Journal ArticleDOI
Shareholder wealth effects of corporate takeovers
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In this paper, the authors examined the effects of over 1,800 U.K. takeovers on shareholders' wealth in the period 1955-1985 and found that around the merger announcement date targets gain 25 to 30 percent and bidders earn zero or modest gains.Citations
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Journal ArticleDOI
The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980
TL;DR: Grimm et al. as mentioned in this paper showed that shareholders of target firms in successful tender offers from 1981 through 1986 received payments in excess of $54 billion over the value of their holdings before the tender offers.
Book ChapterDOI
Corporate Governance and Control
TL;DR: Corporate governance is concerned with the resolution of collective action problems among dispersed investors and the reconciliation of conflicts of interest between various corporate claimholders as mentioned in this paper, which is a fundamental dilemma of corporate governance: regulation of large shareholder intervention may provide better protection to small shareholders; but such regulations may increase managerial discretion and scope for abuse.
Journal ArticleDOI
Factors influencing wealth creation from mergers and acquisitions: A meta‐analysis
TL;DR: This article analyzed the influence of various factors on shareholder wealth creation in mergers and acquisitions using a multivariate framework and found that while the target firm's shareholders gain significantly from M&A, those of the bidding firm do not.
Journal ArticleDOI
The postmerger share-price performance of acquiring firms
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors investigate share-price performance following corporate takeovers and conclude that previous findings of poor performance afer takeover are likely due to benchmark errors rather than mispricing at the time of the takeover.
Posted Content
A Century of Corporate Takeovers: What Have We Learned and Where Do We Stand? (previous title: The History of M&A Activity Around the World: A Survey of Literature)
Marina Martynova,Luc Renneboog +1 more
TL;DR: In this paper, a review of the literature on the market for corporate control is presented, focusing on the cyclical wave pattern that this market exhibits and finding that the patterns of takeover activity and their profitability vary significantly across takeover waves.
References
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Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
TL;DR: In this paper, the benefits of debt in reducing agency costs of free cash flows, how debt can substitute for dividends, why diversification programs are more likely to generate losses than takeovers or expansion in the same line of business or liquidationmotivated takeovers, and why the factors generating takeover activity in such diverse activities as broadcasting and tobacco are similar to those in oil.
Journal ArticleDOI
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Andrei Shleifer,Robert W. Vishny +1 more
TL;DR: In this article, the authors explore a model in which the presence of a large minority shareholder provides a partial solution to the free-rider problem in a corporation with many small owners, where the corporation may not pay any one of them to monitor the performance of the management.
Journal ArticleDOI
Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors examine properties of daily stock returns and how the particular characteristics of these data affect event study methodologies and show that recognition of autocorrelation in daily excess returns and changes in their variance conditional on an event can sometimes be advantageous.
Journal ArticleDOI
The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence☆
TL;DR: A review of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control can be found in this paper, where the authors argue that corporate control is best viewed as an arena in which managerial teams compete for the rights to manage corporate resources.
Journal ArticleDOI
The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
TL;DR: The hubris hypothesis is advanced as an explanation of corporate takeovers by Jensen and Ruback as mentioned in this paper, who argued that the evidence supports the hubris hypotheses as much as it supports other explanations such as taxes, synergy, and inefficient target management.