc with state-of-the-art range-independent localization schemes.