Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
TLDR
A set of strategy profiles is here said to be closed under rational behavior (curb) of it contains all its best replies as mentioned in this paper, and each curb set contains the support of at least one Nash equilibrium in mixed games.About:
This article is published in Economics Letters.The article was published on 1991-06-01 and is currently open access. It has received 250 citations till now. The article focuses on the topics: Epsilon-equilibrium & Nash equilibrium.read more
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Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics
Dean P. Foster,H. Peyton Young +1 more
TL;DR: This chapter shows how the theory of stochastic dynamical systems can be used to characterize the equilibria that are most likely to be selected when the evolutionary process is subject to small persistent perturbations, said to be stochastically stable.
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The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
Andreas Blume,Andreas Ortmann +1 more
TL;DR: Cheap talk is shown to facilitate coordination on the unique efficient equilibrium in experimental order-statistic games, which is roughly consistent with theoretical predictions according to which cheap talk promotes efficient Nash play.
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Evolutionary selection in normal-form games
TL;DR: In this paper, stability properties of evolutionary selection dynamics in normal-form games are investigated, focusing on deterministic dynamics in continuous time and on asymptotic stability of sets of population states, more precisely of faces of the mixed strategy space.
References
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Book
Probability measures on metric spaces
TL;DR: The Borel subsets of a metric space Probability measures in the metric space and probability measures in a metric group Probability measure in locally compact abelian groups The Kolmogorov consistency theorem and conditional probability probabilistic probability measures on $C[0, 1]$ and $D[0-1]$ Bibliographical notes Bibliography List of symbols Author index Subject index as mentioned in this paper
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On the strategic stability of equilibria
TL;DR: In this paper, it was shown that every game has at least one such equilibrium set and that the departure from the usual notion of single-valued equilibrium is relatively minor, because the sets reduce to points in all generic games.
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Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
TL;DR: In this paper, the authors explore the fundamental problem of what can be inferred about the outcome of a non-cooperative game, from the rationality of the players and from the information they possess.
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Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
TL;DR: This paper argued that rationality consists of making a decision which is justifiable by an internally consistent system of beliefs, rather than one which is optimal, post hoc, in a noncooperative game.
Posted Content
Strategy Subsets Closed Under Rational Behaviour
Kaushik Basu,Jörgen W. Weibull +1 more